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Abstract: 
This research looks at the development process of regional infrastructures and the role that 
development banks can play on it. The final objective is to propose a methodology or framework 
for the identification of relevant actions from existing cases, so to derive valuable policy 
implications. These would support development banks for better utilizing and sharing the 
experience from existing case studies by a better selection of those projects to refer. 
Regional infrastructures are those whose impact and development goes beyond national borders. 
These can bring important benefits to all the participating countries like a more sustainable use of 
natural resources, economies of scale in investment, better insertion in globalization and a 
reduction of political tensions. Indeed, international organizations like the G-20 have highlighted 
their relevance in the development agenda and they are even explicitly mentioned as one of the 
targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG-9). 
Although the benefits are widely accepted, there are also several political, institutional, economic 
and financial challenges. Among them, the lack of political will is commonly mentioned as the 
main barrier. There are several reasons to explain why countries can be unwilling to cooperate. A 
World Bank report written by Schiff and Winter (2002) mentions (i) national pride, political 
tensions, lack of trust, high coordination costs among a large number of countries, or the 
asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits; (ii) incentives to behave strategically in one-off 
negotiations; and as mentioned before (iii) given the absence of courts or higher authorities to 
which to appeal, the enforcement of property rights is ambiguous and weak at the international 
level. 
Against this background, development banks can play an important function in fostering consensus 
between the parties in what has been commonly known as “honest brokers” role. Tan (2014) 
referred to this function as “lending its institutional support that encourages dialogue, provides the 
fora and extends assistance when needed”.  
Therefore, the participation of development banks in regional infrastructures has been catching 
attention. Several researchers have been focusing on the identification of what type of actions 
development banks can realize to improve the development of regional infrastructures. Case 
studies are being conducted for several projects which either have proven to be successful or are 
facing difficulties. The outputs of these case studies could provide important lessons for the 
development of other regional infrastructures in different sectors or/and regions. In order to realize 
that, there is a need to understand the influence that context has on these type of projects in general. 
There is no systematic approach to this issue. Researchers on comparative regionalism have 
pointed out the difficulties that bring the lack of comparative dimension on regionalism studies 
(which covers also other areas of functional cooperation). Other intermediate approaches have 
been looking at either a particular sector in several regions or at one region and comparing different 
sectors. Nevertheless, these have also faced difficulties for providing supportive evidence on the 
process of transferring lessons between cases. In summary, existing methodologies have been 
found to either being strong in the identification of actions and lessons, or strong in the comparative 
analysis of the process; but no combining both aspects. 
  
This research aims to develop a methodology to overcome such limitations. This is achieved 
through the proposal of a method for the identification of relevant actions from existing cases. It 
is expected that this would help development banks to improve their involvement in regional 
infrastructures programs. Globally, the research includes three objectives: (i) identification of the 
main contextual variables influencing regional infrastructures development process, (ii) evaluation 
of the contextual dependency of the actions realized, and (iii) proposal of a comparative framework 
to serve to development banks for the identification of relevant actions from existing cases. 
This research is divided into five parts. The first serves as the choice of cases to study. This is 
based on two criteria: the level of integration achieved; and the possible combination of sectors 
and regions, to allow cross-regional and cross-sectorial comparison. Due to the absence of a 
suitable model, a process divided into five stages has been proposed for the evaluation of the level 
of integration achieved. The regional infrastructures development process proposed is based on 
previous studies on regional integration in general and on infrastructures and economic integration. 
The regional infrastructures development process is therefore considered to include five stages: (i) 
national stakeholders’ agreement, (ii) high-level political agreement and commitment, (iii) 
physical construction, (iv) institutional construction, and (v) harmonization. These are not 
necessarily represented chronologically, although projects have commonly started with (i) and be 
completed with (iv) and (v), being (ii) and (iii) in between those. This five stages development 
process have been proven to be useful for the classification of forty existing cases. Three cases 
were found to combine the criteria established, the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) programs 
on Economic Corridors and Power Cooperation and the SIEPAC project for regional power sector 
integration in Central America. 
The second part includes the analysis of the three cases. Causality analyses of each of the stages 
are conducted. For that, information was gathered from various sources, including existing 
literature, official documents, media reports, and interview surveys with experts, MDBs, and 
stakeholders involved. These analyses serve for the identification of the factors, actions, and 
outputs relevant for each case. In particular, the identified factors provide an understanding of how 
the particular context of each project influences the process. The relative impact of these factors is 
also evaluated based on the casual analysis and the interview surveys conducted. 
The third part combine and compare the factors identified from the three case studies. All the 
factors are classified into nine categories: (i) power imbalances, (ii) rivalry between countries, (iii) 
national security concerns, (iv) overall stability of the countries, (v) publicness, (vi) national 
institutional structure, (vii) institutional integration, (viii) existing cooperation, and (xix) shared 
value of regional economies of scale. All these categories were found to correspond to relations 
between stakeholders, namely (i) government to government (Gov. ↔ Gov.), technical body to 
technical body (T.B. ↔ T.B), government to technical body (Gov. ↔ T.B), and national actors to 
technical body (Gov. ↔ N.A.). 
The fourth part “builds” the comparative framework. For that, there is an initial evaluation of the 
relative weight of each of the contextual variables during the process in order to identify possible 
patterns. The result of this analysis shows that (i) for each case, the dominant variables change 
throughout the stages of the development process, (ii) for each sector or region, regional or 
  
sectorial variables are not necessarily dominant, and (iii) a similar pattern has been found for each 
of the stages. Those contextual variables for the stage 1 (national stakeholders’ agreement) are 
“T.B. ↔ T.B.” and “Gov. ↔ T.B.”; for stage 2 (high level political agreement and commitment), 
“Gov. ↔ Gov.” and Gov. ↔ T.B.”; stage 3 (physical construction), “Gov. ↔ Gov.” and “T.B. ↔ 
T.B.”; stage 4 (institutional construction), “Gov. ↔ Gov.” and Gov. ↔ T.B.”; and stage 5, “Gov. 
↔ N.A.”.  Based on those findings, the comparative framework objective of this research is 
proposed. This facilitates the classification, and therefore the identification as well, of the selected 
cases through the evaluation of the contextual variables identified for each stage.  
The last fifth part includes a practical case to show the utilization method as well as the potential 
policy implications that can be derived. Therefore, it applied to the stage 4 of the GMS Power 
Cooperation program, which has been facing struggles. The framework shows contextual 
similarities with the SIEPAC project on that stage. After a careful analysis, three actions are 
proposed in order to improve the institutional construction of the GMS Power Sector based on the 
lessons from SIEPAC: (a) establish RPCC as a permanent institution with representatives from 
national TSOs, (b) develop a prototypal agreement for utilization of third country grid, (c) actively 
promote interconnections with ASEAN countries (like Singapore) as well as look for connections 
with South Asia (Bangladesh, India) and rest of China, and (d) secure the independence of RPCC 
to be able to mediate in disputes. 
The tentative results were presented to real practitioners from the ADB during the interview survey. 
The positive feedback received about the necessity of a methodology such the one proposed, as 
well as the novelty of its design and the appropriateness of the variables and process division are 
detailed in the last chapter. There some recommendations for future research are also presented. 
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1. Background: Regional infrastructures and multilateral development banks (MDBs) 
This chapter provides the background of the thesis. It starts introducing the concept of regional 
infrastructures, its potential merits and its position in the global development agenda. Then it 
describes the barriers faced by regional infrastructures development. Finally, it provides an 
overview of the role for MDBs in promoting regional infrastructures. 
 
1.1. Definition of regional infrastructures 
Regional infrastructures are understood as those with an impact beyond national borders. The most 
immediate image is roads or transmission line actually linking countries. Nevertheless 
infrastructures in one country can have also a wider impact on neighboring countries. For larger 
improvement and enlargement of a port facilities could have a positive impact in neighboring 
countries by reducing their cost of international commerce. Same can be said about large power 
plants (either thermal, hydropower or large renewable). The Asian Development Bank [ADB, 
2009] provides a very comprehensive definition in which regional infrastructures are: 
- Projects that involve physical construction works and/or coordinated policies and 
procedures spanning two or more neighboring countries; and  
- national infrastructure projects that have a significant cross-border impact:  
o their planning and implementation involve cooperation or coordination with one or 
more countries;  
o they aim to stimulate significant amounts of regional trade and income; and  
o they are designed to connect to the network of a neighboring or third country 
Although regional infrastructures are receiving increasing attention these days, they are several 
old examples like the Silk Road between the ancient China and Europe. There are also examples 
of regional infrastructures in every sector. International river basins are a traditional clear example 
of the need for regional cooperation for the optimization of the resources (like dam location and 
operation). Internet and space cooperation are also examples of global functional cooperation. 
Nevertheless, this research focus on the road and power subsectors (of transport and energy sectors 
respectively).  
 
1.2. Regional infrastructures’ positive impacts 
Regional infrastructures have been catching attention for the positive impacts they can bring to all 
the member countries from the region. By going beyond national borders, there are several benefits 
that can be obtained. In particular economies of scale in investments, a better optimization of 
regional resources, and a better insertion in globalization processes are some of the most attractive 
for participating countries.  
Kuroda, Kawai, and Nangia (2008) proposes a new emphasis in the development of cross-border 
infrastructures in Asia. The logic behind is the promotion of economic integration. In that sense, 
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cross-border infrastructures are seen as a trigger of “economy’s competitiveness by reducing the 
economic distance from external markets, building economies of scale due to wider markets, 
increasing FDI inflows, and expanding trade and economic activity in general” 
ECLAC (2009) also looks to regional infrastructures as another form to regional integration, 
different the traditional economic and political integrations, and call it the “silent physical 
integration”. This research pays more attention to the transport infrastructure services. In total 
seven benefits are mentioned. The first of them mentions increased effective economic, trade and 
political integration. Interestingly, there is a strong emphasis on non-economic aspects; for 
example, the second and third benefits detailed are “(ii) It is crucial if greater social equity is to be 
achieved and asymmetries among countries are to be reduced” and “(iii) some It has ample 
potential to foster unity, peace, and development, in the broadest sense.  
ESMAP (2010) provides an analysis of regional sector integration (RPSI) projects around the 
world. The specific benefits identified from these experiences are “enhance energy security, bring 
economies in investments, facilitate financing, enable greater renewable energy penetration, and 
allow synergic sharing of complementary resources”. 
All these studies, among many others, have contributed to attracting the interest from international 
development community on the issue. The G-20 (2010) already included regional infrastructure as 
a specific category of infrastructures.  
“Gaps in infrastructure, including with respect to energy, transport, communications, 
water and regional infrastructure, are significant bottlenecks to increasing and 
maintaining growth in many developing countries.” (G20, 2010) 
More recently, this interest has been raised with its explicit inclusion in the Sustainable 
Development Goal 9: 
“9.1 Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional 
and transborder infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, 
with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all.” (UN, 2015) 
 
1.3. Challenges on regional infrastructures: 
Although some issues need to be addressed in term of potential large environmental and social 
impact, due to their large size, there is a common agreement on the need for promoting regional 
infrastructures. Nevertheless, the development of regional infrastructures has proven to involve 
challenges beyond technical and/or investment issues. In particular, the lack of political will is 
usually mentioned. International organizations have looked to this issues from two approaches. 
The first consists of the identification of objectives that would be needed; for example, World 
Bank (2010) includes (i) mobilizing political will, (ii) developing effective regional institutions, 
(iii) setting priorities for regional infrastructure, (iv) harmonizing regulatory procedures, and (v) 
facilitate project preparation and cross-border finance. The second approach is to explain the 
reasons behind this lack of political will. In this approach, Schiff and Winter (2002) mentions (a) 
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national pride, political tensions, lack of trust, high coordination costs among a large number of 
countries, or the asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits; (b) incentives to behave 
strategically in one-off negotiations; and (c) given the absence of courts or higher authorities to 
which to appeal, the enforcement of property rights is ambiguous and weak at the international 
level. 
 
1.4. Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) involvement in regional infrastructures 
Multilateral Development Banks have been important, if not the largest, advocates of regional 
infrastructures. They have been created and give support to numerous initiatives in different 
regions and sectors in order to promote these projects. Here a summary of some of the major is 
provided: 
 
Development Bank Strategy / Initiative Sub-region Sector 
African Development 
Bank (AfDB) /  
New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) 
Programme for Infrastructure 
Development in Africa (PIDA) 
Africa Multi 
Presidential Infrastructure Champion 
Initiative (PICI) 
Africa Multi 
Africa Power Vision1 (APV) Africa Power 
Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) 
Hub for Africa 
Africa Power 
Infrastructure for Skills Development 
(IS4D) 
Africa Capacity 
training 
E-Africa Program Africa ICT 
Move Africa Initiative Africa Transport 
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 
(ICA) 
Africa Multi 
Africa Action Plan Africa Multi 
Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) 
Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Mekong Multi 
Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation (CAREC) 
Central 
Asia 
Multi 
Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-
Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN 
Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) 
Southeast 
Asia 
Multi 
                                                 
 
1 Based on the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa, http://www.nepad.org/programme/power-africa  
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Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth 
Triangle (IMT-GT) Program 
Southeast 
Asia 
Multi 
South Asia Subregional Economic 
Cooperation (SASEC) Program 
South Asia Multi 
European Development 
Bank (EIB) 
Trans-European Transport and 
Energy Networks (TENs) 
EU Energy, 
ICT,  
transport 
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 
(ICA) 
Africa Multi 
Inter-American 
Development Bank 
(IADB) 
System for the Electrical 
Interconnection of the Central 
American Countries (SIEPAC) 
Central 
America 
Power 
Mesoamerica Project Central 
America 
Multi 
Initiative for the Integration of the 
Regional Infrastructure in South 
America (IIRSA) 
South 
America 
Multi 
Regional Public Goods Initiative 
(RPGs) 
LAC Multi 
World Bank (WB) West Africa Power Pool (WAPP) West 
Africa 
Power 
Central Asia-South Asia Electricity 
Transmission & Trade Project 
(CASA-1000) 
Central and 
South Asia 
Power 
Nepal-India Electricity Transmission 
& Trade Project 
South Asia Power 
Nepal-India Regional Trade & 
Transport Project 
South Asia Transport 
Mizoram Roads II Regional 
Connectivity Project 
South Asia Transport 
Caribbean Regional Communications 
Infrastructure Program for Latin 
America and the Caribbean 
Caribbean ICT 
Regional Integration Assistance 
Strategy (RIAS) for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (pillar 1) 
Africa Multi 
South Asia Regional Integration South Asia Multi 
Table 1 - Overview list of initiatives supported by Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) 
It is clear the importance of their involvement as investors and knowledge-providers. But, in recent 
times, this has not been the one that is getting the most attention. They are being commonly 
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referred as “honest brokers” (Tan, 2014). There is not a clear definition of what this honest broker 
role, nevertheless, a general concept has arisen around. Some of the times mentioned has been: 
 
- Perhaps most important, as honest brokers, multilateral institutions can play a catalytic role 
in cross-border infrastructure projects, bringing countries and other stakeholders together 
impartially and facilitating the dialogue and discussion process so that countries can reach 
political convergence to strengthen cross-border connectivity (Kuroda, Kawai, Nangia, 
2006) 
 
- ABD acted as a catalyst or an “honest broker” by lending its institutional support that 
encourages dialogues, provides the fora and extends assistance when needed (Tan, 2014). 
 
- “While the emergence of individual leaders with vision and dedication is often the result 
of historical fate, it is certain that the governments of relatively larger and more advanced 
countries need to be willing to bear the brunt of integration cost, and that the action of an 
external trusted honest broker can be catalytic for collective action” (IADB, 2010) 
 
- “In development projects that may affect neighboring countries and regional-integration 
projects, they may face difficulties in coordinating the interests of the relevant countries 
concerned. We expect the ADB to play the role of an “honest broker” in the planning and 
implementation of the projects that require such coordination.” (Noda, 2011) 
 
Some studies have been looking for the types of actions that MDBs can realize to fulfill such 
honest broker role: 
 
- “The role of the Bank in this initiative is very much that of a catalyst.  By facilitating 
dialogue and providing analysis where appropriate, the Bank can concentrate on adding 
value to projects that are, increasing the benefits of development activities by helping forge 
linkages with projects in neighboring countries.” (ADB, 1993) 
 
- “As a matter of fact, RDBs are playing an increasingly important role in the provision of 
RPGs to their DMCs in different regions through their ability to convene, generate and 
transfer knowledge, assist negotiations, and transfer funding” (Ferroni, 2002) 
 
- “To be custodian to strengthen confidence and resolve bilateral and regional disputes 
putting issues of economic and environmental cooperation in the broader context of 
regional security, stability and sustainable development” (UNECE, 2002) 
 
-  
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1.5. Summary 
There is an increasing interest in the development of regional infrastructures. Nevertheless, this 
interest is being confronted with a lack of political will and commitment (even though the political 
will is mobilized, this should be continuous at the time). Against this background, Multilateral 
Development Banks have become a major actor in the process, their involvement in promoting 
consensus and solving disputes can have a largely positive impact on the development of regional 
infrastructures. Nevertheless, and although more initiatives are being proposed, there is still a not 
understanding of what concrete actions MDBs can realize.  
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2. Literature review 
This chapter provides an overview of the existing literature and research on regional infrastructures 
and regional cooperation. The references included here are those with a stronger attention towards 
the transfer of lessons between different projects. 
 
2.1. Independent case studies 
There is a vast literature on particular regional infrastructures in the form of case studies. They 
look to identify key issues, drivers, barriers, and actions from existed cases.  
 
Onga (2013) looks at the regional power sector cooperation in Central Asia. Although Central Asia 
countries used to have an integrated energy resources management, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and creation of the new republics ended this cooperation. This has led to a sub-optimal 
management of the resources. Several international donors, as ADB, have been looking towards 
an improvement of the cooperation in the region. The author emphasizes the need of understanding 
the positions of the countries’ leaders for understanding the potential impact of actions. The 
objective is the proposal of an approach for the assessment of potential decision-making of the 
political leader in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan regarding power sector cooperation in Central Asia.  
 
Del Barrio-Alvarez (2013) investigates also regional power sector cooperation but in Central 
America. This is a successful case whose study was expected to provide also valuable lessons for 
other regions, as the Central Asian case. The objective of this research was the identification of 
the governing mechanism of regional power systems integration, utilizing Central America a case 
of study. The outputs include the identification of drivers/motivations for cooperation as well the 
barriers faced. Several successful actions are also presented.  
 
Matsui (2016) focuses on transport corridors development in South America. The case of study is 
the Inter-Oceanic Highway between Brazil and Peru, therefore connecting Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans. The project had been already envisioned time before, but technical and environmental 
challenges due to the need of crossing the Amazonia, and difficulties from achieving the sufficient 
consensus at national level in Peru, had prevented its implementation. The project was included as 
a priority project in the portfolio of the IIRSA initiative, making it one of the frontrunner projects 
in the region. The author aims to identify the key factors of prompt implementation of a 
transboundary infrastructure project, with a particular focus on the creation of the national 
consensus support for the cross-border infrastructure. 
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Nishibayashi (2016) analyzes the regional cooperation in South Asia. The case study covers the 
transmission line between India and Bangladesh. Also, a long time sought project that had not been 
possible to be realized until recently due to the lack of continuous support from Bangladeshi and 
Indian governments. In fact, the main issue has been the switching position of the countries. The 
research is an analysis of the formation process of India-Bangladesh interconnection project, with 
an interest in the identification of critical factors of aid policy contributing to regional integration 
in South Asia. 
 
2.2. Cross-regional comparison 
There are also several studies that look to pool case studies of regional infrastructures in a 
particular sector in different parts of the world. This research is commonly conducted by 
international organizations and/or donors with a global scope of action.  
 
JICA (2009) looks to the cross-border transport infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa and East 
Africa. There are several inter-regional and intra-regional corridors. The report highlights the need 
of Africa of regional cooperation, in particular focusing on the need to reduce the costs of trade to 
promote industrial development. It develops four strategic directions: (i) perspective as a system, 
(ii) coordination with RECs, (iii) effective linkage with trade and industrial development, and (iv) 
introduction of public-private initiatives.  
 
World Bank (2010) compiles 12 case studies on regional power integration carried out by 
Economic Consulting Associates (ECA). These studies cover transmission and trade cases 
(Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP), Argentina-Brazil, 
South East Europe (SEE), Central American electrical Interconnection System (SIEPAC), Gulf 
Coast Countries (GCC), Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)), generation schemes (Cahora Bassa, 
Manantali, and NT2), and schemes in developed countries (Pennsylvania-New Jersey and 
Maryland Interconnection (PJM), and Union for the Coordination of the Transmissions of 
Electricity / European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (UCTE / 
ENTSO-E)). The four key aspects those cases deal with were: (i) finding the right level of 
integration; (ii) optimizing investment on a regional basis; (iii) appropriate regional institutions 
(iv) technical and regulatory harmonization; (v) power sector reform and integration (vi) the role 
of donor agencies (vii) reducing emissions through RPSI; and (viii) RPSI and renewable energy. 
 
2.3. Cross-sectorial comparison 
Although in a lesser extends, some research also looks to regional initiatives covering a diversity 
of regions. In particular, the Initiative for the Regional Infrastructures of South America (IIRSA) 
and the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) initiatives have attracted the attention of international 
institutions and academia for their own nature as multi-sectorial programs. In this case, the main 
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interest usually comes from regional organizations (as regional development banks) and from 
academia interested in regional cooperation studies. 
IADB (2002) provides an overview of the new regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean 
since the 1990s. It includes one chapter focusing on the infrastructures sector. It analyses the main 
barriers, such as the externalities like “costs and benefits that extend beyond countries’ borders”. 
It identifies as a key the need to “establish forms of coordinated decision-making that internalize 
the externalities, and at the same time overcome other political and regulatory risks that may arise 
due to the multi-country nature of the projects”. It provides the cases of IIRSA and Puebla-Panama 
Plan2 (PPP) as successful examples. 
 
Krongkaew (2004) reviews the developments of the Greater Mekong Subregion (MGS) Economic 
Cooperation. By looking at the different areas of cooperation in the program, the author looks to 
the “rationale for the formation of this subregional cooperation from each country’s point of view, 
the achievements so far, and the problems and prospects of further cooperation in the future”. The 
paper also acknowledges the role of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the regional 
cooperation program. It ends providing some proposals about the role that Thailand can play in 
the future development of the GMS. 
 
Cespedes and Agostinis (2014) aims to provide an explanation for “the emergence and 
development of sectoral cooperation and policy coordination within the Union of South America 
Countries (UNASUR)”. The two key variables in this study are state preferences and regional 
leadership. By contrasting the cases of regional cooperation in infrastructures in general and in 
energy in particular in the same region (South America), the author identifies the relevance of 
regional leadership initiatives in the formation process of state preferences.  
 
2.4. Theories on regional cooperation and comparative regionalism 
The last set of research deals does not focus in a single sector or region but looks to the phenomena 
of transnational cooperation in different policy areas.  
Axline (1994) utilizes a political economy approach to propose a framework for comparative 
regional analysis. This framework consists of a series of questions around (i) the major issues dealt 
with within the regional organization, (ii) the policy positions of member states, and (iii) the 
external influences. This framework is applied in parallel to four cases: Andean integration system, 
CARICOM, ASEAN, and South Pacific. The concluding chapter provides “some broad 
generalizations about the processes of regional cooperation among developing countries”. 
                                                 
 
2 Puebla-Panama Plan was replaced by the Mesoamerica Project 
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- The more developed and stronger member states will favor measures to increase benefits 
to the region as a whole, as they are likely to reap the larger share of those benefits, while 
the weaker and less well-off will be more interested in adopting policies that guarantee 
them a specified share of any regional gains. 
- It is possible to predict the positions of member countries towards specific regional 
measures with respect to its opportunity cost 
- There is, to some extent, a direct relation between the comprehensiveness of regional 
policies and the viability of regional grouping in terms of their continued survival and 
functioning 
 
Mattli (1999) looks to the phenomena of regional integration to explain the “general logic” behind 
it. It develops a “general analytical framework for understanding regional integration” combining 
the stress of the importance of market factors, from economic theories, with the reference to 
institutional factors, from political science explanations. It concludes that regional integration 
occurs successfully when demand and supply conditions are fulfilled. This demand or “pressure 
for regional institutional arrangements” comes from the bottom, particularly market actors. The 
other condition required the supply conditions are the “willingness by political actors to 
accommodate demands for functional integration at each step of the integration process, and the 
presence of an undisputed regional leader”. 
 
Acharya and Johnston (2007) applies institutional design to the analysis of regionalism. Their 
project looks to different regional cooperation schemes in Africa (OAU, AU), Asia (ASEAN, 
ARF), Europe (NATO, EU), Latin America (OAS), and Middle East (Arab League). For that, they 
propose to the collaborators to first look at the institutional design3 as their dependent variables, 
“to look at a wide range of plausible independent variables and see which helped them understand 
the form that regional institutions took”; and then as independent variable, “to investigate the 
degree to which the institution and its design helped explain the nature of cooperation”. For both 
of them, the authors gave some instructions about possible variables to be explored, although that 
didn’t limit the contributors. The variables utilized for comparison for the first analysis were: type 
of cooperation problem, the number of actors, ideology and identity, systems and subsystemic 
power distribution, domestic politics, extra-regional institution or non-state as agents of change, 
and geography. And for the analysis considering the institutional design as the independent 
variable were: membership, scope, rules, norms, and mandate. The final objective in to obtain 
“findings of the relationship between institutional design and the nature of cooperation. As 
conclusion, the authors present four propositions: 
                                                 
 
3 In this work, institutional design means “those formal and informal rules and organizational features that constitute 
the institution and that function as either the constraints on actor choice or the bare bones of the social environment 
within which actors interact, or both” 
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(i) The more insure the regimes, the less intrusive are their regional institutions 
(ii) The design of regional institutions in the developing world has been more consistently 
sovereignty-preserving than sovereignty-eroding 
(iii) Functional imperatives are less important than ideational and normative considerations 
in shaping the design of regional institutions the developing world 
(iv) The contrast between the design features of the European Union and regional 
institutions in the developing world can be overstated in relation to the commitment to 
supranationalism and the development of a regional identity 
 
Van Langenhove (2013) aims to contribute to the field of comparative regionalism by providing a 
framework for the dimensions of regions. It looks at “unpack regions along the main dimensions 
of statehood”. This done by looking at the three broad policy domains that define a state’s 
actorness: (i) economy policy, (ii) institutional framework with regard to the delivery of public 
goods, and (iii) sovereignty, which includes aspects from the ability to have diplomatic 
representations to a legal identity (as the EU and ASEAN). 
 
2.5. Summary of the literature review 
Research interest on regional cooperation programs, and in particular on regional infrastructures, 
has found a gap between the case studies (upper section of the below table) and general theories 
about contextual influence (lower section of the table). In order to improve the utilization of the 
knowledge acquired from existing cases, a methodology for the identification of actions based on 
contextual analysis is needed. 
 
Typology 
Strength Weakness References 
Sector Region 
Single Single 
Detailed description of 
actions and their impact 
on the process 
Explanation of contextual 
influence insufficient for 
comparison 
Onga, 2013; del Barrio-
Alvarez, 2013; Matsui, 
2016; Nishibayashi, 2016 
Single Multi 
Possibility to identify key 
issues, and potential 
lessons to transfer 
Parallel cases studies or 
best-practices. General 
conclusions  
JICA, 2009; World Bank, 
2010 
Multi Single 
Detail explanation of 
governments’ incentives 
Emphasis geopolitical and 
intergovernmental aspects 
Bhattacharyay, 2010; 
Cespedes, 2014 
Multi Multi Explanation of different 
mechanisms for regional 
cooperation 
Focus on necessary 
conditions rather than on 
possible actions 
Axline, 1994; Mattli, 
1999; Acharya and 
Johnston, 2007; Van 
Langenhove, 2013 
Comparative 
regionalism 
Table 2 - Summary of literature review  
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3. Objective and method 
This section describes the overall objectives of this research and describes the methodology 
proposed in order to achieve those. 
 
3.1. Objective: 
The overall objective of this research is to propose a methodology for the identification of actions 
from existing cases based on contextual analysis. For that there are sub-objectives: 
(i) To identify the main contextual variables influencing regional infrastructures 
development process (so to explain how differences in the context affect the 
development of the projects) 
 
(ii) To propose a comparative framework to serve to development banks for the 
identification of relevant actions from existing cases 
 
(iii) To evaluate its potential utilization and impact  
 
The methodology proposed by this research is expected to become a new approach for the 
utilization of existing case studies, serving to MDBs first to better manage and share their 
knowledge (inside the institution and between them) and, as a direct consequence, improve the 
effectiveness of their actions, benefiting in this manner to the recipient countries. 
 
3.2. Method: 
The overall method is qualitative comparative case studies based on causality analysis. The 
comparative approach is chosen for being able to cover different “contexts”, these are initially 
understood as a combination of regional and sectorial aspects. Causality analysis is utilized so to 
identify the factors that influence the development process, in a similar manner that “causal-
process observations provides information about mechanism and context” (Brady, Collier, 2004). 
 
This thesis is structured around 11 chapter as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 – Background: Including an initial approach to regional infrastructures and describing 
the role of MDBs in their promotion. The chapter explains the need for a better understanding of 
concrete actions to improve the involvement of MDBs in regional infrastructures projects 
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Chapter 2 – Literature review: Provide an overall picture of the related research about MDBs 
participation in regional infrastructures projects. It identifies the gap in the existing literature and 
therefore the necessity of a methodology that can support the identification of concrete actions 
from existing projects. Current approaches that look 
 
Chapter 3 – Objective and method: presents the overall objective of the research, with the sub-
objectives included. It also presents the method for the research with an explanation of its selection 
 
Chapter 4 – Selection of cases for study: Three case studies are selected from a survey of several 
projects. This choice is based on a development process presented in the same chapter, and with 
the condition of being able to combine sector and region. 
 
Chapter 5 – Case study4 1, GMS Economic Corridors: the first case analyzes is the development 
of the three original economic corridors in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), supported by 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
 
Chapter 6 – Case study 2, Regional Power Sector integration in Central America (SIEPAC): the 
second case covers the development of the Central American Regional Electricity Market (MER), 
supported by the Inter-American Development Bank. 
 
Chapter 7 – Case study 3, GMS Power Sector cooperation program: the third project focuses on 
the power sector cooperation being implemented in the GMS by the ADB. 
 
Chapter 8 – Comparative analysis, identification of contextual variables: Based on the factors 
identified in the three case studies, this chapter identify the variables to explain the differences in 
the contexts of the projects (so that the term contextual variables) 
 
Chapter 9 – Building the Comparative Framework: analyzes the differences in the influence of the 
contextual variables to explore the similarities in the development process. For that, it evaluates 
the relative impact of each of them along the different stages of every project. It includes a 
visualization of the Comparative Framework. 
                                                 
 
4 An overall description of the case studies structure is provided in the section 3.2.1. 
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Chapter 10 – Utilization of the Comparative Framework: it includes a practical application of the 
Comparative Framework for the stage 4 of the GMS Power Sector cooperation program. Therefore 
this chapter provides instructions for its future utilization, as well as an understanding of the 
potential policy implications that could be derived 
 
Chapter 11 – Conclusion: summarizes the main findings and proposals of the thesis. It also 
includes a guideline of the future research that would be needed to continue the research. 
 
3.2.1. Case studies structure: 
The selected cases are analyzed in parallel following the same steps so to get comparable results. 
These steps are: 
1. Overall description of the case / project, including 
o Main figures and objectives of the project (the physical or hardware components) 
o Description of the main institutions and agreements (the institutional or software 
components) 
 
2. Description of individual member countries outlined and motivation for the regional 
infrastructure 
 
3. Description in detail of the development process of the case in particular including a 
timeline of the project. 
o Timeline provides an overview main events occurred during the project. Those are 
also referred to a particular stage. 
o Each of the stages is presented in a descriptive manner to give a more natural 
explanation of the different events and issues during the development process 
 
4. Causality analysis for each of the stages of the development process previously described 
o Distinguishing between: 
 Factors: Elements of the context that have an influence in the process 
 Actions: Realized by the MDB or another stakeholder 
 Outputs: Consequence of factors and/or actions 
 
5. Analysis of factors and actions 
o In order to latterly identify the contextual variables more relevant for each stage, 
the relative of each factor is weighted as: 
 5: Critical factor that overruns others  
 3: Factor part the core process but equally important to others 
 1: Without a direct, or lower, influence in the core process 
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o Although this evaluation has been realized by the author, the justification for the 
evaluation is provided for each factor based on information collected and in the 
understanding of the overall process (from the causality diagrams). 
o A proposal for the improvement of this “subjective”, although grounded, evaluation 
is also included as a recommendation for further work in the chapter 11.1 
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4. Selection of cases for study 
 
4.1. Selection criteria 
The cases selected (chapters 5, 6 and 7) has been done based on: 
- The depth of integration achieved: the regional infrastructures final aim is understood as a 
regional optimization. That is equal, or close to equal, to a situation where national 
boundaries would not exist. In order to assess this, a development process for regional 
infrastructures is proposed (see 4.3) 
 
- Cases combining sector and region: these are understood as the two broad dimensions that 
compose the context affecting a particular project. A combination of those in the cases 
selected should allow to better understand the influence from the sector, and/or from the 
region independently. 
 
4.2. Survey of existing cases 
In total 40 existing regional infrastructures projects were initially surveyed. This does not aim to 
provide a full understanding of each of them, but just to grasp some common understanding of this 
type of projects, and to serve as the basis for the final selection of the cases for deeper study. 
The list of projects is included below. The description of the project has been, in most of the cases, 
obtained from the websites and/or existing case studies of each project. 
 
Project Name Sector Area Countries Brief description 
Beira Corridor Road Africa Mozambique, 
Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
The Beira Agricultural Growth 
Corridor (BAGC) initiative is a 
partnership between the Government 
of Mozambique, private investors, 
farmer organizations and international 
agencies. It was launched in 2010 and 
aims at promoting increased 
investments in commercial agriculture 
and agribusiness within the Beira 
Corridor (Tete, Sofala, and Manica 
Provinces).5 
                                                 
 
5 http://beiracorridor.org/  
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CEMAC Trade 
Corridor 
Road Africa CEMAC To Improve the efﬁciency of trade and 
transport activities in the CEMAC 26 
region the CEMAC Trade Corridor 
project was approved by member 
states in 2006.  
The goal of the project is to facilitate 
efﬁcient regional trade among 
CEMAC member states and improve 
access to world markets.6 
Central African 
Interconnection 
Power Africa South Africa, 
Angola, Gabon, 
Namibia, 
Equatorial 
Guinea, 
Cameroon, Chad 
3 800 kilometer transmission line will 
run from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) to South Africa through 
Angola, and Namibia .It will transfer 
the future power to be generated by 
the Inga III and Grand Inga stations 
and feed it to the Southern Africa 
Power Pool, SAPP. Both the 
Economic Community of Central 
African States, ECCAS, and the 
Central African Power Pool, SAPP, 
will be involved in the implementation 
of this project. 
Chirundu One 
Stop Border 
Road Africa Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
First One Stop Border initiative in 
Africa. 
East African 
Power Pool 
(EAPP) 
Power Africa Burundi, DR 
Congo, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Libya, 
Kenya, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda 
Creation of power pool in the Eastern 
Africa Region to facilitate and secure 
power supply at the lowest possible 
cost. Ultimate objective of 
establishing a regional electricity 
market 
Lobito 
Corridor 
Road Africa Angola, DR 
Congo, Zambia 
Transport corridor which runs from 
the port of Lobito and the city of 
Benguela through the hinterland of 
Angola before it connects with the 
mineral-rich regions of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Zambia. The once important Benguela 
railway was destroyed during the war 
and has not been in use since 1975.7 
                                                 
 
6 http://www.icafrica.org/en/topics-programmes/case-studies/transport-the-cemac-trade-corridor-project/  
7 http://www.cmi.no/publications/5120-angolas-lobito-corridor  
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Maputo 
Corridor 
Road Africa South Africa, 
Mozambique, 
Swaziland 
Rehabilitation of abandoned corridor 
between the industrial area of South 
Africa and Maputo Port in 
Mozambique. 
Bi-national PPP 
Nacala 
Corridor 
Road Africa Malawi, 
Mozambique, 
Zambia 
Located in the Northern Region of 
Mozambique, and it extends from the 
Nacala Port to inland districts of 
Mozambique and further to 
neighboring countries, such as Malawi 
and Zambia. It was a historically 
international transport corridor 
consisting of Nacala Port and 
Northern Railway and Malawian 
Railway System. The Nacala Corridor 
was the most important export route 
for Malawi in those days. However, 
the prolonged civil war in 
Mozambique had disturbed 
international transport through the 
Nacala Corridor.8 
North-South 
Corridor 
Road Africa Botswana, 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo, Malawi, 
Mozambique, 
South Africa, 
Tanzania, 
Zambia and 
Zimbabwe 
The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite 
lead this program with the intention of 
speeding up the flow of traded goods, 
thereby reducing the transactions 
costs of cross-border trade.  The 
program represents an innovative 
approach to supporting and 
developing physical infrastructure 
while also addressing trade facilitation 
and regulatory needs and deficiencies 
along the corridor in a coherent and 
holistic manner. 
North- South 
Power 
Transmission 
Corridor 
Power Africa Egypt, Sudan, 
South Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Tanzania, 
Malawi, 
Mozambique, 
Zambia, 
The corridor will provide the 
infrastructure for an integrated East 
and Southern African power market, 
which will allow increased regional 
power trade. The implementation of 
this project will not only improve 
energy security in Eastern Africa but 
will help to reduce the need for reserve 
                                                 
 
8 http://www.jica.go.jp/project/english/mozambique/002/outline/index.html  
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Zimbabwe, South 
Africa 
capacities, resulting in lower energy 
costs. [NEPAD] 
Southern 
African Power 
Pool 
Power Africa Angola, 
Botswana, DR 
Congo, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, 
Malawi, 
Namibia, South 
Africa, 
Swaziland, 
Tanzania, 
Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
The Southern African Power Pool 
(SAPP) was created with the primary 
aim to provide reliable and 
economical electricity supply to the 
consumers of each of the SAPP 
members, consistent with the 
reasonable utilization of natural 
resources and the effect on the 
environment.9 
Trans-African 
Highways 
network 
Road Africa Across Africa UNECA envisioned project to 
constitute the backbone of the African 
continent and link all the countries 
through nine roads10 
Walvis Bay 
Corridor Group 
Road Africa Namibia, South 
Africa, DR 
Congo, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, 
Angola 
The Walvis Bay Corridors are an 
integrated system of well-maintained 
tarred roads and rail networks - 
accommodating all modes of transport 
- from the Port of Walvis Bay via the 
Trans-Kalahari, Trans-Caprivi, Trans-
Cunene and Trans-Oranje Corridors 
providing landlocked SADC countries 
access to transatlantic markets.11 
West African 
Power Pool 
(WAPP) 
Power Africa Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cape 
Verde, Cote 
d’Ivore, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinee, 
Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, 
Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, 
Togo 
The West African Power Pool 
(WAPP) is integrating the national 
power systems of its members into a 
unified regional electricity market 
which, over time, will provide the 
citizens of the region with a stable and 
reliable electricity supply at 
affordable cost12 
Westcor / Inga 
III 
Power Africa Angola, 
Botswana, DR 
Project for the construction of a mega 
power plant in Nigeria with the 
                                                 
 
9 http://www.sapp.co.zw/  
10 http://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/trans-african-highway-remains-a-road-to-nowhere/  
11 http://www.wbcg.com.na/about-us.html  
12 http://www.icafrica.org/en/topics-programmes/west-african-power-pool/  
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Congo, Namibia, 
South Africa 
capacity to supply of hydropower to a 
large part of the African continent. 
Southern African countries are the 
ones to benefit the most 
Interoceanic 
Highway 
Road LAC13 Brazil, Peru Construction of a highway linking the 
East and West coasts of South 
America, through the Amazonia. 
Through this, shipping times between 
Brazil and Asia would be drastically 
reduced. 
Peruvian producers can benefit from 
easier access to Brazilian markets 
International 
Network of 
Mesoamerican 
Highways 
Road LAC Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, 
Guatemala, 
Honduras, 
Nicaragua, 
Panama 
Rehabilitation, maintenance, and 
construction of a total of 13,132 km of 
highways across 5 corridors (Pacific, 
Atlantic, Touristic, Interoceanic, and 
Complementaries). A trade 
facilitation program, TIM, is also 
under implementation 
SIEPAC Power LAC Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, 
Guatemala, 
Honduras, 
Nicaragua, 
Panama 
Creation of a superposed regional 
electricity market through the 
construction of a trunk transmission 
grid interconnecting with all the 
countries in several points, and the 
constitution of regional institutions for 
operation, regulation, and monitoring. 
It includes also interconnection with 
neighboring countries (Mexico and 
Colombia) 
Andean Energy 
Market 
(SINEA) 
Power LAC Bolivia, Peru, 
Colombia, 
Ecuador 
Aimed to the development of a 
regional power market in the Andean 
region following a similar structure to 
SIEPAC. Transmission grid being 
constructed through bilateral 
interconnections between the 
countries. 
CASA 1000 Power Asia Afghanistan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, 
Pakistan, 
Tajikistan 
Transmission the surplus electricity 
(from May to September) from 
Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic 
through Afghanistan to Pakistan 
                                                 
 
13 LAC refers to Latin America and the Caribbean 
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CAREC 
regional 
corridors 
Road Asia Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, 
China, 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, 
Mongolia, 
Pakistan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Six corridors to link the region’s 
economic hubs to each other and 
connect the landlocked CAREC 
countries to other Eurasian and global 
markets. Corridor 3 connects the 
Russian Federation to South Asia and 
the Middle East, running through six 
of CAREC’s member countries. 
[ADB, web] 
CAREC 
Regional 
energy market 
Power Asia Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Set of initiatives to promote the power 
sector cooperation in the Central 
Asian former soviet republics. 
Ultimately project would evolve into a 
regional power market 
GMS 
Economic 
Corridor 
Road Asia Cambodia, 
China, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, 
Thailand, Viet 
Nam 
Initiative for the development of 
economic corridors in the GMS 
region. Initially, three corridors have 
been constructed. New ones are under 
construction. 
Projects look for the upgrading of 
transport corridors into economic 
corridors. 
GMS Energy Power Asia Cambodia, 
China, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, 
Thailand, Viet 
Nam 
Initiative for the promotion of intra-
regional power trade in the GMS. 
Mostly by increasing capacity in 
Myanmar and Lao PDR. 
Ultimately project should end in the 
constitution or a regional power 
market in the region. 
Some relation to the development of 
an ASEAN power grid 
Nam Theun 2 
(NT2) 
Power Asia Lao PDR, 
Thailand 
Project for the construction of a large 
power dam in Lao PDR with a power 
purchase agreement with EGAT from 
Thailand 
South Asia 
Regional 
Initiative for 
Energy 
Integration 
(SARI/EI) 
Power Asia Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, 
Pakistan, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka, 
Maldives 
The program will address policy, 
legal, and regulatory issues related to 
energy in the region; promote 
transmissions interconnections, and 
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work towards establishing a regional 
market exchange for electricity14 
Atlantropia Power Europe North Africa, 
Europe 
Development of a power dam in the 
Gibraltar Strait to produce electricity 
for the Europe-North Africa region.  
Expected to increase also the available 
land in the region. 
Old project never developed or really 
attempted 
Desertec Power Africa15 EU-MENA Project for harnessing the solar power 
capacity in the Sahara desert and then 
transmission to North European 
countries 
Nord Pool Power Europe Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, latterly 
also Estonia, 
Latvia, and 
Lithuania 
The Nordic countries deregulated 
their power markets in the early 1990s 
and brought their individual markets 
together into a common Nordic 
market. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
deregulated their power markets and 
joined the Nord Pool market in 2010-
2013.16 
Trans-
European 
Energy 
Network / EU 
internal market 
Power Europe Across EU This policy aims to close the gaps 
between Member States' transport 
networks, remove bottlenecks that still 
hamper the smooth functioning of the 
internal market and overcome 
technical barriers such as 
incompatible standards for railway 
traffic. It promotes and strengthens 
seamless transport chains for 
passenger and freight while keeping 
up with the latest technological trends. 
This project will help the economy in 
its recovery and to grow, with a budget 
of €24.05 billion up to 2020.17 
Trans-
European 
Road Europe Across EU EU project for the construction of 
transport corridors improving the 
interconnection through Europe 
                                                 
 
14 https://aric.adb.org/initiative/south-asia-regional-initiative-for-energy-integration  
15 Project main infrastructure (generation) would be in Africa, although the consumers would be in Europe 
16 http://www.nordpoolspot.com/How-does-it-work/  
17 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/index_en.htm  
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Transport 
Network 
Iberian power 
market 
Power Europe Portugal, Spain Integration of the power markets of 
Portugal and Spain 
Asian Energy 
Highway 
Power Asia Across Asia UN-ESCAP sponsored project for the 
interconnection of power grids 
throughout Asia 
Asian 
Highways 
Road Asia Across Asia UN-ESCAP sponsored project to 
create a highway network throughout 
Asia 
Bi-oceanic 
tunnel Agua 
Negra 
Road LAC Argentina, Chile Proposal of a tunnel under the Andean 
mountains between Argentina and 
Chile to facilitate the connectivity 
between the Southern regions of both 
countries, especially during winter 
(when existing roads are blocked) 
Connect 2022 Power LAC Colombia, United 
States are main 
promoters 
Finally, mostly 
all America 
would be 
interconnected 
Development of a Pan-American 
power grid through the 
interconnection of sub-regional power 
markets across the continent. 
Colombia is the main advocate and 
was endorsed at the 7th Summit of the 
Americas in 2015 
India-
Bangladesh 
interconnection 
Power Asia Bangladesh, 
India 
Development of a transmission line 
and power purchase agreement 
between India and Bangladesh 
One Bet One 
Road 
Road Asia18 Across Asia China sponsored project for the 
development of a Silk Economic Belt 
and a Maritime Silk Road for 
increasing the connectivity between 
China and the rest of Eurasia 
Tufiño – Chiles 
– Cerro negro 
binational 
geothermal 
project 
Power LAC Colombia, 
Ecuador 
Development of geothermal power 
resources on the Chiles volcano area. 
Public utilities from Colombia and 
Ecuador would define the areas to 
explore 
Olkaria-
Lessos-Kisumu 
Power Africa Kenya, EAPP Project to strengthen the link between 
the eastern and western part of the grid 
                                                 
 
18 Most of the infrastructure would be in Asia, although there would be connections in Europe 
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Transmission 
Line 
for system stability and to facilitate the 
evacuation of geothermal power19. 
Table 3 - Survey of existing cases 
 
 
Figure 1 - Map of existing cases (location approx. drawn by the author) 
 
4.3. A development process for regional infrastructures projects 
Although there is not an overall theory for the concrete case of regional infrastructures 
development process, by looking to different studies looking at the phenomena of regional 
cooperation from different academic backgrounds, it is possible to derive a process divided into 
several stages. 
 
Mattli (1999) describes integration as “the process of internalizing externalities that cross borders 
within a group of countries”. It defines two conditions to satisfy for a successful regional 
integration. The first one is the “demand condition”, which is a pressure for regional institutional 
arrangements that comes from the bottom. In particular, it identifies market actors as the initiators 
of this process. Secondly, it is also needed to fulfill the “supply condition”, a positive acceptance 
from political actors is also needed. This include the “willingness by political actors to 
accommodate demands for functional integration at each step of the integration process”, and “the 
                                                 
 
19 http://www.ketraco.co.ke/projects/ongoing/olkaria-lessos-kisumu.html  
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presence of an undisputed regional leader that can serve as a focal point in the coordination of 
rules, regulations, and policies, and is able to ease distributional tensions by actions as regional 
paymaster”. In this sense, we understand the process is initiated with a “National stakeholders 
agreement” (Stage 1) and “High-level political agreement” (Stage 2). 
 
Estevaderodal, Frantz, and Nguyen (2004) describes how regional infrastructures development is 
usually divided into “hardware”, or the physical dimensions of infrastructures development; and 
“software”, or the program to formulate and implement cross-border agreements. Besides many 
institutions, this is the common approach utilized by the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB). This provides the basis for the proposal of stages of “Physical infrastructure” (Stage 3) 
and “Institutional infrastructure” (Stage 4). 
 
Figure 2 - Hardware and Software of regional infrastructures (source, IADB) 
 
Balassa (1961) model is one widely used description of the economic integration process. The 
author divides the process in different degrees of integration: (i) free trade areas (FTA), (ii) 
customs union, (iii) common market, (iv) economic and monetary union, and (v) full integration 
or political union. In particular, this latest level of economic integration includes “the setting up of 
a supranational authority whose decisions are binding for the member states”. In this sense, for the 
matter of this research, this represents the need to include the latest stage of “Harmonization” 
(Stage 5). 
 
Stage Description Example on power Example on road 
1. National 
stakeholders’ 
agreement 
Initial drafting of the 
agreements and building 
of a vision  
Support for a vision 
of regional power 
market 
Support for a 
vision of open 
regional trade 
2. High level 
political 
Inter-governmental 
agreements and 
Sign of 
commitment for 
Sign of 
commitment for 
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agreement and 
commitment 
commitments needed to 
start and define the goals 
of the project 
regional power 
market 
trade facilitation 
measure 
3. Physical 
construction 
Negotiation of routes and 
coordination of 
construction works 
Agreement on 
regional grid 
network and 
integration with 
national grids 
Agreement on and 
construction of  
road’s network 
route 
4. Institutional 
construction 
Negotiation on the 
regulations and 
operational rules of the 
infrastructure 
Operation and 
regulation measures 
Agreement for 
trade facilitation 
5. Harmonization Reforms at national level 
needed to implement the 
stage 4 agreements 
 
Reform of national 
power systems to 
comply with 
regional regulation 
Implementation of 
regionally unified 
cross-border 
procedures 
Table 4 - Stages of regional infrastructures development process 
 
4.4. Choice of cases 
As explained in the introduction of this chapter, the selection of the cases to study has been done 
in two steps as follows: 
 
4.4.1. Evaluation of development process on survey of existing cases: 
Based on the development process previously described, the projects from the survey of existing 
cases were evaluated in the level of success for each stage: 
 ○: Stage fulfilled 
 △: Limited progress and/or undergoing 
 X :  None or very limited progress 
 
Project Name Sector Area Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 
Beira Corridor Road Africa ○ △ ○ △ X 
CEMAC Trade 
Corridor 
Road Africa △ X X X X 
Central African 
Interconnection 
Power Africa △ X X X X 
Chirundu One Stop 
Border 
Road Africa ○ ○ ○ ○ X 
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East African Power 
Pool (EAPP) 
Power Africa ○ ○ ○ △ X 
Lobito Corridor Road Africa ○ ○ ○ X X 
Maputo Corridor Road Africa ○ ○ ○ ○ △ 
Nacala Corridor Road Africa ○ ○ ○ △ X 
North-South Corridor Road Africa ○ ○ ○ △ X 
North- South Power 
Transmission Corridor 
Power Africa ○ X X X X 
Southern African 
Power Pool 
Power Africa ○ ○ ○ △ △ 
Trans-African 
Highways network 
Road Africa △ X X X X 
Walvis Bay Corridor 
Group 
Road Africa ○ ○ ○ △ △ 
West African Power 
Pool (WAPP) 
Power Africa ○ ○ ○ △ △ 
Westcor / Inga III Power Africa △ X X X X 
Interoceanic Highway Road LAC ○ △ △ X X 
Mesoamerican 
Highway 
Road LAC ○ ○ ○ ○ △ 
SIEPAC Power LAC ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Andean Energy 
Market (SINEA) 
Power LAC △ △ △ X X 
CASA 1000 Power Asia ○ △ △ X X 
CAREC regional 
corridors 
Road Asia ○ ○ ○ △ △ 
CAREC Regional 
energy market 
Power Asia △ △ X X X 
GMS Economic 
Corridor 
Road Asia ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
GMS Energy Power Asia ○ △ ○ △ X 
Nam Theum 2 (NT2) Power Asia ○ ○ ○ X X 
South Asia Regional 
Initiative for Energy 
Integration (SARI/EI) 
Power Asia △ X X X X 
Atlantropia Power Europe X X X X X 
Desertec Power Africa △ X X X X 
Nord Pool Power Europe ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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Trans-European 
Energy Network / EU 
internal market 
Power Europe ○ ○ ○ △ △ 
Trans-European 
Transport Network 
Road Europe ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Iberian power market Power Europe ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Asian Energy 
Highway 
Power Asia △ X X X X 
Asian Highways Road Asia ○ △ △ X X 
Bi-oceanic tunnel 
Agua Negra 
Road LAC △ X X X X 
Connect 2022 Power LAC △ X X X X 
India-Bangladesh 
interconnection 
Power Asia ○ ○ ○ X X 
One Road One Belt Road Asia △ △ △ X X 
Tufiño – Chiles – 
Cerro negro binational 
geothermal project 
Power LAC ○ ○ X X X 
Olkaria-Lesso-Kisumu 
Transmission Line 
Power Africa ○ ○ ○ X X 
Table 5 - Evaluation of development process on survey of existing cases 
 
4.4.2. Selection of cases with deeper level of integration 
Here are presented those considered to have achieved large level of integration. Those are the ones 
which has shown progress across the five stages and/or in both progress: 
 
Project Name Sector Area Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 
Maputo Corridor Road Africa ○ ○ ○ ○ △ 
Southern African 
Power Pool 
Power Africa ○ ○ ○ △ △ 
Walvis Bay Corridor 
Group 
Road Africa ○ ○ ○ △ △ 
West African Power 
Pool (WAPP) 
Power Africa ○ ○ ○ △ △ 
Mesoamerican 
Highway 
Road LAC ○ ○ ○ ○ △ 
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SIEPAC Power LAC ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
CAREC regional 
corridors 
Road Asia ○ ○ ○ △ △ 
GMS Economic 
Corridor 
Road Asia ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
GMS Power 
Cooperation 
Power Asia ○ △ ○ △ X 
Nord Pool Power Europe ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Trans-European 
Energy Network / EU 
internal market 
Power Europe ○ ○ ○ △ △ 
Trans-European 
Transport Network 
Road Europe ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Iberian power market Power Europe ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Table 6 - Selection of cases with deeper level of integration 
 
4.4.3. Selection combining sector and area 
Among those, a selection was done on those that would combine sector and area. It is needed to 
note that cases from the European Union were finally not included because of the particularity of 
existence of regional bodies with a certain capability to impose sanctions on member countries. 
Project Name Sector Area Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 
SIEPAC Power LAC ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
GMS Economic 
Corridor 
Road Asia 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
GMS Power 
Cooperation 
Power Asia 
○ △ ○ △ X 
Table 7 - Selected cases 
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4.5. Outline of selected cases 
 
Therefore the final three cases selected are: 
 
Project GMS Economic 
Corridors 
SIEPAC 
GMS Power 
Cooperation 
Region South East Asia Central America South East Asia 
Sector Transport (Road) Energy (Power) Energy (Power) 
Related MDB ADB IADB ADB/WB 
Short 
description 
Three economic 
corridors connecting 
ports and inland areas, 
and regional agreement 
for trade facilitation 
Regional transmission 
trunk and regional 
institutions for operating 
regional power market 
Large power plants and 
cross-border 
transmission lines to 
facilitate optimization 
of regional resources 
Image 
 
 
 
Table 8 - Summary of selected cases 
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5. Case study 1, GMS Economic Corridors 
 
5.1. The Greater Mekong Subregional (GMS) Economic Cooperation program 
The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program on Economic Cooperation is an initiative 
launched by the Asian Development Bank and designed to enhance economic relations between 
Cambodia, China 20  (Yunnan Province and Guangxi Autonomous Region), Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam. It was officially launched 
(ADB) in 1992 at the First Conference on Subregional Economic Cooperation among Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam and Yunnan Province of the People’s Republic of China 
(First Ministerial Conference) in Manila (Philippines). The original objective of ADB with this 
program was to prepare the countries for working together after years of conflict. In the long term, 
the ADB hoped “to contribute to an ongoing process that will build confidence and trust among 
the participants and help provide an enduring framework for development assistance with a 
regional focus” (ADB, 19993). In respect to that, it can be said that the program has been proven 
to be highly successful, achieving the vision expressed by Thai’s Prime Minister Chatichai 
Choonhavan’s speech for “Turning Indochina from a battlefield to a marketplace”. In fact, the term 
GMS has replaced Indochina to refer to the region [Cruz-del Rosario, p. 147]. 
The cooperation in the six sectors initially envisioned (transportation, telecommunications, energy 
development, environmental management, human resource development, and trade and 
investment).  Currently includes also agriculture, tourism, and multi-sector or economic corridor. 
The institutional setting of the GMS Program has also evolved and increase with the time and 
experiences. Initially started in a very informal and pragmatic manner, with the ADB serving as 
Secretariat, while ownership and decision-power remaining in the countries represented at annual 
Ministerial Conferences and Working Groups for each sector, it is, in fact, an international 
organization without a charter. The program now includes also GMS Heads of State Summit, 
Business Forum, GMS Senior Officials meeting and National Coordinators (NTFC). 
In all this process, the role of the ADB has been critical, and has been called to have acted as: 
- Catalyst: encouraging dialogue, providing forums for that dialogue, and assisting, if 
requested, in subregional cooperation through project identification and development 
[ADB, 1993, p. 28] 
- Honest broker: by lending its institutional support that encourages dialogue, provides the 
for a and extends assistance when needed (Tan, from Faure 2007, ADB 2008) 
 
                                                 
 
20 At this thesis, China is utilized for People’s Republic of China 
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Figure 3 - Institutional Arrangements for the GMS (source: ADB, 2008, p.8) 
 
5.2. The GMS Economic Corridors project 
The transport sector has been one of the key sectors from the very beginning of the regional 
cooperation program. In fact, the Phase I found that “the most urgent need is in the transport sector”. 
The practical working hypothesis was “if things can move, the will move” [ADB, 1993, p. 19 (35)]. 
At the First Ministerial Conference, a list of projects was proposed. This was refined during the 
next ministerial conferences until the agreement on nine transport corridors. A new major step 
forward was agreed at the 8th Subregional Transport Forum (STF) meeting. The economic corridor 
approach was approved there. 
Economic corridor concept is presented as a connector to link production, trade, and infrastructure 
within a specific geographical framework; the economic corridor is expected not only to connect 
the centers of economic activities but also to extend the benefits from developing transport projects 
to remote rural areas through linkages of production activities [Ishida, 2012, p.11] 
An economic corridor promotes regional economic cooperation. It has the following 
characteristics21: [ADB, website] 
                                                 
 
21 http://www.adb.org/countries/gms/sector-activities/multisector  
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 Covers smaller, defined geographic space, usually, straddling a central transport artery 
such as a road, rail line, or canal; 
 Emphasizes bilateral rather than multilateral initiatives, focusing on strategic nodes 
particularly at border crossings between two countries; 
 Highlights physical planning of the corridor and its surrounding area, to concentrate 
infrastructure development and achieve the most positive benefits 
 
5.2.1. Key institutions 
In the process of the development of the economic corridors, a special institutionalism has been 
created both at national and subregional level to complement the initial GMS ministerial meetings. 
 
Institution Key tasks 
Leader’s Summit  Sets vision and major directions for the GMS Program and its 
components. 
Ministerial Meeting 
(MM) 
 Approves and launches implementation of the Strategy and 
Action Plan (SAP) for economic corridors development. 
 Receives and deliberates on progress reports covering the 
implementation of the SAP for corridors development. 
 Considers and acts on SAP-related policy and implementation 
issues requiring high-level resolution and other related matters 
brought up to their attention. 
Senior Officials’ 
Meeting (SOM) 
 Receives and deliberates on monitoring and evaluation reports 
covering the implementation of the SAP for economic corridors 
development. 
 Acts on SAP-related policy and implementation issues on which 
it has authority to decide. 
 Brings SAP-related policy or implementation issues requiring 
action from higher authorities to the attention of the MM. 
 Works closely with the GMS Business Forum to promote private 
sector participation in economic corridors development 
GMS Forums and 
Working Groups 
 Facilitate and coordinate the identification and formulation of 
initiatives focusing on economic corridors in their respective 
sector and areas of concern. 
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 Coordinate the implementation of economic corridors initiatives 
(consolidated in the Action Plans for economic corridors 
development) in their respective sector and areas of concern. 
 Prepare progress reports on the implementation of economic 
corridors initiatives in their respective sectors and areas of 
concern. 
 Facilitate the resolution of issues and bottlenecks in the 
implementation of economic corridors initiatives in their 
respective sectors and areas of concern. 
 Work closely with the GMS-BF to promote private sector 
participation in economic corridors development. 
GMS Secretariat  Liaises between the MM and/or SOM and other concerned GMs 
institutions on matters involving economic corridors development 
 Provides overall secretariat support to GMS bodies and 
institutions in performing their functions related to economic 
corridors development. 
 Compiles monitoring and/or progress reports on SAP 
implementation for submission to the SOM, MM, and Economic 
Corridors Forum. 
 Liaises and coordinates with external partner agencies and 
institutions on matters involving economic corridors 
development. 
National 
Coordinators 
 Facilitate and coordinate in-country activities involving economic 
corridors development. 
 Monitor the progress of SAP implementation and highlight 
implementation issues in coordination with the GMs Secretariat 
in their respective areas. 
 Facilitate the in-country flow of information and coordination 
among agencies and institutions involved in economic corridors 
development. 
 Serve as in-country liaison with external partner agencies and 
institutions on matters involving economic corridors 
development, including national and local chambers of commerce 
and industry 
GMS Business 
Forum 
 Foster closer relations and cooperation among private sector 
organizations in economic corridors countries, and represents 
them in GMS deliberations involving their respective economic 
corridor matters. 
 Promotes domestic and foreign direct investment in each of the 
economic corridors development areas. 
 Advocates policies, regulations, and system and procedures 
favoring private sector investments in economic corridors areas. 
 Initiates the identification and dissemination of business 
opportunities in economic corridors areas. 
37 
 
 Compiles and disseminates business information on economic 
corridors to private sector organizations and entities 
Economic 
Corridors Forum 
(ECF) 
 Provide a platform for strengthening cooperation among areas in 
the East–West  Economic  Corridor,  North–South  Economic  
Corridor,  and  Southern Economic  Corridor  (hereinafter  
referred  to  as  EWEC,  NSEC,  and  SEC, respectively) and 
among the GMS forums and working groups; 
 Serve  as  a  venue  for  networking  and  sharing  of  information  
and  views among central and local officials, businesspeople, and 
international agencies on strategies, approaches, programs, and 
projects to accelerate economic corridor development; 
 Highlight concerns, approaches, initiatives, and priorities in the 
transformation of transport corridors into economic corridors; 
 Discuss  the  implementation  of  strategies  and  action  plans  for  
economic corridor  development,  identify  gaps  in  implementing  
such  strategies and  action  plans,  and  propose  actions  to  
resolve  implementation  issues;  
 Help  increase  the  involvement  of  local  authorities  and  
communities, encourage and support the Governors Forum, and 
expand the participation of the private sector in economic corridor 
development; 
 Bring to the attention of higher authorities issues that need 
resolution at the central level; and 
 Assist in mobilizing technical and financial resources for 
economic corridor development. 
Governors Forum  Provide a platform for networking among the governors (or their 
equivalent) of  the  provinces  along  the  East–West  Economic  
Corridor,  North–South Economic Corridor, and Southern 
Economic Corridor (hereinafter referred to as EWEC, NSEC, and 
SEC, respectively);  
 Serve as a venue for the exchange of information and sharing of 
experience on strategies,  approaches,  and  measures  to  promote  
economic  corridor development; 
 Highlight issues and concerns in the development of economic 
corridors and discuss possible ways and means of addressing such 
issues and concerns;  
 Consider possible actions to resolve issues that arise in the 
implementation of strategies and action plans for economic 
corridor development; 
 Bring to the attention of the ECF issues that need resolution at the 
central level; 
 Assist in resolving issues that arise in implementing approved 
cross-border initiatives in respective areas; 
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 Promote private sector participation in cross-border development; 
and 
 Discuss opportunities for cooperation among provinces along the 
GMS economic corridors to promote economic corridor 
development. 
Table 9 - Existing Mechanisms and Arrangements on Economic Corridors (Source: ADB, generalized from NSEC) 
 
Below an overview of the institutional structure of the GMS Economic Corridors is provided: 
 
Figure 4 - Organizational framework of the GMS economic cooperation program (source, ADB, NSEC) 
 
5.3. The original three economic corridors: 
Although currently more economic corridors are being developed and more projects being funded 
under its scheme, the economic corridors initiative started with three projects 
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Figure 5 - GMS Three Economic Corridors and Transport Sector Strategy Study Economic Corridors (source: ADB) 
 
5.3.1. North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC): 
The North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC) crosses the sub-region connecting the landlocked 
region of Yunnan with Thailand, and more specifically to the port of Bangkok. The link between 
both countries is done through two alternatives, one crossing the northern part of Lao PDR, and 
the other one through Myanmar.  
 
Sub-corridor Route 
Western Kunming (PRC) – Chiang Rai (Thailand) – Bangkok (Thailand) via Lao 
PDR or Myanmar 
Central Kunming (PRC) – Ha Noi (Viet Nam) – Hai Phong (Viet Nam) which 
connects to the existing Highway No. 1 running from the northern to the 
southern part of Viet Nam 
Easter Nanning (PRC) – Ha Noi (Viet Nam) via the Youyi Pass or Fangchenggang 
(PRC) – Dongxing (PRC) – Mong Cai (Viet Nam) route 
Table 10 - Sub-corridors of the NSEC 
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Due to the connection between China and Bangkok, the traffic through the route has rapidly 
increased.  Road infrastructure in both countries is of high quality, leaving Lao PDR as the weak 
link in that sense. 
 
Figure 6 - NSEC (source ADB, NSEC) 
 
5.3.2. East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC): 
The East-West Economic Corridor connects Myanmar, Thailand, Lao PDR and Viet Nam without 
a direct link to major cities in the sub-region, in fact, it has been called to be “going from nowhere 
to nowhere”. Hence, the traffic has been found to be still low. Nevertheless, it provides an 
important connection for future development of logistics between Thailand and Viet Nam.  
 
Figure 7 - EWEC (source: ADB, EWEC) 
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5.3.3. Southern Economic Corridor (SEC): 
The Southern Economic Corridor provides a rapid connection between the economic centers of 
Bangkok and the South of Viet Nam. It is also an important mean for Cambodian development. 
Currently, it is also being extended to Myanmar in a project for the development of the Dawei 
deep seaport.  
 
Sub-corridor Route 
Central Bangkok–Phnom Penh–Ho Chi Minh City–Vung Tau 
Northern Bangkok–Siem  Reap–Stung  Treng–Rathanakini–O  Yadov–Pleiku–Quy  
Nhon 
Southern 
Coastal 
Bangkok–Trat–Koh  Kong–Kampot–Ha  Tien–Ca  Mau  City–Nam  Can 
Intercorridor 
link 
Sihanoukville–Phnom Penh–Kratie–Stung Treng–Dong Kralor (Tra Pang  
Kriel)–Pakse–Savannakhet 
Table 11 - Sub-corridors of the SEC 
 
 
Figure 8 - Southern Economic Corridor (source: ADB) 
 
5.4. Context of Regional transport sector integration in Greater Mekong Sub-region: 
 
5.4.1. Countries overview: 
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The ADB carried out a series of studies of the transport infrastructure sectors in the GMS countries. 
This section provides a summary of those findings in order to capture the overall picture of the 
situation. 
 
5.4.1.1. Cambodia: 
Cambodia transport sector has experienced a transition from a state-controlled transport sector, 
with a number of state-run companies under the supervision of the Ministry of Transport, Post, 
and Tele-Communication (MTPT), in the 1980s, to a progressive liberalization and privatization 
of the sector since the 1990s. Currently, these responsibilities have been divided into four 
institutions: Ministry of Post and Tele-Communication (MPTC), in charge of Mail and electronics 
communication; Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT), in charge of National & 
Provincial Road, Inland and Maritime transport, Railways and Airport; Ministry of Rural 
Development (MRD), in charge rural road; and Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning 
and Construction. There has been also a process of privatization of the transport services. Since 
the early beginning of the GMS, Cambodian government showed a strong interest in increasing 
the connectivity with neighboring countries. 
 
 
Figure 9 – Evolution of MPWT (source: ADB, 2010) 
 
5.4.1.2. China: 
Although the development stage of China is much higher than the majority of the member 
countries of the GMS, Yunnan remains as one of the least developed regions. This can be partially 
attributed to its landlocked situation, which limits its possible international trade. Except for the 
highways, the rest of the road network is said to be of lower quality. Since 1997, the highway law 
decentralized road administration to the provincial level. The Ministry of Transport is in charge of 
approving the development plans and of providing guidance and technical support to the provinces. 
Ministry of Transport, Post 
and Tele-Communication 
(MTPT)
Ministry of Public Works, 
Transport and Construction 
(MPWTC)
Ministry of Public Works 
and Transport (MPWT)
Ministry of Rural 
Development (MRD)
Ministry of Land 
Management, Urban 
Planning and Construction
Ministry of Post and Tele-
Communication (MPTC)
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While the road network development and administration is carried out by the Yunnan Provincial 
Highway Administration Bureau (YHAB). 
 
5.4.1.3. Lao PDR: 
Roads represent the practical totally of the transportation sector in Lao PDR. Nevertheless, the 
quality of the infrastructure is said to of low quality, as well as without sufficient density. The 
main institutions are the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT), in charge of national 
government activities; the Traffic Police Department in the Ministry of Public Security, for the 
traffic enforcement; urban development administration authorities, for urban roads; and the 
Ministry of finance for the financing with the resources of the national budget. 
 
5.4.1.4. Myanmar: 
Myanmar has faced a long period of isolation which has affected its development. The overall 
situation of the sector is dominated by the low quality of the infrastructures and the fragmentation 
and overlapping of its institutional structures. In total six institutions are in charge of the road 
development: (i) Ministry of Transport (MOT); (ii) Ministry of Rail Transportation (MORT); (iii) 
Ministry of Construction (MOC); (iv) Ministry for Progress of Border Areas and National Races 
and Development Affairs; (v) Ministry of Defense (MOD); (vi) Ministry of Home Affairs; and 
(vii) the Yangon, Mandalay, and Nay Pyi Taw city development committees. ADB assessment 
report also refers to the need of capacity building.  
 
5.4.1.5. Thailand: 
Thailand is the transportation hub of the region. Road infrastructure is of good quality in general. 
Nevertheless, ADB assessment mentions “an excessive number of agencies are responsible for the 
road, rail, and urban transport subsectors”. The road subsector is divided between the Department 
of highways (DOH), in charge of highways and motorways, and EXAT, responsible for 
expressways (which only exist in the metropolitan area of Bangkok). Other institutions with 
responsibilities are the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), for local road development 
in Bangkok; the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Plan (OTP), of the Ministry of 
Transportation. The Neighbouring Countries Economic Development Cooperation Agency 
(NEDA), has been also actively participating in the promotion of the GMS by providing support 
to other member countries. 
 
5.4.1.6. Viet Nam: 
The Ministry of Transport is the main institution in the transport sector, including all the main 
transport agencies. The exception would be the urban transit which are below the specific people’s 
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committees. These are under the control of their respective Provincial departments of transport 
(PDOTs), without a direct link to the Ministry of Transport.  
 
5.5. The development process of GMS Economic Corridors 
 
5.5.1. Timeline of the GMS Economic Corridors: 
Date Description  Stage 
1978 Mekong Committee started to operate only as Interim Committee - 
1979 Viet Nam invasion of Cambodia - 
1984 Mr. Morita attended the meeting of Mekong Committee on behalf of 
ADB in Lao PDR. The hotel where he stayed was attacked by 
Thailand. The idea of a project that can foster friendship rather than 
enmity appeared. 
1 
1985 Peace talks started in Cambodia 1 
1986 Major policy reforms in Lao PDR and Viet Nam starting transition 
towards market economies: 
- Laos declared Chintanakan Mai (New Thinking). Introduce the 
“New Economic Mechanism” (NEM) 
- Vietnamese Communist party also adopted the policy of Doi Moi 
(Renovation) at the Sixth Party Congress 
1 
1988 Thai’s Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan’s speech for “Turning 
Indochina from battlefield to marketplace” 
1 
1988 Construction of the Xeset hydroelectric project was started 
- Hydropower dam in Lao PDR with contract agreement for 
exporting electricity to Thailand 
- Agreement fostered through bilateral conversations held by Mr. 
Morita 
Thanks to personal relations, Mr. Morita fostered agreement between 
EGAT (Thailand) and EDL (Lao PDR) for Xeset hydroelectric 
project. Furthermore, this represented the ADB’s first ever project 
loan to Lao PDR since the revolution of 1975. 
1 
1989 Cambodia reestablished private property - 
1991 Construction of the Xeset hydroelectric project was concluded 1 
1991, 
October 23 
Paris Peace Accords, ending the military conflicts in Cambodia: 
- UN mission sent to Cambodia (UNCTAC) until 1993 to supervise 
the ceasefire 
1 
45 
 
1992,  
March 9 
ADB’s approval of the regional technical assistance (RETA) to 
promote economic cooperation among Cambodia, the People’s 
Republic of China (the PRC), Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(Lao PDR), Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam.  
1 
1992,  
Aug. - Sept. 
Bank Study Team visited each of the countries in the subregion to 
undertake an initial survey of existing arrangements for subregional 
cooperation, to identify potential areas for cooperation, and to assess 
the impediments to enhanced cooperation [ADB, 1993] 
1 
1992, 
October 
First Ministerial Conference in Manila (Philippines): 
- GMS program is officially launched 
- Countries represented by General David Bell (Myanmar), Dr. 
Supachai Panichpakdi (former Deputy Prime Minster of Thailand 
and the four factional leaders of the Cambodian government, 
including Mr. Hun Sen) [ 
- Agreement on the road projects at the first phase 
1 
1992 Chinese Communist Party Congress adopted the “Socialist Market 
Economy” 
1 
1993,  
May 27-28 
Quadripartite Meeting convened by the Thai Government in 
Bangkok addressed ways of promoting subregional transportation 
linkages among Thailand, China, Lao PDR and Myanmar: 
- Discussion about road project linking Yunnan Province, Myanmar, 
and Thailand 
1, 2 
1993,  
August 
Mr. Qiao Shi, chairman of the standing committee of the National 
People’s Congress, visit in Thailand and pointed out: [Zhu, 2010] 
- China concerned with Mekong development and utilization 
- China highly approved of the Mekong development and 
cooperation 
1 
1993,  
Aug. 30-31 
Second Conference on Subregional Economic Cooperation Among 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam and Yunnan 
Province of the People’s Republic of China (Second Ministerial 
Conference) in Manila (Philippines) 
- Agreement on the five principles for project selection, 
prioritization, and design: 
1 - 2 
1994 USA lifting of commercial embargo over Viet Nam [Teresita] 1 
1994 Third Ministerial Conference 1, 3 
1994,  
April 8 
First Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge opened connecting Nong Khai 
province and the city of Nong Khai (Thailand) with Vientiane 
Prefecture (Lao PDR) 
- Part of the AH12 
- Different traffic directions in Thailand (left) and Lao PDR (right) 
1, 3 
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- First bridge across the lower Mekong and the second on the full 
course of the Mekong 
- Australia, through the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID), provided $42 million for feasibility studies, 
design and construction of the bridge between 1991 and 1994 
1994,  
Sept. 15-16 
Fourth Ministerial Conference in Chiang Mai: 
- Agreement to approve the Draft Final Report Submitted by 
PADECO, CO. after adding a ninth transport corridor 
- Need to improve the “software” issues was included for the first 
time 
2, 3, 
4 
1995 Transport Master Plan formulated by ADB: 
- Transport Corridors 
3 
1995,  
April 24-25 
Second meeting of the Subregional Transport Forum (STF): [Ishida, 
2013, p. 56] 
- Agreement on remove cross-border barriers 
- Proposal of the UN-ESCAP Resolution 48/11 
2, 4 
1996 Third meeting of the STF: 
- “Agreement to specify feasible and practical conventions with 
bilateral and multilateral basis in the short and the medium term and 
to examine the accession to the seven conventions in the long term” 
[Ishida, p 57] 
4 
1997, 
August 
First Friendship Bridge between Thailand and Myanmar inaugurated 
[The Nation, 2012] 
1, 3 
1998 Eight Ministerial Meeting in Manila (Philippines): 
- The Economic Corridor approach is adopted. 
2 
1999 Cross-Border Transport Agreement (CBTA) signed as trilateral 
agreement between and among the governments of Lao PDR, 
Thailand and Viet Nam 
4 
1999, 
October 
Meeting of Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam Prime Ministers in 
Vientiane: 
- Development Triangle Initiative started 
4 
2000,  
Jan. 11-13 
Ninth Ministerial Conference in Manila (Philippines): 
- Concrete routes of the economic corridors were identified 
 
2001 Cambodia acceded to the CBTA 4 
2001 Vientiane Plan of Action for GMS Development for 2008-2012 
[Selvarajah]: 
- effective infrastructure linkages for cross-border trade, investment 
and economic cooperation 
- a framework for developing human resource capacity and skill 
competencies 
2 
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2001 6th meeting of the STF 4 
2001, 
November 
10th GMS Ministerial Conference in Yangon (Myanmar): 
- Reinvigorated GMS ministers: 
- Strategic framework of the GMS for next 10 years 
- the framework agreement for facilitation of cross-border movement 
- 11 flagship programs. Three economic corridors (EWEV, NSEC, 
and SEC) designated 
2, 3, 
4 
2002, 
September 
11th GMS Ministerial Conference in Phnom Penh (Cambodia) - 
2002, 
November 
First GMS Summit in Phnom Penh (Cambodia) under the theme: 
“Making it Happen: A Common Strategy on Cooperation for 
Growth, Equity, and Prosperity in the Greater Mekong Subregion” 
- Heads of state endorsed the Ten-Year Strategic Framework 
including the three economic corridors as a flagship initiative. 
- Phnom Penh Plan for Development Management (PPP) launched 
to develop capacity in civil servants 
- The three Cs: (i) enhance Connectivity, (ii) improve 
Competitiveness, and (iii) build strong sense of Community 
2, 4 
2002 China acceded to the CBTA 4 
2002 Lao PDR established the National Transport Committee (NTC) for 
interagency coordination and consultation 
4,5 
2003 Myanmar acceded to CBTA 4 
2003 Transport Master Plan upgraded to include the CBTA 3 
2003,  
Feb. 25-27 
First Negotiation Meeting on the CBTA Stage 1 held in Ha Noi (Viet 
Nam) 
4 
2003,  
Aug. 13-15 
Second Negotiation Meeting on the CBTA Stage 1 held in Kunming 
(China) 
4 
2003, 
September 
12th GMs Ministerial Conference in Yunnan (China) - 
2003, 
November 
Inter-government agreement for Asian highway Network adopted by 
UN-ESCAP including 24 countries 
- 
2004, April 
27-29 
First Negotiation Meeting on the GMS CBTA Stage 2 held in Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia 
4 
2004, 
August 9-12 
Second Negotiation Meeting on the GMS CBTA Stage 2 in Kunming 
(China) 
4 
2004, 
August 
8th meeting of the STF: 
- Agreement to implement the CBTA before signing the annexes and 
protocols by prescribing the interim measures for them [Ishida] 
- Agreement came to be called as CBTA 
- Main agreement ratified by the six countries by the end of 2003 
4 
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2004, 
October 
 4 
2004, 
November 
30 
Japan agreed to provide non-refundable aid to small projects on rural 
development and social security [Viet Nam breaking news] 
4 
2005 Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region became member of GMS - 
2005, May GMS Transport Sector Strategy Study 3 
2005 MoU on the implementation of the Cross-Border Transportation 
Agreement (CBTA) at the EWEC [VBN,Feb 2015] 
4 
2005, July 
4-5 
Second GMS Summit held in Kunming , Yunnan (China) under the 
theme: “A stronger GMS partnership for common prosperity” 
- 
2005, 
December 
Second Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge opened 
- Linking Savannakhet with Mukhadan 
- EWEC became operational 
3 
2006, April Second EWEC conference held in Ho Chi Minh City (Viet Nam) 4 
2006, May GMS Transport Sector Strategy, TSS, 2006-2015 was published 3 
2007 Second Thai-Lao Friendship Brides with the development aid by 
Japan connecting Mukdahan and Savannakhet-> Route 9 (EWEC) 
3 
2007, 
January 
Japan proposed the Mekong – Japan partnership program with focus 
in 3 main area: sub-regional economic integration, expansion of 
trade, and the pursuit of universal values and the shared goals of the 
sub-region 
3 
2007 STF proposed new corridors in the Transport Sector Strategy Study 
as a blueprint for next ten years and approved at 14th GMS 
Ministerial Conference in Manila on June 19-21, 2007 
4 
2007 Viet Nam and Cambodia signed a MoU on the establishment of a 
one-stop-shop model at the Moc Bai-Ba Vet border under the CBTA 
[VNBreaking News, 2015] 
4, 5 
2007 
August 23 
MOU signed by Thailand – Lao PDR –Viet Nam at Savannakhet, 
Lao PDR (Wongsuksiridacha): 
- Cross-border transport of goods and passengers along the EWEC 
permitted 
- Designated transport route (Mae Sot – Phitsanulok – Khon Khen – 
Kalasin – Mukdahan – Savannakhet – Dansavanh – Lao Bao – Dong 
Ha – Hue – Danang) 
- Recognition of authorized transport operators by other contracting 
parties 
- Gradual implementation of SWI and SSI 
4 
2008 Economic Corridors Forum (ECF) was formed to “bolster efforts in 
transforming GSM transport corridors into economic corridors” 
4, 5 
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http://www.adb.org/countries/gms/sector-activities/multisector 
2008, 
March 30-
31 
Third GMS Summit held in Vientiane (Lao PDR) under the theme: 
“Enhancing competitiveness through greater connectivity” 
- 
2009, June 
11 
Commencement of the implementation of the MOUs between 
Thailand – Lao PDR – Viet Nam 
- Initial quota (trucks only) 400 vehicles / country 
4 
2011, 
November 
Third Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge opened 3 
2011,  
Dec. 19-20 
Fourth GMS Summit held in Nay Pyi Taw (Myanmar) under the title 
of: “Beyond 2012: toward a new decade of GMS strategic 
development partnership” 
2, 4 
2013,  
Nov. 26 
Fourth Joint Committee Meeting for the GMS Cross-Border 
Transport Agreement (CBTA) held in Nay Pyi Taw (Myanmar): 
- Action Plan for GMS Transport Facilitation (2013-2015) endorsed 
4 
2013, 
December 
Fourth International Mekong Bridge between Hoayxay (Lao PDR) 
and Chiang Khong (Thailand) completed 
- Last missing link along the NSEC completed 
3 
2014, 
September 
Noi Bai – Lao Cai Expressway (240 km long) in Viet Nam opened 
in the eastern part of the NSEC 
3 
2014, 
August 7-8 
Sixth GMS Economic Corridors Forum (ECF-6)  
- Completion of its first full cycle of hosting of the Forum by all GMS 
countries 
4 
2014,  
Dec. 19-20 
5th GMS Summit: “Committed to Inclusive and Sustainable 
Development in the GMS” 
- Recognition to the ECF to has served “its role as the main advocate, 
overseer and coordination of all activities toward the development of 
the GMS economic corridors. It has facilitated networking and 
exchange of information, overseen the preparation of and endorsed 
strategies and action plans (SAPs) for specific economic corridors, 
identified the relevant corridor-related issues to be addressed, 
institutionalized the participation of local authorities, and enhanced 
the involvement of the private sector in economic corridor 
development” 
- Sixth GMS Summit to be held in Viet Nam in 2017 
- 
2015, 
February 6 
Launch of the one-stop-shop customs model at the Lao Bao – 
Dansavanh International Border Gate (EWEC) 
4, 5 
2015,  
May 9 
Myanmar and Laos formally opened the first ever friendship bridge 
across the Mekong River that links Myanmar's Tachileik in Shan 
state and Laungnamthat Province of Laos 
3 
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- Construction started in February 2013 
- Plan raised during Lao Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong 
visit to Myanmar in July 2011 
2015,  
May 20 
Third East-West Economic Corridor Conference took place in 
Bangkok (Thailand) focusing on promoting the effective 
development of the region: 
- A Joint Declaration was approved, specializing in upgrading 
infrastructure and completing legal framework for trans-border 
transport 
4, 5 
2015,  
June 11 
Seventh GMS Economic Corridors Forum (ECF-7) held in Kunming 
(China) under the theme of: “Fostering Pragmatic Cooperation 
towards the Future of GMS Economic Corridor 
- 
2015, 
August 30 
Inauguration ceremonies of the construction of the second Thai-
Myanmar Friendship Bridge crossing the Moei/Thaungyin River and 
of the handover of the Myawaddy – Kawkareik Road 
3 
2015,  
Sept. 10 
20th GMS Ministerial Conference in Nay Pi Taw (Myanmar) - 
Table 12 - GMS Economic Corridors, Timeline 
 
5.5.2. Stage 1 - National stakeholders’ agreement: Mr. Noritada Morita initiative and the 
Ministerial Conferences 
The origin of the GMS Economic Corridors can be traced together with the proposition of the 
GMS program. After the attach to his hotel during the Mekong Committee meeting in Lao PDR 
and the aftermaths discussions between the countries, Mr. Morita got strongly concerns about how 
to guarantee the peace after the peace agreements would be signed. He could observe how the 
confronting positions were getting stronger and the inability of the international powers to 
positively influence. At that moment the demand from Lao PDR for the construction of small 
hydropower dam was the opportunity for him to “foster projects that would promote cooperation 
rather than enmity” [Teresita]. As Mr. Morita explained during the interview, Lao PDR sought 
project was too small in size to have economic sense. Lao PDR wanted to develop small 
hydropower plant for increasing the electrification access, without any major industry in the 
country plants of about 50MW (minimum to support the investment economically profitable) was 
beyond their needs. Mr. Morita proposed then to export the surplus electricity to the highly 
demanding Thailand’s national utility EGAT. Even without surprise because of the tensions at that 
time, Lao PDR accepted to consider the deal if that would be possible. Mr. Morita then introduced 
the project to EGAT, which pointed out that “electricity has no color”. After several discussions 
at technical and political level among the countries with different levels of involvement of Mr. 
Morita team, the Xeset hydropower dam was agreed between the countries and approved by the 
ADB Board of Directors. This small project had a huge impact on the regional mindset, for the 
first time two countries, formerly declared enemies, had a joint project that was benefiting both.  
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The success of the Xeset hydropower agreement (even though its small size), allow Mr. Morita to 
start a round of bilateral talks with each of the countries in the Indochina region to propose a 
regional program for economic cooperation. For that, he formed a Bank Study Team which 
allowed him in this task. With this, he outreached all the countries, no matter of their political 
situation. The logic behind was that the ADB had the same responsibility towards every of its 
member countries, what granted him independence from the “geopolitics aspects” as well as 
granted neutrality in front of the member countries.  
The Bank Study Team was led by Mr. Thomas Crouch, Senior Economist, under the guidance of 
Mr. Ricardo M. Tan, Programs Manager, Programs Department (West). Other core members of 
the Study Team were Mr. Cesar E. Virata and Dr. David Husband, who served as senior advisors 
to the Bank.22 
In order to foster that cooperation program, ADB approved a regional technical assistance (RETA) 
including two phases. The Phase I covered from August 1992 to February 1993 and included (i) 
consultations between the Bank study team and each of the participating governments, (ii) the 
preparation of a draft framework paper on subregional economic cooperation, (iii) the convening 
of the First Conference on Subregional Economic Cooperation to discuss the results of the 
consultation and to agree on work to be undertaken under Phase II, and (v) the publication of the 
result of Phase I [ADB, 1994]. 
After getting all the countries onboard, the next task was to find a place for the gathering. 
Considering the recent political situation, Mr. Morita’s main concern was to not fall in avoidable 
conflicts. For that, two conditions were put in place as preventive: (i) setting a neutral venue, the 
ADB headquarters in Manila; (ii) reducing the formalities to the minimal, and (iii) excluding 
ministries of foreign affairs (while the delegation should be appointed directly by Prime Ministers’ 
offices). This latter has been considering very important for avoiding international affairs 
discussions and concentrate on the pragmatic aspects. 
In those terms, the First Ministerial Conference was held in Manila (Philippines) on October of 
1992. This conference was a milestone in the regional politics. It was the first time in which high 
representatives from all the countries gathered in the same place. The meeting started very cold 
with the countries not talking to each other. In order to facilitate the conversation additional 
measures were put in place, the most relevant were to skip the need of signing any formal 
declaration and just create proceedings that written by ADB would reflect the visions of all the 
countries. This was also in order to avoid the need to report back to the cabinets and possible 
conflicts for interpretations. A second condition that was proposed and accepted in what later 
would be called the “two plus” principle which in sum, the “enables subsets of member countries 
to pursue regional cooperation initiatives without requiring full consensus” [ADB, 2002]. 
Subregional Road Projects identified and discussed during the consultations of Phase I: 
                                                 
 
22 ADB, 1993 
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1. Lao PDR/Yunnan Province: a road to Luand Prabang and Phong Sali, if extended, 
could connect with the Yunnan road system. This would also improve the link 
between Yunnan and Thailand 
 
2. Lao PDR/ Viet Nam: Upgrading and completion of the road from Nakhon Phanom 
(on the border between Thailand and Lao PDR) to Vinh (on Viet Nam’s coast) 
would give producers in Lao PDR and Thailand better access to Viet Nam and the 
South China Sea. Construction of a new port at or near Vinh is also favored by Lao 
PDR. 
 
3. Lao PDR/Thailand: A second bridge across the Mekong would improve the link 
between Thailand, Lao PDR and Viet Nam, and increase access for Lao PDR and 
Thailand to the South China Sea. 
 
4. Cambodia / Lao PDR and Cambodia /Viet Nam/Thailand: Rehabilitation of the 
most dilapidated sections of the primary network in Cambodia, including 
temporary structures (in particular RN5 and RN6) and key provincial roads (e.g., 
RP69), would improve the link between Cambodia’s interior and its coast, and 
between Cambodia and Lao PDR, Viet Nam and Thailand. 
 
5. Viet Nam / Cambodia/Thailand: rehabilitation of the Ho Chi Minh – Phnom Penh 
– Bangkok road would reduce travel time between the three capitals 
 
6. Myanmar/Yunnan Province: Road improvement between Kunming-Dali-Ruili, 
known both as the Dian Mian Road and the Stilweel Road, would improve 
Myanmar’s link to the Chinese transportation network and improve Yunnan’s 
access to markets in Myanmar and Thailand. Some 320 km of the 900 km road are 
now being upgraded 
 
7. Myanmar/Thailand: Construction and upgrading of sections of the Asian Highway, 
including the planned A2 route crossing the Salween River at Ta Kaw and linking 
with Thailand via Kengtung and Hpayak, would eliminate a weak link in a road 
system that connects Southeast Asia with South and West Asia 
Based on the success of the First Conference, ADB approved a Phase 2. 
After new consultations with the countries, the Second Ministerial Conference was held in Manila 
(Philippines) on 30-31 August 1993. At this time, the projects were better defined and for the 
transport sector an agreement was made for the “Five Principles for Project Section, Prioritization, 
and Design, Especially in Regards to the Transport Sector” [ADB, 1993]: 
 Priority should be given to the improvement and rehabilitation of existing facilities over 
that of construction of new ones. 
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 Subregional projects need not involve all six countries in the subregion. Priority should be 
given to those subregional projects on which there is already agreement among the 
countries that are directly concerned. 
 The design of projects should give attention to the trade generation potential of projects, 
especially in light of the economic transformation taking place in the countries in the 
subregion 
 To facilitate project implementation and provide immediate benefits, transport projects 
should be implemented in sections or stretches. 
 In view of financial constraints, there is a need to establish some criteria for project 
selection. Among those that should be considered are the subregional (versus national) 
character of the project and the financial resources that are most likely to become available 
for funding subregional projects 
Based on those five principles, five projects were prioritized [ADB, 1993, p. 56]:  
 Upgrading of the Ho Chi Minh – Phnom Penh – Bangkok road connection, including 
possible extension to Vung Tau in Viet Nam; 
 Construction of a Thai – Lao PDR – Viet Nam East-West Corridor involving Routes 8, 9  
and/or 12, including associated ports and bridges; 
 Development of a good quality road serving traffic between Chiang Rai (Thailand) and 
Kunming (southwest PRC) via Myanmar; 
 Upgrading of the Kunming – Lashio road system. 
In addition, other five projects was considered for further study by the consultants as part of the 
subregional transportation sector study: 
(i) The Kunming – Hanoi road link 
(ii) The Southern Lao PDR road link to Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) in Cambodia 
(iii) The Mongla – Kengtung – Takaw – Loilem road project 
(iv) The Yunnan Province – Kyugok – Lashio – Loilem road project. 
Participants at the Second Conference included representatives from each of the countries. H.E. 
Chea Chanto, Minister of Planning for Cambodia, Mr. Li Ruogu actions direct of the International 
Department of China, H. E. Phao Bounnaphol, Minister of Prime Minister’s Cabinet, H. E. Khin 
Maung Yin, Minister of Construction of Myanmar; H. E. Supachai Panitchpadki, Deputy Prime 
Minister of Thailand; H. E. Tran Duc Luong Vice Prime Minister of Viet Nam.  
 
5.5.3. Stage 2 – High level political support: Economic Corridors concept and 1st GMS 
Summit: 
Based on the five principles agreed at the Second Conference, construction of road links was 
rapidly started in the region. Thailand held meeting with Lao PDR, China, and Myanmar to discuss 
what would become the NSEC; Cambodia approved its First Socioeconomic Development Plan 
including road development from border to border; and the First Friendship Bridge between Lao 
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PDR and Thailand funded by Australian cooperation was opened to the public on 1994. Under this 
positive environment, the negotiations for the regional road network continued and the final routes 
experiences several changes until at the Fourth Ministerial Meeting an agreement was achieved on 
9 transport corridors. At the same occasion, the need to introduce measures to the “software” 
aspects was also raised by the consultant and included in the draft final report [Ishida 2013, p. 56].  
The Asian Crisis in the 90s affected the implementation of the transport corridors. At that moment, 
the ADB staff proposed an alternative (also referred as an initial explosive by Ishida, 2013) in the 
form of the economic corridor concept. This aimed to a broader impact on the entire corridor (not 
only on the industrial poles), therefore reaching the development to remote rural areas. This new 
approach was very well welcomed by the member countries and immediately possible corridors 
were discussed at the time of Eight Ministerial Conference in 1998. 
The economic corridor approach also emphasized the need for the software measures. The 
countries have also faced the difficulties for the approval of the conventions recommended at the 
UN-ESCAP 48/11. In fact, an agreement has already existed since the Third Meeting of the STF 
in 1996 about the need of developing new conventions that would be better suited to the conditions 
of the region in the near term. With the new impulse from the economic corridors, in 1999, the 
three countries across the EWEC agreed to implement a basic framework proposed by the 
consultant for the elimination of the non-physical barriers. Following the principles of “two plus”, 
the other member countries decided to join in the consecutive years, Cambodia in 2001, China in 
2002, and Myanmar in 2003. With the incorporation of all the member countries, the now called 
Cross-Border Trade Agreement was going to become a key document to integrate all the measures 
needed for the facilitation of the intra-regional trade through the utilization of the economic 
corridors. This was beyond the capabilities of the STF, and at the Sixth Meeting of the STF (once 
the first full round through the countries), it was decided to move that discussions to the National 
Transport Facilitation Committee (NTFC) of each country and through a Joint Committee at the 
regional level.  
The combination of the economic corridors and a fully operational CBTA needed of a political 
capital that was lacking at that moment. For that, a summit of heads of state of the GMS countries 
was arranged for the first time, as the superior hierarchy in the institutional set-up of the GMS 
program.  
 
5.5.4. Stage 3 – From the road projects to the three Economic Corridors: 
During the bilateral consultations of Phase I, seven road projects have emerged as priorities. From 
the map available (Ishida, Isono, 2012) these seven projects showed a clear focus on national road 
networks. With the approval of the five selection principles, there was a modification of the initial 
network already at the Second Conference. Discussions continued and at the Third Ministerial 
Conference, 8 projects were presented by the consultant. Finally, at the Fourth Ministerial 
Conference in 1994, the 8 projects were approved and another one added. These 9 projects 
constitute the transport corridors that were officially included in the 1995 GMS Transport Master 
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Plan. Finally, those were replaced by the three economic corridors after the Eight Ministerial 
Meeting. 
These changes in the routes didn’t create major complaints in the Southern Economic Corridor 
and the East-West Economic Corridor, but in the North-South Economic Corridor, the change on 
the route became a major concern for the Laotian government. The modification from trespassing 
throughout Lao PDR to only go through the Northern part had an evident impact on the motivation 
of Lao PDR for investing in a road that would not go through any economic or industrial center. 
For the Chinese and Thai side, this was a more direct and shorter route for communicating Yunnan 
province with Bangkok port and therefore had accelerated their investments. As a consequence, 
the entire was ready except the part inside Lao PDR national borders. 
In order to facilitate the support from Lao PDR, China and Thailand offered to finance the 
construction of the infrastructure needed. Nevertheless, not only economic reasons were behind 
the Laotian opposition. What became to be the main concern was based on national defense issues. 
The presence of a Thai military base near the expected bridge triggered opposition at the national 
level based on the recent history of conflicts between both countries. 
Thanks to the direct and private conversations between Mr. Morita and Lao PDR government, a 
new solution was possible. At this moment, the chance of losing the advantage as “land-linked” 
country finally balanced more in the decision because of the possibility (which in fact is included) 
of an alternative through Myanmar (although through the Sian State). 
 
 
Figure 10 - Evolution of Economic Corridors since the First Ministerial Conference. (Source: Ishida, Isono, 2012) 
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5.5.5. Stage 4 - The institutional construction: The Cross-Border Trade Agreement (CBTA) 
As explained before the removal of non-physical trade barriers became an important issue soon 
after the starting of the construction works, as well as one of the main complaints from transport 
operators. In order to facilitate the process, a standard set of recommended and widely use 
international conventions compiled in the UN-ESCAP 48/11 was the first approach. The seven 
international conventions recommended in the resolution are23: 
- The Convention on Road Traffic of 1968, and the Convention on Road Signs and 
Signals of 1968. 
 
- International customs transit regimes, such as those stipulated in the Customs 
Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets 
(TIR Convention) of 1975 (as recommended in Economic and Social Council 
resolution 1984/79 of 27 July 1984 
 
- The Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Commercial Road 
Vehicles of 1956 (currently under review) and the Customs Convention on 
Containers of 1972, to enact facilities for the temporary importation of goods road 
vehicles and loading units 
 
- The International Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier Control of Goods 
of 1982, as a legal framework for the harmonization of such operations to minimize 
border control measures in international transport, harmonize their inspection 
requirements, and to provide, if possible, for joint inspection locations 
 
- The Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road 
(CMR) of 1956, to establish internationally acceptable regulations on the legal 
relationship between road carriers and consignees or consignors; 
Also mentioned before, it was soon found that the approval of these international conventions by 
the six GMS countries was not going to be possible (in fact no one has ratified any of them). This 
made clear the need of setting a process of regional negotiations for the development of a set of 
agreements that would better suit the needs of the region in the short and medium term. The main 
agreement, which was drafted by the international consultant was rapidly approved and ratified by 
the six countries. The document was introduced in 1999 and Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam 
had signed it by November 1999, Cambodia in November 2001, China in November 2002 and 
Myanmar in September 2003; so by the end of 2003 it was signed by all the countries [Yushu 
Feng].  
                                                 
 
23 http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/tarns_annex1.pdf  
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The declared objectives of the CBTA are [Souvannavong]: 
- Facilitation of border crossing formalities (single window and single stop customs 
inspection, coordinating of hours of operation; and exchange of advance information and 
clearance) 
- Facilitate cross-border movement of people (multi-entry visa, recognition of driver license) 
- Facilitate cross-border movement of goods (regional transit regime, phytosanitary and 
veterinary inspection) 
- Exchange of traffic rights 
- Requirements for admittance of road vehicles 
- Institutional Arrangements 
 
Nevertheless, after the signing of the main document the complications came for the discussion 
and negotiation of the 20 annexes and protocols. This process was beyond the capabilities of the 
STF and a new institutional setting was introduced with success.  
 
 
Figure 11 - CBTA Institutional Mechanism (source: Feng, 2014) 
 
Annexes and Protocols Date of 
signing 
Number of 
articles 
Main Agreement Sep. 17, 2003 44 
A1. Carriage of Dangerous Goods Dec. 16, 2004 12 
A2. Registration of Vehicles in International Traffic Apr. 30, 2004 18 
A3. Carriage of Perishable Goods Jul. 5, 2005 34 
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A4. Facilitation of Frontier Crossing Formalities Apr. 30, 2004 21 
A5. Cross-border Movement of People Jul. 5, 2005 27 
A6. Transit and Inland Customs Clearance Regime Mar. 20, 2007 22 
A7. Road Traffic Regulation and Signage Apr. 30, 2004 13 
A8. Temporary Importation of Motor Vehicles Mar. 20, 2007 21 
A9. Criteria for Licensing of Transport Operators for 
Cross-border Transport Operations 
Dec. 16, 2004 15 
A10. Conditions of Transport Jul. 5, 2005 20 
A11. Road and Bridge Design, Construction, and 
Specifications 
Apr. 30, 2004 21 
A12. Border Crossing and Transit Facilitates and Services Apr. 30, 2004 16 
A13a. Multimodal Carrier Liability Regime Apr. 30, 2004 11 
A13b. Criteria for the Licensing of Multimodal Transport 
Operators for Cross-border Transport Operations 
Dec. 16, 2004 15 
A14 Container Customs Regime Mar. 20, 2007 23 
A15 Commodity Classification System Apr. 30, 2004 15 
A16 Criteria for Driver’s Licenses Dec. 16, 2004 13 
P1. Designation of Corridors, Routes, and Points of Entry 
and Exist (Border Crossings) 
Apr. 30, 2004 12 
P2. Charges Concerning Transit Traffic Jul. 5, 2005 17 
P3. Frequency and Capacity of Services and the Issuance 
of Quotas and Permits 
Mar. 20, 2007 17 
Total number of Articles 407 
Table 13 - Main agreement, annexes, and protocols of the CBTA and the number of articles (source: Ishida) 
 
Due to the long time that the negotiations took, the 8th meeting of the STF in August 2004 agreed 
to start an initial implementation of the CBTA was started (IICBTA) in five borders [Ishida, 2013]. 
Therefore Memorandum of Understandings were signed between the countries involved, in a 
bilateral manner. During the interview survey, this was also explained as the need of specifying 
issues that CBTA was not covering (CBTA as an umbrella agreement). 
Border Date of signing of MOU 
Lao Bao (Viet Nam) / Dansavanh (Lao PDR) March 25, 2005 
Savannakhet (Lao PDR) / Mukdahan (Thailand) July 4, 2005 
Poipet (Cambodia) / Aranya Prathet (Thailand) July 4, 2005 
Moc Bai (Viet Nam) / Bavet (Cambodia) March 31, 2006 
Hekou (Yunnan, China) / Lao Cai (Viet Nam) March 20, 2007 
Table 14 - Borders for the IICBTA (source: Ishida, 2013) 
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Figure 12 - CBTA Road Map (source: Feng) 
 
 
Figure 13 - Overview of IICBTA MOUs (source: Wongsuksiridacha) 
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5.5.6. Stage 5 - Harmonization: Initial implementation and ratification process of the CBTA 
 
The main text of the CBTA was signed in 2003 and after several meetings, the sixteen annexes 
and three protocols were also signed. By the need of 2010, China, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Viet 
Nam have already ratified all the annexes and protocols. That was not the case of Thailand and 
Myanmar, who ratified not before 2015. During the interview survey, it was mentioned that the 
internal instability could be a reason behind the delay in Myanmar. The reasons for Thailand are 
more unclear, especially considering that Thailand has traditionally been one of the main 
promoters of the project. Some national level issues, like the 2014 military coup, could be a 
reasonable explanation. 
 
 Date of 
signing 
CAMB CHINA LAO MYAN THAI VIET 
Main Sep. 17, 2003 R R R R R R 
A1. Dec. 16, 2004 R R R R Signed R 
A2. Apr. 30, 2004 R R R R R R 
A3. Jul. 5, 2005 R R R R R R 
A4. Apr. 30, 2004 R R R R Signed R 
A5. Jul. 5, 2005 R R R Signed R R 
A6. Mar. 20, 2007 R R R R Signed R 
A7. Apr. 30, 2004 R R R R R R 
A8. Mar. 20, 2007 R R R R Signed R 
A9. Dec. 16, 2004 R R R R R R 
A10. Jul. 5, 2005 R R R R Signed R 
A11. Apr. 30, 2004 R R R R R R 
A12. Apr. 30, 2004 R R R R R R 
A13a. Apr. 30, 2004 R R R Signed R R 
A13b. Dec. 16, 2004 R R R Signed R R 
A14 Mar. 20, 2007 R R R R Signed R 
A15 Apr. 30, 2004 R R R R R R 
A16 Dec. 16, 2004 R R R R R R 
P1. Apr. 30, 2004 R R R R R R 
P2. Jul. 5, 2005 R R R R R R 
P3. Mar. 20, 2007 R R R Signed R R 
Table 15 - Ratification of CBTA annexes and protocol by 2012 (source: Wongsuksiridacha) 
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5.6. Causality analysis of the development process 
 
5.6.1. Stage 1: National stakeholders’ support 
The Stage 1 of the GMS Economic Corridors occurred in parallel with the Stage 1 of the GMS 
Power Cooperation project. In order to better grasp the influences, both processes are presented 
together in the following causality analysis. The area surrounded in red refers specifically to the 
GMS Economic Corridors, while the GMS Power Cooperation appears surrounded by blue. 
Therefore, those respective factors, actions, and outputs are explained respectively. This section 
covers GMS Economic Corridors Stage 1, whilst section 6.4 deals with GMS Power Cooperation. 
 
Figure 14 - Causality Analysis GMS Economic Corridors, Stage 1 
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5.6.1.1. Analysis of causality diagram 
 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 Indochina was divided 
into three groups after II 
World War 
The region was divided into soviet 
communism (Lao PDR and Viet Nam), 
Chinese communism (China and part of 
Cambodia), Western capitalism (Thailand) 
and nationally unstable countries (Myanmar 
and Cambodia)  
 
“In the 1980s, the countries through which 
the Mekong River flowed were separate 
nation-states that were divided not only by 
administrative and political boundaries but, 
more importantly, by ideological ones” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, pp. 141] 
Factor 
 
2 Inter-governmental 
relations freeze 
Countries kept their foreign relations in terms 
of defense and agreements were minimal 
 
“Apart from a history of differing ideological 
alignments, the four counties were also the 
site of numerous border disputes” 
“Preah Vihar temple dispute between 
Thailand and Cambodia” 
“Other border disputes involved Thailand and 
Laos particularly in northern Thailand” 
“Thailand closed down its borders in 
November 1975” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, pp. 141] 
Output 
3 Military and defense 
concerns were priority 
over technical issues 
Considering the borders’ conflicts mentioned 
before, the military concerns became 
dominant in the entire process. For later on 
stage was mentioned: 
 
“One is Route 9, Da Nang – Savannakhet and 
Thai's side is Mukdajan. That was to me to 
me the most difficult routing. It took almost 
three years because military groups were 
against” 
“In Thai side, Mukdahan, near to the river, 
there was a cantonment” 
“And if you have ever come from Da Nag to 
Laos and connect to the existing road. 
Savannakhet – Mukadahan was very 
Factor 
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beneficial, but the Laotian side didn’t agree 
because the Thai side had a military base” 
[GMS.II.EC-205-208] 
4 Thailand alliance got 
support from international 
community 
Thailand’s so-called “bamboo diplomacy” of 
“bending with the prevailing wind”  
[Asia sentinel] 
 
“Prior to the end of the Cold War, Thailand’s 
foreign policy had a passive attitude: in 
response to international issues, it focused on 
accommodating foreign countries by either 
taking sides or balancing powerful countries 
against one another” 
[Carle, 2015, p. 40] 
 
“Western side was always siding with Thai 
side” 
[GMS.EC.II-18] 
Output 
5 Previous cooperation 
institutions paralyzed 
The Mekong Committee, an only existing 
forum for regional cooperation, was not able 
to make decisions. 
International donors were not able to 
intermediate 
Mekong Committee even moved to interim 
status 
 
“Then, the meeting I attended was of the 
Mekong River Commission. Instead of 
people talking about the agenda, both 
countries started criticizing the other size” 
[GMS.EC.II-17] 
Factor 
6 Trading between countries 
reduced to minimum 
Without formal relations, and lacking the 
infrastructure formal trading was reduced to 
a minimum. 
Even the transport of merchandises from Lao 
PDR to Bangkok, granted by international 
agreement, was commonly difficult 
 
“In the case of the port, they have to rely on 
Thailand.” 
“We have to plan everything to Bangkok. The 
trucking company is Thai. And they inspect 
everything. So they know very well where we 
are, and what we are carrying. Everything is 
under their military observation” 
Factor 
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[GMS-EC.II.165-166] 
7 Foreign relations based on 
mistrust 
Tensions between countries had moved 
towards. As mentioned during the interview 
survey, even media was critic with regional 
dialogue as it could be considered to  
 
Output 
8 Transport and trade 
involved several different 
departments and 
authorities 
Cambodia through state-run enterprises 
under the control of Ministry 
Thailand division across authorities 
Myanmar atomized 
 
Factor 
9 No talks between 
technical bodies on 
regional transportation 
No agreement between countries in building 
infrastructure for connecting countries at that 
time. Even not to build bridges across the 
Mekong river 
Factor 
10 Civil servants didn’t 
appreciate how closer 
regional cooperation 
could benefit the GMS 
¨Civil servants back then didn´t really 
appreciate how closer regional cooperation 
could benefit the GMS,¨  
[The Phnom Penh Plan For Development 
Management: A Retrospective, p. 4] 
Output 
11 Avoiding foreign 
ministries involvement 
was considered needed for 
agreement 
Mr. Morita requested to countries to not 
include foreign affairs ministries because if 
so, building the agreements would have been 
more difficult  
 
“”The reason why in the GMS I refused that 
is represented by the ministries of foreign 
affairs is because of the nature of foreign 
affairs. They are not guided to put priority for 
the international cooperation” 
“So when I started the sub-regional 
cooperation, GMS, I asked all the leaders 
“please do not put minister of foreign affairs 
s the coordination office, please remove them 
from the scheme” 
[GMS-EC.II.2-3] 
Action 
12 Road development in the 
countries didn’t include 
regional connectivity 
Absence of infrastructures connecting 
countries and of plans for developing 
Output 
13 Lao request for financial 
support for development 
After the meeting of the Mekong Committee, 
during which Mr. Morita’s hotel was 
attacked, Lao requested financial support 
from ADB expressing their concerns that no 
Output 
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other international donor was supporting 
them  
 
“He said, I like to have ADB financing for us 
to construct a hydropower project” 
[GMS-P.I.28] 
14 Transition towards market 
economies after Cold War 
Lao PDR Chintanakan Mai and Viet Nam’s 
Doi Moi introduced in 1986 
Reforms like the Doi Moi in Viet Nam and 
the New Economic Mechanism introduced in 
Lao PDR were with the intention to integrate 
into market economies  
[Interview] 
 
“The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 
necessarily changed the dynamic in 
Indochina. Without the Soviet Union’s 
support for Vietnam and Laos, both countries 
faced the distinct possibility of economic 
collapse” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, p.142] 
 
“Furthermore, the prime minister of a free 
market country, Thailand, Mr. Chartchai 
Chunhavan advocated ‘the conversion of 
Indochina from a battlefield to a market’ in 
1998” 
[Ishida, 2013, p.9] 
Factor 
15 ADB interested in 
establishing relations 
between countries for 
consolidation of the peace 
In the aftermaths of the conflicts in the 
region, Mr. Morita’s concerns were more 
focused on how the peace was going to be 
maintained after the signing of the Peace 
Accords 
 
“Thailand is our shareholder, but your 
country is also our shareholder. For us, as 
long as you are our member country, whether 
country A or country B is correct is not my 
issue. My issue is how to create the peace” 
[GMS-EC.II.27] 
 
“What continues to make this possible after 
nearly two decades of uninterrupted 
economic exchange is what ADB refers to as 
the peace dividend” 
Action 
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[Cruz-del Rosario, p.147] 
16 Reduction of political 
tensions in the region 
The Peace Accords signed on October 23 in 
1991 represented the official end of the 
military tensions 
Cooperation started to be sought again in the 
region 
Establishment of the Mekong River 
Commission in 1995, replacing the interim 
Mekong Committee 
 
“It was probably because of the Peace Accord 
for Cambodia, that was possible in 1991-91” 
[GMS-EC.III] 
 
“Furthermore, the prime minister of a free 
market country, Thailand, Mr. Chartchai 
Chunhavan advocated ‘the conversion of 
Indochina from a battlefield to a market’ in 
1998” 
[Ishida, 2013, p.9] 
Factor 
17 Idea of ADB project to 
promote friendship 
appeared 
“Mr. Morita thought of the possibility, if any, 
to undertake project that would benefit Laos, 
yet would also promote cooperation rather 
than enmity among the countries” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, p.140] 
Output 
23 ADB established a Bank 
Study Team for bilateral 
conversation with each 
country / government 
“A draft Framework Report, prepared after 
the bilateral consultations between the Bank 
Study Team and each of the participating 
governments, was the basic working 
document for the round table conference” 
[ADB, First Conference Proceedings, 
Preface] 
Action 
24 First Ministerial 
Conference held at ADB 
headquarters 
“In late 1992, the ADB organized the first 
ever ministerial conference in Manila at the 
ADB Headquarters” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, p.146] 
Action 
25 Intra-regional IPP 
agreements gained interest 
of national utilities 
Right after the initiation of the GMS 
program, several MOUs were being signed 
 
“Thai has met with Lao PDR and has signed 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for 
cooperation on energy projects” 
[ADB, 1993, Second Conference 
Proceedings, p. 35] 
Output 
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Thailand, for example, has signed MOU with 
Lao PDR, Myanmar, China and Cambodia 
[GMS-P.III.3-21] 
26 Increasing cooperation 
gained international 
support 
The change in the foreign policies from 
Thailand can have  
In fact, US embargo over Viet Nam was 
removed a bit later, in 1991. 
 
Other international donors have been 
supporting the development and 
implementation of GMS projects 
“Australia joins Friendship Bridge 
anniversary celebrations” 
[Australian Embassy, 2009] 
 
Output 
27 Discussions were complex 
and projects focused on 
national approaches 
It was reported that initially there were 
complexities (countries didn’t talk to each 
other)  
 
“They didn’t talk each other in the meeting” 
[Morita] 
 
When looking to the projects discussed, a 
strong focus on national needs rather than 
regional optimization can be observed 
[proceedings, Ishida] 
Action 
28 Adoption of Two Plus 
principle 
For a project to be approved to be classified 
as GMS project need to include at least two 
member countries, keeping it open to the rest 
to join if they want 
 
“2+ principle: there is no need for the 6 
countries to agree for a project” 
[GMS-EC.I.17] 
 
“I said as long as two countries agree to do 
that, whether you have a third or fourth 
country I said, it doesn’t matter” 
[GMS-EC.II.106] 
Action 
29 Focus on implementation Mr. Morita immediate objective was to 
develop the connections between the 
countries. As he mentioned, if there is money 
only for bamboo, bamboo bridge is ok 
 
Action 
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“I said, if you are really to decide about the 
road network, which is very important. 
Everybody lets come together to one place 
and compare your map and my map and see 
at to the border what are the missing links. 
And connect these missing links, once the 
road is upgraded or not, if the missing link is 
due to the absence of a bridge, whether the 
bridge is wood or concrete or even bamboo, 
let’s accept it. Once you start designing, the 
new road takes the time. And let’s no create a 
new route. Initially, let’s connect existing 
road by filling the missing links and ask your 
village people which road should connect. 
Whether is a straight line or not, it doesn’t 
matter. If you want to make it straight line, 
you make later on. When you make the 
tunnel, you make later on. If you want 
concrete bridge you make when your country 
become rich” 
[GMS-EC.II.108] 
30 Agreement of five 
principles for road project 
prioritization 
The five principles mentioned previously 
were endorsed by the member countries at the 
Second Ministerial Conference [Proceedings 
of the conference, ADB 1993] 
Action 
31 Projects based on 
consultant regional master 
plan 
ADB contracted the studies for regional 
master plan through an external international 
consultant, which was in charge of the plan 
and of the bilateral talks with the parties 
(PADECO) 
Output 
33 GMS projects opened to 
other donors’ financing 
“Ownership belongs to countries: in fact, 
ADBs approval is not needed for a project to 
be done. Countries propose a project and then 
there is a call for donors. ADB can be donor, 
but it is not a requirement” 
[GMS-EC.I.21] 
Action 
34 ADB becoming 
Secretariat while not 
program “owner” 
One of the key issues for the GMS program 
was to increase the ownership of the countries 
of it. In that sense, it was open to their 
agreements to decide which project to fund. 
So, GMS most critical role was to serve as a 
platform or forum for dialogue in the region. 
 
“No secretariat: to avoid again conflicts 
because of excessive formalism. Neither 
Action 
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ADB is secretariat, it only gives 
administrative support” 
[GMS-EC.I.20] 
 
 
5.6.1.2. Links 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
 
From To Description [source] 
1 2 The borders’ conflicts and the ideological differences between countries 
members clearly affecting the inter-governmental relations 
1 3 The military concerns were said to come from fears of possible invasions 
(e.g. Laos and Thailand crossing-border issues) 
1 4 As the only capitalist country in the region, Thailand remained as the only 
ally of Western countries (in particular the US) 
2 7 During the interview survey, it was mentioned the need of removing foreign 
ministries from the scheme in order to overcome less than optimal 
agreements. This could be due to the mistrust between the parties, which 
would be more concerned about protecting national interests rather than in 
creating economies of scale from the regional cooperation 
2 6 Under the context of increasing enmity (even worries about invasions), the 
trade between countries was reduced or even eliminated. Furthermore, even 
though Lao PDR had the right of access to Bangkok port as a landlocked 
country, this was said to be strongly complicated [interview] 
3 5 The rise of military conflicts affected the operation of the technical forums 
(like the Mekong Committee). It was also reported how the international 
community, by siding on Thailand’s support, was aggravating such 
circumstances 
4 5 
5 9 With the paralyzation of the existing technical cooperation forums (that is 
the Mekong Committee), and being under strict control of government 
policies, there were no attempts by roads or development authorities of 
looking to the regional dimension as a possibility 
6 9 
8 10 Without existing technical forums and without a full vision of the sector by 
the technical bodies, the civil servants were unable to appreciate the 
potential benefits that could be derived from the cooperation scheme 
9 10 
7 11 Because of this mistrust, avoidance of ministries of foreign affairs was a 
condition since the first conference. 
5 23 
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10 23 After the success of the Xeset hydropower dam, ADB had an existing case 
of effective cooperation which could serve for attracting the interest of the 
member countries. Without operational technical forums, ADB created a 
Bank Study Team that could convey that message to each of the countries 
individually. 
In order to grab the cooperation, the talks were directly at prime ministers 
level. It was understood that only by having them onboard the risk of second 
round national discussions would be avoided (needed discussions after 
reporting from countries’ representatives) 
11 23 
14 23 
22 23 
10 12 The lack of regional corridors plan could be a consequence of this lack of 
understanding of the merits. No country have prepared these types of plans, 
even though the interest they have showed latterly (e.g. Yunnan in NSEC, 
Lao’s land linked policy and so on) 
10 27 It was mentioned that the initial discussions were not easy: “at beginning 
countries didn’t talk to each other” [interview].  
In the case of the transport, it is possible to see how the road projects 
proposed initially had more of national routes rather than regional 
optimization. 
7 27 
23 24 With that, ADB prepared a regional conference at its headquarters. This 
was not innocent but to find a neutral venue where the representatives 
would be able to discuss freely. In order to reduce the possible tensions, it 
was sought to have a low profile meeting. For example, no official 
statements were done, only a meeting note from the secretariat (ADB). 
24 28 Although the program had a regional membership and objective, it was 
found that it was needed to have all the countries participant at every project 
(some of them would have no special interest in a road link between China 
and Thailand for example). It was also found that for some particular cases 
some countries might be ready to move towards deeper integration rather 
than others (for example, Thailand and Lao PDR in energy agreements). In 
that sense, the final agreement was to accept as GMS project any that would 
involve at least two countries and leave them open to the incorporation of 
other countries if they would like [interview] 
This would also help to better focus the large number of projects initially 
proposed. 
27 28 
24 29 Against this background, the focus from the ADB was to connect the 
missing links, to get results as soon as possible, therefore to focus on 
implementation. It was mentioned that “if bridge must be of bamboo, 
bamboo will be good”. [interview] 
27 29 
28 30 After the agreement on the two plus principle and with the focus on 
implementation (getting rapid results), discussions at the second conference 
were about getting 5 principles for the prioritization [conference 
proceedings] 
29 30 
4 26 
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14 26 With the pacification and the support from Thailand, other international 
donors could feel more incentivized towards increasing support for regional 
cooperation 
26 33 Under the need of getting the momentum for the cooperation and to bring 
as many partners as possible, the ADB accepted to leave the GMS opened 
to funding from other donors (which by the way are in their majority 
shareholders of the ADB) 
29 33 
12 31 The lack of existing plans(and even the lack of real interest at technical 
level) could have been a trigger why ADB contracted international 
consultant for that (outsider point of view), rather than started from 
proposals by member countries (insiders point of view) 
30 31 
15 34 With that action, ADB fulfilled another key objective, to increase the 
ownership of their own development to the member countries. 33 34 
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5.6.2. Stage 2: High level political agreement 
 
Figure 15 - GMS Economic Corridors, Stage 2 
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5.6.2.1. Analysis of causality diagram: 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 History of conflicts Indochina suffered several wars and there 
were continuous concerns among countries 
about invasions (possible invasion of Viet 
Nam into Thailand, border conflicts between 
Thailand and Lao PDR as well as with 
Cambodia, border conflicts with Myanmar, 
drug and human trafficking at the Golden 
Quadrangle…) 
 
“In the 1980s, the countries through which the 
Mekong River flowed were separate nation-
states that were divided not only by 
administrative and political boundaries, but, 
more importantly, by ideological ones” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, pp. 141] 
Factor 
2 Five principles for road 
project prioritization 
“Five Principles for Project Selection, 
Prioritization and Design, Especially in 
Regard to the Transport Sector: 
 Priority should be given to the 
improvement and rehabilitation of 
existing facilities over that of construction 
of new ones. 
 Subregional projects need not involve all 
six countries in the subregion. Priority 
should be given to those subregional 
projects on which there is already 
agreement among the countries that are 
directly concerned. 
 The design of projects should give 
attention to the trade generation potential 
of projects, especially in light of the 
economic transformation taking place in 
the countries in the subregion 
 To facilitate project implementation and 
provide immediate benefits, transport 
projects should be implemented in 
sections or stretches. 
 In view of financial constraints, there is a 
need to establish some criteria for project 
selection. Among those that should be 
considered are the subregional (versus 
national) character of the project and the 
Action 
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financial resources that are most likely to 
become available for funding subregional 
projects 
” 
[ADB, 1993, Second Conference 
Proceedings, p.53] 
3 GMS projects opened to 
other donors’ financing 
One of the agreements at the two initial 
regional conferences and that has continued. 
Very active since its inception, for example, 
the First Friendship Bridge over the Mekong 
was funded by Australia 
 
“Australia joins Friendship Bridge 
anniversary celebrations” 
[Australian Embassy Lao PDR, 2009] 
Action 
4 Different national 
authorities in charge of 
transport, trade, and 
border crossing 
procedures 
As described in the initial section of this 
chapter, transport sector is divided into many 
authorities and ministries in every country 
(although there are differences also in the 
level of “atomization” of the sector for each 
country) 
 
“The related authorities that inspect the 
borders are different: the Ministry of finance 
for customs; the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Ministry of Public Security, or the Ministry of 
Defense for immigration; the Ministry of 
Agriculture for animal and plant quarantine; 
and the Ministry of Health for public health 
quarantine and drug and food quarantine” 
[Ishida, 2013, p. 57-58] 
Factor 
5 National budgets 
constrained by the Asian 
Financial Crisis 
“The implementation of the GMS program, 
including the 9 road projects, faced with 
stagnation caused by the Asian Currency 
Crisis”  
[Ishida, 2007, p.10] 
Factor 
6 Absence of trust between 
countries 
As mentioned before, ideological differences 
and military conflicts, reduced the trust 
between the countries to minimal levels 
 
Factor 
7 Numerous non-physical 
trade barriers still 
remained 
Borders control was very complex. At the 
time of starting the CBTA and its initial 
implementation these have been clearer. Even 
during the development of the transport 
Factor 
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corridors, there were complaints from 
operators  
[Ishida, book] 
8 GMS program started 
without a major political 
agreement 
As a matter of fact, GMS does not have an 
official statement, even it lacks a charter to 
rule its operations  
 
“I think this is first and last international 
group without a charter. People just don’t 
notice it, but it doesn’t have it. Because I 
know, it’s nicer to have but if you propose 
something among countries they are shooting 
each other until yesterday, nothing will be 
agreed. If country A said chapter 1 ok, 
country B will say no. Going back to 
parliament, to cabinet and 1 year 2 years 3 
years disappear. So I said we have to skip this 
very critical and unnecessary thing to avoid 
any conflict. So when the Indochina war was 
ended, I didn’t think I need to introduce new 
war that is battle” 
[GMS-EC.II.91] 
Action 
9 Infrastructure 
construction started 
without including 
institutional aspects 
The initial phases of the corridors were more 
concerned about the missing links (with 
statements as “bamboo bridge is ok”). The 
increase in the demand proved later the need 
to include institutional of software aspects 
 
“The road corridor was only to provide 
infrastructure, but there was a need to 
facilitate the usage of the provided 
infrastructures” 
“That was the genesis of the pre-CBTA in the 
late 90s” 
[GMS-EC.III.49-50] 
Action 
10 ADB structured the GMS 
into different working 
groups 
The institutional setting of the GMS was 
divided into a different working groups for 
each of the sectors plus a hierarchical superior 
meeting of GMS ministers, which responded 
directly to Primer Ministers’ Offices 
 
“GMS bodies: Subregional Transport Forum, 
Economic Corridors Forum, Working Group 
on Human Resource Development, 
Subregional Energy Forum, Subregional 
Action 
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Telecommunications Forum, Tourism 
Working Group, Working Group on 
Agriculture, Working Group on 
Environment” 
[ADB, 2011, p. 26 
11 Five stages for gradual 
development of the 
economic corridors were 
introduced 
Srivastava, 2011 mentions five stages for the 
development of regional corridors: 
(i) Transport Corridor 
(ii) Transport and Trade Facilitation 
Corridor 
(iii) Logistics Corridor 
(iv) Urban Development Corridor 
(v) Economic Corridor 
[Srivastava, 2011] 
Action 
12 Rapid construction 
focused on “missing 
links” 
Rather than building new corridors, the initial 
construction works were focused on 
connecting the missing links. In that sense, 
the construction of the Friendship Bridges 
over the Mekong was essential. This was 
possible thanks to the involvement of other 
international donors. 
 
“The first Friendship Bridge, which was built 
and funded by Australia, first opened in 
1994” 
[Australian Embassy Lao PDR, 2012] 
Action 
13 Connectivity gained 
support across the region 
Countries started to include regional 
connectivity issues in their own development 
plans  
[Cambodia’s First Socioeconomic 
Development Plan] 
Output 
14 ADB carrying out studies 
for project identification 
ADB contracted new studies (the second 
stage)  
[GMS proceedings] 
Action 
15 Negotiations remained at 
technical level 
At the institutional structure of the GMS, the 
main part of the work was assigned to 
Working groups, over which Senior Officials 
meetings also were included 
Action 
16 Transport Corridors (9 
routes) approved at the 4th 
GMS Ministerial meeting 
The original road projects were transformed 
into transport corridors, with some 
modifications that show a more 
comprehensive regional optimization 
Action 
17 New business 
opportunities appeared 
With the establishment of new links and the 
promising reduced distances between main 
Output 
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industrial centers, growing interest appeared 
into the business community (which for 
example supported the establishment of the 
GMS Business Forum) 
 
“Established in 2000, the Greater Mekong 
Subregion Business Forum (GMS-BF) is a 
multicountry, independent, nongovernment 
organization, and a joint initiative of the 
chambers of commerce of the six GMS 
countries; Cambodia, People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, Thailand, 
and Viet Nam. It plays a key role in promoting 
and facilitating cross-border trade and 
investment in the region. 
The main goal of the GMS-BF is to foster 
cooperation and growth of the private sector 
through information sharing, networking, and 
public-private sector dialogue. It is active on 
issues of common interest to members such as 
trade facilitation, cross-border trade 
agreements, and preshipment financing and 
capacity building for small and medium-sized 
enterprises. The forum seeks to promote the 
GMS as a unique trade-investment-transport 
hub.” 
[GMS Business Council website: 
www.gmsbizfourm.com] 
18 Market transition in 
socialist and communist 
countries increased 
importance of 
international trade 
It is assumed that with the reforms in Lao 
PDR and Viet Nam aiming at increasing 
foreign direct investment, promotion of 
international trade was another objective. 
Factor 
19  Transport operators 
complained about 
difficulties for crossing 
borders 
It had been reported that complaints from 
transport operators were common (and still 
are in some cases) at the time of the transport 
corridors and the beginning of the economic 
corridors  
[Ishida] 
Factor 
20 Subnational governments 
and private actors 
initiated dialogues for 
cross-border cooperation 
Different initiatives started to arise in the 
region outside the direct control of central 
governments. For example the development 
triangle  
[Ishida, 2012] 
Action 
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21 Discussions for starting 
of institutional 
construction ended in 
consensus for 
development of CBTA 
After the attempt of implement the 
recommended conventions by UN-ESCAP, it 
was decided to develop a new umbrella 
agreement better suited to the conditions of 
the region  
[Ishida, 2013] 
Action 
22 Progress of the transport 
corridors challenged 
“The implementation of the GMS program, 
including the 9 road projects, faced with 
stagnation caused by the Asian Currency 
Crisis”  
[Ishida, 2007, p.10] 
Output 
23 An “initial explosive” 
was needed 
“The need for a kind of initial explosive was 
also felt from the speeches of ADB staff and 
some ministers”  
[Ishida, 2007, p.10] 
Output 
24 Countries looked forward 
deepening regional 
economic cooperation in 
ASEAN 
“There was a change in Viet Nam’s foreign 
policy to normalize relations with ASEAN 
and China” 
[GMS.I.25] 
Factor 
25 Development of the 3Cs 
vision for GMS 
(Connectivity, 
Competitiveness and 
Community) 
“To realize its vision of a prosperous, 
integrated, and harmonious subregion, the 
GMS Program has adopted a three-pronged 
strategy (the 3Cs)”  
[ADB, 2015, 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publica
tion/29387/gms-ecp-overview-2015.pdf] 
Action 
26 ADB developed and 
proposed the concept of 
Economic Corridor 
“The economic corridor is a concept proposed 
by the ADB as such kind of initial explosive 
“ 
[Ishida, 2007, p.10] 
 
“But then, in 2006 or 7, the countries agreed 
that they should look at more comprehensive 
development along GMS transport corridors” 
“At that time, economic corridor concept was 
brought in” 
[GMS.III.29-30] 
Action 
27 Economic corridors 
showed impact across 
corridor 
The major difference between the transport 
corridors and the economic corridors was the 
change from linking economic centers to a 
more comprehensive development across the 
entire corridor. Belt-shaped  
[Ishida]  
Action 
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28 Regional transport sector 
development was linked 
with national 
development 
It is understood that by aiming at extending 
the growth across the corridors, central 
government felt those better suited their 
national strategies  
Output 
29 Major countries 
(Thailand) looked for 
new trading opportunities 
more intensively 
“ASEAN was also important at that time. At 
the end of the 80s, their economy was 
booming so the next was to extend that to 
Indochina. Leaders from major countries like 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand were 
looking for opportunities to invest” 
[GMS.I.29] 
 
It is reasonable to think that as a way to re-
start after the crisis, countries looked even 
more towards their neighbouring countries 
Factor 
30 Countries looked for 
wider benefits from 
transport corridors 
As a mean to recover their economies, it is 
assumed that countries’ thoughts were at the 
maximization of the benefits of the 
infrastructures being built (in this case, the 
roads) 
Output 
31 First GMS Leaders’ 
Summit was held 
“We, the Heads of Government of the 
Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s 
Republic of China, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, the Union of Myanmar, 
the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam, assembled for the first 
time in Phnom Penh, Cambodia for the GMS 
Summit of Leaders on the tenth anniversary 
of the Program of Economic Cooperation in 
the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS 
Program), to reaffirm our commitment to the 
subregional economic cooperation,” 
[GMS Summit, Joint GMS Summit 
Declaration] 
Action 
32 Leaders endorsed the 
development of the 
economic corridors and 
the CBTA 
The countries showed a strong commitment 
with the implementation: 
“We will accelerate the implementation of 
“software” arrangements of infrastructure 
linkages” 
“We will expedite the full implementation of 
the Framework Agreement for the Facilitation 
of Cross-border Movement of Goods and 
People” 
[Joint Summit Declaration: 1st GMS Summit 
of Leaders] 
Output 
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5.6.2.2. Links: 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
 
From To Description [source] 
1 6 It seems clear that in a context of continuous conflicts between the 
countries, the level of trust between the governments would be minimal if 
not null 
1 7 As a direct consequence of the conflicts between the countries, the border 
crossing procedures were highly complex. This could be observed since the 
starting of the transport corridors from the claims of the transport operators. 
[Ishida, 2013] 
6 8 In order to avoid conflictive situations, ADB decided to give a low profile 
to the GMS. In that sense, the GMS lacks a charter for example [Interview 
Mr. Morita] 
8 9 As a direct consequence of this lack of political considerations, and 
counting with the agreed 5 principles before mentioned, the construction 
started with including institutional aspects 
2 9 
9 12 Without considering institutional aspects and thanks to involvement of 
other international donors, construction could started rapidly (by the way, 
one of the objectives at the beginning) 
3 12 
12 13 This initial rapid implementation could potentially have triggered in the 
countries a rapid reaction for including regional connectivity issues in their 
own development plans [ 
6 14 In order to overcome the lack of trust between countries, ADB assumed this 
role of carrying out the studies for project identification 
8 10 In order to coordinate the work of different issues, the GMS was divided 
into working groups 4 10 
10 15 By doing so, the negotiations were kept at technical level 
15 16 The transition from the initial road projects to the transport corridors could 
be understood as a consequence of the independent studies discussed at 
technical levels (where countries confrontation importance is lower) and 
with the increasing acceptance of the connectivity in the region 
13 16 
14 16 
16 17 The transport corridors looked not only for allowing the connection 
between countries but also to make it economically profitable. In any case, 
by opening the borders and with a clear strategy of stimulating the growth 
of trade in volume and value, new opportunities were created  
7 19 With the increasing traffic demand in the corridors, the numerous non-
physical barriers could become more evident. The first in suffering those 
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barriers would have been the transport operators, who consequently 
reported their complaints. [Ishida, 2013] 
19 21 Partly due to the complaints from operators, and in order to grab the new 
business opportunities being created, negotiations started at regional level 
for the agreements on institutional aspects 
17 21 
5 27 Asian Financial Crisis could be considered as a trigger for the countries to 
look for more comprehensive approach towards the transport corridors 
[interview ADB]. This could be understood as a political incentive for the 
countries to proceed with deeper integration 
5 22 “The implementation of the GMS program, including the 9 road proejcts, 
faced with stagnation caused by the Asian Currency Crisis” [Ishida, 2012] 
22 23 Starting new negotiations for institutional reforms under reduced 
investment in infrastructure was an important challenge. For that, it seems 
reasonable that “The need for a kind of initial explosive was also felt from 
the speeches of ADB staff and some ministers” [Ishida, 2007, p.10] 
21 23 
23 26 Although it is not clear how the consultant/ADB came with the concept of 
economic corridor approach, it seems clear that this was a response to that 
demand for an “initial explosive” 
27 27 The economic corridors were drawn belt-shaped rather than a link, this 
could have served to show the impact not only from point to point but across 
the entire corridor 
5 24 Increasing regional cooperation became a mean to solve the economic crisis 
in the region, increasing the interest on ASEAN 
23 25 Ideas or visions similar to those of ASEAN (like community) get more 
interest as part of the political agenda. In that sense, the initial explosion 
adapted to those ideals. 
24 25 
17 20 These new opportunities were clear for the business community, who 
started to try to do collective action for the reduction of bottlenecks. Also 
sub-national governments could have seen new opportunities from the 
increasing traffic (in areas that previously were battlefronts) due to the 
opening to international traffic.  
Private sector gathered around the GMS Business Forum, while sub-
national governments (with the support of central governments) started to 
create the so-called development  triangles [Ishida] 
18 20 
20 28 The technical solution proposed (economic corridors with broad impact 
across the route) matched with overall national goals or visions as well as 
with the demands from national actors 
27 28 
25 28 
5 29 The close of international markets could have led to larger countries like 
Thailand to try to reach out more opportunities in the neighbouring 
countries 
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29 30 In order to maximize those investments, a more comprehensive approach 
for regional value chains seems to have been more intensively sought 
28 31 As a consequence of this better matching the overall national goals and to 
give the sufficient support, involvement and active support from countries’ 
leader was the next step 
39 31 
4 11 In order to overcome the differences between countries and between 
involved areas, a more gradual process was proposed (doing at once was 
not possible) 
11 32 This gradual process helped to reduce concerns from countries’ leaders of 
ceding “too much” sovereignty, ending in their active support 31 32 
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5.6.3. Stage 3: Physical construction 
Until reaching the agreement on the final route design of the three initial GMS Economic Corridors, 
different drafts were proposed. An evolution can be observed from the initial road projects to the 
final design. Those changes created also difficulties in some cases, in particular, as will be 
explained later, in the North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC).   
 
Figure 16 - GMS Economic Corridors, Stage 3 
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5.6.3.1. Analysis of causality diagram: 
 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 Ideologically rivalry 
between countries (divide 
in 3) 
The region was divided into: soviet 
communism (Lao PDR and Viet Nam), 
Chinese communism (China and part of 
Cambodia), Western capitalism (Thailand) 
and nationally instable countries (Myanmar 
and Cambodia) 
 
“In the 1980s, the countries through which 
the Mekong River flowed were separate 
nation-states that were divided not only by 
administrative and political boundaries, but, 
more importantly, by ideological ones” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, pp. 141] 
Factor 
2 No technical bodies for 
regional transport/trade 
Technical cooperation in the region was 
limited to the Mekong Committee (and even 
this was not properly functioning, as 
mentioned before) 
 
“Then, the meeting I attended was of the 
Mekong River Commission. Instead of 
people talking about the agenda, both 
countries started criticizing the other size” 
[GMS.EC.II-17] 
 
In terms of transport, no existing forum was 
found 
Factor 
3 Two plus approach 
adopted since inception 
Approved from the First Conference, it was 
accepted that as long as a project would 
involve at least two member countries, that 
would be considered to benefit the regional 
cooperation, and therefore would be included 
as GMS project. As a consequence, that 
means that other countries could not oppose 
to it. 
 
For a project to be approved to be classified 
as GMS project need to include at least two 
member countries, keeping it open to the rest 
to join if they want 
Action 
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“2+ principle: there is no need for the 6 
countries to agree for a project” 
[GMS-EC.I.17] 
 
“I said as long as two countries agree to do 
that, whether you have a third or fourth 
country I said, it doesn’t matter” 
[GMS-EC.II.106] 
4 Minimal formal trading 
between countries 
Without formal relations, and lacking the 
infrastructure formal trading was reduced to 
minimum. 
Even the transport of merchandises from Lao 
PDR to Bangkok, granted by international 
agreement, was commonly difficult 
 
“In case of the port, they have to rely on 
Thailand.” 
“We have to plan everything to Bangkok. 
Trucking company is Thai. And they inspect 
everything. So they know very well where we 
are, and what we are carrying. Everything is 
under their military observation” 
[GMS-EC.II.165-166] 
Factor 
5 First conference in Manila 
focused on exploring areas 
for regional cooperation 
and setting basic shared 
principles 
From the proceedings of the First Conference 
it can be understood that many topics were 
discussed in order to identify the most 
relevant for the member countries under a 
regional economic cooperation scheme  
 
“The Conference reached a consensus on the 
concept and basic modalities for subregional 
economic cooperation” 
[ADB, 1993, First Conference Proceedings] 
Action 
6 Roads built without 
attention to connectivity 
The lack of connections between countries 
seems to be due to the lack of interest about 
connectivity issues during the planning of 
national networks 
Action 
7 No studies from Lao 
authorities about potential 
positive impact of 
increasing China-Thailand 
trade 
As a matter of fact, the connection between 
China and Thailand through the Northern 
side of Lao seemed the originally ideal option 
for those two countries. No evidence was 
found that Lao PDR had prepared 
development plans in advance for taking 
advantage of that position. Claims that the 
Factor 
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project was not aligned with national interests 
of Lao PDR appears to support such logic 
 
For example, gold mines have been found 
and are being utilizing thanks to the NSEC 
“Thank you, without GMS road we could not 
get a hit on gold mine. How to develop, how 
to transport out. It was our headache. But 
now, thanks to this project, the gold mine 
give us more money than hydropower. It is 
very nice” 
[GMS-EC.II.266] 
8 7 road projects focused on 
connecting missing links 
“Prior to the ministerial meeting, a study 
team of the ADB visited each of the countries 
of the subregion and identified potential areas 
for subregional cooperation/ In accordance 
with the consultations between the ADB and 
the governments of the 6 countries, 7 road 
projects were listed as prioritized projects” 
[Ishida, 2012, p. 3] 
Action 
9 Roads to be utilized by 
private operators 
Contrary to power sector, in the road sub-
sector, government only provides the 
infrastructure, while the utilization is then up 
to private operators. Because of that, 
economically merit of the project becomes 
more critical. In the case on roads, reduction 
of distance is a clear factor then 
 
“Road transport is very different from other 
types of transport or other types of 
infrastructure” 
[GMS-EC.III.45] 
Factor 
10 Missing links evolved into 
transport corridors and 
ultimately into economic 
corridors 
As explained in the previous section, the 
initial road projects were modified into 
transport corridors, which ended becoming 
the economic corridors (NSCE, EWEC, and 
SEC) 
 
[Ishida, 2013] 
Output 
11 Asymmetry in the value of 
Thailand-China trade over 
Lao-Thailand and Lao-
China 
During the interview survey, it was 
mentioned about this relative imbalance in 
the trade relations between countries. This 
asymmetry represents the relative higher 
importance that trade with China, in 
Factor 
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comparison with Lao PDR, meant for 
Thailand and vice versa 
 
“I found that the real reason was not the 
question of the need of financing. No legal 
aspects, or financial aspects. It was really 
Laotians that were saying this road which we 
are offering our land and participating the 
financing, which we have to borrow from 
outside, really benefits only Thailand and 
China, not us.” 
[GMS-EC.II.236] 
12 Road 3 (NSEC) modified 
so it only crossed through 
Northern Lao PDR 
The originally road number 3 was supposed 
to have crossed Lao PDR from South 
(Vientiane) to North. Nevertheless, this plan 
was latterly change and crossed only from 
North part  
[Road maps] 
Output 
13 Thai military base near 
expected crossing border 
bridge 
During the interview survey it was mentioned 
that one of the issues referred by Lao’s 
officials were the concerns about a military 
base near the initial border point  
 
“Fears of possible military actions from 
Thailand using the Second Mekong bridge to 
be constructed” 
[GMS-EC.I.46] 
Factor 
14 Myanmar was presented 
as viable alternative 
The transport corridor was divided into two 
alternatives, Road 3A and Road 3B  
[Road maps] 
Action 
15 Border conflicts between 
Lao PDR and Thailand 
Several border conflicts were reported 
between Lao PDR and Thailand, and these 
having implications for the other member 
countries (particularly Viet Nam and China) 
[New York Times, 1988] 
 
“Other border disputes involved Thailand and 
Laos particularly in northern Thailand where 
the Meo tribespeople from Laos took refuge 
after the Pathet Lao seized power in 1975” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, p.141] 
Factor 
16 Lao PDR military opposed 
the project 
During the interview survey it was reported 
that a key actor opposing the construction of 
Output 
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the bridge between Thailand and Lao PDR 
was the military of the former 
 
“Fears of possible military actions from 
Thailand using the Second Mekong bridge to 
be constructed” 
[GMS-EC.I.46] 
17 Lao PDR opposed the 
project based on non-
sufficient benefits 
It was extensively reported that Lao PDR 
opposed the project in several occasions, 
delaying continuously the project 
 
[“I found that the real reason was not the 
question of the need of financing. No legal 
aspects, or financial aspects. It was really 
Laotians that were saying this road which we 
are offering our land and participating the 
financing, which we have to borrow from 
outside, really benefits only Thailand and 
China, not us.” 
[GMS-EC.II.236] 
Output 
18 Road, industrial and 
border control shared 
across many institutions 
As mentioned before, the responsibilities 
were shared among different departments and 
agencies at each country 
 
 
Output 
19 China and Thailand 
started their road 
investments while Lao 
PDR remained reluctant 
“actual length was from Kunming to Chiang 
Mai, but route of Chinese side already done, 
and good part of Thailand already done 
before they started the missing link” 
[GMS-EC.II.226]  
Action 
20 Facilitation of other 
international donors’ 
investment in the GMS 
ADB decision to open the funding scheme to 
other international donors 
 
“Ownership belongs to countries: in fact 
ADBs approval is not needed for a project to 
be done. Countries propose project and then 
there is a call for donors. ADB can be donor, 
but it is not a requirement” 
[GMS-EC.I.21] 
Action 
21 Lao PDR still could get 
investment for additional 
projects economically 
attractive 
Being the availability of resources potentially 
unlimited (resources could come from other 
international donors), Laotians could have 
seen this project not as a total loss of 
opportunity 
Output 
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22 China and Thailand 
offered funding to Lao 
“ADB, Thailand and China put equally 
US$30 million each to build the Lao section 
of the NSEC (R3E—228 km)” 
“To complete the NSEC plans, Thailand and 
China also agreed to share the cost of the 
US$43 million bridge linking Houayxay 
(Laos) to Chiang Khong (Thailand)”.  
[Tan, 2014] 
Action 
23 Project progress remained 
stopped 
It was mentioned that until Lao PDR was 
convinced about the merits of the land-linked 
opportunity, no agreement was possible. Mr. 
Morita mentioned to explain they could be 
like Switzerland 
“I was given example to the deputy minister. 
Switzerland, where there is no main road 
there, the life is different” 
[GMS-EC.II.270] 
Output 
24 Mr. Norita talks with Lao 
PDR 
It was reported that Mr. Norita was requested 
to have bilateral talks with Laotian officials 
in order to  
[Interview, del Rosario] 
Action 
25 Lao PDR worried about 
losing its “land-linked” 
country status 
Although it is not fully confirmed, it seems 
that the concerns about not being able to 
continue with its strategy as land-linked 
country 
 
Mr. Morita conveyed the message that they 
could risk to lose their opportunity to become 
land-linked country (as Switzerland) 
“I mobilized so much my limited knowledge 
that […] Laotians were going to miss one the 
very important ones” 
[GMS-EC.II.240] 
Output 
26 Thailand-Lao PDR 
negotiation for bridge 
relocation unblocked 
Finally the project was realized Action 
27 Agreement possible by 
moving a bit northern the 
location of the bridge and 
granting funding from 
China, Thailand and ADB 
The final location of the bridge was 
mentioned to be northern from the initial 
point [interview] 
Action 
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5.6.3.2. Links: 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
 
From To Description [source] 
1 3 It seems clear that the Two plus approach was chosen partly based on the 
impossibility to involve all countries under same programs/projects, or at 
least in order to avoid impositions on them. During the interview, it was 
reported that was part of the consideration of “regional democracy” 
2 3 
1 4 It also seems reasonable that the conflicts between countries had an 
important impact on trade, which would be instable and depending on 
regular conflicts between countries 
2 6 A possible explanation for the lack of connectivity between the countries 
would be the low level of regional trading (demand condition) and the lack 
of coordination mechanisms to incentivize it (supply condition) 
4 6 
1 5 From the interview survey it was understood that the main objective of the 
First Conference was to sit all the countries under the same table for the 
first time. In order to achieve that, it was aimed to reduce the potential level 
of conflict as much as possible. The selection of a neutral venue and the 
opening for accepting different topics were done with that purpose 
[interview] 
6 8 It was also reported that, in the absence of roads between countries, 
connecting the missing links was the top priority. This should be done also 
with the available resources and without imposing burdens. In that sense, 
the idea of even bamboo bridges was acceptable [interview] 
5 8 
8 10 With the progress in the discussions for the road projects, the agreement for 
road prioritization principles and the studies brought by the international 
consultant, the road corridors evolved into transport corridors and finally to 
economic corridors. 
9 11 As mentioned during the interview survey, a big difference between road 
subsector and others (like energy or even railway) is that government only 
provides infrastructure, while the use depends to private operators. 
[Interview]. Because of that, asymmetries in the relatively importance of 
the trade relations between countries could be observed. 
11 12 Then, it seems reasonable that during the process of regional optimization 
of the infrastructure (including the transition from connecting roads to 
economic corridors), some links would be abandoned favoring others or 
new ones. This is what seems to have happened for the modification of the 
NSEC. 
10 12 
6 7 Although this is not clear, it seems that Laotian authorities had not prepared 
for the possibility of taking advantage of a connection between China and 
Thailand through the northern part of the country.  
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12 16 The new location of the bridge between Lao and Thailand raised concerns 
on the Laotian military which considered it could be a threat for the national 
security of the country [interview] 
15 16 
13 16 
7 17 The lack of economic incentives (or at least reduced from the original 
proposal) and the opposition from members of the military were reported 
to have played the most important roles in the initial decision of the 
government of not accepting / cooperating with the construction of the 
NSEC [interview] 
16 17 
12 17 
11 19 Due to the economic incentives, Thailand and China started rapidly their 
investments in their respective sections of the NSEC 
17 22 These already done investments (as well as the economic incentives) and 
the concerns from Lao PDR about the low profitability for them, triggered 
that China and Thailand offered the funding for the bridge and the road in 
the Laotian territory (it is also worthy to noted that it seems clear that 
Thailand and China also considered the budget difficulties of Lao PDR) 
19 22 
16 23 Nevertheless, that didn’t have the expected effect on the Laotian 
government. A possible reason for that would be that the concerns from the 
military weighted more than the potential recommendations from trade & 
development experts (who may have proposed some alternatives for Lao to 
take advantage of the infrastructure development). The lack of coordination 
between them could explain why that happened. 
22 23 
18 23 
23 24 Due to the lack of progress from the negotiations, Mr. Morita was requested 
to have bilateral talks with Laotian officials due to his close relations with 
them [interview, Teresita] 
3 14 The change of the NSEC put the road near to the borders of Myanmar. In 
that sense it was a possible alternative for the road through Lao PDR.[Road 
map] 
Although this was a complicate alternative [Interview, Ishida], it also 
fulfilled the will from the ADB of involving all the countries [Interview, 
ADB], something that was more complex with Myanmar due to the 
international sanctions and the internal situation [Interview, Morita] 
14 25 Talks initiated by Mr. Morita had an influence in the Laotian officials to 
continue with the strategy as land-linked country [interview]. The potential 
alternative through Myanmar potentially had an influence on this decision 
too. 
24 25 
19 26 With the reinforced perspective of land-linked country (with examples as 
Switzerland) and the pressure on Thailand and China, a commonly 
acceptable solution was found by moving northern the location of the 
bridge. [interview]. It seems reasonable that by increasing the value of the 
project for the national development of Lao PDR, the military concerns 
were reduced (this could be understood as another contribution from the 
ADB) 
25 26 
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5 20 One of the consequences of the First Conference was the opening of the 
GMS project to other international donors (this was explained in previous 
section) 
20 21 The opening of the funding to other international donors could potentially 
mean for Lao PDR that although some investment would be for the NSEC, 
there would still other projects they could get funded 
21 27 In that sense, it seems reasonable that the reduction of potential negative 
consequences and the understanding of the potential benefits were relevant 
for achieving the consensus building across the NSEC 
26 27 
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5.6.4. Stage 4: Institutional construction 
The CBTA is the key document for the institutional construction of the GMS Economic Corridors. 
As mentioned before, it integrates all the measures needed for the removal of the non-physical 
barriers for the cross-border procedures. The development of the CBTA was a complex process 
and involved several actions 
 
Figure 17 - GMS Economic Corridors, Stage 4 
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5.6.4.1. Analysis of causality diagram: 
 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 Governments lacked trust 
on each other 
There was a clear mistrust between countries 
which considered each other enemies before 
than neighbours 
 
“The first meeting in Manila, in 1992. IT was 
not a big event at all. People dind’t 
understand whas was naturally. To me it was 
a dream, countries shooting each other now 
coming to the Philippines, which is outside 
the Indochina, in a way neutral 
They didn’t talk each other in the meeting” 
[GMS.EC.II.86-87] 
Factor 
2 Countries had very 
different national 
regulations 
“The need to improve the ‘software’ issues in 
the subregional transport system was first 
addressed in the draft final report on the 
subregional transport sector study submitted 
by a consulting company to the fourth GMS 
ministerial conference” 
[Ishida, 2013, p.56] 
Factor 
3 Construction started 
before discussion on 
regulations 
The initial focus was to start connecting the 
missing links, therefore, the infrastructure 
was first 
 
“I said, if you are really to decide about the 
road network, which is very important, 
everybody lets come together to one place 
and compare your map and my map and see 
at to the border what are the missing links. 
And connect these missing links,” 
[GMS-EC.II.108] 
Output 
4 Cross-border processes 
were complex and non-
coordinated 
“There were lot of contradictions between the 
domestic laws and the seven conventions 
used by the GMS member countries” 
[Ishida, 2013, p. 57] 
Output 
5 Demand for corridors had 
been increasing rapidly 
“Connecting the two metropolises in the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), Bangkok 
and Hanoi, by land has drawn the attention of 
a lot of businessmen in East Asia” 
Output 
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“Thus, driving experiments had been 
undertaken by private firms and governments 
since 2004. In consequence, a number of 
logistics firms have established chartered 
services between Bangkok and Hanoi” 
[Ishida, 2013, p.53] 
6 Hiring of external 
consultants 
“The consultants representing PADECO Co. 
Ltd., the firm selected to conduct the 
comprehensive subregional transport sector 
study, presented their proposed technical 
approach and methodology” 
[ADB, 1993, Second Conference 
proceedings, pp. 6-7] 
Action 
7 External consultant 
collected claims from all 
parties and change focus 
towards non-physical 
barriers 
“The need to improve the ‘software’ issues in 
the subregional transport system was first 
addressed in the draft final report on the 
subregional transport sector study submitted 
by a consulting company to the fourth GMS 
ministerial conference” 
[Ishida, 2013, p.56] 
Action 
8 Second meeting of the 
Subregional Transport 
Forum (STF) agreed on 
the removal of cross-
border barriers in 1995 
“The second meeting of the Subregional 
Transport Forum (STF), a working group 
formed under the senior official meeting of 
the GMS Program, agreed to remove cross-
border barriers in the GMS in reflecting such 
complaints on April 24-25 1995” 
[Ishida, 2013, p.56] 
Output 
9 Development of 
agreement among all the 
parties would have been 
highly complex 
“It was understood that more time was 
needed for discussion” 
[Ishida, 2013, p.57] 
Output 
10 UN-ESCAP 
recommended 
conventions were 
introduced to all the 
parties 
“At the meeting, Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP) Resolution 48/11 adopted in 1992 
was introduced. The resolution recommends 
that the countries in Asia and the Pacific 
region ratify the eight conventions elected 
from among 50 conventions introduced 
throughout the world” 
[Ishida, 2013, p. 56] 
Action 
11 Regulations involving 
different ministries and 
authorities 
“The related authorities that inspect the 
borders are different: the Ministry of finance 
for customs; the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Ministry of Public Security, or the Ministry 
Factor 
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of Defense for immigration; the Ministry of 
Agriculture for animal and plant quarantine; 
and the Ministry of Health for public health 
quarantine and drug and food quarantine” 
[Ishida, 2013, p. 57-58] 
12 Implementation of the 
UN-ESCAP 
recommended 
conventions was not 
possible 
“There are no countries in the GMs, however, 
that had acceded to even one of the seven 
conventions” 
[Ishida, 2013, p.57] 
Output 
13 A new agreement based 
on countries negotiations 
was proposed with direct 
involvement of ADB 
“In order to formulate an agreement that 
would be accepted by the GMS countries and 
implemented without delay, the countries, 
with the assistance of the ADB drafting team, 
formulated and developed the CBTA to 
broadly incorporate provisions of the 
international conventions, while at the same 
reflecting the unique realities of the GMS 
countries.” 
[ADB, 2011, p. 2] 
Action 
14 Countries gave different 
relative importance to 
each connection 
“For example, if we look at the border point 
between Myanmar and Thailand” 
“That might not be relevant to other 
countries” 
“Then, it might not be necessary to discuss at 
such GMS big meeting, but just with the two 
countries at ministry level or even agency 
level in order to implement” 
[GMS.III.79-81] 
Factor 
15 Two plus principle 
adopted 
For a project to be approved to be classified 
as GMS project need to include at least two 
member countries, keeping it open to the rest 
to join if they want 
 
“2+ principle: there is no need for the 6 
countries to agree for a project” 
[GMS-EC.I.17] 
 
“I said as long as two countries agree to do 
that, whether you have a third or fourth 
country I said, it doesn’t matter” 
[GMS-EC.II.106] 
Action 
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16 Discussion for corridor 
development were done 
independently 
“The three corridors evolved more or less 
independently” 
[GMS.III.37] 
Action 
17 In 1999, the three 
countries along the R2 
agreed to implement the 
basic framework provided 
by outsource by ADB 
“In 1999, the three countries along the R2 
agreed to implement the basic framework 
provided by outsource by ADB” 
[Ishida, 2013, p.57] 
Action 
18 Removal of non-physical 
barriers would include 
national strategic issues 
It is understood that strict border control was 
considered a strategic issue for the countries. 
Especially considering the illegal trafficking 
occurring in some areas (like in Northern 
Thailand). 
Factor 
19 STF lacked the 
capabilities for hosting the 
negotiations 
“It was then understood that more time was 
needed for discussion” 
[Ishida, 2013, p. 57] 
Output 
20 NTFCs were created in 
each country to coordinate 
works at national level 
“National Trade Facilitation Committees 
(NTFC) were created to coordinate with other 
ministries involved like finance, police & 
military, agriculture” 
[GMS-EC.I.81] 
Action 
21 Negotiation was moved to 
meeting between 
government 
representatives (Joint 
Committee) supported by 
NFTCs 
“As a result it was decided that discussion is 
to be made by the government officials of the 
National Working Group under the National 
Transport Facilitation Committee of each 
government – instead of the meeting of the 
STF” 
[Ishida, 2013, p. 57] 
Action 
22 Myanmar, China and 
Cambodia joined the 
negotiations 
“Later, Cambodia, China and Myanmar 
acceded to the basic framework, in 2001, 
2002, and 2003, respectively” 
[Ishida, 2013, p.5 7] 
Output 
23 Initial implementation 
with different approached 
at each border point 
“CBTA only umbrella to facilitate the 
trade/transport flow within the region” 
“But for the implementation, you need to go 
to the details for the cross-border point for the 
two countries” 
[GMS-EC.III.77-78] 
Action 
 
 
5.6.4.2. Links: 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
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From To Description [source] 
1 6 External consultants would the so much needed neutrality to the studies.  
2 4 Countries differences in ideologies had also impact in the way their national 
systems were structured (some more open to international trade, always 
with tight public control on the sector). These created asymmetries in the 
processes at borders, making more difficult to harmonize those procedures 
6 7 From their neutral position, the external consultants were able to gather the 
demands and complains from all the parties. That process helped to include 
also demands from private operators about the difficulties for border 
crossing procedures. 
3 7 
4 7 
7 8 With an increasing demand (that is countries expecting to get more gains) 
those demands for removing non-physical barriers were better accepted by 
public authorities, with the consequent agreement at the second meeting of 
the STF 
5 8 
2 9 The differences between regulations at each country also increased the 
complexity of finding a standard approach for all. Such difficulties also 
affected the initial implementation (as ween at 2->23) 
8 10 In order to keep neutrality, aiming at international standards (support by 
another independent and neutral institution as UN-ESCAP) could have 
appeared as an optimal solution 
9 10 
10 12 The implementation of those common standards (the international 
conventions) was proved also to be highly complex. The need to modify 
regulations and systems involving different departments seems to have 
played an important role on that 
11 12 
12 13 In order to unblock the situation, ADB proposed the creation of a new based 
agreement trying to better consider the context and particularities of the 
member countries 
14 15 Partially the logic of the Two plus principle was based in the possibility of 
developing projects that would not interest equally to all the countries. In 
this sense, it was accepted that some countries would speed up their 
cooperation in areas of their particular interest, while others would be 
allowed to incorporate if they would latterly like 
15 16 Based on this similar idea, each of the corridors was developed 
independently 
16 17 This agreement was actually initially proposed by the external consultant 
for the EWEC 6 17 
13 17 
15 22 Based on the Two plus principle, the other countries (Myanmar, China and 
Cambodia) also requested their participation 17 22 
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11 19 As similar as occurred for the implementation of the UN-ESCAP 
recommended international conventions, the development of an umbrella 
agreement for the border-crossing procedures involved several aspects that 
were beyond the possibilities of the STF to negotiate 
18 19 
17 19 
19 20 By moving the negotiations to a more politically group, the discussion 
about technical implementation in each country was allocated to each 
country. For that purpose (implement what was going to be agreed) national 
committees were created at each country (the NTFCs) 
2 20 
19 21 The negotiations were therefore moved to higher level officials which could 
better represent the countries and had authority over different departments 
2 23 Once the umbrella agreement (CBTA) was finally approved, differences 
between border-crossing points became more relevant and in fact it was 
understood that each of them would need some specific measures and 
bilateral agreements between countries 
14 23 
21 23 
22 23 
 
 
5.6.5. Stage 5: Harmonization 
No causality analysis of this stage was conducted because of shortage of relevant information. As 
explained at 1.5.6., it is still not clear the reasons that delayed the ratification of the CBTA in 
Thailand.  
 
5.7. Analysis of factors and actions: 
The factors are evaluated as follows: 
 5: Critical factor that overruns others  
 3: Factor part the core process but equally important to others 
 1: Without a direct, or lower, influence in the core process 
 
Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
1 1 Indochina was divided 
into three groups after II 
World War 
The ideological differences were one 
the factors that continuously influenced 
the process from the beginning, making 
more complex the project (for example, 
the acquisition of the written agreement 
between governments for the pilot 
project). 
3 
100 
 
1 3 Military and defense 
concerns were priority 
over technical issues 
More importantly, the military conflicts 
were affecting any possible 
collaboration at any level, as the attack 
to Mr. Morita during the Mekong 
Committee meeting showed 
5 
1 5 Previous cooperation 
institutions paralyzed 
The paralyzation of these bodies was an 
important component, but since those 
were not directly related to transport, 
the influence had not been direct 
1 
1 6 Trading between 
countries reduced to 
minimum 
The low levels of trading was an 
important factor, making more complex 
the understanding of the potential 
benefits of the regional project 
(probably because the military and 
defense minds were predominant) 
3 
1 8 Transport and trade 
involved several 
different departments 
and authorities 
The coordination of different 
departments was also an important 
factor at national level for not having 
comprehensive approaches towards the 
communications with neighboring 
countries 
3 
1 9 No talks between 
technical bodies on 
regional transportation 
In the absence of such institutions or 
forums, no relationships were 
established between the national 
authorities, making more complex the 
identification of commonly beneficial 
projects and/or mutual understanding 
5 
1 14 Transition towards 
market economies after 
Cold War 
The process towards opening to 
international market was one of the 
drivers for the socialist and communist 
countries to join the program, as well as 
an incentive for Thailand to cooperate 
with them 
3 
1 16 Reduction of political 
tensions in the region 
The perspective of pacification of the 
region helped the process to be moved, 
nevertheless, this pacification didn’t 
finish the conflicts between countries. 
1 
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Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
2 1 History of conflicts Indochina wars had left a common 
mistrust between the countries, 
nevertheless at this stage those were not 
any more active. 
1 
2 4 Different national 
authorities in charge of 
transport, trade, and 
border crossing 
procedures 
The entire set-up of the program needed 
to adapt to such reality, first by creating 
different ad-hoc groups as well as 
establishing a gradual process of 
implementation of the economic 
corridors 
5 
2 5 National budgets 
constrained by the 
Asian Financial Crisis 
Another factor that putting more 
emphasis on the need of the “initial 
explosive”, although the influence was 
indirect 
1 
2 6 Absence of trust 
between countries 
A major factor during the entire process, 
influencing different consensus 
building processes 
3 
2 7 Numerous non-physical 
trade barriers still 
remained 
One of the background factors that 
highlighted the need of moving beyond 
the simple construction of the 
infrastructure 
3 
2 18 Market transition in 
socialist and communist 
countries increased 
importance of 
international trade 
One of the drivers for the governments 
to be willing to sign high level 
agreements 
3 
2 19 Transport operators 
complained about 
difficulties for crossing 
borders 
Complains from private operators and 
business community became an 
important trigger for the governments 
acceptance of facilitate border-crossing 
procedures 
3 
2 24 Countries looked 
forward deepening 
regional economic 
cooperation in ASEAN 
The development of the ASEAN 
community became a main trigger for 
countries in the region willing to 
increase their cooperation becoming a 
main policy objective for every country. 
In addition, successful cooperation in 
the GMS became also an objective for 
ASEAN itself 
5 
2 29 Major countries 
(Thailand) looked for 
new trading 
An increasing willingness for regional 
trading and the creation of regional 
value chains became another major 
5 
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opportunities more 
intensively 
driver for countries to seek 
collaboration. 
 
 
Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
3 1 Ideological rivalry 
between countries 
(divided in 3) 
At technical level the ideological 
differences only had indirect influences. 
1 
3 2 No technical bodies for 
regional transport / 
trade 
The absence of such bodies reduced the 
regional perspective on the national 
authorities, becoming an important 
factor for the “two plus” approach (due 
to the unlikeliness of getting projects 
that all countries would initially agree 
on) 
3 
3 4 Minimal formal trading 
between countries 
Although at beginning it had influence, 
this was overrun by the demands from 
business community to facilitate the 
trading 
1 
3 7 No studies from Lao 
authorities about 
potential positive 
impact of increasing 
China-Thailand trade 
Such lack of national plans to take 
advantage of regional connectivity 
projects became a major issue for the 
agreements on the routes of the 
corridors 
3 
3 9 Roads to be utilized by 
private operators 
The role of the private sector gained 
relevance as the construction of the 
infrastructure progressed 
3 
3 11 Asymmetry in the value 
of Thailand-China trade 
over Lao-Thailand and 
Lao-China 
The differences of the relative value that 
each country puts to each of their 
neighbors is a major consideration 
during the entire negotiation process 
5 
3 13 Thai military base near 
expected crossing 
border bridge 
The presence of the infrastructures or 
installations that could be considered a 
threat was an important factor, but only 
directly (the conflict was the main 
factor) 
1 
3 15 Border conflicts 
between Lao PDR and 
Thailand 
These conflicts increases the 
complexities of the negotiations for the 
routes between the countries 
5 
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Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
4 1 Governments lacked 
trust on each other 
A major concern for their ability to 
develop proposals through inter-
governmental negotiations. The 
involvement of external consultants was 
required to increase the neutrality of the 
studies and proposals. 
3 
4 2 Countries had very 
different national 
regulations 
Another major factor for the 
negotiations of the CBTA as well as for 
its implementation 
3 
4 5 Demand for corridors 
had been increasing 
rapidly 
Although it was important, its impact 
was indirect in this case (it was more 
important in order to mobilize the 
political will at the beginning) 
1 
4 11 Regulations involving 
different ministries and 
authorities 
In order to overcome the issues derived 
from it, the set up was needed to adapt 
through the creation of the NTFCs 
5 
4 14 Countries gave 
different relative 
importance to each 
connection 
Such differences were relevant not only 
for the adoption of the two plus (as 
explained before) but also for the initial 
implementation 
3 
4 18 Removal of non-
physical barriers would 
include national 
strategic issues 
National strategic issues like 
enforcement of national regulations was 
necessarily taken into consideration 
during the negotiations  
3 
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6. Case study 2, Regional Power Sector integration in Central America 
This chapter includes the description and the analysis of the power sector cooperation program in 
Central America. This chapter has benefited extensively from the previous master study of the 
author (immediate predecessor of this doctoral research). Nevertheless, the analysis has been 
newly conducted in order to fit the needs of this research. 
 
6.1. Central America Power sector trade and cooperation 
The “Sistema de Interconexión Regional de los Países de América Central24” (SIEPAC) is a long 
time sought dream for the creation of a regional electricity market in the Central America25. The 
project includes the construction of trunk transmission line and the related infrastructure for 
connecting to each country as well as the creation of regional bodies for the construction and 
management of the assets and operation and regulation of a superposed 7th market, the “Mercado 
Eléctrico Regional 26 ” (MER). The project has been funded with resources from the Inter-
American Development Bank, Spanish cooperation and contributions from each of the members 
of the market (including the member countries, and the companies that have become also 
shareholders, that is Endesa from Spain, ISA from Colombia and CFE from Mexico). The ultimate 
objective is to promote a gradual process of integration under which a faster growing regional 
market will finally replacing the six national electricity markets. 
 
                                                 
 
24 System for the Electrical Interconnection of the Central American countries (translation by the author) 
25 In this thesis Central America refers to Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. 
Although Belize is physically part of Central America is not target of this study. Also even Panama is not considered 
as culturally Central America but South America (for that reason the term Mesoamerica is getting wider acceptance), 
Central America is utilized for easier reference to the name of the project (SIEPAC) 
26 Regional Electricity Market (translation by the author) 
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Figure 18 - SIEPAC transmission line (source CRIE) 
6.2. Background for the regional power sector integration in Central America: 
Central American national power systems are commonly characterized for their small size. This 
has led to a number of inefficiencies in their operation, like difficulties to create effective 
competition between market actors and/or attract investment to large and more efficient power 
plants. Greater interconnection was therefore always seen as a possibility to overcome those 
difficulties. As a reference, considering the entire Central America as a single system, this would 
have a size (in terms of population) similar to Colombia. 
 
6.2.1. Main agreements and institutions: 
 Empresa Propietaria de la Red27 (EPR): A special purpose enterprise whose tasks are the 
design, construction, maintenance and ownership of the SIEPAC infrastructure. The estate-
owned companies firstly created the Empresa Propietaria de la Linea (EPL) as a private 
company in which they were equal shareholders. With the incorporation of Endesa as 
another equal shareholder, the company was transformed into the EPR and settled the 
headquarters in San Jose (Costa Rica). They also have offices in every country for 
supervising the construction.  
                                                 
 
27 Owner of the Network, the regional transmission company, translated by the author 
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 Ente Operador Regional28 (EOR): It is the regional entity in charge of the operation of the 
regional market. Its headquarters are sited in San Salvador (El Salvador), it was created by 
the Framework Treaty in 1996 and it’s ascribed to the SICA. The Body of Directors of the 
EOR is constituted by 2 directors from each country named by their respective countries. 
Its objectives are29: 
 
(1) Develop and implement the system for the planning of the regional transmission and 
generation following the RMER. 
(2) Harmonize the integration of the extra-regional markets with the MER. 
(3) Support the regulatory harmonization between the national electricity markets and the 
regional electricity markets 
 
 Comisión Reguladora de la Interconexión Eléctrica30 (CRIE): It is the regional regulator 
of the MER, constituted by one commissioner from each country and with the headquarters 
at Ciudad de Guatemala (Guatemala). Its main role is the supervision the appropriate 
operation of the MER according to the Framework Treaty principles (gradualism, 
reciprocity, and competition). It also approves the tariffs for the use of the infrastructure 
and solves any dispute between the agents of the market. It has recently strengthened with 
the creation of 3 managerial departments: legal, market and technical. Each of these is 
composed by one specialist and one analyst; being in total 6, each of them has been pointed 
by each country (in order to maintain an equal representation of nationalities).  
 
 Executive Unit: It is a small technical unit inside the CEAC31 whose have been in charge 
to realize the technical cooperation for the execution of the project32. 
 
 Steering group: It was the representation of the governments during the construction of the 
infrastructure, the creation of the regional institutions and preparation of the regional 
regulation. 
 
Governing board: Created by the II Protocol (explained below), it has replaced the Steering group. 
Its members are directly appointed by the ministers of energy of each country and have 
representative power. Its main objective to ensure that the Framework Treaty and the Protocols are 
respected, it also supervises that CRIE and EOR operate correctly, guarantee the respect of the 
                                                 
 
28 Regional Operator Entity, translated by the author 
29 Source: http://www.enteoperador.org/, translated by the author 
30 Electric Interconnection Regulatory Commission, translated by the author 
31 A regional association created by the Central American state-owned companies 
32 Source: Mesoamerica Project, translation by the author 
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national sovereignties and report to the national presidents in case any action must be done. This 
pretends to increase the implication of the national governments with the development of the 
regional market with the full operation of this. 
 
6.3. Overview of individual countries’ situation and incentives 
6.3.1. Guatemala: 
The Guatemalan national power sector was reformed from 1996, opening generation, transmission, 
and distribution to private initiative. Despite that, the state-owned utility INDE still a large 
proportion of the hydro generation capacity and dominates the transmission business. 
Hydro is the main energy source, with capacity sufficient for export. In fact, Guatemala has 
become a major supporter of the regional electricity market with the objective of increasing the 
private investment in hydro (facilitated by the access to the other national power markets). 
 
Figure 19 - Installed capacity and power generation in Guatemala (ECLAC, 2011) 
 
6.3.2. El Salvador: 
The sector in El Salvador is divided into generation, transmission, distribution, and 
commercialization. The state-owned company CEL remains as the national TSO (through its 
subsidiary ETESAL) as well as with a dominant position in the generation of hydro and geothermal. 
El Salvador energy resources are scarce, making it highly dependent on imported electricity 
(traditionally from Guatemala) 
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Figure 20 - Installed capacity and power generation in El Salvador (ECLAC, 2011) 
 
6.3.3. Honduras: 
Honduras electricity sector suffers due to the unsuccessful power reform. Although formally 
totally opened to private initiative, Honduras de facto remains as a single-buyer system. The 
energy crisis suffered in the 1990s led the state-owned company, ENEE, to sign numerous IPPs 
with thermal generation. This has affected its financial sustainability in the long term. Currently, 
Honduras is looking to both reduce its dependency on expensive thermal through the import of 
cheaper electricity from the MER and to attract private investment in generation. In particular, 
during the interview survey, it was mentioned the potential interest of developing LNG thermal 
plant with regional scale in Honduras. 
 
Figure 21 - Installed capacity and power generation in Honduras (ECLAC, 2011) 
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6.3.4. Nicaragua: 
The sector is divided into generation, transmission, and distribution. Only the transmission sector 
remains under the public ownership of the state-owned company, ENATREL. Generation is 
mostly thermal. The participation in the regional electricity market can allow Nicaragua to get 
import cheaper hydro, and export thermal at times when rest of the countries cannot generate 
sufficient electricity. 
 
Figure 22- Installed capacity and power generation in Nicaragua (ECLAC, 2011) 
 
6.3.5. Costa Rica: 
The electricity sector in Costa Rica still remains as a single-buyer model and fully dominated by 
the state-owned company ICE. Although some attempts have been done towards increasing the 
private participation, this still remains legally limited to 35% of the generation of the country. 
Costa Rica is rich in renewable resources, particularly hydro. The regional electricity market is an 
opportunity for ICE to find the required funding for developing large-scale hydro, which otherwise 
would not be able to invest (and of which large capacity would not be currently utilized). Costa 
Rica has also the national target of becoming carbon neutral country, for which large investment 
in other renewable resources is needed (particularly wind energy). The regional electricity market 
can serve also as grantee of backup energy. 
10% 8%
16%
44%
6%
0%
0% 11%
6%
Capacity
12% 7%
13%
54%
0%
0%
8% 6%
Generation
Hydro
Geo
Steam
Diesel
Gas
Combined cycle
Coal
Cogeneration
Wind
111 
 
 
Figure 23- Installed capacity and power generation in Costa Rica (ECLAC, 2011) 
 
6.3.6. Panama: 
Panama national electricity sector is fully unbundled. The transmission remains under to control 
of the state-owned company ETESA. In generation, hydro remains 51% government-owned. 
Electricity demand is fast growing, and the difficulties to develop new hydro projects due to 
environmental concerns is making more complex to ensure the security of supply. The national 
sector is weak against drought, so the regional electricity market provides an opportunity to 
overcome such circumstances (as the electricity crisis of 2013 showed). 
 
 
Figure 24- Installed capacity and power generation in Panama (ECLAC, 2011) 
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6.4. The Development Process of SIEPAC project 
6.4.1. Timeline - Events: 
Date Description  Stage 
1940 State-owned company created in Guatemala: 
- Department of National Electrification (INDE) 
- 
1941 State-owned company created in Nicaragua - 
1945 State-owned company created in El Salvador 
- CEL 
- 
1949 State-owned company created in Costa Rica 
- Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) 
- 
1951 Creation of the Organization of the Central America States (ODECA) - 
1957 State-owned company created in Honduras: 
- ENEE 
- 
1960, 
Dec. 13 
Managua Treaty: 
- General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration 
- Creation of the Central American Common Market (MCCA) and the 
Central American Bank for the Economic Integration (CABEI) 
- Costa would join in 1963 
- 
1962 Establishment of Regional Organism for policy coordination - 
1969 Football War between Honduras and El Salvador - 
1972 Vicente Iglesias became Executive Secretary of ECLAC - 
1973 ODECA stopped operations - 
1976 Electric interconnection between Honduras and Nicaragua 1 
1979 VI Summit of Presidents and Managers of the national utilities 
Agreement for the creation of Council for the Electrification of Central 
America (CEAC) 
1 
1979 Arenal – Corodbici Dam in Costa Rica 1 
1980 Construction of El Cajon started in Honduras 1 
1982 Electric interconnection between Nicaragua and Costa Rica 1 
1982 Vicente Iglesias awarded with Principe de Asturias Prize for 
International Cooperation 
- 
1983 Contadora group for the promotion of the pacification of Central 
America 
2 
1984 Contadora group awarded with Principle de Asturias prize for 
International Cooperation 
2 
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1984 Construction of the Fortuna dam in Panama: 
- 300 MW 
1 
1984 San Jose Dialogue for pacification of Central America: 
- Contadora Group + EU + Spain + Portugal 
2 
1985 Constitution of the Central American Electrification Council (CEAC) 
- ERICA study by ECLAC for regional interconnection 
1 
1985 Approval of the V Centenario Funds 1 
1985 Construction of Chixoy hydraulic power plant in Guatemala: 
- 300 MW 
1 
1985 Construction of El Cajon hydraulic power plant in Honduras: 
- 300 MW 
1 
1986 Spain became member of the European Union - 
1986 First draft for the Peace Agreements, Esquipulas I - 
1986 Electric interconnection between Costa Rica and Panama 1 
1986 Nicaragua ratified CEAC treaty 1 
1987 Electric interconnection between Guatemala and El Salvador 1 
1987 Final draft for the Peace Agreements, Esquipulas II - 
1987 Costa Rica’s President, Arias awarded with Nobel Peace Price - 
1987 Protocol for agreement for SIEPAC project in Madrid (Spain): 
- Endesa + presidents of utilities 
- Spain agreed to fund the technical studies 
1 
1988 Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Panama ratified CEAC treaty 1 
1988 Spain created V Centenario trust fund at IADB 1 
1988 Vicente Iglesias became President of IADB (until 2005) - 
1989 First meeting of CEAC was held 1 
1989 Publication of “What Washington Means by Policy Reform” - 
1989 Democracy in Panama - 
1989, July IV Presidential Summit: 
- reformulation of the project 
1 
1990 Peace agreements signed in Nicaragua - 
1990 Costa Rica approved reform of electric sector (Law 7200): 
- Authorization of private generation 
- 
1990 V Centenario Patronage meeting: 
- “Latin America needs cooperation” 
1 
1991 Tuxtla Mechanism is created: - 
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- For discussion about regional issues 
- Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Mexico were the members 
1991, 
Dec. 13 
Tegucigalpa Protocol to ODECA Charter 
- System for the Integration of Central America (SICA) was created 
- 
1992 Costa Rica ratified CEAC treaty 1 
1992 Pace Agreements signed in El Salvador - 
1992 Ibero-American summit in Seville (Spain) - 
1992 Mexico became member of CABEI - 
1993, Oct. 
29 
XIV Central America presidents’ summit held in Guatemala: 
- Signature of the Treaty for the Economic Integration of Central 
America 
- Agreement for the progressive constitution of the Central American 
Economic Union (Protocol of Guatemala to the General Treaty of 
Central American Economic Integration) 
- 
1993 SIEPAC Inc. created in Madrid (Spain) by ENDESA and the Central 
American state-owned companies 
1 
1994 Honduras reformed national electric sector: 
- Although still continue as single-buyer model  
- 
1994 Mexico approved new electric sector law - 
1994 Spain started privatization of Endesa: 
- 66,89% state-owned 
- 
1994 Internationalization of Endesa in Peru: 
- Companía Peruana de Electricidad and Distrilima 
- 
1995 SIEPAC Preliminary studies concluded 1 
1995 IADB approved new technical assistance funds for the preparation of 
the Framework Treaty 
1, 2 
1995 CEAC created Unidad Ejecutora for the management of the technical 
assistance funds 
1, 2 
1995 Costa Rica approved new law for increasing authorization of private 
generation (Law 7508) 
- 
1996 Peace agreements signed in Guatemala - 
1996 Framework Treaty signed: 
- Regional operator (EOR) and regulator (CRIE) were approved 
2 
1996 Electric sector reforms in Guatemala and El Salvador - 
1997 Mexico and Guatemala approved energy cooperation: 
- Electric interconnection between both countries was approved 
2 
115 
 
1997 Agreement for the funding of the project in meeting in Barcelona 
(Spain): 
- Spain, IADB, and Central American governments 
2 
1997 I Protocol 2 
1998 Privation of the distribution sector in Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Panama 
- 
1998 Electric sector reform approved in Nicaragua - 
1998 Framework Treaty and I Protocol ratified by all the member countries 2 
1999 EPR created in Panama for the construction and management of the 
physical assets: 
- Endesa was not included as shareholder 
- Replace SIEPAC Inc. created before 
3 
1999 Creation of the Steering Group (Grupo Director) as a unit inside the 
CEAC 
1, 3, 
4 
2000 Approval of the Market Design rules 4 
2000 Combo ICE protests in Costa Rica: 
- Against major reform of electric sector and ICE 
5 
2000 Political change in Mexico, Vicente Fox acceded to the presidency 2, 3, 
4 
2000 Mexico proposed Puebla-Panama Plan: 
- For development of Southern neighbors (and southern part of 
Mexico) 
2 
2001, 
March 
Constitution of Spanish General Cooperation Fund at IADB 3 
2001 Endesa became shareholder of EPR: 
- Equal ownership and voting rights granted to all the shareholders 
(majority remains “Central American”) 
- Endesa appointed executive director 
- EPR became economic and managerial independent  
- Headquarters sited in San Jose (Costa Rica) 
3, 4 
2001 Preliminary design of the line 3 
2001, 
June 15 
Puebla – Panama Plan officially launched 2 
2002 EPR officially started operations 3 
2002 Completion of the interconnection between Honduras and El Salvador: 
- The Northern and Southern “Electric blocks” became interconnected 
3 
2002 CRIE approved enforcement of transitory regulation (RTMER): 
- MER started operations 
4 
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2003 MOU for the electric interconnection between Guatemala and Mexico 4 
2004 Spain became member of CABEI - 
2004 Colombia became observer at Puebla-Panama Plan - 
2005 Cancun Declaration: 
- Program for the Mesoamerican Energy Integration approved 
2 
2005 Vicente Iglesias became General Secretary of the Iberoamerican 
General Secretary (SEGIB) 
- 
2005,  
Feb. 17 
ISA Colombia became shareholder of EPR 3 
2005 Approval of the final design of the infrastructure 3 
2005 CRIE approved the regulation code of the MER (RMER) 4 
2006 Construction of SIEPAC line started 3 
2006 Colombia became full member of Puebla-Panama Plan - 
2006 EOR started operation and took the responsibility for MER: 
- Before, El Salvador Dispatch Center 
4 
2006 SICA created the Unit for Energy Coordination 4 
2007 II Protocol was signed 4 
2007 El Salvador ratified II Protocol 5 
2007 EPR created REDCA: 
- Company for the operation and management of a regional fiber optic 
built across the SIEPAC line 
- The Highway for telecommunications 
3 
2008 Agreement signed between Grupo Terra and CAESS (El Salvador) for 
30MW from Hidro Xacbal (Guatemala) 
4, 5 
2008 II Protocol ratified by Honduras, Panama, Guatemala and Nicaragua: 
- All countries had ratified except Costa Rica 
5 
2008 Mesoamerica Project replaced Puebla-Panama-Plan - 
2009 Interconnection between Mexico and Guatemala completed 4, 5 
2009 CFE Mexico became shareholder of EPR 3 
2009, 
August 28 
CRIE approved Mexico – Guatemala interconnection 3, 4 
2009 Costa Rica authorized private concessions for hydro, Law 8723 - 
2009 ETESA Panama and ISA Colombia created ICP for the interconnection 
between Colombia and SIEPAC 
3, 4 
2010 EOR approved operation of Mexico – Guatemala interconnection 4 
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2010 Creation of Board of Directors, replacing the Steering Group 4, 5 
2010, 
August 24 
Inauguration of Hidroxacbal (Grupo Terra) in Guatemala: 
- Total of 94 MW 
- 30 MW for exporting to El Salvador 
4, 5 
2010  
Nov. 25 
Electrification of the first part of SIEPAC line: 
- Interconnection of Costa Rica and Panama between the substations of 
Rio Claro and Veladero 
3 
2010, 
Dec. 3 
Commercial operation of Rio Claro – Veladero 3 
2010, 
Dec. 31 
Commercial operation of Ticuantepe - Cañas 3 
2011 Costa Rica ratified II Protocol 4, 5 
2011, 
March 14 
Commercial operation of Aguacapa – Ahuachapán 3 
2011,  
July 15 
Commercial operation of 15 Sept – Agua Caliente 3 
2011, 
August 15 
Commercial operation of Auchapán – Nejapa 3 
2011, 
August 31 
Commercial operation of San Buenaventura – T43 3 
2011,  
Oct. 31 
Commercial operation of Nejapa – 15 Sept. 3 
2012 CRIE approved gradual implementation of RMER 5 
2012,  
Feb. 10 
Commercial operation of Cañas – Parrita 3 
2012, 
March 30 
Commercial operation of Panaluya – San Buenaventura  3 
2012, 
April 
Sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena (Colombia) 
- Support for Connect 2022 Initiative from Colombia 
- SIEPAC as key component of the Pan-American connectivity 
- 
2012, 
June 29 
Commercial operation of Guate Norte – Panaluya 3 
2012, 
August 31 
Commercial operation of Palmar Norte – Río Claro 3 
2012, 
Dec. 19 
Commercial operation of Agua Caliente – Sandino 3 
2012, 
Dec. 19 
Commercial operation of Sandino – Ticuantepe 3 
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2013, 
January 1 
Commencement of gradual implementation of RMER 5 
2013, 
June 1 
RMER fully enforced 5 
2014, 
October 1 
Commercial operation of Parrita – Palmar Norte 
- SIEPAC transmission line completed 
3 
2014 Regional power transactions reached 1500 GWh 
- 300% over MER transactions in 2012 
- 
 
6.4.2. Stage 1: National stakeholders’ agreement 
The development of large hydropower dams in several Central American countries had brought 
seasonal surpluses to many national. With the national transmission grids growth until the borders 
of the countries, state-owned companies, at that time in charge of the entire power sector 
management, saw the opportunity that deployment of bilateral interconnections could bring into 
their mutual interest. 
Although the limitation of these bilateral interconnections, state-owned companies were benefited 
of transitory transmissions for the management of emergency situations and even for the operation 
of hydro-power dams situated in the same river but in a different country.  The small scale of these 
projects made them appear without any “sovereignty risk” to the central governments and, as a 
consequence, granted greater independence to the state-owned companies for the operation of the 
international transmissions.  
These increasing relations between the state-owned companies facilitated the development of 
relations between the general managers. And, although the region was divided into two electric 
blocks, a regional forum/association for the discussion of the issues affecting the operation of the 
electricity systems in the region and the better management of the bilateral interconnections was 
established, the “Consejo de Electrificación de América Central” (CEAC). 
This was a contrast with the political context of a polarized region during the Cold War times. 
Central American countries were facing large political and economic instability. The triggering of 
the Latin American debt crisis brought new challenges to the national power sectors due to the 
reduction in public funding. The state-owned companies based on the positive experiences from 
the bilateral trade carried out studies to analyze the possibilities of increasing the utilization of 
those interconnections (and even expand them). The ERICA project developed with the support of 
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) was the most ambitious 
of those. Nevertheless, when this was presented to the presidents of the countries, these didn’t 
accept to increase the inter-dependency. It was mentioned that governments considered the project 
as a threat of national security issue.  
In this context, the project was initially removed, and sector reforms started across the region. 
Meanwhile, in Spain, Endesa, the state-owned company at that time, was starting to look for 
international business opportunities in preparation for the privatization of the Spanish power sector. 
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Having knowledge about the interest of the Central American utilities for a greater interconnection 
in the region, and with the experience of the development of large transmission networks from 
Spain, Endesa prepared a proposal for the Central American countries. At the same time, the 
Spanish government was preparing a major ODA program from the LAC region in 
commemoration of the fifth hundred anniversary of the arrival of Columbus to America. In this 
sense, Endesa project was able to obtain part of the funding from this program.  
The proposal presented this time to the Central American countries consisted of the development 
of a new regional trunk transmission line connected to each of the countries in the major cities. 
Construction of large power plants in every country was included as part of the project, with the 
purpose of providing sufficient supply to the new system. The project was rejected, but this time 
was by the state-owned companies, which considered that a project of that size, and owned by an 
extra-regional company could pose a risk to the stability of the national systems, as well as to a 
sovereignty threat. 
The project was presented also to the IADB, which got interested. As a result, the IADB approved 
a technical assistance for the development of new independent studies to assess the possibilities 
and benefits of a regional power market. These studies were contracted to two independent 
institutions in Spain and Canada. Also, this time, the Central American state-owned companies 
were involved through the CEAC. The results showed that the largest benefits would be obtained 
from a full regional electricity market with centralized dispatch. Nevertheless, the state-owned 
companies expressed that such approach would not have been accepted by any of the governments. 
At that meeting, the second best option was identified as a potentially successful. This combined 
the creation of regional infrastructures (main interest of the state-owned companies) with the 
creation of a superposed electricity market.  
 
6.4.3. Stage 2: High level political agreement 
After finding the consensus vision of a superposed regional electricity market, the next step was 
to achieve a written commitment from all the governments that would guarantee the development 
of the regional project. This was a pre-requisite because the regional electricity market would 
require numerous changes in the countries in order to be able to operate. At that time, there was 
also a need to adapt the project to different institutional structures in the countries, since some of 
them had already started reforming their national sectors with different levels of success. The first 
action was to change the initial concept of a regional cooperation program between countries to 
the creation of a regional market of actors (which include also private investors in the definition), 
incorporating the concept of competition to the design. 
Another important issue to solve would have been to reduce the national security concerns that 
had prevented the initial studies from ECLAC to move forward. Due to the participation of the 
state-owned companies initially, those were already overcome because of the superposed nature 
of the MER (which should not affect the development of the national sectors). Nevertheless, the 
regional market was kept as a target, introducing in this manner the concept of gradualism. 
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There were also concerns due to asymmetries between countries and the possibility of free-rider 
behaviors. Those were overcome by introducing the concept of reciprocity. In this manner, any 
country could apply to other the same rules that would be being imposed on it. 
IADB also facilitated another technical assistance for the writing of a draft agreement. Due to their 
active involvement in the entire process, state-owned companies through CEAC were the first to 
receive such draft. Immediately they realized that it included several clauses that would only create 
disputes and opposition from the governments. It was an extensive document that gave strong 
protections to the regional market institutions. In order to make it easier to be approved, the state-
owned companies designed a new one incorporating only those essential elements to allow the 
creation of the regional market.  
Partly due to this modifications, partly due to the direct influence from the presidents of the state-
owned companies with the presidents of the countries, that agreement was signed and became the 
Framework Treaty of the MER. 
 
6.4.4. Stage 3: Physical construction 
One of the key aspects of the Framework Treaty was the constitution of a special-purpose company 
for the construction and ownership of the regional assets (a measure to reduce the concerns of 
countries of being dominated by another member). Although initially, Endesa had created a 
company for that purpose including the Central American countries (SIEPAC Inc.), there was 
some reluctance from some members to have also an extra-regional shareholder and a new 
company was created under Panama law including only the Central American state-owned 
companies, EPR. The initial years of operation were following a similar structure as CEAC, based 
on regular meetings covered by each of the companies. Nevertheless, this was proved to not be 
sufficiently effective for the operation of the company and little progress was made. At that 
moment, Endesa offered new funding resources for covering the initial operations of an 
autonomous EPR (with full-time employees and headquarters in Costa Rica and offices across the 
region). The condition was to become an equal shareholder and to control the top position of the 
company for the first period. Finally, the agreement was possible and Endesa became a shareholder 
of the EPR in 2001. This represented a major change in the management style of the company, 
becoming more corporate and objective-oriented. EPR also gained independence from 
governments, while retaining a double personality of a private company with state-owned 
shareholders. This became very important in the negotiation process of the rights of way. The 
successful new management of EPR increased the value of the regional project. With the progress, 
neighboring countries (Mexico and Colombia) also requested, and were accepted, membership as 
equal shareholders.  
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6.4.5. Stage 4: Institutional construction 
The other two important institutions created from the Framework Treaty were the regional operator 
(EOR) and the regional regulator (CRIE). Although both constitutes what the Inter-American 
Development Bank calls the software of the integration, they followed different process. 
Since the power sector had been traditionally controlled by the state-owned companies and it was 
considered as a technical issue by the governments, the EOR was created composed of 
representatives of these companies. The first challenge for the EOR came very soon, once El 
Salvador and Honduras decided to develop a bilateral interconnection between them. This was the 
remaining missing link in the region; so, in a sense, this new interconnection physically allowed 
the transmission of electricity across the region. Nevertheless, the regional regulation for it was 
not ready. In order to not delay the process, and based on a very pragmatic approach, EOR was 
able to set a temporal regulation, the RTMER, to enable the commencement of operations of the 
MER (although in an interim manner). In parallel, the regional regulation (RMER) was been 
negotiated. State-owned companies were the main persons involved in these negotiations, and 
understanding the potential benefits of the regional market and the vision for it, the RMER was 
designed so it would be also applicable to a fully integrated regional electricity market. This 
process also potentially contributed to the interest of neighboring countries to develop 
interconnections with the MER (the interest of Mexico and Colombia would be either to export to 
different countries of the region or even to the other hemisphere). 
Against this background, CRIE struggled to make progress. This was said to have occurred 
because it once became a “political arena” to discuss issues no related to the regional electricity 
market. These difficulties faced stimulated the state-owned companies to include new aspects to 
ensure CRIE independence at the Second Protocol (which was for the approval of the RMER). 
The main aspect was the strengthening of the independence and capabilities of the CRIE. The price 
to pay for this autonomy was the creation of a new political body to supervise the development of 
the regional market (CDMER). It is still unclear whether this CDMER will contribute to a smooth 
implementation of the regional market or not. 
 
6.4.6. Stage 5: Harmonization 
The sign of the II Protocol started the process for the harmonization of national and regional 
systems. For that, each country was required to ratify that agreement on their respective national 
parliaments. This process was relatively smooth in all the countries, except in Costa Rica. There, 
it was reported that the government aimed to include a reform of the state-owned company together 
with the ratification of the II Protocol. This has traditionally been a very sensitive issue in Costa 
Rica society and immediately created strong opposition at the parliament to the continuation of the 
process. It was needed the active involvement of the state-owned company management and some 
reforms to it to be passed and to ensure Costa Rica fulfill the requirements of the Framework 
Treaty. For example, ICE was vertically divided in business units and was explicitly appointed as 
the only allowed exporter in Costa Rica. 
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6.5. Causality analysis 
6.5.1. Stage 1: National stakeholders’ support 
 
Figure 25 - SIEPAC Causality Analysis. Stage 1 
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6.5.1.1. Analysis of causality diagram 
 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 State-owned companies 
created to monopolize 
national sectors 
Those companies were created during the 
1940s: 
- Guatemala created “Departamento de 
Electrificación Nacional” in 1940 [INDE 
website] 
- El Salvador created “Comisión Ejecutiva 
Hidroeléctrica del Rio Lempa” (CEL) in 
1945 [CEL website] 
- Honduras created “Empresa Nacional de 
Energia Electrica” (ENEE) in 1957 
[ENEE website] 
- Nicaragua created “Empresa de Luz y 
Fuerza de Managua” in 1941 [ENATREL 
website] 
- Costa Rica created “Instituto 
Costarricense de Electricidad” (ICE) in 
1949 [ICE website] 
- Panama created “Instituto de Recursos 
Hidraulicos y Electrificacion” (IRHE) in 
1961 
[websites on state-owned utilities] 
“Finally the state-owned companies became 
monopolies” 
[SIEPAC I.2.10] 
Factor 
2 Countries tended to 
consider power sector as 
technical issue 
“Every company was in charge of their whole 
national sectors. INDE, CEL, ENEEL, INE, 
ICE and IRE. They were gods” 
“The president of each company used to have 
more relevance than any minister” 
“Since they were directly elected by the 
presidents of each country, they had a strong 
representation” 
[SIEPAC. III.59-61] 
Output 
3 Debt crisis affected every 
Central American country 
“During the 80s the debt crisis in Latin 
America. International financing is closed for 
them” 
[SIEPAC XX.12] 
Factor 
4 IADB became main/only 
donor in the region 
“IADB is the main financer of the region” 
[SIEPAC I.58] 
Factor 
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5 Conflicts between 
countries due to 
aftermaths of Cold War 
“Nowadays there are several fears because of 
differences in political ideologies” 
“The region is politically unstable” 
[SIEPAC.VIII.14-15] 
Factor 
6 State-owned companies 
were reluctant to reforms 
that would diminish their 
position 
State-owned companies initial interest in 
reducing their operational costs and being 
able to grasp international funding seems to 
be explained by their willingness to try to 
protect their status quo at that time 
Factor 
7 Large generation power 
plants built in most of the 
countries 
“During this time large hydropower plants 
were built and the countries started to sell lot 
of electricity from these power plants.” 
[SIEPAC II. 19] 
Factor 
8 State-owned companies 
built national grids until 
borders 
“By late 70s, each country had an 
interconnected electric system and reached to 
the borders” 
[SIEPAC.XX.12] 
Factor 
9 Impossibility to continue 
public funding of sector 
“They didn’t have enough money for buying 
the fuel for thermal plant” 
“They were not able to expand the generation 
capacity” 
[SIEPAC.XXI.13-14] 
Factor 
10 Seasonal surplus of 
capacity appeared in some 
countries 
“We made in a bilateral way and we agreed 
how to sell / purchase power between two 
countries, or better said, between two 
companies. That allowed us to sell / purchase 
surplus power from some countries to 
another.” 
[SIEPAC.XX.22] 
Factor 
11 State-owned companies 
built weak bilateral 
interconnections without 
need of political 
agreement 
“Technically, no market wise, large electric 
systems have more strength. And it’s the best 
way for having better cost. That was made by 
the national companies and it didn’t require 
in all the situation government treaties.” 
[SIEPAC.XX.23] 
Factor 
12 State-owned companies 
had greater autonomy of 
action 
“Every company was in charge of their whole 
national sectors. INDE, CEL, ENEEL, INE, 
ICE and IRE. They were gods” 
 [SIEPAC. III.59] 
Factor 
13 State-owned companies 
created regional technical 
organization (CEAC) 
“During the VI Meeting of Presidents and 
Manager of the State-owned electric utilities 
of Central America, held in Panama between 
29-30 March 1979, it was decided the 
Factor 
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creation of the Consejo de Electrificacion de 
America Central (CEAC)” 
[CEAC website] 
14 Studies were carried out to 
analyze impact of 
strengthened bilateral 
interconnections 
“Several coordination organisms were 
created” [SIEPAC I.2.18] 
“Technical studies were made for finding the 
best way to create interconnections” 
[SIEPAC I.2.20] 
Action 
15 State-owned companies 
were initially interested 
only in regional 
infrastructure 
“The region only wanted the interconnection” 
[SIEPAC.XXI.38] 
Factor 
16 State-owned companies 
identified potential 
benefits from economies 
of scale 
“During this time large hydro power plants 
were built and the countries started to sell lot 
of electricity from these power plants. 
Therefore the benefits from greater 
interconnection appear naturally” 
[SIEPAC.II.19] 
“Technically, no market wise, large electric 
systems have more strength. And it’s the best 
way for having better cost.” 
[SIEPAC.XX.23] 
Factor 
17 Strengthening of bilateral 
interconnections was 
stopped by governments 
because of national 
security concerns 
“In 1965, with ECLAC, the ERICA study 
was created” 
[SIEPAC.II.20] 
The outcomes of that study were never 
implemented 
Factor 
18 Market oriented reforms 
appeared as only solution 
“The electric companies, government owned, 
started to have a lot of difficulties in order to 
finance future generation projects. Because 
governments will not permit them to finance, 
because it is debt, or the electric rates were 
controlled politically. Companies started to 
deteriorate at the end of 80s. In general the 
whole region started to have blackouts, 
payment problems, no continue the 
expansion of new projects. And the demand 
continued to grow. The solution started to be, 
take a look at the electric competitive 
markets. Chile and England have done that, 
there were some experiences. Suggestions 
appear that part of the solution was to have 
electric markets, at least until the wholesale 
market.” 
Output 
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[SIEPAC.XX.25] 
“First the countries should reform their 
national systems” 
[SIEPAC.XXI.33] 
19 Individual markets too 
small for being profitable 
“I have seen that large private generator are 
retiring from Central America […]. It seems 
there is a trend of large energy companies to 
leave space in small countries and 
concentrate in larger markets” 
“Central America is not attractive. Large 
companies are losing interest in small 
countries” 
[SIEPAC.XX.104] 
Factor 
20 International actors 
intervened to foster 
pacification 
“Grupo Contadora played an important role 
in Central America during the period 1983-
86. Essentially, it started to articulate 
elements of what latterly would become a 
negotiated end of the Central American 
crisis”33 
[Granados (1998), p114] 
Factor 
21 Market reforms struggling 
to succeed in some 
countries 
“In Honduras and Costa Rica, politically it 
was not successful” 
[SIEPAC.XX.28] 
Output 
22 CEAC became active 
supporter of connectivity 
“The important were agreements between the 
state-owned companies” 
[SIEPAC I.29] 
“The idea was since the creation of the 
CEAC” 
[SIEPAC.V.5] 
Factor 
23 Pacification process 
started in the region 
“There was also a political decision 
motivated by the Peace Agreements. There 
was a favorable environment for the 
integration” 
[SIEPAC III.16] 
Factor 
24 Spain was willing to 
provide funds for regional 
cooperation project 
through IADB 
“In 1987 Spain was preparing for celebrating 
in 1992 the 500 years since the arrival of 
Colom to America. That meant an increase in 
the political relations with Latin America. 
Spain offered to give money to the IADB for 
Action 
                                                 
 
33 Translated from Spanish by the author 
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projects in Latin America. That created also a 
relation between Spain and the IADB” 
[SIEPAC XXI.20] 
25 Endesa proposed regional 
transmission trunk with 
generation plants at every 
country 
“Endesa brought a new idea: create a unique 
interconnection between all the countries” 
“Endesa came with the solution, a single line 
of 5000 MW that would connect all the 
capitals” 
[SIEPAC II.24-25] 
Action 
26 Full regional consensus 
became bases of 
cooperation 
“Success actions in SIEPAC:[…]consensus 
environment” 
[SIEPAC I.54] 
Factor 
27 Endesa’s project was not 
accepted 
“Finally the project was no accepted” 
[SIEPAC II.28] 
Output 
28 IADB coordinated all the 
funding resources 
“Thanks to the final incorporation of Endesa, 
the project could start. Endesa unblocked the 
financing of US$170 million from IADB 
(Spain gave that money to IADB for this 
project)” 
[SIEPAC.V.37] 
Action 
29 New independent studies 
were contracted through 
CEAC 
“Technical studies y PTI (Canada) and 
economic by University of Comillas (Spain)” 
[SIEPAC.II.32] 
Action 
30 Different levels of 
integration were 
considered 
“Feasibility studies were made considering 6 
possible scenarios” 
[SIEPAC II.34] 
Action 
31 Final agreement was 
achieved for market + 
infrastructure solution 
(superposed regional 
market) 
“Those showed the “minimum cost of 
repentance”. That idea was very well 
accepted.” 
[SIEPAC.II.34] 
“It was needed to create an electricity market 
for getting the benefits” 
[SIEPAC.II.36] 
“The compromise solution was to do both 
aspects” 
[SIEPAC.XXI.39] 
Output 
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6.5.1.2. Links: 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
From To Description [source] 
1 8 As national monopolies, the main role of the state-owned companies was 
to expand the national interconnected systems 
1 7 They also had the sufficient funding for the development of large power 
plants (mostly hydro) that would cover the growing energy demand 
1 6 As national monopolies, it seems reasonable that they were looking for 
solutions that would keep their status-quo (even though their interest was 
also to attract private investment to the region) 
7 10 The construction of these large hydro-power dams created season surpluses 
10 11 After extending their national grids to the borders, the next logic step was 
to make connections with their neighboring countries. These were 
originally only to give mutual support to manage emergencies, taking 
advantage of the surplus capacity installed in some of them. The bilateral 
interconnections were therefore of low capacity (no designed for a robust 
system), and since they didn’t represent a cession of sovereignty, 
governments didn’t require the sign of explicit agreements. 
8 11 
2 11 
11 13 With the growth in the utilization of the bilateral interconnections, several 
studies were carried out. In order to maximize the utilization of them, state-
owned companies decided to form the Consejo de Electrificacion de 
America Central (CEAC) as a regional technical forum. 
12 13 
3 9 The reduction of public funding had a direct impact on the available 
resources of the state-owned companies. This was even greater with the 
freeze of electricity tariffs 
9 14 A potential increasing of the utilization of the interconnections was then 
seen as a way to protect the financial situation of the state-owned 
companies. This optimization would mean a reduction in their costs. In 
order to quantify those benefits and to identify the mechanism for that, 
several studies were carried out. One of the most commonly mentioned was 
the ERICA study funded by ECLAC, which ultimately would also serve for 
Endesa to know about the interest of the region in increasing connectivity 
13 14 
6 14 
3 4 One of the immediate consequences of the debt crisis was the closing of the 
windows of international financing for the member countries. In this 
context, only the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) continued 
providing funding to the countries, making all, or at least most, of them 
depending on that. 
5 20 The deterioration of the overall situation in Central America, with internal 
conflicts near to start major regional disputes, called the attention of 
international community. In particular, the Group of Contadora, with 
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Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, had an important role in the 
promotion of the peace in the region,  
4 24 Spain showed strong support to Group of Contadora (even awarding them 
with the Principe de Asturias Award for international cooperation in 1984). 
Once, Spanish government started a new international cooperation program 
(V Centenario funds) for Latin American and Caribbean region, the 
regional cooperation program captured great attention. 
 
20 24 
5 17 Once the technical studies carried out by the state-owned companies and 
CEAC were presented to their respective governments, these declined to 
continue based on national security concerns. No country was confident of 
depending on imported electricity from countries that might be perceived 
as enemies in some cases. 
14 17 
17 18 Without the appropriate public funding and the discard of the option of 
regional interconnections, the only remaining was to move towards the 
creation of national electricity markets following the examples of Chile and 
England 
9 18 
18 21 Nevertheless, these reforms were found to be more complex to implement 
than expected. One of the reasons for that was the small size of the countries 
(and therefore of the national systems and the aggregated demand). This 
small size increased the difficulty in fostering effective competition in the 
power sector, bringing to high concentration in some countries (like El 
Salvador were all the major distribution companies ended belonging to the 
same international investor, AES) 
19 21 
21 25 Knowing about the interest of the state-owned companies about the 
transmission project, the difficulties for the reforms, as well as about the 
possible financing from the Spanish government, Endesa decided to 
propose their own regional transmission system as an option for the region 
24 25 
14 16 The studies served to the state-owned companies to gain knowledge about 
the potential benefits they could get from increasing interconnectivity. 
Furthermore, some other interesting results were obtained, like the potential 
operational benefits for Costa Rica from power transmission between 
Panama and Nicaragua 
16 22 With larger knowledge about those potential benefits, CEAC became to 
main advocacy group in the region for the increasing interconnectivity 
22 26 CEAC operation was based on creating consensus. This organization can 
be understood as having strong concerns about fostering cooperation in the 
region. In order to grasp momentum from the pacification process 
23 26 
24 28 Without strong the sufficient experience to manage such kind of program, 
Spain approached the IADB to fulfill that role and created the V Centenario 
Trust Fund to be operated by the multilateral development bank. 
25 27 
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26 27 The initial proposal from Endesa was rejected by the state-owned 
companies. The reluctance to be potentially dependent on an extra-regional 
company seems to be behind of that opposition. 
26 29 After that rejection, new studies were carried out. This time, CEAC was 
involved and the technical and economic studies were done by independent 
organizations. 
27 29 
28 29 
6 15 It was reported that the state-owned companies were interested in the 
infrastructure rather than the market reforms. The initial interest in fostering 
the role of the state-owned companies seems to explain this behavior 
15 30 In order to find the appropriate level of market and infrastructure needed, 
the new technical and economic studies evaluated 6 different levels of 
integration 
21 30 
29 30 
17 31 The final solution agreed was a combination of market and infrastructure. 
Although the solution with the largest benefits was the full integration, the 
understanding of the reluctance from governments, a vision of a superposed 
regional electricity market was proposed 
30 31 
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6.5.2. Stage 2: High level political support and commitment 
Figure 26 - SIEPAC Causality Analysis. Stage 2 
132 
 
6.5.2.1. Analysis of causality diagram 
 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 Countries with different 
levels of reform 
At the time of these negotiations, some of the 
countries had already embarked in the 
process of reforming their national sectors. 
The region was therefore divided between 
those with single-buyer model (Costa Rica, 
and Honduras) and those already reformed 
(Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and 
Panama). 
 
“The other possibility would have continued 
through CEAC, but that was good only for 
vertically integrated systems and many 
countries started to create national electricity 
markets” 
[SIEPAC II.37] 
Factor 
2 Conflicts between 
countries still existing at 
that time 
Neighboring relations were mentioned to be 
still facing tough times. Some of the ones 
mentioned more frequently during the survey 
were the disputes between El Salvador and 
Honduras. The position of Nicaragua as an 
ally of Chaves’ government in Venezuela 
was also a potential source of disputes 
 
“The region is politically unstable. When the 
coup d’etat in Honduras; Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua closed the borders, 
isolating Honduras” 
[SIEPAC.VIII.15] 
Factor 
3 Negotiations held at 
technical level through 
existing organization 
As mentioned in the previous stage, the 
CEAC was in charge on the new technical 
and economic studies contracted through 
IADB Technical Assistance 
 
“The important were agreements between the 
state-owned companies, right below the 
governments” 
[SIEPAC.II.29] 
“When the idea is defined, it is brought to the 
Presidents’ Summits at SICA. From there, the 
idea of the Framework Treaty appears” 
[SIEPAC.II.38] 
Action 
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4 Acceptance of full 
consensus for project 
selection 
During the interview survey it was mentioned 
the need of full consensus for moving 
forward the project at any stage 
 
“Endesa was not included since the beginning 
because some members (like Costa Rica or El 
Salvador) opposed to it. There were 
nationalist feelings; they considered Endesa 
wanted to take the control. Panama had no 
problems with the incorporation but finally 
the regional consensus prevailed.” 
[SIEPAC.V.32] 
“Usually this commissioner is from the 
national regulatory bodies. That makes that 
there are many national political pressures, 
because they want to go slower in the 
regulatory integration. Since the agreements 
are made by consensus, the decisions are 
slow.” 
[SIEPAC.VII.13] 
“Decisions are always by consensus. At least, 
that’s the main goal” 
[SIEPAC.VII.19] 
Action 
5 Strengthening of the 
regional organization by 
putting it at the center for 
the studies 
While previous studies had been presented by 
Endesa, these new studies were organized 
actively involving the CEAC 
 
“The Executive Unit is formed by very high 
level persons, both technicians and top 
managers” 
“There is the risk to get lost during the 
decision-making process. For that is 
important to have a “bedside consultant”. In 
SIEPAC three “gurus” were contracted, three 
global consultants” 
“The consultant has no big power. In other 
regions consultants lead the process and 
impose the philosophy of the project. That 
scheme creates big problems” 
“Every step was approved by the Executive 
Unit” 
[SIEPAC.II.66-70] 
Action 
6 Some countries could get 
more benefits than others 
In particular, Costa Rica’s ICE was able to 
develop projects in other countries and/or sell 
their surplus electricity to other markets 
Factor 
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(through open bidding systems), while others 
(in particular Guatemala’s private generators) 
may face difficulties to access to Costa Rica’s 
market because of different regulatory 
systems  
 
“There are problems of reciprocity: ICE can 
make contracts with distribution companies 
or invest in Guatemala, while the private 
generators in Guatemala cannot make it 
freely (only through ICE)” 
[SIEPAC.VI.21] 
7 Studies including different 
combinations of market 
integration 
Pre-feasibility studies included 7 possible 
scenarios considering different levels of 
integration. From existing bilateral 
interconnections to regional electricity 
market with single dispatch 
 
“ 
 
“ 
[Sustainable Energy Policy and Technology, 
2013] 
Action 
8 Concept of gradualism 
was introduced 
The concept of gradualism appears in the 
Framework Treaty as: 
“Forecast for the progressive evolution of the 
market, through the incorporation of new 
participants, the progressive increase of 
coordinated operation, the development of 
interconnection networks and the 
strengthening of the regional entities.”34 
[Framework Treaty, Article 3] 
Action 
                                                 
 
34 Tratado Marco (Translated from Spanish by the author) 
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9 State-owned companies 
actively involved in 
design 
Not only the CEAC was at the center of the 
technical and economic studies but also for 
the negotiation of the draft version of the 
Framework Treaty 
 
“Every step was approved by the Executive 
Unit” 
[SIEPAC.II.70] 
“Everything was made by the state-owned 
companies” 
[SIEPAC.V.22] 
Action 
10 State-owned companies 
had major influence in 
their respective national 
sectors 
Even in the countries with reform in the 
national sectors (where the state-owned 
companies had become national TSOs) still 
were a major stakeholder in their respective 
country due to their expertise 
 
“Every company was in charge of their whole 
national sectors. INDE, CEL, ENEEL, INE, 
ICE and IRE. They were gods” 
“The president of each company used to have 
more relevance than any minister” 
“Since they were directly elected by the 
presidents of each country, they had a strong 
representation” 
[SIEPAC. III.59-61] 
Factor 
11 Major reforms would be 
needed in some countries 
In particular, it was assumed by all that Costa 
Rica would need to implement major reforms 
(unbundling and openness to private 
participation) 
 
“Integration was not made since the 
beginning because politically was 
impossible. It was impossible to make such 
big reforms in each country” 
[SIEPAC.II.57-60] 
 
“We are still vertical integrated but with the 
division in business units we commit with the 
Tratado Marco. Logic is that we will arrive to 
the same situation as other countries” 
[SIEPAC.XX.111] 
 
Factor 
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“We are very socialistic country. It is very 
difficult to privatize or unbundling or 
increase the amount of private generation” 
[SIEPAC.XX.113] 
12 Neutrality of the regional 
system was required 
For example, avoiding situations in which the 
regional transmission could be utilized to 
undermine a particular country 
 
“I proposed a single company with equal 
ownership of every country. Then, no one 
could dominate the project” 
[SIEPAC.XXI.46] 
Action 
13 Tensions between 
countries could affect 
entire region 
Being an integrated system, an interruption in 
the infrastructure could cause a major 
regional blackout. This interruption could be 
both unintended and intended 
 
“The national systems were, and are, weak. 
They can resist that kind of interconnection in 
a single point; there were possibility to total 
blackouts in case of failure.” 
[SIEPAC.II.26] 
Factor 
14 A strong commitment 
from all governments was 
needed 
Not only the involvement of the state-owned 
companies, but the written binding agreement 
of the heads of state (that is a treaty) was 
required for granting the funding 
 
“IADB conditioned the financing to a clear 
and firm commitment of the countries” 
[SIEPAC.XXI.28] 
Action 
15 State-owned companies 
direct conversations with 
countries’ presidents 
During the interview survey it was mentioned 
how the state-owned companies became 
“champions” of the project 
 
“For the ratification of the Framework Treaty 
we explained and defended the project in the 
national parliaments in El Salvador, Costa 
Rica…” 
[SIEPAC.V.23] 
Action 
16 Changes in the framework 
treaty were introduced to 
remove non-necessary 
components 
During the interview survey some were 
mentioned, like the diplomatic status of the 
employees at the regional institutions (CRIE, 
EOR and EPR) 
 
Action 
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“The first Tratado was very large and we 
went to directors and they stated to have 
many objections. After several meetings we 
found we will never agree” 
[SIEPAC.XX.202] 
 
“We only put there what we believed that the 
6 countries were going to accept. If we would 
have continued discussing the full Tratado we 
would have never finished” 
[SIEPAC.XX.208] 
17 A future regional market 
of actors was envisioned 
In comparison with previous projects, the 
MER is a market of actors rather than of 
countries, what opens the door for future 
smoother integration and transition 
 
“The goal is to use one single electric sector 
law. There are several interphases for that” 
“From 2002 there are trading between the 7 
countries, but the Framework Treaty is not 
only for exchanges, it has bigger targets. If 
not, it would have been much simpler” 
Process will end with the full integration 
because national resources for national 
dispatch will finish” 
“Integration was not made since the 
beginning because politically was 
impossible. It was impossible to make such 
big reforms in each country” 
[SIEPAC.II.57-60] 
Action 
18 Concept of reciprocity 
was introduced 
“Right of each state to apply to another state 
the same rules and norms that the second state 
applies temporally, in accordance with the 
principle of Gradualism” 
[Framework Treaty, Article 3] 
Action 
19 Concept of competition 
was introduced 
“Freedom in the development of the service 
provision activities according the objective, 
transparent and no discriminatory rules” 
[Framework Treaty, Article 3] 
Action 
20 IADB coordinating all the 
funding sources 
While there have been different donors. 
Particularly at the initial stages, the funding 
from Spain was channeled through the IADB 
in the form of a trust-fund (V Centenario) 
 
Action 
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“In 1987, Spain was preparing for celebrating 
in 1992, the 500 years from the arrival of 
Colon to America. That meant an increase in 
the political relations with Latin America. 
That created also a relation between Spain 
and the IADB” 
[SIEPAC.XXI.20] 
21 Concerns about unfair 
competition were 
overcome 
Although issues still exist, it is commonly 
accepted that a system of rules was created 
 
“Also it is difficult to take too many 
advantages or reduce the commitment; that 
doesn’t work because “your neighbor can be 
kind because has other interests with you, but 
others will not allow you” 
[SIEPAC.II.50] 
Output 
22 Concerns about 
interference on national 
structure were avoided 
National markets were fully independent, the 
only condition is to prevent interference with 
the operation of the regional infrastructure 
(SIEPAC) and market (MER) 
 
“In simple. The Tratado Marco we respect 
what you do in your country (it’s on your 
loss), but if you are going to sell / purchasing 
cross border there are new rules” 
[SIEPAC.XX.28] 
Output 
23 Countries’ president 
signed the Framework 
Treaty 
Framework Treaty (Tratado Marco) signed 
by the Presidents of the Central American 
countries in Guatemala City on December 30, 
1996 
Costa Rica: Jose María Figuere Olsen 
El Salvador: Armando Calderon Sol 
Guatemala: Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen 
Honduras: Carlos Roberto Reina 
Nicaragua: Violeta de Chamorro 
Panama: Ernesto Pérez Balladares 
[Framework Treaty] 
Output 
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6.5.2.2. Links: 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
 
From To Description [source] 
1 6 In particular some countries/companies perceived that the dominant 
position of the still public monopolies (like ICE) could become dominant 
in the region due to their largest size 
3 4 It was mentioned by different stakeholders that the shared value of 
consensus based negotiations had grown at the interactions at CEAC 
4 7 In order to balance the level of changes that would be needed (that is the 
level of integration) and the benefits that could be derived, different 
possibilities were included in the studies 
1 7 
3 5 The decision of keeping active discussions at the technical level, and, in 
particular, through the CEAC, end strengthening their position (for example 
it increased their knowledge and capabilities) 
5 9 It seems reasonable to consider that this protagonism had an influence in 
getting on board the state-owned companies 
9 16 It was mentioned that there were a number of clauses included in the initial 
draft which was not acceptable for some members, while other clauses were 
also not acceptable for other members. In this process, the involvement of 
the state-owned companies was relevant to be able to remove those 
elements without diminishing the final objective of the project (the creation 
of regional electricity market) 
4 16 
7 8 As an output of the preliminary studies, the selection was the second best 
option, the superposed regional market. It was chosen also because it 
continues allowing further integration while not suppose a threat to national 
governments 
8 22 The structure of the superposed market, as well as removing elements that 
could be perceived as challenges to national sovereignty, helped to avoid 
such claims at the political negotiations stage 
16 22 
8 17 The superposed market brought what is was called as “6+1=1”. This is 
meant to allow a future transition towards a fully integrated regional 
electricity market 
17 19 Considering the process of privatization occurring in every country, it was 
envisioned that the regional market should not be any more a market of 
countries, but of “actors” (that is companies, either public or private). It was 
also agreed, that the market rules would select the best “actors”. For that 
competition was enhanced as a fundamental value of the Framework Treaty 
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6 18 As a measure to reduce the concerns from countries to be dominated by 
others, reciprocity principle was considered relevant. In that sense, each 
country could impose similar barriers to another member country 
2 12 Conflicts between countries seem to have influenced a strong requirement 
of appearance of neutrality 
12 20 The role of IADB as a neutral partner was several times mentioned (in the 
form of honest broker) 
20 21 One of the expressions commonly repeated was that the ones who would 
better work on the competitive market would get the most benefits. In that 
sense, it can be understood that a common understanding that a fair system 
for competition was being achieved 
19 21 
18 21 
2 14 The signature of the Framework Treaty was said to be a condition from the 
IADB. The reasons for that can be understood due to the existing conflicts, 
the potential effects those could have and the complexities of the reforms 
expected to be implemented 
13 14 
11 14 
14 15 Getting this involvement from the presidents was triggered due to the 
involvement of the state-owned companies, and also due to their direct 
talks. 
10 15 
9 15 
15 23 It was after avoiding the potential concerns and direct talks with countries’ 
presidents that a strong written commitment was possible 22 23 
21 23 
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Figure 27 - SIEPAC Causality Analysis. Stage 3Stage 3: Physical construction 
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6.5.2.3. Analysis of causality diagram 
 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 State-owned companies 
had a history of 
cooperation 
State-owned companies had been actively 
cooperating at CEAC as well as through the 
bilateral interconnections, which in some 
cases were operated in an informal manner 
 
“From 1976, there were meetings between 
the countries” 
“During the 80s, bilateral interconnections” 
[SIEPAC.I.2-3] 
 
“Teofilo de la Torre proposed the creation of 
CEAC as an institution for the cooperation 
and integration through the communication 
between the different parties” 
‘Before CEAC there were several 
coordination groups. CEAC was the 
mechanism for institutionalizing that” 
[SIEPAC.I.6-7] 
Factor 
2 Conflicts between 
countries still existing at 
that time 
Even after the pacification process, conflicts 
and ideological differences in the region still 
existed 
 
“July 14, 1969: Honduras and El Salvador 
clash in the four-day ‘Football War’ [BT, 
2015] 
 
“At present times, no one country really 
accepts to depend on the others. Only El 
Salvador and Panama accepts relatively” 
[SIEPAC.XI.9] 
Factor 
3 Endesa initiated the 
regional project 
Project was started after the interest of 
Endesa 
 
“Endesa was founder of the project. They 
have the idea of having a strong transmission 
line crossing Central America” 
[SIEPAC.XX.121] 
 
“Endesa was interested to start a 
internationalization process. Ignacio 
Larranzabal, the director of the international 
Output 
143 
 
department of Endesa, has worked previously 
in ECLAC, where he heard about the interest 
of the Central American countries about 
creating regional interconnection. He 
reported to Mr. Tora Galvan, his boss and an 
expert in transmission projects. Tora Galvan 
showed great interest in the project and 
offered the support of Endesa to Central 
America.” 
[SIEPAC.XXI.21] 
4 State-owned companies 
were reluctant to lose 
control of their national 
sectors 
This could be perceived from their preference 
over the strengthening of the bilateral 
interconnections rather than the privatization 
of the national sectors  
 
“At the beginning, Central American 
countries felt that this is a project that only 
Central American should be the owners of the 
transmission line” 
[SIEPAC.XX.122] 
Factor 
5 Countries didn’t have 
experience of effective 
functional cooperation 
The only cooperation at political level was 
the pacification process. Regional institutions 
created later, like SICA, were still young 
 
[SICA was created in 1991, after the sign of 
the Tegucigalpa Protocol to the ODECA] 
Factor 
6 Full consensus was a 
condition for agreements 
During the interview survey it was mentioned 
the need of full consensus for moving 
forward the project at any stage 
 
“Success actions in SIEPAC:[…]consensus 
environment” 
[SIEPAC I.54] 
Action 
7 Neutrality of the regional 
system was required 
For example, avoiding situations in which the 
regional transmission could be utilized to 
undermine a particular country 
 
“I proposed a single company with equal 
ownership of every country. Then, no one 
could dominate the project” 
[SIEPAC.XXI.46] 
Output 
8 Agreement was made 
around the idea of equally 
It was mentioned that it was also considered 
that the infrastructure could be owned by 
each country in their own national borders, 
Action 
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ownership of the 
infrastructure 
but, since the project should benefit equally 
of the parties, the ownership would be also 
equal 
 
“The ownership of the EPR is agreed to be 
shared equally. No company can control 
more than a 15% of the total shares” 
[SIEPAC.V.30] 
9 Endesa looked to avoid 
political discussions 
interference 
From the proposals of Endesa it can be seen 
that they tried to avoid previous political 
discussions (for example by offering the 
construction of large power plants at every 
country). Endesa proposal was also to make 
an regional trunk system connecting only to 
one point at each country (in that sense it 
would be independent from national systems) 
 
“Endesa brought a new idea: create a unique 
interconnection between all the countries” 
“Endesa came with the solution, a single line 
of 500Mw that would connect all the 
capitals” 
[SIEPAC.II.24] 
Output 
10 Proposal of a company for 
owning the regional assets 
Initial proposal was SIEPAC Inc., which was 
effectively constituted in Spain for the 
project, including also Endesa as shareholder. 
 
“They created a company in Spain named 
SIEPC corporation with the state as 
shareholders” 
[SIEPAC V.4] 
Action 
11 CEAC was the main actor 
for the promotion of the 
regional project 
CEAC was effectively created for that 
purpose, to improve and increase the 
utilization of the interconnections in the 
region 
 
“CEAC wrote the Framework Treaty” 
[SIEPAC.I.8] 
Factor 
12 State-owned companies 
were highly involved in 
the entire process 
Since the beginning it can be observed their 
involvement in all the discussions 
 
“CEAC wrote the Framework Treaty” 
[SIEPAC.I.8] 
 
Action 
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“For the ratification of the Framework Treaty 
we explained and defended the project in the 
national parliaments in El Salvador, Costa 
Rica…” 
[SIEPAC.V.23] 
13 Constitution of the 
company exclusively with 
members’ state-owned 
companies 
Incorporation of Endesa was initially not 
accepted for the EPR. It was mentioned that 
some members were not comfortable 
including non-regional members 
 
“Endesa was not included since the beginning 
because some members opposed to it” 
[SIEPAC.V.32] 
Action 
14 Management of the 
company through inter-
governmental approach 
Operation of EPR was done through regular 
meetings with representatives from each 
countries in a rotating location 
 
“From 1999 to 2002, the company operated 
very bad with meeting every 4 months with 
ach company paying its own expenses and the 
studies financed by IADB and realized by the 
executive Unit” 
[SIEPAC.V.36] 
Action 
15 EPR faced struggles to 
move the project forward 
It was reported that during that time, progress 
was limited 
 
“From 1999 to 2002, the company operated 
very bad with meeting every 4 months with 
ach company paying its own expenses and the 
studies financed by IADB and realized by the 
executive Unit” 
[SIEPAC.V.36] 
Output 
16 Endesa was accepted as an 
equal shareholder 
Endesa incorporated to the EPR in 2011 
“Endesa to take 14.3% SIEPAC stake” 
[BN Americas, 2001] 
Action 
17 Management of the 
company through project 
based approach 
It was mentioned that the incorporation of 
Endesa helped to set a more corporate 
strategy (with independent budget, own 
personnel and permanent offices) 
 
“EPR is very executing. It gives explications 
only to its shareholders, not to the 
governments” 
[SIEPAC XXI.50] 
Action 
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18 EPR raised demand for 
appropriate funding 
mechanism at CRIE to 
grant economic viability 
of infrastructure 
“There are problems for approving the needs 
for repayment to EPR, through the Annual 
Transmission Costs for the operation and 
maintenance. Law allows only 3%, EPR 
studies said they need 4%, while CRIE has 
only approved 1.9%. Despite it doesn’t need 
to make a big business, EPR should be 
financially independent from the countries”. 
[SIEPAC. VI.27] 
 
“SIEPAC charges criticized” [Prensa Libre, 
2012] 
Output 
19 EPR gained economic and 
managerial autonomy 
“Thanks to the final incorporation of Endesa, 
the project could start. Endesa unblocked the 
financing of US$170 million from IADB 
(Spain gave that money to IADB for this 
project)” 
[SIEPAC.V.37] 
Action 
20 Complains from Honduras 
were discussed and solved 
at technical level without 
major political 
intervention 
During the survey in Central America, it was 
mentioned that there were some initial 
reluctances from Honduras because of the 
route. These issues were overcome thanks to 
agreement at technical level 
Output 
21 EPR utilized SIEPAC line 
for a regional trunk fiber 
optic line 
“For appointing the executive director of 
REDCA 35  three candidates were proposed. 
One from Honduras, one from Spain and 
another from Colombia. The Honduran 
candidate was the favorite but he decided to 
withdraw. Finally, no one was chosen and 
REDCA is still inside the EPR structure. 
There were concerns to choose the most 
neutral, and there is confidence on EPR 
work.” 
[SIEPAC.VIII.34] 
Output 
22 Most of employees came 
from state-owned 
companies 
Being the state-owned companies the 
shareholders of the EPR, it seems reasonable 
to think that many of the employees were 
originally coming from the state-owned 
companies (as it was the case of the people 
interviewed) 
Action 
                                                 
 
35 REDCA is a new project developed by EPR for creating a regional optical fiber using the route of the SIEPAC line 
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23 Effective coordination of 
regional and national 
works was achieved 
During the survey it was mentioned that for 
the construction works the EPR acted with a 
double nature. Sometimes as a private 
company, others through its public 
shareholders  
Output 
24 Costa Rica national issues 
didn’t paralyze project 
implementation 
“ICA has been cooperating always; despite 
some don’t want to see that point. During the 
period of the ratification, ICE committed with 
the payments despite it was not accepted by 
the country” 
[SIEPAC.VIII.51] 
Output 
25 EPR became clearly 
“regional transmission 
company” 
“EPR made a good job obtaining the 
financing and new investors” 
[SIEPAC.XX.35] 
Output 
26 Colombia and Mexico 
supported regional project 
and requested to join EPR 
“CFE and ISA entered later. They requested 
invitation. Each one of them have interest of 
being part the SIEPAC development 
expecting that they will be ble to interconnect 
their systems with SIEPAC […]Colombia 
and Mexico have also given strong political 
support” 
[SIEPAC.XX.129] 
 
“External political support is very important 
for national government support” 
[SIEPAC.XX.131] 
Output 
 
6.5.2.4. Links: 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
 
From To Description [source] 
1 6 From the experience of cooperating at CEAC, the reaching of full 
consensus between all the members became the norm 
1 11 The background of the benefits from the bilateral interconnections and the 
studies carried out by CEAC, this became the main actor for the promotion 
of the regional project 
11 12 From their position at CEAC, the state-owned companies got involved in 
the entire process 
2 7 Because of the conflicts between countries, looking for neutrality was key 
during the entire process. For example, at every stage, it has been important 
that no country could dominate the project.  
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2 9 The proposal of Endesa seems to have tried to avoid the interference of 
political conflicts. By being an independent regional grid and proposing the 
construction of large power plants at every country would have reduced 
such concerns. 
3 9 
7 8 In order to avoid reluctances that one country would dominate the regional 
project, by dividing the shares of the regional company between all the 
member countries created the idea of regional ownership. This approach 
was different to the originally thought of each country building their own 
section. 
6 8 
9 10 The original company created by the initiative of Endesa was SIEPAC Inc. 
combining the two aspects: relative independence from political influence 
and equal ownership 
8 10 
10 13 The reluctance of some member to the inclusion of extra-regional parties, 
combined with the look for full consensus among the state-owned 
companies ended in the no-incorporation of Endesa in the establishment of 
EPR 
6 13 
12 13 
4 13 
13 14 It was mentioned that the initial operations of EPR were based on regular 
meetings without a permanent structure. This would be similar to the 
operations of CEAC, and therefore without including Endesa the same 
approach continued 
14 15 The issue was that following this system, the real implementation of the 
regional project was more challenging 5 15 
15 16 Endesa still continued showing its willingness to be part of EPR. After 
granting that Endesa would not be dominant in the company (same 
ownership as each of the state-owned companies), it was accepted as a new 
shareholder. 
3 16 
16 17 Endesa brought a more corporate management style. It provided the initial 
funding needed for the establishment of the headquarters and the initial 
operations with full-time employees. 
17 18 This more corporate approach to the company can be observed in the 
demands from EPR for an increasing in the revenue to be collected from 
the utilization of the regional infrastructure against the initial will of the 
countries 
17 19 In that sense, EPR gained its economic and managerial independence, 
fostering a regional vision in its employees 
19 20 The independence of EPR also fostered a more low-profile approach, 
limiting the impacts of the potential conflicts and looking to their resolution 
initially at a technical level. The complaints from Honduras and 
modification of the initial route of the infrastructures is one example of it 
6 20 
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19 21 Another example of its independence was the incorporation of REDCA (the 
regional trunk fiber optic line) as an ad-hoc project that would increase its 
revenue 
19 22 With the experience of working on the regional project, and the funding 
provided initially by Endesa, several employees from the state-owned 
companies with experience with the project became full-time employees or 
representatives of EPR 
1 22 
22 23 This double role of private corporation and fluent relations with the state-
owned companies, allowed EPR to find the best approached to each of the 
issues needed to solve for the construction of the line. 
23 24 For example, even though the acquiring of the rights of way in Costa Rica 
was delayed, there was a clear understanding in the rest of the state-owned 
companies of the difficulties being faced and the efforts being realized. 
Reducing the conflicts between member countries (at least at technical 
level)  
23 25 In that sense, EPR continued increasing its role as a transmission company, 
in this case of regional dimension 
25 26 This could give a more pragmatic vision to the project and increase its 
reliability, contributing to the willingness of neighboring countries (Mexico 
and Colombia) to participate in the project 
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6.5.3. Stage 4: Institutional construction 
 
Figure 28 - SIEPAC Causality Analysis. Stage 4 
 
6.5.3.1. Analysis of causality diagram 
 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 Market + infrastructure 
approach was agreed 
“The compromise solution was to do both 
aspects” 
[SIEPAC.XXI.40] 
Action 
2 State-owned companies 
were in charge of national 
systems 
“Every company was in charge their whole 
national sectors. INDE, CEL, ENEEL, INE, 
ICE and IRE. They were “gods” 
[SIEPAC.III.60] 
 
“The national reforms changed drastically. 
Nevertheless, the state-owned companies are 
still very large. Only in Panama they don’t 
control the generation, despite the 
Factor 
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government owns the 49% of the power 
plants” 
[SIEPAC.III.63] 
3 Framework Treaty was 
written to allow regional 
market 
“Integration was not made since the 
beginning because politically was 
impossible” 
[SIEPAC.II.60] 
 
“Considering that under the framework of the 
Sistema de Integracion Centroamericana, 
SICA, the member states have shown their 
interest in the starting a gradual process of 
electric integration, through the development 
of a regional competitive power market, by 
transmission line that interconnect their 
national grids and the promotion of regional 
power generation projects” 
[Framework Treaty, preamble] 
 
“The present Treaty has for objective the 
creation and gradual growth of a regional 
competitive power market” 
[Framework Treaty, Article 1] 
Action 
4 Market would enable 
investments 
“The creative idea was to create a 7th market 
apart of the nationals. The regional organisms 
will push to the integration” 
[SIEPAC.III.15] 
Output 
5 Regional operator and 
regulator were created 
[Framework Treaty] 
“The idea was not only to build the line or 
make exchanges. For that a regional 
administration is created: CRIEC, EOR, 
EPR” 
[SIEPAC.III.18] 
Action 
6 Regional operator 
composed by 
representatives from state-
owned companies 
The Board of Directors of EOR is formed by 
12 directors appointed by each of the 
governments 
[EOR website] 
 
It was mentioned that those come from the 
national operators of each country 
Action 
7 Regional regulator 
composed by politically 
appointed representatives 
“The maximum authority in CRIE is the 
Board of Directors, constituted by 1 
representative (or commissioner) from each 
country” 
Action 
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“Usually the commissioner is from the 
national regulatory bodies. That makes that 
there are many national political pressures” 
[SIEPAC.VII.12-13] 
8 Foreign relations 
influenced by ideological 
differences 
“The region is politically instable” 
[SIEPAC.VIII.15] 
 
Factor 
9 CRIE was unable to make 
some decisions to move 
market forward 
“Usually the commissioner is from the 
national regulatory bodies. That makes that 
there are many national political pressures, 
because they want to go slower in the 
regulatory integration. Since the agreements 
are made by consensus, the decisions are 
slow” 
[SIEPAC.VII.12-13] 
Output 
10 Provisions for protecting 
future development of 
MER were introduced 
“RMER is very complex, designed for 
allowing a full integration of the region” 
[SIEPAC.III.22] 
Output 
11 Investments focused on 
regional transmission 
All the international donors funding have 
been channeled to the EPR, so to the 
construction of the regional transmission 
system, and to the strengthening of the 
national transmission systems to allow no 
interference. 
 
“The development of the infrastructure was 
going to promote the exchanges in a better 
way” 
[SIEPAC.XXI.34] 
Action 
12 Operations could start 
rapidly with the 
construction of Honduras 
El Salvador bilateral 
interconnection 
“Despite the efforts, the projects was not 
feasible due to the absence of physical 
interconnection between El Salvador and 
Honduras, that was foresaw for 2002; for that, 
in 2001 was critical in the process since all 
the Central American national dispatch 
centers started to work in a transitory 
regulation” 
[EOR website, History] 
 
“In 2002, all the bilateral agreements were 
canceled and replaced by RTMER. A very 
simple regulation because the transactions 
capacity was very limited. A Pilot code for 1 
or 2 years, but finally during a longer time. 
Output 
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RMER and line. It has been enforcing for 10 
years. It is a very weak regulation, cannot 
operate with several transmission lines 
connecting countries. It is very important to 
start using the RMER and stop using the 
RTMER. A lot of new problems.” 
[SIEPAC.XX.65] 
13 Regional transactions 
allowed with temporal 
measures 
“With the finalization of the interconnection 
El Salvador – Honduras and, the test on July 
21st 2002, the process was accelerated, so it 
was needed to implement a transitory period 
before the setting of EOR” 
[EOR website, History] 
Action 
14 RMER designed for future 
regional market operation 
“RMER is very complex, designed for 
allowing a full integration of the region” 
[SIEPAC.III.22] 
Action 
15 Privatization of generation 
was progressing in the 
region 
“We started to see in parallel that these 
electric companies were disintegrating, 
dividing in different companies. Four 
companies moved from purchasing power to 
a wholesale electricity market, unbundling 
generation, transmission, and distribution, 
and large consumers appear: Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama. In 
Honduras and Costa Rica, politically it was 
not successful”. 
[SIEPAC.XX.28] 
Factor 
16 Regional investors got 
interested in power 
generation opportunities 
“Inauguration of hydroelectric Hydroxacbal” 
[Central America Data, 2010] 
 
“Grupo Terra looks to expand to all Central 
America” [Central America Data, 2010] 
Action 
17 Interconnections with 
Mexico and Colombia 
were accepted 
“Electric interconnection with Mexico 
becomes priority: Guatemala” [El 
Economista, 2012] 
“Mexico willing to export electricity to 
Central America” [Central America Data, 
2014] 
Action 
18 RMER became a general 
demand 
The impossibility of granting line access for 
long term contracts became a challenge for 
Grupo Terra to commit with its contract with 
El Salvador distribution company 
 
“Lack of regulation prevents power delivery” 
Output 
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[Central America Data, 2012] 
 
“Lack of regulation prevents power delivery 
(2)” 
[Central America Data, 2013] 
 
“Lack of regulation prevents power delivery 
(3)” 
[Central America Data, 2014] 
19 II Protocol was signed to 
enforce RMER 
“II Protocol and RMER give sanctioning 
power of the CRIE. Without enforcement of 
RMER, CRIE cannot force because it cannot 
punish any action” 
[SIEPAC.VII.24] 
Action 
20 Countries concerns about 
losing control over 
regional market 
“For solving disputes CRIE works well, but 
we don’t feel comfortable that there is no 
regional institution over CRIE. Costa Rica 
has not accepted Parlacen nad Panama will 
soon quit. The Central American Court works 
better, but it is still not enough 
[SIEPAC.VIII.21] 
 
“Develop CRIE is more complicated than 
EOR because governments are reluctant to 
give power to it” 
[SIEPAC.XX.164] 
Factor 
21 II Protocol incorporated 
creation of political 
supervisory body 
“Governments felt they have given too much 
power to the regional institutions, thaty’s why 
the created the Governning Board 
(CDMER)” 
[SIEPAC.II.49] 
 
“CDMER is composed mainly by ministers 
of energy” 
[SIEPAC.VIII.43] 
 
“The idea is that CDMER reduces 
reluctances from governments” 
“CDMER is the place for involving the 
governments” 
[SIEPAC.XX.168-169] 
Action 
22 Economic and managerial 
autonomy of regional 
regulator was agreed 
“It is growing. Until very recently they didn’t 
have own budget, they were living with 
donations from IADB. Now they are more 
than 20, they used to be only 3” 
Action 
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[SIEPAC.XX.163] 
 
 
6.5.3.2. Links: 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
 
 
From To Description [source] 
1 3 After the acceptance of a combination of market and infrastructure, the common 
agreement was that this should be an intermediate step in the achievement of a 
single regional electricity market. That’s the principle behind the 6+1=1, which 
was also expressed in the Framework Treaty with the term “gradual”. 
1 4 The idea behind the market + infrastructure was that the creation of the market 
attract foreign investments, one of the main incentives for the project, and the 
infrastructure was needed for that. 
3 5 In order to allow the integration process to continue until becoming a plenty 
regional market, the creation of institutions that would replicate the national 
systems was required. For that, the regional operator and the regulator were 
included in the Treaty. 
5 7 The regulator was created therefore including political representatives (originally 
from the national regulators). 
7 9 This politicization was said to be behind the difficulties to move forward some 
decisions. 8 9 
2 6 Contrary, the regional operator board of directors’ members came from state-
owned companies (the operators at the national level). 5 6 
6 14 Being them the main promoters of the full integration, that was kept in the 
development of the RMER, which is more ambitious than for the current 
superposed electricity market. 
4 11 Since the target was to attract investments, rather than replace them, the focus was 
on the construction of the required infrastructure, that is the regional transmission 
system. 
11 12 After the rapid construction of the interconnection between El Salvador and 
Honduras, the starting of operations (and therefore the attraction of private 
investment) was possible. 
12 13 Being technically strong institution with determination for the success of the 
regional market, EOR was able to rapidly develop a transitory regulation that 
would allow the operation of the regional market (although under several 
limitations). 
6 13 
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13 16 This was successful in the sense that interest appeared in the region. Private 
investors like Grupo Terra started to realize investments in order to get the benefits 
from the future implementation of the market. 
4 16 
15 16 
13 17 The rapid starting of operations was a signal of reliability to the project. That 
combined with the objective of the full integration was an incentive to the 
neighboring countries to support the project, because of their interest in the 
interconnection between North and South America 
14 17 
2 10 After the problems faced by CRIE, the state-owned companies accepted to 
incorporate provisions in the Second Protocol to protect its independence 9 10 
16 18 With the incorporation of the neighboring countries and the increasing attention 
by private investors, the need for the RMER became larger 17 18 
18 19 In order to unblock the situation, the Second Protocol was introduced and signed 
by the member countries 10 19 
19 21 Nevertheless, since the CRIE would be more independent, and in order to reduce 
the concerns from governments, a new institution was created, the CDMER 20 21 
19 22 With the RMER being introduced, the CRIE gained control over the operations of 
the regional market 
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6.5.4. Stage 5: Harmonization 
 
Figure 29 - SIEPAC Causality Analysis. Stage 5 
 
6.5.4.1. Analysis of causality diagram 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 II Protocol was signed by 
all member countries 
Signed on 10 April, 2007 in Campeche 
(Mexico) by foreign affairs ministers 
[EOR website, II Protocol] 
Action 
2 National sectors needed to 
adapt to regional market 
“Now the problem is the harmonization in the 
regional and national level” 
[SIEPAC.XX.150] 
 
“Harmonization has been a slow process” 
“CRIE made a proposal to each country, what 
CRIE considered a valid way to making the 
harmonization. Maintain the regional 
regulation and tide the local regulation to the 
regional. Plugging both together. CRIE did 
that by contracting consulting companies.” 
Factor 
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[SIEPAC.XX.155-156] 
3 Strong public criticism 
towards privatization of 
ICE 
“Report from Costa Rica on mass protests 
against privatization of state-owned utilities” 
[WSWS,2000] 
Factor 
4 Principles of gradualism 
and reciprocity had been 
included in Framework 
Treaty 
“Forecast for the progressive evolution of the 
market, through the incorporation of new 
participants, the progressive increase of 
coordinated operation, the development of 
interconnection networks and the 
strengthening of the regional entities.”36 
“Right of each state to apply to another state 
the same rules and norms that the second state 
applies temporally, in accordance with the 
principle of Gradualism” 
[Framework Treaty, Article 3] 
Action 
5 CRIE started discussion 
for harmonization period 
“CRIE made a proposal to each country, what 
CRIE considered a valid way to making the 
harmonization. Maintain the regional 
regulation and tide the local regulation to the 
regional. Plugging both together. CRIE did 
that by contracting consulting companies. 
Panama did by them.” 
[SIEPAC.XX.156] 
Action 
6 “Interfaces” were created 
at each country 
“Then each national regulator has used this 
information for taking more time of study and 
decided how to do it. How they will take 
resolution in order to have the RMER in 
operation in January, under preliminary 
phase.” 
[SIEPAC.XX.157] 
Action 
7 Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Panama ratified II 
Protocol 
All the countries except Costa Rica were 
reported to have ratified the II Protocol 
Action 
8 Costa Rica tried to pass 
law including reform of 
ICE 
“When II Protocol went to the parliament, 
government found the opportunity to make 
slightly changes” 
[SIEPAC.XX.185] 
Action 
                                                 
 
36 Tratado Marco (Translated from Spanish by the author) 
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9 Parliament opposed and 
the ratification was 
stopped 
“It took three years to the government to 
understand that was not going to happen” 
“It is a very sensitive issue” 
[SIEPAC.XX.188-189] 
Output 
10 Other countries started to 
complain about delays in 
Costa Rica 
Some complains were heard about the delay 
of the project due to Costa Rica national 
issues 
Output 
11 ICE president delivered 
explanation to parliament 
“Interview: Teofilo de la Torre: Our Project 
protects the role of ICE” [CR Hoy, 2011] 
Action 
12 Satisfactory solution was 
agreed 
Finally, Costa Rica ratified the II Protocol Output 
13 ICE was vertically 
unbundled 
“We are still vertical integrated but with the 
division in business units we commit with the 
Tratado Marco” 
[SIEPAC.XX.111] 
Action 
14 ICE was appointed as only 
allowed exporter in Costa 
Rica 
“Costa Rica: one single power exporter” 
[Central America data, 2011] 
Action 
 
6.5.4.2. Links: 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
 
From To Description [source] 
1 5 The ratification of the Second Protocol started the process for the full 
implementation of the RMER. In order to avoid problems because of 
interferences, the CRIE approved a period for the harmonization. 
2 6 Some changes were needed in the regulations of the countries. For that 
interfaces were created during the harmonization period. 5 6 
6 7 With the work of the interfaces, all the member countries except Costa Rica 
ratified the II Protocol and were ready to implement the RMER 
6 8 During this process, the government of Costa Rica tried to introduce some 
reforms in their national sector 
8 9 Nevertheless, the public perception in Costa Rica is very critic against 
reform of ICE. With a very active parliament, opposition parties stopped 
the ratification of the protocol until getting security that ICE was not going 
to be reformed 
3 9 
9 10 These delays in the ratification by Costa Rica prevented the implementation 
of RMER, impeding other countries to get the benefits of the regional 
market 
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10 11 In order to unblock the situation, the president of ICE talked to the 
parliament explaining the benefits of the regional market for ICE and Costa 
Rica 
7 11 
11 12 Utilizing the principles of gradualism and reciprocity, ICE was able to find 
a solution that would be acceptable to all the parties 4 12 
12 13 This solution was the separation of ICE into business units 
2 13 
12 14 The second part of this solution was to explicitly appoint ICE as the only 
exported in Costa Rica 
 
6.6. Analysis of factors: 
The factors are evaluated as follows: 
 5: Critical factor that overruns others  
 3: Factor part the core process but equally important to others 
 1: Without a direct, or lower, influence in the core process 
 
Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
1 1 State-owned companies 
created to monopolize 
national sectors 
Although it is true that their initial status 
as monopolies was important for the 
initial bilateral interconnections, they 
were not anymore all national 
monopolies at the time of the SIEPAC 
project was being studied. 
1 
1 2 Countries tended to 
consider power sector 
as technical issue 
It granted autonomy to the state-owned 
companies for the elaboration of the 
feasibility studies, as well as the drafts 
of the agreements 
3 
1 3 Debt crisis affected 
every Central American 
country 
It added urgency to the need of 
reforming national power systems 
1 
1 4 IADB became 
main/only donor in the 
region 
Indirect impact since IADB was not the 
initiator of the project, it later phases 
IADB played a bigger role 
1 
1 5 Conflicts between 
countries due to 
aftermaths of Cold War 
The process was successfully separated 
from other major conflicts in the region 
1 
1 8 State-owned companies 
built national grids until 
borders 
That made possible the bilateral 
interconnections, which are the starting 
point of the regional project 
3 
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1 9 Impossibility to 
continue public funding 
of sector 
Without proper funding, the demand for 
changes was bigger 
1 
1 10 Seasonal surplus of 
capacity appeared in 
some countries 
It gave an initial understand the benefit 
of being interconnected 
1 
1 11 State-owned companies 
built weak bilateral 
interconnections 
without need of 
political agreement 
It showed to the state-owned companies 
the possibility of creating 
interconnections 
1 
1 12 State-owned companies 
had great autonomy of 
action 
Due to their independence, they were 
able to: 
- Start bilateral interconnections 
- Carry out initial studies 
- Oppose to Endesa’s first proposal 
- Join the new studies 
Make preliminary agreement 
5 
1 13 State-owned companies 
created regional 
technical organization 
(CEAC) 
It served as a platform for the initial 
discussions  
1 
1 15 State-owned companies 
were initially interested 
only in regional 
infrastructure 
It was a strong influence in the decision 
of combining infrastructure and market 
3 
1 16 State-owned companies 
identified potential 
benefits from 
economies of scale 
This understanding has been the main 
driver of the cooperation during the 
entire process 
5 
1 17 Strengthening of 
bilateral 
interconnections was 
stopped by 
governments because of 
national security 
concerns 
The national security concerns stopped 
first proposals by state-owned 
companies and latterly were also key in 
selecting the superposed market 
alternative 
3 
1 19 Individual markets too 
small for being 
profitable 
One of the drivers for the regional 
market has been to “gain size” 
3 
1 20 International actors 
intervened to foster 
pacification 
That process put Central American 
regional cooperation on the agenda of 
international donors (like Spain) 
1 
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1 22 CEAC became active 
supporter of 
connectivity 
CEAC was the regional institution that 
served for channeling the funding and 
coordinating the works, through the 
Executive Unit 
3 
1 26 Full regional consensus 
became bases of 
cooperation 
Although consensus got increasing 
importance in later phases, for the initial 
the views from state-owned companies 
were similar 
1 
 
 
Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
2 1 Countries with different 
levels of reform 
It didn’t become a major issue during 
the discussions for the framework treaty 
because private investors didn’t 
participate in these negotiations 
1 
2 2 Conflicts between 
countries still existing 
at that time 
Those conflicts were the major obstacle 
to getting the support from the 
governments 
5 
2 6 Some countries could 
get more benefits than 
others 
At that time it was not a major issue in 
the negotiations 
1 
2 10 State-owned companies 
had major influence in 
their respective national 
sectors 
It was critical in the development of the 
studies, the draft of the treaty and in 
getting the political support 
5 
2 11 Major reforms would 
be needed in some 
countries 
Since there was an initial commitment 
from the countries for the reform, this 
was not an issue of disagreement  
1 
2 13 Tensions between 
countries could affect 
entire region 
It created fears in the countries to be not 
willing to depend on imported 
electricity 
3 
 
Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
3 1 State-owned companies 
had a history of 
cooperation 
Initially created the will for the regional 
cooperation and latterly was key in the 
rapid development of EPR 
3 
3 2 Conflicts between 
countries still existing 
at that time 
Looking for neutrality and shared 
ownership was one the main 
components of the process 
3 
3 4 State-owned companies 
were reluctant to lose 
Although initially important, those fears 
disappeared rapidly 
1 
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control of their national 
sectors 
3 5 Countries didn’t have 
experience of effective 
functional cooperation 
Lack of experience in developing 
common projects of that dimension was 
the main reason of the difficulties faced 
in the initial phases of EPR 
5 
3 11 CEAC was the main 
actor for the promotion 
of the regional project 
CEAC, in particular, the Executive 
Unit, was essential in moving the 
project forward 
5 
 
Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
4 2 State-owned companies 
were in charge of 
national systems 
Their experience and influence in the 
national processes were the main 
drivers for the institutional processes 
between the Framework Treaty and the 
II Protocol 
5 
4 8 Foreign relations 
influenced by 
ideological differences 
Ideological differences had been 
playing a role in the discussions at 
CRIE, where, for example, countries 
openness to private investments was a 
major issue. 
3 
4 15 Privatization of 
generation was 
progressing in the 
region 
Some of the new private actors had 
some influence in the demands for the 
regional regulation 
1 
4 20 Countries' concerns 
about losing control 
over regional market 
Major concern of the countries, partly 
behind the difficulties faced by CRIE 
and a clear issue for the need of the 
creation of the CDMER 
5 
 
Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
5 2 National sectors needed 
to adapt to regional 
market 
There was a recognition of the need to 
modify the national system with a 
dominant ICE in order to accommodate 
the regional market  
3 
5 3 Strong public criticism 
towards privatization of 
ICE 
The remember of the protests of Combo 
ICE had a direct influence in the 
government 
3 
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7. Case study 3, GMs Power Sector cooperation program 
 
7.1. GMS Power sector trade and cooperation 
Energy sector and intra-regional power trade have been at the core of the GMS objectives since its 
commencement. In fact, the development of the 45 MW Xeset hydropower plant in Lao PDR, and 
an associated power purchase agreement with Thailand can be considered as the forerunner project 
of the entire program.  
The success of this project triggered a series of consultations by the ADB with the governments 
of Cambodia, PRC (at this time including only the Autonomous Province of Yunnan), Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam, which ultimately led to the First GMS Ministerial Conference 
held on 21-22 October 1992 in the headquarters of the ADB in Manila (Philippines).  
After that, additional studies were conducted so to identify priority projects and to evaluate the 
potential impact, feasibility and barriers to the development of a regional electricity market in the 
GMS. ADB funded the first subregional energy sector study, commissioned in 1995. This was 
complemented by a Power Trade Strategy for the GMS conducted by the World Bank in 1999. In 
2002, during the First GMS Summit of Leaders in Phnom Penh (Cambodia), the Inter-
Governmental Agreement on Regional Power Trade (IGA) was signed by all the member countries. 
A Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee (RPTCC) was created to supervise the further 
developments. In particular, the design of the Regional Power Trade Operating Agreement whose 
final report was submitted in 2004 at the 3rd meeting of the RPTCC. This included a gradual 
process (ADB, 2008): 
- Stage 1: One-way power sales under a power purchase agreement from an independent 
power producer in one country to a power utility in a second country, using dedicated 
transmission lines established; 
- Stage 2: Trading between two countries, initially using spare capacity in dedicated stage 1 
transmission lines, and eventually using other third country transmission facilities; 
- Stage 3: All countries interconnected with 230-500 kilovolt lines will introduce centralized 
operations with a regional system operator that would facilitate third-party participation in 
trading (entities other than generators/sellers and utilities/purchasers); and 
- Stage 4: All countries accept legal and regulatory changes to enable a free and competitive 
electricity market, with independent third party participation. 
 
Since the commencement of the power sector cooperation in the GMS, the ADB, and other 
international donors, as the World Bank, have funded several technical assistances: 
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Code Year Title 
RETA 5535 1995 Subregional Energy Sector Study for the Greater 
Mekong Subregion 
(World Bank) 1999 Power Trade Strategy Study 
TAR: REG 34092 2000 Technical Assistance for Regional Indicative Master 
Plan on Power Interconnection in the GMS 
TA5920-REG 2000 Regional Indicative Master Plan on Power 
Interconnection in the Greater Mekong Subregion 
RETA 5920 2002 Regional Indicative Master Plan on Power 
Interconnection 
TA-6100-REG 2003-2005 Study for a Regional Power Trade Operating 
Agreement in GMS 
TA 6304-REG 2006-2008 GMS Power Trade Coordination and Development 
TA 6440-REG 
(Package 1) 
2008 - 2010 Facilitating Regional Power Trading and 
Environmentally Sustainable Development of 
Electricity Infrastructure in the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (2008-2010) 
TA 6440-REG 
(Package 1-Cont) 
2008 - 2010 Facilitating Regional Power Trading and 
Environmentally Sustainable Development of 
Electricity Infrastructure in the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (2011) – Setting Up a Regional 
Organization for GMS Power Trade 
(ADB) 2009 Building a Sustainable Energy Future: the Greater 
Mekong Subregion 
RETA 6440 2010 Update of the Regional Indicative Master Plan on 
Power Interconnection 
RETA 7764 2011 Ensuring Sustainability of GMS Regional Power 
Development 
Table 16 - List of main technical assistance to GMS Power Coop. / RPTCC (Source: ADB, 2012; Lefevre, 2012) 
 
During this time, numerous power plants have been developed and the amount of power trade 
bilaterally has increased dramatically. In particular, Thailand has been the most active member 
country, in particular for the import of power from Lao PDR. The latest Power Development Plan 
(PDP) of the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) includes an objective to cover 
between 15 and 20% of the power demand with imported hydropower by 2036. PRC has also 
supported the development of different hydropower generation plants in Myanmar. Meanwhile, 
Viet Nam has been exporting electricity to Cambodia from its Southern grid, while importing from 
China at the North. In summary, although these bilateral interconnections are still far from the 
2002’s regional indicative master plan, the generation and transmission capacities for regional 
power trade have been continuously growing.  
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Country Imports Exports Total trade Net imports 
Cambodia 1,546 - 1,546 1,546 
Lao PDR 1,265 6,944 8,210 (5,679) 
Myanmar - 1,720 1,720 (1,720) 
Thailand 6,938 1,427 8,366 5,511 
Viet Nam 5,599 1,318 6,917 4,281 
China 1,720 5,659 7,379 (3,939) 
Total 17,069 17,069 34,139  
Table 17 - GMS Power Trade and Net Imports, 2010 [GWh] (source: Chi Nai, 2015) 
 
 
Table 18 - Exchanges of Electricity within the GMS in 2014 (GWh) (source: ADB, 2016) 
 
Figure 30 - Planned and existing interconnections in the GMS 
 
Source: UNDESA (2005) and ADB (2010) 
 
168 
 
On the other hand, similar progress has not yet been achieved in terms of developing the 
institutional capacity to move beyond the stage 1. For example, the constraints for third party 
access to the dedicated transmission lines developed for the PPAs is becoming a challenge for new 
projects (Antikainen, Gbert, Moller, 2011). Similarly, the lack of agreement in wheeling charges 
for the use of a third country transmission network appears to be the impossibility for the 
development of the MOU signed between PRC and Thailand for the export of electricity from 
Yunnan Province (PRC). 
This unbalances between the developments of the physical infrastructures (hardware) and 
institutional aspects (software) has been pointed out by different studies. It is included, for example, 
the ADB’s 2013 Assessment of the GMS Energy Sector Development: 
“There has been remarkable progress in the GMS energy sector over the past 2 decades. 
Considerable success was also achieved in rolling out rural electrification in member 
countries. Rapid provision of large-scale, high-volume national grid systems; successful 
mobilization of indigenous resources; and the beginnings of cross-country trade also took 
place. These successes have been achieved mainly at the national level. Despite 
considerable political pronouncements that recognize the imperatives of regional 
cooperation, progress has not matched national achievements. The high-volume trans-
boundary connections that have been made to date within the GMS do not achieve a true 
interconnection of systems with synchronous operations, but are simply an extension of 
the national grids of the large- consuming countries into the territories of producers of 
(mainly) hydropower” 
ADB (2013), “Assessment of the GMS Energy Sector Development” 
 
Against this background, recent developments seem to be bringing a new impulse to the regional 
power cooperation program. The power trade agreement between Lao PDR and Singapore, going 
through Thailand and Malaysia, is a promising development that could have some implications for 
third country access agreements. In addition, the updating of the regional master plan and the 
negotiations for the establishment of the Regional Power Coordination Center seem to indicate a 
renewed effort for strengthening the institutional structure of the program. Finally, projects 
including neighboring countries, like the ASEAN Power Grid and the China’s supported Global 
Energy Interconnection project, could facilitate the negotiation processes between the member 
countries. 
 
 
The Greater Mekong region is rich in energy resources, although these are unevenly distributed, 
Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Yunnan have surplus energy sources (particularly hydro), while Thailand 
and Cambodia are in deficit, Viet Nam remains in an intermediate position. 
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Energy 
resource 
Cambodia Lao PDR Myanmar Thailand 
Viet 
Nam 
Guangxi Yunnan 
Total 
GMS 
Hydro (MW) 9,703 17,979 39,669 4,566 35,103 17,640 104,370 229,031 
Coal 
(million ton) 
10 503 2 1,239 150 2,167 23,994 28/065 
Natural Gas 
(billion 
cubic 
meters) 
n.a. - 590 340 217 n.a. n.a. 1,179 
Crude oil 
and national 
gas liquids 
(million ton) 
n.a - 7 50 626 173 n.a. 819 
Table 19 - GMS Energy Resources (2009/latest) (source: ADB, 2012) 
 
 
7.1.1. Institutions 
Sub-regional Electric Power Forum 
(EPF) 
Established in 1994 serves as advisory body to the GMs 
Ministerial Meeting 
Experts Groups on Power 
Interconnection and Trade (EGP) 
Established in January 1998 to provide 
recommendations on regional power issues to the EPF 
Regional Power Trade Coordinating 
Committee (RPTCC) 
Established by the IGA, replacing the EPF, with the 
objective to “actively coordinate for successful 
implementation of regional trade and to represent the 
countries involved in regional power trade” 
Focal Group (FG) Established under the RPTCC to coordinate 
implementation of activities in each GMS country 
Planning Working Group Established under the RPTCC to fulfill the functions of 
the operational and system planning working groups 
identified in the RPTOA 
Table 20 - GMS Power Cooperation, Main Institutions (source: ECA, 2010) 
 
7.2. Overview of individual countries’ situation and incentives 
 
7.2.1. Cambodia: 
Cambodia is mainly characterized by the low energy independence and the high prices of the 
electricity (highest in the region and higher even when comparing with international standards). 
This is because of its low capacity and its strong dependence on fossil fuels. Cambodia has also 
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been looking towards the development of some hydropower capacity. It is currently importing 
electricity from the South of Viet Nam. 
 
7.2.2. China: 
The provincial grid is operated by two subsidiaries of the China Southern Power Grid: Yunnan 
Power Grid and Guangxi Power Grid. Although Yunnan Province is rich in hydro resources, many 
of these are being developed so to transfer the power to the energy demanding Guangdong 
Province thought the Southern Corridor of the West to East electricity transfer project [Wilson 
Center]. Therefore, the motivation of China to involve in the regional power trade combine the 
possibility of exporting to the region (mainly through the MOU signed with Thailand), as well as 
importing additional power, as current projects developed in Myanmar. 
 
7.2.3. Lao PDR: 
Lao PDR has been sometimes referred as the “battery of Southeast Asia” [International Rivers]. 
Although rich in hydro resources, these remain highly untapped. This presents an opportunity for 
the development of power generation to export, bringing back the economic resources much 
needed for the development of the country. These are done through IPPs in which the state-owned 
utility, EDL, participates.  
Rural electrification and supplying the rapidly increasing energy demand are the main challenges 
for the power sector in Lao PDR. The government set ambitious goals of achieving an 
electrification rate of 90% by 2020 through both on-grid and off-grid electrification. The 
development of interconnections with neighboring Thailand Viet Nam is also an important part of 
the national strategies 
 
7.2.4. Myanmar: 
Myanmar is rich in energy resources, particularly hydro and natural gas, bringing also 
opportunities for the development of generation projects oriented towards the export of electricity, 
both to China and to Thailand. The institutional structure of the sector has been reformed in several 
occasions, changing also the national priorities. Currently, the entire country is again reforming 
itself. Nevertheless, even with those changes, the two priorities for the power sector in Myanmar 
are to match the rapidly increasing energy demand and to extend the electrification rate 
 
7.2.5. Thailand: 
The power sector in Thailand is dominated by the state-owned company EGAT. The creation of 
the Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO) in 2002 got the policy making responsibility from 
EGAT and move it into the ministry. Nevertheless, EGAT remains as the single buyer in the 
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national market. Thailand is also very active in the promotion of regional power trade, having 
signed MOUs with Myanmar, Lao PDR, Cambodia, China, and Malaysia. 
 
7.2.6. Viet Nam: 
The power subsector of Viet Nam has experienced major changes during the last two decades since 
the beginning of the GMS program. Before 1995, the power sector was fully government-owned 
through three companies in charge of generation, transmission and distribution in their respective 
territories. A process for gradual reformed was initiated in 1995 with the creation of a single 
monopoly power company, Electricity of Viet Nam (EVN). This was implemented in parallel with 
a massive investment plan to increase electricity access, moving from roughly half of Viet Nam’s 
population in 1995 to 93% by 2004. Expansion of generation capacity was also undertaken, 
highlighting the rapid increase in thermal generation.  
The sector has been under major structural reform since July 2005, when the Electricity Law of 
2004 was enforced. This aims for the establishment of wholesales market by 2017 and a 
competitive retails market by 2023. Vertical unbundling of EVN as well as creation of new 
institutions to grant independence have been carried out, including: 
- “Equitization” of EVN through the identification of several generation and distribution 
assets of EVN for partial privatization (in 2003). 
- Establishment of the National Power Transmission Corporation (NPT) in 2008. Fully 
owned by EVN and responsible of the management of the power transmission grid. It was 
created from the merging to EVN’s four transmission companies and three power grid 
management boards. 
- Establishment of Electricity Power Trading Company within EVN in 2008, with the role 
of being the single buyer in the power generation market. 
- Establishment of the National Load Dispatch Center (NLDC) as system operator, also part 
of EVN. 
- EVN’s legally unbundling in January 2009. The name was changed to Viet Nam Electricity, 
although the acronym remains as EVN 
- Reorganization of the distribution system from the existing 11 regional power distribution 
into power distribution corporations under EVN. Those are responsible for supplying 
power and for the maintenance of the distribution grid up to 110kV over the areas of North, 
Central, South, Ha Noi, and Ho Chi Minh City. 
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7.2.7. Summary, GMS countries incentives towards power sector cooperation: 
Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) countries37’ primary energy demand is rapidly growing, faster 
than the 1.5% average annual growth predicted for the world (Doi et al, 2010). According to ADB 
(2016), by 2035, it is expected to grow nearly 80% of the current levels, and in some cases, like 
Myanmar and Viet Nam will double them. Meanwhile, member countries are expected to become 
increasingly dependent on imported fossil fuels (ADB, 2009). Addressing those needs while 
considering the environmental and social sustainability will be a major challenge for all the 
countries.  
 
Table 21 - Forecast of Primary Energy Demand in GMS countries 
 
Source: ADB, 2016 
 
Against this background, regional power cooperation in the Greater Mekong Sub-region has been 
found to be a promising alternative. In the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) exists high 
complementarity between national systems. Whereas energy resources, particularly hydro, are 
concentrated in Upper Mekong countries, like Lao PDR and Myanmar, demand is stronger in 
Thailand and Viet Nam. Interconnecting them would bring investment to Lao PDR and Myanmar, 
and supply cheap and clean electricity to Thailand and Viet Nam. Cambodia could get benefited 
by importing cheaper hydro, as well as to a certain level of investment in developing its potential 
hydro capacity. Yunnan and Guangxi provinces can get also benefited from importing and 
exporting.  
 
                                                 
 
37 The countries covered by the GMS program are Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam and the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC, specifically Yunnan Province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) 
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Table 22 - GMS energy resources (2009) 
 
Cambodia 
Lao 
PDR 
Myanmar 
PRC, 
Guangxi 
PRC, 
Yunnan 
Thailand 
Viet 
Nam 
Total 
Hydro 
(MW) 
9,703 17,979 39,669 17,640 104,370 4,566 35,103 229,031 
Coal 
(million 
ton) 
10 503 2 2,167 23,994 1,239 150 28,065 
Natural 
gas 
(billion 
cubic 
meter) 
n.a. - 590 n.a. n.a. 340 217 1,179 
Crude oil 
and 
natural 
gas 
liquids 
(million 
ton) 
n.a. - 7 173 n.a. 50 626 819 
Source: ADB, 2012 
 
Table 23 - Drivers for regional power cooperation for GMS member countries 
Country Drivers for regional power cooperation 
Cambodia  Import of cheaper power from Southern Viet Nam and Lao PDR 
 Development of hydropower plants for export 
Lao PDR  Attraction on FDI for Development of hydro capacity for export 
 Attraction of investments 
Myanmar  Attraction of investments 
 Export of hydro and natural gas 
PRC  Development of cost effective projects in neighboring countries (mainly 
Myanmar) to import electricity for Guangdong Province 
 Export of electricity (mainly to Northern Viet Nam and potentially 
Thailand) 
 Promotion of Global Energy Interconnection project 
Thailand  Import of electricity from neighboring countries (especially Lao PDR and 
Myanmar) 
 Increase diversification of energy mix, so to reduce dependence on 
imported natural gas 
 Reduce the need for development of coal-fired power plants 
Viet Nam  Import of hydropower for Northern Viet Nam grid 
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 Export of surpluses due to capacity and/or differences in peak times from 
Southern Viet Nam 
 
Different studies have shown how the entire region could benefit from greater energy sector 
integration in the region. In particular, ADB, 2009, identified: 
(i) reduction of overall energy costs by 19% compared to business as usual scenario up to 
2030,  
(ii) reduction in overall dependence on imported resources by 5.5% of total energy 
consumption,  
(iii) 40% lower coal-based power generation capacity, and (iv) greater integration of 
renewable energy sources and other off-grid solutions by 11 GW. 
 
7.3. The Development Process of GMS Power Sector Integration 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, regional power sector development has been one of 
the key sectors from the starting of the GMS and the actual starting project of the entire program. 
7.3.1. Timeline - Events: 
Date Description  Stage 
1971 Thailand and Lao PDR power purchase agreement for export power from 
the Nam Ngum hydropower plant in Lao PDR to northeast Thailand: 
[ADB, 2008] 
- First power trade agreement in Indochina 
1 
1984 Xeset hydropower dam in Lao PDR financed by ADB for export 
electricity to Thailand: 
- Project identified through Mr. Morita’s initiative 
1 
1986 Viet Nam Doi Moi - 
1991, 
October 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the Petroleum 
Authority of Thailand and the Heavy Industry Ministry of Viet Nam to 
develop jointly the White Tiger and Big Bear natural gas fields in the 
South China: 
- If more than 500 million cubic feet of natural gas are found, some will 
be transferred from Viet Nam to Thailand directly along an 800 km 
pipeline (costing estimated $ 1 billion or more) 
- 
1992, Oct. 
20-21 
First Conference on Subregional Economic Cooperation: 
- To discuss the results of  
1 
1993 Lao PDR opened up the power sector to private and foreign investment 
[ECA] 
- 
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1993, June First MOU between Thailand and Lao PDR for the import of 1,500 MW 
of power by 2000 [ECA] 
- Theun-Hinboun Power Project joint venture form of equity financing 
- Other projects include Nam Song, Houay Ho 
- Thai delegation submitted to the Myanmar Delegation a “Draft of 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Union 
of Myanmar and the Government of Thailand on Joint Development of 
Water Resources on the Salween River” for consideration by the 
Myanmar Government 
1, 3 
1993, June 
10 
ADB approval of Phase II 1 
1993, Aug 
30-31 
Second Ministerial Conference in Manila (Philippines): 
- Subregional energy sector study elaborated by NORCONSULT was 
presented  
 
1 
1994, 
April 
Third Conference on Subregional Economic Cooperation in Ha Noi City 
(Viet Nam): [ADB 2 decades] 
- Several of the proposals under study of the Subregional Energy Sector 
Study were discussed and accorded high priority 
1 
1994, 
September 
Fourth Conference on Subregional Economic Cooperation in Chiang Mai 
(Thailand): [ECA] 
- Agreement for the establishment of the EPF 
- Revised list of projects was presented and reconfirmed [2decades] 
1, 2 
1994 “The 3rd and 4th Ministerial Meetings in Ha Noi and Chiang Mai endorse 
subregional priority projects, which include eight hydro and transmission 
line projects, two oil and natural gas projects, and one institutional 
project, as recommended by the subregional energy sector study” 
 
1994, 
November 
Subregional Energy Sector Study [Yamamura, ESCAP, ADB 2 decades 
– Appendix 3]: 
- Earliest energy study with a GMS-wide focus 
- Initiated in 1993, prepared by Norconsult under ADB RETA 5535 
- Helped to define the parameters for the development of the energy sector 
in the subregion, build consensus on the initial shortlist of priority 
subregional energy projects, and provide the initial based for pursuing 
detailed feasibility and design studies for these subregional projects 
1 
1995 Mekong River Commission (MRC) funded: 
- With the aim of ensuring that the Mekong is developed in the most 
efficient manner, one that mutually benefits all member countries and 
minimizes harmful effects on people and the environment in the Lower 
Mekong Basin. 
- Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Viet Nam members 
- Myanmar and China dialogue partners 
- 
176 
 
1995, 
April 25 
EPF 1: Subregional Electric Power Forum (EPF) formally inaugurated in 
Yangon (Myanmar): 
- EPF under the overall GMS governance structure 
- To lead the development of the regional power market 
- Each GMS member has two representatives: a senior official from the 
government agency dealing with policy and planning in the power sector 
and another from a key power utility [ADB two decades] 
- Met at least once a year 
- helped to provide a broad framework for subregional power sector 
coordination as well as an ongoing mechanism for knowledge sharing and 
collaboration among GMS members and their development partners 
- EPF adopted a two-pronged approach to developing the GMS power 
market: one focused on the policy and institutional framework for 
promoting power trade and another focused on facilitating physical 
interconnections to facilitate cross-border dispatch of power [ADB, two 
decades] 
1 
1995, 
December 
EPF 2 in Vientiane 
- Aimed to strengthen the subregional consultative process with a view to 
facilitating preparation and implementation of priority power projects 
1 
1996 Second MOU between Thailand and Lao PDR for the import of a total of 
3,000 MW by 2006 [ECA] 
1, 3 
1996, 
September 
Mekong integrated transmission system study started: 
- Financed by the Government of Japan 
- Conducted by the Mekong River Commission Secretariat 
- Focused primarily on the lower Mekong Basin countries 
- Myanmar and Yunnan Province were included in an overall assessment 
of the situation and a proposal for an interconnected network in the GMS 
- Started in 1995, June 
1, 2 
1996, 
December 
EPF 3 - Third Electric Power Forum in Kunming (China) 
- Endorsement of the World Bank Power study 
1, 2 
1997, July Initial MOU between Thailand and Myanmar for the purchase of 1,500 
MW of hydro capacity by 2010 [ECA] 
1, 3 
1997, 
October 
EPF 4 - Fourth Electric Power Forum in Hanoi (Viet Nam): 
- Interim report of World Bank study presented 
- Discussed and agreed to the establishment of an experts group (EGP) 
within the EPF that would now focus on promoting cross-border trade in 
electricity and the attendant requirement of developing a regional power 
grid 
2, 4 
1997 China’s State Power Corporation (SPC) established following the 
abolition of the former Ministry of Electric Power 
- 
1997 Establishment of the Ministry of Electric Power (MEP) in Myanmar: 
- Policymaker and owner for the power sector 
- 
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1998, 
January 
(June) 
Establishment of the Expert’s Group on Power Interconnection and Trade 
(EGP) 
- To provide recommendations on regional power issues in the GMS 
- Established by the EPF, drawn from utilities and GMS member 
governments 
2, 4 
1998, June ESMAP-funded Regional Workshop held in Thailand: 
- Final draft of World Bank study discussed with GMS countries 
- Hosted by National Energy Policy Office (NEPO) of Thailand 
2, 4 
1998, 
December 
EPF 5 in Bangkok (Thailand)  
Second EGP and fifth Subregional Electric Power Forum (EPF) meetings: 
- GMS countries requested ADB to provide technical assistance to update 
a 1996 power transmission study and prepare an indicative mast plan for 
subregional transmission development up to 2020 [ADB, 2008] 
2, 4 
1998 Theun Hinboun hydropower in Lao PDR interconnection with 
Sakhonnakhon (Thailand) [Hasnie] 
- 230 kV, 200 MW, 176 km 
1, 3 
1998 MOU between Thailand and China for the import of 3,000 MW by 2017 
[ECA] 
- Interconnectors passing through Lao PDR 
- Need to agree to transit payments to be made to Lao PDR 
2, 4 
1998 Intergovernmental MOU between Viet Nam and Lao PDR for the import 
of 2,000 MW of power 
2, 4 
1999 Houayho hydropower in Lao PDR interconnection with Ubon 2 
(Thailand) [Hasnie] 
- 230 kV, 150 MW, 230 km 
2, 3, 
4 
1999, 
March 
World Bank’s Power Trade Strategy for the Greater Mekong Sub-Region: 
-  
3, 4 
1999, 
October 
EPF 6 in Phnom Penh - Third meeting of the Experts Groups on Power 
Interconnection and Trade (EGP): 
- Detailed terms of reference for the TA for the regional indicative master 
plan discussed and endorsed 
1, 2 
1999,  
Oct. 28 
Sixth Electric Power Forum Meeting in Phnom Penh (Cambodia) 
- Adoption of a Policy Statement on Regional Power Trade in the GMS 
 
1, 2 
2000, 
January 
Ninth GMS Ministerial meeting in Manila (Philippines) [ECA],  
- Endorsement of the Policy Statement on regional power trade in GMS 
by GMS Ministers: 
   - First key milestone of the GMS regional power trade 
   - Established the objectives and principles for power trade 
- Endorsement of the regional indicative master plan 
2 
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2000, 
December 
EPF 7 held in Vientiane  
2001 Seventh meeting of the Experts Group on Power Interconnection and 
Trade (EGP): [ADB, 2003] 
- Countries requested ADB for technical assistance to prepare the RPTOA 
4 
2001, 
December 
EPF 8 held in Ha Noi  
2002 China Southern Power Grid Co. Ltd (CSG) formed as part of the 
reorganization of the former State Power Corporation (SPC) 
- 
2002, May Completion and adoption of the Regional Indicative Master Plan on 
Power Interconnection in the GMS [e7]: 
- Confirmation of the economic benefits of regional harmonization in 
development of power systems in GMS 
- Recommendation the interconnection grid capable of providing the 
power transfer capacities to fully benefit from the pooling of resources 
with a least-cost solution 
- Prepared by Norconsult, under ADB RETA 5920 
- First indicated master plan developed for regional power interconnection 
in the GMS 
- Included two main power development scenarios: Scenario 1 – Limited 
Power Cooperation and Scenario 2 – Extended Power Cooperation, with 
a few alternative scenarios (2A, 2B, and 2C) based on varying degrees of 
power cooperation 
2 
2002, 
October 
EPF 9 held in Yangon (Myanmar)  
2002, 
Nov. 3 
Signing of the Inter-governmental Agreement at the Phnom Penh 1st GMS 
Summit 
- Establishment of the Regional Power Trade Coordinating Committee 
(RPTCC) 
- RPTCC assigned with the responsibility for preparing a Regional Power 
Trade Operating Agreement (RPTOA) and establishing actions required 
to achieve the objectives for power trade 
2 
2003, 
November 
EPF 10 - Ninth Meeting of Experts Group on Power Interconnection and 
Trade 
Tenth meeting of the Subregional Electric Power Forum in Guangzhou 
(China) 
4 
2003, 
November 
EGP 9 held in Guangzhou 
- Last EGP meeting, following the constitution of the RPTCC and its 
taking over of EGP functions 
4 
2004 The IGA on regional power trade is ratified by all six GMS countries 2, 3, 
4 
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2004, July RPTCC 1 First meeting of the RPTCC [ADB, 2008, e7] held in Guilin: 
- To coordinate implementation of regional power trade 
To draft the RPTOA 
- Guidelines for RPTCC adopted 
4 
2004, 
December 
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Regional formally included as GMS 
member 
- 
2004, 
December 
EPF 11 held in Bangkok (Thailand): 
- Last meeting of the EPF before its function was subsumed under the 
new Subregional Energy Forum (SEF) 
4 
2004, 
December 
RPTCC 2 held in Bangkok (Thailand) 4 
2005, 
April 
Approval of NT2 hydroelectric project [ADB, 2008] 3 
2005, 
April 
RPTCC 3 - Third RPTCC meeting held in Vientiane 
- Draft RPTOA submitted (to be approved in July) 
- Draft initial Regional Power Trade Operating Agreement (RPTOA) 
completed 
4 
2005, May New MOU between Thailand and Myanmar for the development of five 
hydro projects on the Salween River [ECA] 
- Myanmar government proposed two initial projects with a combined 
capacity of 8,200 MW 
4 
2005, 
September 
RPTCC 4 held in Yangon 4 
2005,  
July 1 
Viet Nam’s Electricity Law came into effect - 
2005, July First Memorandum of Understanding on the Guidelines for the 
Implementation of Stage 1 of the RPTOA (MOU #1) signed in Kunming 
(China) [Sida, ADB 2012, ESMAP, ECA] 
- To set the guidelines for power trade to achieve the Stage 1 
- Establishment of the Focal Group (FG), for coordination 
implementation activities; and the Planning Working Group (WG), for 
identifying priority interconnection projects and establishing common 
regional performance standards, under the RPTCC 
3, 4 
2005 IGA ratified by all respective parliaments 2, 4 
2006 Third MOU between Thailand and Lao PDR which increased the 
purchase amount to 5,000 MW by 2015 
3 
2006 Viet Nam Prime Minister Decision #26/2006/QĐ-TTg, a roadmap for the 
introduction of the competitive power market has been approved [ECA] 
- 
2006 Commencement of the development of a regional energy sector strategy 
(ESS) [ADB, 2008] 
4 
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2006, May Split of Myanmar’s MEP into Ministry of electric Power (1) and Ministry 
of Electric Power (2) 
- 
2006, June RPTCC 5 held in Siem Reap 4 
2006 Xinquao in Yunnan (China) interconnection with Lao Cai (Viet Nam) 
[Hasnie] 
- 220 kV, 250-300 MW, 56 km (in China) 
3 
2007, May RPTCC 6 held in Sanya 4 
2007, June Dr. Piyasavasti, Thai energy minister in the then military-installed 
government, reported to have said Thailand was not looking to buy power 
from Myanmar [ECA] (didn’t happen) 
2, 4 
2007, 
October 
World Bank’s Strategy Note on World Bank Regional Support for the 
Greater Mekong Sub-Region 
4 
2007 Maguan in Yunnan (China) interconnection with Ha Giang (Viet Nam) 
[Hasnie] 
- 220 kV, 200 MW, 51 km (in China) 
3 
2007 Transmission line connecting Thailand to Bantey Meanchay, Siem Reap 
and Battabang [ECA] 
- 115 kV northwestern grid of 203 km in length 
- Financed and operated by Cambodia Power Transmission Co Ltd 
(CPTL) 
- Under a 30-year BOT agreement with EDC 
- Import capacity of 80 MW 
3 
2007 Midterm review of the GMS Strategic Framework: 
- “Very good progress in the ‘hardware’ aspects of cooperation, but less 
so in the ‘software’ components of cooperation” 
3, 4 
2008 Shewli I hydropower in Myanmar interconnection with Dehong (Yunnan, 
China) [Hasnie] 
- 220 kV double circuit, 600 MW, 2 x 120 km 
3 
2008 June Draft of the ESS presented at a regional workshop [ADB, 2008] 4 
2008, 
November 
RPTCC 7 held in Ho Chi Minh (Viet Nam) 4 
2008, 
November 
Roadmap based on the draft ESS suggestions actions up until 2012 
presented to the GMS governments for consideration [ADB, 2008] 
3, 4 
2008 MOU on the Road Map for Implementing the GMS Cross-Border Power 
Trading (MOU #2) 
Second MOU (MOU #2) prescribing measures to fully achieve Stage 1 
during the period 2008 – 2010 
- Update of the regional master plan on power interconnection completed 
4 
2009 Nam Theun 2 hydropower in Lao PDR interconnection with Roi Et 2 sub 
(Thailand) [Hasnie] 
3 
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- 500 kV double circuit, 1000 MW, 304 km 
2009, 
March 
EGAT hopeful of shortly signing an MOU for the Hutgyi project on the 
Salween River, one of the plants covered under the second MOU [ECA] 
3 
2009 Chau Doc in Viet Nam interconnection with Phnom Penh (Cambodia) 
[Hasnie] 
- 220 kV (Viet Nam0, 230 kV (Cambodia) double circuit, 200 MW, 111 
km 
3 
2009 Study on building a sustainable energy future in the GMS was published 
(ADB RETA 6301) 
4 
2010 Ban Nabong hydropower in Lao PDR interconnection with Udon 3 sub 
(Thailand) [Hasnie] 
- 500 kV (opr at 230 kV), 615 MW, 100 km 
3 
2010 Second update of the GMS regional master was completed by RTE 
International (ADB RETA 6440) 
3, 4 
2010, 
March 
Power production began at Nam Theun 2 (NT2). A 1075 MW 
hydropower dam in central Lao PDR for export to Thailand (90%, 
1000MW) [International Rivers, 2010] 
[ADB, 2008] The first high voltage cross-border transmission line within 
the 
3 
2011, May 
19-25 
67th Session of the UN-ESCAP held in Bangkok: 
- Adoption of the resolution 67/2 for Promoting regional cooperation for 
enhanced energy security and the sustainable use of energy in Asia and 
the Pacific 
- 
2011 Discussions on the establishment of the Regional Power Coordination 
Center (RPCC) initiated 
- RPCC to be the dedicated coordination center for regional power trade 
4 
2012, 
March 
Special 12th RPTCC meeting (RPTCC-12-A) was held mainly to 
continue discussions on the inter-governmental MOU to establish the 
Regional Power Coordination Center (RPCC), which will oversee the 
evolution of the GMS power market toward a more open, but 
appropriately regulated competitive market 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29824/gms-
rptcc12a.pdf 
4 
2012, May 
17-23 
68th Session of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific: Growing Together; Economic Integration for an Inclusive and 
Sustainable Asia-Pacific Century 
- Adoption the resolution Connectivity for energy security 
- Request for conceptualization of the Asian Energy Highway 
- 
2012, 
December 
Ministerial meeting endorsed MOU for establishment of the Regional 
Power Coordination Center (RPCC) 
4 
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2012 Two working groups set up for (i) performance standard and grid code, 
and (ii) regulatory issues 
- Intergovernmental MOU initiated by all members 
4 
2013, June 
6 
MOU on Power Purchase Program from China to Thailand [Hasnie] 4 
2013 Completion (?) of 1,878  MW Hongsa power plant in Laos nearing 
completion [Bangkok Post] 
 
2014, 
December 
Fifth GMS Summit held in Bangkok (Thailand) 
- All the GMS countries signed the MOU for the Establishment of the 
Regional Power Coordination Center (RPCC), 
- intended to be a permanent institution owned by all GMS countries to 
enhance regional power trade and implement regional power 
interconnection projects 
- With this agreement coming into force, the process for selecting the 
RPCC host country is ongoing 
- new studies on “Strategic Environment Assessment for the GMS 
Regional Power Development Planning” and “GMS Renewable Energy 
and Energy Efficiency Development” would provide useful guidelines for 
power development planning and identify opportunities to promote 
renewable energy and energy efficiency in the GMS . 
- and ensure that the RPCC serves as a forum for addressing GMS power 
challenges and opportunities in the coming years. 
 
Table 24 - Timeline of events at GMS Power Cooperation 
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Figure 31 - Overall view of the GMS Power Cooperation process (stages) 
 
7.3.2. Stage 1: National stakeholders’ agreement 
Before the GMS program started there was only one precedent of cross-border power exchanges. 
The Nant-Theun hydropower, which had been founded by international donors before the Laotian 
political change, had been in operation without disruption even though the political and military 
tensions between Thailand and Lao PDR. So, when Laotian representative asked Mr. Morita for 
support for funding small hydropower development in the country and that was found to be too 
small to be bankable even for the ADB, Mr. Morita suggested to target into a larger hydropower 
development and exporting to Thailand.  
Thanks to his fluent relation with EGAT, Mr. Morita was able to explore the potential interest 
from EGAT in such project.  
The process followed a similar structure to that of the transport sector. The ADB technical 
cooperation works were divided in two phase, concluding each with one of the two firsts 
Ministerial Conferences. 
Projects identified during Phase I 
- Salween River Hydropower Project, known in Myanmar as the Thanlwin Hydopower 
Project 
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- Development of eight Mekong River (Lancang river) hydropower projects in Yunnan 
Province with surplus electricity to be exported to Myanmar ad Thailand 
- The Martaban Gas Project, known as the Mottama Gas Project in Myanmar, which call for 
a gas pipeline from the Gulf of Murtaban to link with markets in Thailand 
The list of projects discussed during the country consultations with the Bank Study: 
 
Energy 
resource 
Origin Market Projects 
Hydro Lao PDR Thailand, 
Myanmar, PRC 
Namtha, Nam Khan and Nam Ou 
Hydro Lao PDR Thailand Nam Ngum, Nam Ngiep 
Hydro Lao PDR Thailand, Viet 
Nam 
Nam Theun 
Hydro Lao PDR Thailand, Viet 
Nam, Cambodia 
Bolovenus 
Hydro Lao PDR Viet Nam Sekong 
Hydro Myanmar Thailand Salween River Hydro Project: including the 
diversion of water from the Salween River to the 
Chao Phraya River in Thailand 
Hydro Viet Nam Cambodia Development of the Pleikrong and Yali Fall sites 
on the Upper Se San River in Viet Nam. This 
would provide energy for the central and southern 
portions of the country. A grid system could also 
serve portions of Cambodia 
Hydro Yunnan Thailand, 
Myanmar 
Development of eight hydropower stations on the 
middle and lower sections of the Lancang 
(Mekong) River in Yunnan, with an installed 
capacity of 14,810 MW. Four of these projects 
(Manwan, Xiaowan, Dachaoshan, Nuozhadu), 
accounting for more than 90 percent of the new 
capacity, are scheduled to be completed by 2015.  
Surplus electricity would be exported to Thailand 
and Myanmar. 
Gas Myanmar Thailand Gas pipeline linking reserves in Gulf of Martaban 
with markets in Thailand 
Gas and 
oil 
Viet Nam Thailand Gas and oil pipelines linking reserves in southern 
Viet Nam with markets in Thailand 
Table 25 - Energy projects discussed during Phase I (source: ADB, February 1993) 
In between the first and the second conference, Thailand and Lao PDR signed a Memorandum of 
Understandings concerning the financing, construction, and operation of the Theun-Hinboun 
Power Project 
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At the Second Conference, the subregional energy sector study elaborated by NORCONSULT was 
presented  
(i) Desirability of a possible grid system, covering sections of the subregion or possibly 
the whole of the subregion, 
(ii) Pricing issues, 
(iii) Involvement of the private sector; and 
(iv) The environmental impact of proposed energy projects. 
 
There was also a general agreement on the small and medium scale projects to ease the funding 
and reduce the implementation periods. 
The priority projects from the proceedings of the Second Conference included those identified in 
Phase I as well as some additions. At the end of this, the ones selected as priority were: 
- Development of a subregional grid system: which would allow countries to better manage 
their peak loads.  
 
- Establishment of development criteria for project selection based on hydropower, gas, and 
oil thermal power generation potential, area services, project cost, environmental impact, 
and project timing. 
 
- Development of a demand-supply pricing system. Comparing the location and cost 
structure of hydropower plants with thermal plants. 
 
- The Salween (Thanlwin) River Hydropower Project which would produce substantial 
economic and social benefits to Myanmar and Thailand. It is also mentioned that the large 
size of this project would require also substantial investment financing. Therefore, private 
sector, as well as multilateral and bilateral financing, would be acceptable 
 
- The Gulf of Martaban (Mottama) Gas Project: already in progress. The French 
multinational operator Total had already drilled four appraisal wells. 
 
7.3.3. Stage 2: High level political agreement 
After the initial support for the regional cooperation in the power sector (with the approval of the 
priority projects at the Second Conference), the project entered the phase of achieving higher level 
political agreement. Initially, two studies were carried out. A Regional Indicative Master Plan on 
Power Interconnection by the ADB, between 2000 and 2002, to “identify levels of energy demand 
the priority interconnection projects up to 2020 necessary to support regional power trade” [ADB, 
2012]. World Bank carried out a study on power trade strategy. The identification of the main 
barriers was a key output of that study. It identified (i) policy barriers, (ii) technical barriers, (iii) 
institutional barriers, and (iv) commercial and financial barriers. 
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Another important event was the establishment of the Experts Groups on Power Interconnection 
and Trade (EGP) in 1998 by the EPF. One of the first tasks for the EGP was to oversee the Regional 
Master Plan previously mentioned. It was also in charge of preparing the policy statement for the 
support of the regional power trade. After the Policy Statement on regional power trade was signed 
by the GMS Ministers in January 2000, the heads of summit backed up at the First GMS Summit 
in November 2002 with the signing of the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA). The objectives of 
this were: (i) coordinate and cooperate in the planning and operation of their systems, (ii) fully 
recover costs and share equitably the resulting benefits, and (iii) provide reliable and economic 
electricity services to the customers [Hasnie] 
 
7.3.4. Stage 3: Physical construction 
In parallel to the process towards the formation of the high level political will, the physical 
construction of the project started, or more specifically continued, based on bilateral MOUs signed 
between governments. These agreements have been following the same scheme as the one initiated 
by Thailand and Lao PDR. First a signature of a MOU between the two governments indicating 
an agreement of the maximum capacity to be traded; and then, the preparation of frameworks and 
identification of suitable projects by the state-owned companies. This pragmatic approach has been 
proven to forge solid agreements, which can resist political differences between countries as was 
the case of Thailand and Myanmar. On the other hand, the emphasis on the bilateral agreements 
have made more complex the power trade through third countries (as the case of the MOU between 
China and Thailand). 
Several cross-border connections have been constructed and are planned for the near future: 
Project Location Market Type Capacity 
(MW) 
Completion 
Date 
Nam Ngum 
1 
Lao PDR Lao PDR / Thailand Hydro 155 1971 
Se Xet 1 Lao PDR Lao PDR / Thailand Hydro 45 1990 
Theun-
Hinboun 
(IPP) 
Lao PDR Lao PDR / Thailand Hydro 210 1998 
Houay Ho 
(IPP) 
Lao PDR Thailand Hydro 152 1999 
Nam Leuk Lao PDR Lao PDR / Thailand Hydro 60 2000 
Nam Mang 
3 
Lao PDR Lao PDR / Thailand Hydro 40 2004 
Se Xet 2 Lao PDR Lao PDR / Thailand Hydro 76 2009 
Nam Theun 
2 (IPP) 
Lao PDR Lao PDR / Thailand Hydro 1,075 2010 
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Nam Ngum 
2 (IPP) 
Lao PDR Thailand Hydro 615 2011 
Shweli-1 
(IPP) 
Myanmar Myanmar/Yunnan 
Province, PRC 
Hydro 600 2009 
Dapein-1 
(IPP) 
Myanmar Myanmar/Yunnan 
Province, PRC 
Hydro 240 2011 
Ongoing      
Xekaman 3 
(IPP) 
Lao PDR Lao PDR / Viet Nam Hydro 250 2012 
Theun-
Hinboun 
Expansion 
(IPP) 
Lao PDR Lao PDR / Thailand Hydro 220 + 60 2012 
Xekaman 1 
(IPP) 
Lao PDR Lao PDR / Viet Nam Hydro 322 2014 
Sekong 3 Lao PDR Lao PDR / Viet Nam Hydro 205 2014 
Xekaman 4 Lao PDR Viet Nam Hydro 80 2016 
Hongsa 
Lignite 
(IPP_ 
Lao PDR Lao PDR / Thailand Coal 1,878 2015 
Nam Ngum 
3 (IPP) 
Lao PDR Lao PDR / Thailand Hydro 460 2017 
Table 26 - Cross-border power connections in GMS 
 
From To Voltage Capacity Year 
Theun Hinbourn 
HPP, Lao PDR 
Sakhonnakhon, 
Thailand 
230 kV 200 MW 1998 
Houayho HPP, 
Lao PDR 
Ubon 2, 
Thailand 
230 kV 150 MW 1999 
Xinquao, 
Yunnan, PRC 
Lao Cai, Viet 
Nam 
220 kV 250 – 300 MW 2006 
Maguan, 
Yunnan, PRC 
Ha Giang, Viet 
Nam 
220 kV 200 MW 2007 
Shewli I HPP, 
Myanmar 
Delhong, 
Yunnan, China 
220 kV double 
circuit 
600 MW 2008 
Chau Doc, Viet 
Nam 
Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia 
220 kV (Viet 
Nam), 230 kV 
(Cambodia) 
double circuit 
200 MW 2009 
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Ban Nabong, 
Lao PDR 
Udon Thani, 
Thailand 
500 kV 
(operated at 230 
kV) 
615 MW 2010 
Xekaman 3, 
HPP, Lao PDR 
Thanh My, Viet 
Nam 
220 kV double 
circuit 
250 MW 2012 
Hong Sa TPP, 
Lao PDR 
Mae Moh, 
Thailand 
500 kV 1,470 MW 201?? 
Source: ADB (2015), Power Interconnections in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Presentation by 
Chong Chi Nai 
Source: ADB (2012), Greater Mekong Subregion Power Trade and Interconnection, 2 Decades of 
Cooperation 
 
7.3.5. Stage 4: Institutional construction 
The institutional construction has followed a different path. After the signature of IGA, a new 
institution was created for its implementation. The Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee 
(RPTCC) was then created, replacing the EPF. The objectives of the RPTCC have been: (i) 
preparing the Regional Power Trade Operating Agreement (RPTOA), (ii) recommending of 
overall policy and management of regional power trade, including bodies and coordination, (iii) 
establishing short, medium and long term initiatives to achieve the objectives of regional power 
trade within a specified timeframe, and (iv) identifying steps for implementation including means 
for financing. A key issue for the operation of the RPTCC has been its continuity with the approach 
of the EPF, which is regular meetings between state-owned companies’ representatives.  
In this time two MOUs were prepared by the RPTCC to continue with the progress of the power 
cooperation program. The MOU#1 for the completion of stage 1, and the MOU#2 for moving the 
project to the next stage. The general assessment is that the progress in this matter has been slower 
than would have been desired: 
 
“There has been remarkable progress in the GMS energy sector over the past 2 decades. 
Considerable success was also achieved in rolling out rural electrification in member 
countries. Rapid provision of large-scale, high-volume national grid systems; successful 
mobilization of indigenous resources; and the beginnings of cross-country trade also took 
place. These successes have been achieved mainly at the national level. Despite 
considerable political pronouncements that recognize the imperatives of regional 
cooperation, progress has not matched national achievements. The high-volume trans-
boundary connections that have been made to date within the GMS do not achieve a true 
interconnection of systems with synchronous operations, but are simply an extension of 
the national grids of the large- consuming countries into the territories of producers of 
(mainly) hydropower” 
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ADB (2013), “Assessment of the GMS Energy Sector Development” 
In order to give a new impulse, the RPTCC decided to establish a new Regional Power Trade 
Coordination Center (RPCC) to oversee GMS power trade development at the 5th GMS Summit 
in 2014. Nevertheless, probably because of the lack of experience in cooperating and the custom 
of utilizing inter-governmental approaches, countries are currently facing difficulties even for the 
election of place to settle the headquarters. 
 
7.3.6. Stage 5: Harmonization 
 Without real improvement in stage 4, the process has not reached a point of harmonization 
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7.4. Causality analysis 
7.4.1. Stage 1: National stakeholders’ support 
 
Figure 32 - GMS Power Cooperation causality analysis, Stage 1 
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7.4.1.1. Analysis of causality diagram 
 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 Indochina was divided 
into three groups after II 
World War 
The region was divided into: soviet 
communism (Lao PDR and Viet Nam), 
Chinese communism (China and part of 
Cambodia), Western capitalism (Thailand) 
and nationally instable countries (Myanmar 
and Cambodia)  
 
“In the 1980s, the countries through which 
the Mekong River flowed were separate 
nation-states that were divided not only by 
administrative and political boundaries, but, 
more importantly, by ideological ones” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, pp. 141] 
Factor 
 
2 Inter-governmental 
relations freeze 
Countries kept their foreign relations in terms 
of defense and agreements were minimal 
 
“Apart from a history of differing ideological 
alignments, the four counties were also the 
site of numerous border disputes” 
“Preah Vihar temple dispute between 
Thailand and Cambodia” 
“Other border disputes involved Thailand and 
Laos particularly in northern Thailand” 
“Thailand closed down its borders in 
November 1975” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, pp. 141] 
Output 
3 Military and defense 
concerns were priority 
over technical issues 
Considering the borders’ conflicts mentioned 
before, the military concerns became 
dominant in the entire process. For later on 
stage was mentioned: 
 
“One is Route 9, Da Nang – Savannakhet and 
Thai side is Mukdajan. That was to me to me 
the most difficult routing. It took almost three 
years, because military groups were against” 
“In Thai side, Mukdahan, near to the river, 
there was a cantonment” 
“And if you have ever come from Da Nag to 
Laos and connect to the existing road. 
Savannakhet – Mukadahan was very 
Factor 
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beneficial, but the Laotian side didn’t agree 
because the Thai side had a military base” 
[GMS.II.EC-205-208] 
4 Thailand alliance got 
support from international 
community 
Thailand’s so called “bamboo diplomacy” of 
“bending with the prevailing wind”  
[Asia sentinel] 
 
“Prior to the end of the Cold War, Thailand’s 
foreign policy had a passive attitude: in 
response to international issues, it focused on 
accommodating foreign countries by either 
taking sides or balancing powerful countries 
against one another” 
[Carle, 2015, p. 40] 
 
“Western side was always siding to Thai 
side” 
[GMS.EC.II-18] 
Output 
5 Previous cooperation 
institutions paralyzed 
The Mekong Committee, only existing forum 
for regional cooperation, was not able to 
make decisions. 
International donors were not able to 
intermediate 
Mekong Committee even moved to interim 
status 
 
“Then, the meeting I attended was of the 
Mekong River Commission. Instead of 
people talking about the agenda, both 
countries started criticizing the other size” 
[GMS.EC.II-17] 
Factor 
6 Trading between countries 
reduced to minimum 
Without formal relations, and lacking the 
infrastructure formal trading was reduced to 
minimum. 
Even the transport of merchandises from Lao 
PDR to Bangkok, granted by international 
agreement, was commonly difficult 
 
“In case of the port, they have to rely on 
Thailand.” 
“We have to plan everything to Bangkok. 
Trucking company is Thai. And they inspect 
everything. So they know very well where we 
are, and what we are carrying. Everything is 
under their military observation” 
Factor 
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[GMS-EC.II.165-166] 
7 Foreign relations based on 
mistrust 
Tensions between countries had moved 
towards. As mentioned during the interview 
survey, even media was critic with regional 
dialogue as it could be considered to  
 
Output 
8 Transport and trade 
involved several different 
departments and 
authorities 
Cambodia through state-run enterprises 
under the control of Ministry 
Thailand division across authorities 
Myanmar atomized 
 
Factor 
9 No talks between 
technical bodies on 
regional transportation 
No agreement between countries in building 
infrastructure for connecting countries at that 
time. Even not to build bridges across the 
Mekong river 
Factor 
10 Civil servants didn’t 
appreciate how closer 
regional cooperation 
could benefit the GMS 
¨Civil servants back then didn´t really 
appreciate how closer regional cooperation 
could benefit the GMS,¨  
[The Phhom Penh Plan For Development 
Management: A Retrospective, p. 4] 
Output 
11 Avoiding foreign 
ministries involvement 
was considered needed for 
agreement 
Mr Morita requested to countries to not 
include foreign affairs ministries because if 
so, building the agreements would have been 
more difficult  
 
“”The reason why in the GMS I refused that 
is represented by the ministries of foreign 
affairs is because the nature of foreign affairs. 
They are not guided to put priority for the 
international cooperation” 
“So when I started the sub-regional 
cooperation, GMS, I asked all the leaders 
“please do not put minister of foreign affairs 
s the coordination office, please remove them 
from the scheme” 
[GMS-EC.II.2-3] 
Action 
12 Road development in the 
countries didn’t include 
regional connectivity 
Absence of infrastructures connecting 
countries and of plans for developing 
Output 
13 Lao request for financial 
support for development 
After the meeting of the Mekong Committee, 
during which Mr. Morita’s hotel was 
attacked, Lao requested financial support 
from ADB expressing their concerns that no 
Output 
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other international donor was supporting 
them  
 
“He said, I like to have ADB financing for us 
to construct a hydro power project” 
[GMS-P.I.28] 
14 Transition towards market 
economies after Cold War 
Lao PDR Chintanakan Mai and Viet Nam’s 
Doi Moi introduced in 1986 
Reforms like the Doi Moi in Viet Nam and 
the New Economic Mechanism introduced in 
Lao PDR were with the intention to integrate 
into market economies  
[Interview] 
 
“The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 
necessarily changed the dynamic in 
Indochina. Without the Soviet Union’s 
support for Vietnam and Laos, both countries 
faced the distinct possibility of economic 
collapse” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, p.142] 
 
“Furthermore, the prime minister of a free 
market country, Thailand, Mr. Chartchai 
Chunhavan advocated ‘the conversion of 
Indochina from a battlefield to a market’ in 
1998” 
[Ishida, 2013, p.9] 
Factor 
15 Reduction of political 
tensions in the region 
The Peace Accords signed in October 23 in 
1991 represented the official end of the 
military tensions 
Cooperation started to be sought again in the 
region 
Establishment of the Mekong River 
Commission in 1995, replacing the interim 
Mekong Committee 
 
“It was probably because of the Peace Accord 
for Cambodia, that was possible in 1991-91” 
[GMS-EC.III.20] 
 
“Furthermore, the prime minister of a free 
market country, Thailand, Mr. Chartchai 
Chunhavan advocated ‘the conversion of 
Factor 
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Indochina from a battlefield to a market’ in 
1998” 
[Ishida, 2013, p.9] 
16 ADB interested in 
establishing relations 
between countries for 
consolidation of the peace 
In the aftermaths of the conflicts in the 
region, Mr. Morita’s concerns were more 
focused on how the peace was going to be 
maintained after the signing of the Peace 
Accords 
 
“Thailand is our shareholder, but your 
country is also our shareholder. For us, as 
long as you are our member country, whether 
country A or country B is correct is not my 
issue. My issue is how to create the peace” 
[GMS-EC.II.27] 
 
“What continues to make this possible after 
nearly two decades of uninterrupted 
economic exchange is what ADB refers to as 
the peace dividend” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, p.147] 
Output 
17 Idea of ADB project to 
promote friendship 
appeared 
“Mr. Morita thought of the possibility, if any, 
to undertake project that would benefit Laos, 
yet would also promote cooperation rather 
than enmity among the countries” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, p.140] 
Output 
18 Commitment from EGAT 
and EDL with existing 
hydro power purchase 
agreement 
“The Laotian was saying that during our 
difficult times with Thailand we never cut off 
the power, we always sent the power. And 
Thai side they never get delayed in paying us” 
[GMS-P.I.42] 
 
“Constructed and completed in 1971, the 
Nam Ngun hydropower plant continued to 
operate even during the period of socialist 
economy in Laos” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, p. 143] 
Factor 
19 Relative autonomy of 
EGAT and EDL 
“Thai government I don’t know, but their 
electric authority has said ‘as long is power, 
whether it has yellow color or red color, we 
buy’” 
[GMS-P.I.36] 
 
“They have some level of autonomy” 
[GMS-P.II.66] 
Factor 
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20 ADB selected hydropower 
as pilot project of regional 
economic cooperation 
“You are right that Xeset hydro-project was a 
frontrunner, a good pilot. In fact, once Xeset 
hydropower started, I was able to start 
discussion, look, even Thai and Lao was 
shooting to each other, they are now doing 
joint project.” 
[GMS-P.I.157] 
Action 
21 EGAT and EDL direct 
talks with governments for 
closing a deal 
“Mr. Morita no more you negotiate the price. 
It is beyond your capacity. I promise in a few 
months of time, our prime minister might be 
in Vientiane and your issue will be in his 
priority agenda” 
[GMS-P.I.44] 
Action 
22 Xeset hydropower project 
became ex 
“Xeset hydro-project was a frontrunner, a 
good pilot project. In fact, once Xeset 
hydropower started, I was able to start 
discussion” 
[GMS-P.I.157] 
Output 
23 ADB established a Bank 
Study Team for bilateral 
conversation with each 
country / government 
“A draft Framework Report, prepared after 
the bilateral consultations between the Bank 
Study Team and each of the participating 
governments, was the basic working 
document for the round table conference” 
[ADB, First Conference Proceedings, 
Preface] 
Action 
24 First Ministerial 
Conference held at ADB 
headquarters 
“In late 1992, the ADB organized the first 
ever ministerial conference in Manila at the 
ADB Headquarters” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, p.146] 
Action 
25 Intra-regional IPP 
agreements gained interest 
of national utilities 
Right after the initiation of the GMS 
program, several MOUs were being signed 
 
“Thai has met with Lao PDR and has signed 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for 
cooperation on energy projects” 
[ADB, 1993, Second Conference 
Proceedings, p. 35] 
 
Thailand for example has signed MOU with 
Lao PDR, Myanmar, China and Cambodia 
[GMS-P.III.3-21] 
Output 
26 Increasing cooperation 
gained international 
support 
The change in the foreign policies from 
Thailand can had  
Output 
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In fact, US embargo over Viet Nam was 
removed a bit later, in 1991. 
 
Other international donors have been 
supporting the development and 
implementation of GMS projects 
“Australia joins Friendship Bridge 
anniversary celebrations” 
[Australian Embassy, 2009] 
 
27 Discussions were complex 
and projects focused on 
national approaches 
It was reported that initially there were 
complexities (countries didn’t talk to each 
other)  
 
“They didn’t talk each other in the meeting” 
[Morita] 
 
When looking to the projects discussed, a 
strong focus on national needs rather than 
regional optimisation can be observed 
[proceedings, Ishida] 
Output 
28 Adoption of Two Plus 
principle 
For a project to be approved to be classified 
as GMS project need to include at least two 
member countries, keeping it open to the rest 
to join if they want 
 
“2+ principle: there is no need for the 6 
countries to agree for a project” 
[GMS-EC.I.17] 
 
“I said as long as two countries agree to do 
that, whether you have a third or fourth 
country I said, it doesn’t matter” 
[GMS-EC.II.106] 
Action 
29 Focus on implementation Mr Morita immediate objective was to 
develop the connections between the 
countries. As he mentioned, if there is money 
only for bamboo, bamboo bridge is ok 
 
“I said, if you are really to decide about the 
road network, which is very important. 
Everybody lets come together to one place 
and compare your map and my map and see 
at to the border what are the missing links. 
And connect these missing links, once the 
Action 
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road is upgrade or not, if the missing link is 
due to absence of bridge, whether the bridge 
is wood or concrete or even bamboo, let’s 
accept it. Once you start designing, new road 
takes the time. And let’s no create new route. 
Initially let’s connect existing road by filling 
the missing links and ask your village people 
which road should connect. Whether is 
straight line or not, it doesn’t matter. If you 
want to make it straight line, you make latter 
on. When you make the tunnel, you make 
later on. If you want concrete bridge you 
make when you country become rich” 
[GMS-EC.II.108] 
32 Energy projects proposed 
and developed mostly 
based on bilateral MOUs 
Only bilateral interconnections are being 
agreed. These are being done based on MOUs 
that set the maximum capacity of power to be 
transmitted from one country to the another 
Action 
33 GMS projects opened to 
other donors’ financing 
“Ownership belongs to countries: in fact 
ADBs approval is not needed for a project to 
be done. Countries propose project and then 
there is a call for donors. ADB can be donor, 
but it is not a requirement” 
[GMS-EC.I.21] 
Action 
34 ADB becoming 
Secretariat while not 
program “owner” 
One of the key issues for the GMS program 
was to increase the ownership of the countries 
of it. In that sense, it was open to their 
agreements to decide which project to fund. 
So, GMS most critical role was to serve as a 
platform or forum for dialogue in the region. 
 
“No secretariat: to avoid again conflicts 
because of excessive formalism. Neither 
ADB is secretariat, it only gives 
administrative support” 
[GMS-EC.I.20] 
Action 
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7.4.1.2. Links: 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
 
From To Description [source] 
1 2 The borders’ conflicts and the ideological differences between countries 
members clearly affecting the inter-governmental relations 
1 3 The military concerns were said to come from fears of possible invasions 
(e.g. Laos and Thailand crossing-border issues) 
1 4 As the only capitalist country in the region, Thailand remained as the only 
ally of Western countries (in particular the US) 
2 7 During the interview survey it was mentioned the need of removing foreign 
ministries from the scheme in order to overcome less than optimal 
agreements. This could be due to the mistrust between the parties, which 
would be more concerned about protecting national interests rather than in 
creating economies of scale from the regional cooperation 
3 5 The raise of military conflicts affected the operation of the technical forums 
(like the Mekong Committee). It was also reported how the international 
community, by siding on Thailand’s support, was aggravating such 
circumstances 
4 5 
5 13 The request from Lao for financing came from its feeling of isolation from 
international community and neighbouring countries. This could be 
perceived at the paralyzation of the existing forums 
14 15 The movement of the socialist and communist countries into the 
international community was key to reduce the level of conflicts. For 
example, for the case of Viet Nam, it was essential in the lifting of the 
international sanctions and the possibility for the ADB to start funding 
projects there. 
15 16 After years of conflicts, Mr. Morita was concerned that the peace would not 
be possible if countries didn’t learn how to cooperate 
13 17 The request from Lao PDR was the opportunity to put in practice such 
vision by the implementation of cross-border projects that would benefit all 
member countries 
16 17 
17 20 The selection of the hydropower project was based on the understanding 
that similar agreement had been maintained during Indochina War times 18 20 
19 21 During negotiations, it was mentioned that active involvement of ADB (Mr. 
Morita) was creating some concerns from media (of cooperation with 
“enemies”). The autonomy of EGAT and EDL allowed them to conduct the 
negotiations more discretely 
 
20 21 
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21 22 As a consequence of those negotiations, the project was successfully 
implemented and became a “front-runner” 
7 11 Because of this mistrust, avoidance of ministries of foreign affairs was a 
condition since the first conference. 
5 23 After the success of the Xeset hydropower dam, ADB had an existing case 
of effective cooperation which could serve for attracting the interest of the 
member countries. Without operational technical forums, ADB created a 
Bank Study Team that could convey that message to each of the countries 
individually. 
In order to grab the cooperation, the talks were directly at prime ministers 
level. It was understood that only by having them onboard the risk of second 
round national discussions would be avoided (needed discussions after 
reporting from countries’ representatives) 
10 23 
11 23 
14 23 
22 23 
10 27 It was mentioned that the initial discussions were not easy: “at beginning 
countries didn’t talk to each other” [interview].  
In the case of the transport it is possible to see how the road projects 
proposed initially had more of national routes rather than regional 
optimization. 
7 27 
23 24 With that, ADB prepared a regional conference at its headquarters. This 
was not innocent but to find a neutral venue where the representatives 
would be able to discuss freely. In order to reduce the possible tensions, it 
was sought to have a low profile meeting. For example, no official 
statements were done, only a meeting note from the secretariat (ADB). 
24 28 Although the program had a regional membership and objective, it was 
found that it was needed to have all the countries participant at every project 
(some of them would have no special interest in a road link between China 
and Thailand for example). It was also found that for some particular cases 
some countries might be ready to move towards deeper integration rather 
than others (for example, Thailand and Lao PDR in energy agreements). In 
that sense, the final agreement was to accept as GMS project any that would 
involve at least two countries and leave them open to the incorporation of 
other countries if they would like [interview] 
This would also help to better focus the large number of projects initially 
proposed. 
27 28 
24 29 Against this background, the focus from the ADB was to connect the 
missing links, to get results as soon as possible, therefore to focus on 
implementation. It was mentioned that “if bridge must be of bamboo, 
bamboo will be good”. [interview] 
27 29 
22 25 The success of Xeset hydropower triggered the interest in realizing larger 
projects following similar approach 
25 32 Based on the two plus principle and the IPPs’ approach, the projects in the 
power sector were developed in a bilateral manner, based on MOUs signed 
between the two countries involved. 
29 32 
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4 26 With the pacification and the support from Thailand, other international 
donors could feel more incentivized towards increasing support of regional 
cooperation 
14 26 
26 33 Under the need of getting the momentum for the cooperation and to bring 
as many partners as possible, the ADB accepted to leave the GMS opened 
to funding from other donors (which by the way are in their majority 
shareholders of the ADB) 
29 33 
16 34 With that action, ADB fulfilled another key objective, to increase the 
ownership of their own development to the member countries. 33 34 
 
7.4.2. Stage 2: High level political support and commitment 
 
Figure 33 - GMS Power cooperation causality analysis, Stage 2 
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7.4.2.1. Analysis of causality diagram 
 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 Lack of previous studies on 
regional power trade 
It was the Bank Study Team the first to identify 
the potential energy projects during the country 
consultations 
“Phase II of the cooperation initiative will 
include research and consultation on an energy 
master plan for the subregion” 
[ADB, 1993, Second conference, p. 96] 
Factor 
2 Subregional Electric Power 
Forum (EPF) looked for 
priority projects’ 
implementations 
One of the key objectives of the EPR is to 
“identify and promote opportunities for 
mutually beneficial subregional cooperation 
projects in the power sector” 
[ECA, 2010, p. 34] 
Output 
3 State-owned companies 
were the main actors in each 
country 
As explained in the previous section. 
State-owned companies dominated the power 
sector of the member countries 
EGAT in Thailand, EDL in Lao PDR, EVN in 
Viet Nam… 
Factor 
4 Countries concerned about 
the stability of their national 
supply 
Although it was not clear for that time, recent 
initiatives by importing governments of 
limiting the supply from a single country seems 
to indicate those concerns 
“(Viet Nam) in particular would like to set 
limits to import from China to no more than 5 
or 10%” 
[GMS-P.II.15] 
“Thailand looking to 25-30% of power import 
in the PDP” 
“Limit to max of 15% from a single country” 
[GMS-P.III.23-23] 
Factor 
5 ADB prepared Regional 
Master Plan for 
Interconnection 
“The earliest energy study with a GMS-wide 
focus, the Subregional Energy Sector Study 
initiated in 1993 with ADB assistance and 
completed in November 1994, was especially 
important in furthering the process of 
identifying the scope, opportunities, and 
mechanisms for energy cooperation among 
GMS members” 
[ADB, 2012, p.4] 
Action 
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6 Most of state-owned 
utilities without previous 
agreements 
At the time of the First GMS Conference only 
Thailand and Lao PDR had some experience of 
cooperation (coming from Xeset power plant) 
Factor 
7 World Bank carried out 
study to identify bottlenecks 
“The main objectives of the present study are 
to: (a) assess options and formulate a strategy 
for power trade among the Greater Mekong 
countries, paying special attention to the 
barriers to trade and the policy, institutional and 
commercial framework required to develop and 
operate efficiently a regional power network; 
and (b) establish the rationale and options for 
donors’ support to power trading and 
transmission network investment needs within 
the region” 
[World Bank, 1999] 
Action 
8 EPF established Experts 
Group on Power 
Interconnection and Trade 
(EGP) for supervision of 
Regional Master Plan 
“Recognizing that a more focused approach 
involving key personnel associated with 
transmission development was needed to 
promote regional power trade, the EPF 
established the Experts Group on Power 
Interconnection and Trade (EGP) in 1998. The 
EGP oversaw the preparation of the Regional 
Master Plan for Interconnection in the GMS. It 
was also tasked to help determine the 
institutional, legal, and other arrangements to 
develop and manage the interconnected power 
network.” 
[ADB (2012), p. 6] 
Action 
9 Approach based on bilateral 
MOU became the standard 
Only bilateral interconnections are being 
agreed. These are being done based on MOUs 
that set the maximum capacity of power to be 
transmitted from one country to the another 
Output 
10 Several obstacles were 
found for market integration 
The study mentioned the existence of important 
barriers, citing as most crucial: 
- Policy barriers: National Priorities, Regional 
Protocol, Flexibility in Laws, Regulations and 
Contracts; Environmental Impact 
- Technical barriers: Planning, Transmission 
Facilities, Operations Protocol 
- Institutional Barriers: Leadership, 
Independent Regulators 
- Commercial and Financial Barriers: 
Generation Tariffs, Transmission Tariffs, 
Financing 
[World Bank, p2] 
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11 A lack of leadership 
towards the regional project 
was found 
No country is moving the project to a next stage Output 
12 A four stages process was 
proposed 
“In furthering regional power trade, the GMS 
members, since their 1999 Policy Statement on 
Regional Power Trade, have thus consistently 
affirmed the principles of cooperation, 
gradualism, and respect for the environment. 
All of them recognize that regional power trade 
will develop in phases” 
[ADB, 2012] 
“Stage 1: bilateral cross-border connections 
through power purchase agreements (PPAs) 
Stage 2: Grid-to-grid power trading between 
any pair of GMS countries, eventually using 
transmission facilities of a third regional 
country 
Stage 3: Development of transmission links 
dedicated to cross-border trading 
Stage 4: Most GMS countries with multiple 
seller-buyer regulatory frameworks, towards 
the implementation of a wholly competitive 
regional market” 
[Jude, 2013] 
Action 
13 EGP proposed and drafted a 
Policy Statement to EPF 
“At the Ninth GMS Ministerial Meeting in 
Manila, ministers endorsed the Policy 
Statement on Regional Power Trade in the 
Greater Mekong Subregion” 
[ECA, 2010] 
Action 
14 Inter-governmental 
agreement was prepared 
without explicit target of 
regional power market 
Although promotion of regional power trade is 
a clear objective, the final foal of a market is 
not that clear 
“The objective of regional power trade under 
this IGA are for all participants to 
i) coordinate and cooperation in the planning 
and operation of their systems to minimize 
costs while maintaining satisfactory reliability; 
and 
ii) fully recover their costs and share equitably 
in the resulting benefits, including reductions in 
required generation and transmission capacity, 
reductions in fuel costs and improved use of 
low-cost electricity sources; and 
iii) provide reliable and economic electric 
service to the customers of each Party” 
Action 
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[IGA, 1999] 
15 Introduction of market 
reforms were unlikely in 
most of countries 
Only Viet Nam has started a reform process. 
Thailand has also committed with some level of 
reform, although still remains as a single buyer 
model 
“In 2007 Thailand began, but did not complete, 
the process of liberalizing its power sector. 
Originally intending to move to a competitive 
power pool model, Thailand has instead 
implemented what it refers to as the “enhanced 
single buyer model”. In addition to owning 
approximately 50% of Thai generation and the 
high-voltage transmission network, EGAT also 
acts as the country’s central dispatcher of 
generation. The remaining generation is 
purchased from privately owned independent 
power producers (IPPs) locater both within 
Thailand and in neighbouring countries. The 
possibility of moving to a power pool model 
remains under discussion, but at the time of 
writing no firm decision had been taken” 
[IEA, 2016] 
Factor 
16 An explicit mention 
towards state-owned 
companies as main actors 
for power trade was 
included 
“The Parties shall support and assist their 
respective appropriate national authorities and 
government-designated electric utilities in the 
performance and execution of their obligations 
in terms of any agreement enter into between 
the respective utilities pursuant to this IGA and 
consistent with the Policy Statement” 
[IGA, 2002, 4.4] 
Action 
17 Heads of State approved the 
Intergovernmental 
Agreement (IGA) during 
the 1st GMS Summit 
The IGA was signed at Phnom Peng on 3 
November 2002 by respective ministers 
[IGA, 2002] 
Action 
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7.4.2.2. Links: 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
 
From To Description [source] 
1 5 ADB’s Regional Master Plan for Interconnection came from a demand by 
the member countries as well as need in the absence of existing studies that 
would guide state-owned utilities. 
2 5 
5 8 In order to get the most from the Regional Master Plan, the creation of a 
group of experts from the state-owned companies was a logical step. 3 8 
5 9 The Regional Master Plan was mostly utilized for the identification of 
generation projects rather than for the development of the regional power 
grid. This was influenced because the first projects developed in the region 
was the IPPs between Lao PDR and Thailand. As a direct consequence, 
other countries followed that approach. 
6 9 
2 7 The World Bank study came as a demand from the EPF for the promotion 
of regional power trade. 
7 10 This study helped to identify the different obstacles. The first one 
mentioned was “National Priorities: Regional issues are secondary to 
domestic needs” [World Bank, 1999] 
4 10 
4 11 That ended in another of the barriers identified by the study of the World 
Bank: “No recognized leadership has been established within the region to 
facilitate and promote greater regional trade” 
9 12 With the actual interest in promoting regional power trade through IPPs, 
and considering the barriers for the development of a regional electricity 
market. In fact the World Bank’s study proposed “a process” [World Bank, 
1999] including the need for “public partnership to develop power trade in 
the region”. In that sense the four stages proposed follow those 
recommendations.  
10 12 
11 12 
8 13 In order to start that process, state-owned utilities required high level 
support to start negotiations, those preparatory works (the Policy 
Statement) was therefore prepared by the EGP and submitted to EPF 
12 13 
13 16 One of the elements of the Policy Statement is the explicit mention to the 
state-owned utilities rather than talking about the creation of a market of 
agents (the terminology utilized in SIEPAC). The unlikely of reforms in the 
countries would be an important factor on that. 
15 16 
4 14 In the four stages process, the regional power market appears to be an 
aspiration rather than a concrete objective, which is influenced by the strong 
emphasis of countries on their national supply. 
12 14 
13 17 
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14 17 The elimination of a specific path for the regional power market and the 
preparation of the Policy Statement by their state-owned companies, and 
ratified by at ministry level, eased the approval by the heads of state. 
 
 
7.4.3. Stage 3: Physical construction 
 
Figure 34 - GMS Power cooperation causality analysis, Stage 3 
 
7.4.3.1. Analysis of causality diagram 
 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 MOUs have been 
signed between 
neighbouring 
countries 
“ 
 Pending agreements between China and 
Myanmar: 16 to 20 GW by 2030 
 MOU between Thailand and Myanmar: 1.9 GW 
 MOU between Thailand and Lao PDR: 7GW 
Factor 
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 MOU between Vietnam and Lao PDR: 5 GW 
” 
[Lefevre, 2012] 
2 Countries didn’t 
want to depend on 
single source 
“ 
 Thailand “acceptable max” import = level 
equivalent to already sigend MoUs 
 Vietnam “acceptable max import = 10% of peak 
demand 
” 
[Lefevre, 2012] 
Factor 
3 Lao PDR’s main 
objective has been 
to increase its 
generation 
capacity 
“The  Lao  PDR’s  vast  hydropower  potential,  fortui
tously  located in  the  center  of  the  GMS, provides 
the opportunity for it to be a “battery” for energy-
deficit neighboring countries. Pursuit of this 
opportunity requires optimal development of the 
country’s hydropower resources, retaining ample 
electricity for rural electrification and harnessing the 
potential on a sustainable basis. The energy sector, in 
short, is very much dominated by interest in 
hydropower. “ 
[ADB, 2013] 
Factor 
4 GMS was opened 
to other 
international 
donors funding 
ADB decision to open the funding scheme to other 
international donors 
“Ownership belongs to countries: in fact ADBs 
approval is not needed for a project to be done. 
Countries propose project and then there is a call for 
donors. ADB can be donor, but it is not a requirement” 
[GMS-EC.I.21] 
Action 
5 Border disputes 
still remained 
Several border conflicts were reported between Lao 
PDR and Thailand, and these having implications for 
the other member countries (particularly Viet Nam and 
China) [New York Times, 1988] 
“Other border disputes involved Thailand and Laos 
particularly in northern Thailand where the Meo 
tribespeople from Laos took refuge after the Pathet Lao 
seized power in 1975” 
[Cruz-del Rosario, p.141] 
Factor 
6 Thai and Myanmar 
utilities have been 
working together 
at different 
institutions 
Regional groups like SPF and EGP are composed 
mainly by representatives from state-owned 
companies, which are also in charge of ensuring the 
energy supply in their respective countries 
Factor 
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7 Interconnections 
projects have been 
always analyzed 
independently 
Projects are being developed through IPPs, requiring 
for that project-based analysis 
Action 
8 Projects have 
continued 
although tensions 
between two 
countries 
There has not been found project cancelled due to 
political disputes 
Output 
9 Several generation 
power plants have 
been being 
developed for 
exporting (mostly 
in Lao PDR for 
Thailand) 
“In the GMS, power has been traded on a bilateral 
basis, mainly through long-term power purchase 
agreements.” 
[ADB, 2000, p.2] 
Action 
10 Objective of a 
regional grid has 
been delayed 
“Still at bilateral agreement phase” 
“Still not a multilateral trade” 
[GMS-P.III.27-28] 
Output 
11 Agreement for 
transmission 
through third 
country has not 
been approved yet 
“China and Thailand would be 2nd stage because it 
goes through Lao PDR” 
“Need for China and Lao PDR to make an 
arrangement” 
[GMS-P.III.29-30] 
Output 
12 China – Thailand 
MOU has not been 
developed yet 
“China and Thailand would be 2nd stage because it 
goes through Lao PDR” 
“Need for China and Lao PDR to make an 
arrangement” 
[GMS-P.III.29-30] 
 
“In 1998, Thailand signed an MOU with China for the 
import of 3,000 MW by 2017. Imports would be by 
interconnectors passing through Lao PDR, making it 
necessary to agree to transit payments to be made to 
Lao PDR. At present, no agreement has been reached 
on these payments, and progress on developing export 
projects under the MOU remains stalled.” 
[ECA, 2010] 
Output 
13 Thailand made 
claim of refusal to 
commit with MOU 
for purchasing 
electricity from 
Myanmar 
“An initial MOU was signed in July 1997 for the 
purchase of 1,500 MW of hydro capacity by 2010. In 
May 2005, a new MOU was signed for the 
development of five hydro power projects on the 
Salween River for which the Myanmar government 
Output 
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proposed two initial projects with a combined capacity 
of 8,200 MW 
There appears to be some ambivalence in the Thai 
government’s attitude toward this MOU. In June 2007 
the energy minister in the then military-installed 
government, Dr Piyasavasti Amarand, was reported to 
have said that Thailand was not looking to buy any 
power from Myanmar.  In part this appears to have 
been a response to concerns that the MOU resulted 
from what were seen as excessively close links 
between the former prime minister, Thaksin 
Shinawatra, and the Myanmar government. However, 
in March 2009, EGAT was hopeful of shortly signing 
an MOU for the Hutgyi project on the Salween River, 
one of the plants covered under the second 
intergovernmental MOU.” 
[ECA, 2010] 
14 EGAT is in charge 
of ensure national 
power supply 
Thailand follows the so-called enhanced single buyer 
model where 
“EGAT operates as a single buyer, purchasing all 
output from IPPs and SPPs and onselling this, together 
with output from its own generators, to MEA and PEA 
at a bulk supply tariff.” 
[ECA, 2010] 
Factor 
15 MOU has been 
maintained, 
although 
discussions still 
remain for 
framework 
“However, in March 2009, EGAT was hopeful of 
shortly signing an MOU for the Hutgyi project on the 
Salween River, one of the plants covered under the 
second intergovernmental MOU.” 
[ECA, 2010] 
Output 
 
7.4.3.2. Links: 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
 
From To Description [source] 
1 7 Active importing countries (especially Thailand and at a lower level Viet 
Nam), who are the main buyers have been well concerned about relying 
excessively from a single country or even from imports. For that, all the 
negotiations have been implemented in bilateral manner, and looking to 
ensure the projects to develop. 
2 7 
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7 10 This project-based approach has resulted in numerous IPPs signed and 
specific transmission lines being built. For example, SIDA study mentions 
“The main issue here is that private investors, generally in consortiums, are 
starting to create an energy landscape in Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar that 
is based on IPPs with dedicated transmission lines to export power based 
on long term PPAs to neighbouring countries.  Such arrangements then 
become part of the list of barriers noted above, as there ends up being no 
third party access to the transmission system (not even by the host country’s 
utility)” [SIDA, 2011] 
10 11 The focusing on bilateral transmission lines has delayed the agreement for 
utilizing third countries grid. 
11 12 Without such agreement, there is no reason for Lao PDR to approve the 
utilization by China for the exporting to Thailand (considering that such 
agreement could compete with its owned power plants). 
3 12 
7 8 The positive outcome of the project-based approach has prevented that 
those were stopped because of other conflicts (since every project has very 
solid economic viability). 
1 9 The combination of MOUs between countries, project-based approach and 
sufficient financing (also from international donors) has created a positive 
climate to increase the generation capacity for regional power trade. 
4 9 
8 9 
5 13 The border disputes seems to have been influencing the governments will, 
as the case of Thailand and Myanmar. 
6 15 Although these conflicts have affected the political will, it seems that the 
strong involvement from state-owned companies as well as the relations 
developed and the clear understanding of the benefits (even though it’d be 
only for single project) have weighted more in the overall process 
9 15 
13 15 
14 15 
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7.4.4. Stage 4: Institutional construction 
 
Figure 35 - GMS Power cooperation causality analysis Stage 4 
 
7.4.4.1. Analysis of causality diagram 
 
Code Factor Description / Source [Cat.] 
1 Countries main concern 
was security of national 
supply 
The introduction of caps in the imported 
electricity seems to indicate an emphasis in 
the diversification of the energy mix 
Factor 
2 Countries cooperation 
was influenced by 
governments’ relations 
momentum 
As the case of the MOU between Myanmar 
and Thailand showed, although the projects 
were not cancelled, those could potentially 
influence the process 
Factor 
3 Management of common 
resources was still not 
well developed 
Countries do not have experience in dealing 
with regional issues. ASEAN is the only 
regional organization that includes most of 
them (China is not member). 
Factor 
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4 State-owned companies 
are main stakeholders in 
each country 
National power reforms have not been 
implemented. Only Viet Nam is in the 
process, but still the national utility is in a 
dominant position in the system  
Factor 
5 Several challenges for 
implementation of 
regional power pool were 
identified 
The study mentioned the existence of 
important barriers, citing as most crucial: 
- Policy barriers: National Priorities, 
Regional Protocol, Flexibility in Laws, 
Regulations and Contracts; Environmental 
Impact 
- Technical barriers: Planning, Transmission 
Facilities, Operations Protocol 
- Institutional Barriers: Leadership, 
Independent Regulators 
- Commercial and Financial Barriers: 
Generation Tariffs, Transmission Tariffs, 
Financing 
[World Bank, p2] 
Output 
6 4 stages gradual process 
was adopted 
“Stage 1: bilateral cross-border connections 
through power purchase agreements (PPAs) 
Stage 2: Grid-to-grid power trading between 
any pair of GMS countries, eventually using 
transmission facilities of a third regional 
country 
Stage 3: Development of transmission links 
dedicated to cross-border trading 
Stage 4: Most GMS countries with multiple 
seller-buyer regulatory frameworks, towards 
the implementation of a wholly competitive 
regional market” 
[Jude, 2013] 
Action 
7 A new high level body 
(RPTCC) was created 
replacing EGP 
“ EGP 9 was the last EGP meeting, following 
the constitution of the RPTCC and its  
taking over of EGP functions” 
[ADB, 2012] 
Action 
8 MOU #1 signed for the 
full implementation of 
stage 1 
“Formally, MOU #1 approved guidelines for 
the implementation of the RPTOA.” 
[ECA, 2010] 
Action 
9 RPTCC operations were 
based on 
intergovernmental 
approach 
“The membership of the RPTCC is the same 
as that of the EPF” 
“Each GMS country is represented on the 
EPF by two members. One is a senior official 
from the ministry or other government agency 
responsible for power sector policy and 
Output 
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planning and the other is a senior manager 
from the key power utility in the country.” 
[ECA, 2010] 
“ 
RPTCC operations are based on meetings, 
without permanent headquarters and/or 
managerial and economic independence 
“As  of  the  end  of  2011,  the  RPTCC  cre
ated  under  the  IGA  has  met  12  times  sin
ce  its  
establishment in 2004 and has helped provide 
strategic direction and overall management  
of the interim stage of GMS power trade “ 
[ADB, 2012] 
 
“ it was recognised by the 9 th  RPTCC 
meeting that there is a strong  
need for a permanent secretariat to facilitate 
regional power trade on a daily basis” 
[SIDA, 2011] 
10 Regional power based on 
inter-utility agreements 
(MOUs) 
“ 
·       Pending agreements between China 
and Myanmar: 16 to 20 GW by 2030 
·       MOU between Thailand and 
Myanmar: 1.9 GW 
·       MOU between Thailand and Lao 
PDR: 7GW 
·       MOU between Vietnam and Lao 
PDR: 5 GW 
” 
[Lefevre, 2012] 
IGA also specifies that the regional power 
trade is based on inter-utility agreements 
 
“The Parties shall support and assist their 
respective appropriate national authorities 
and government-designated electric utilities 
in the performance and execution of their 
obligations in terms of any agreement enter 
into between the respective utilities pursuant 
to this IGA and consistent with the Policy 
Statement” 
[IGA, 2002, 4.4] 
Action 
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11 Importing countries have 
been including import as 
part of their PDPs 
PDPs of both Thailand and Viet Nam already 
include targets of import electricity in the 
near future. 
Output 
12 Interest has been growing 
for the transmission 
through third countries 
“Lao-Singapore transmission line can save 
billions” 
[The Nation, 2014] 
Output 
13 Countries have 
developed independently 
their power development 
plans (PDPs) 
“Currently all the countries’ PDP are done 
independently” 
[GMS-P.III.54] 
Output 
14 Project has been 
struggling to move 
forward to 2nd stage 
“The first issue that arises in analysing the 
general progress in establishing the RPT is 
that none of the  
instruments have adequately defined a time 
frame for the establishment of a regional 
power market.   
This is partly to do with the underlying 
principle of “gradualism”” 
[SIDA, 2011] 
 
“GMS is in Stage 1 transitioning to Stage 2” 
[Chong Chi, 2015] 
Output 
15 Agreement made for the 
establishment of 
Regional Power Trade 
Coordination Center 
(RPCC) to oversee GMS 
power trade development 
“The gradualist approach is expected to 
continue even while agreement on the 
establishment of the Regional Power 
Coordination Center (RPCC), the permanent 
dedicated center envisioned to coordinate 
power trade in the GMS, reached an advanced 
stage of discussions by early-2012” 
[ADB, 2012] 
Action 
16 RPTCC facing 
difficulties to agree on 
location of RPCC 
headquarters 
“Current discussions for the location of the 
RPCC” 
“China and Thailand bidding” 
“No agreement was possible, ADB is setting 
the criteria for re-bidding process” 
[GMS-P.III.51-53] 
Output 
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7.4.4.2. Links: 
Below, the logic of all the links is provided: 
 
From To Description [source] 
1 5 The background of lack of experience of cooperation between the countries 
and the favoring of national objectives much over regional-wide 
perspectives were an important input for the evaluation of the challenges 
for the implementation of regional power pool. 
2 5 
3 5 
5 6 The number and magnitude of the barriers identified were sufficient for 
favoring a gradual implementation process. 
6 7 With the agreement for a gradual implementation in stages, a new 
institution (the RPTCC) was created in order to prepare this process 
7 9 RPTCC was a replace of the EPF with a new mandate, therefore it followed 
similar approach (inter-governmental with meetings between 
representatives) 
6 8 Similarly, a new MOU was signed to complete the implementation of the 
first stage. 
4 10 The signed of the MOU#1 focused the incentives of the increasing of power 
generation for regional power trade. This has been carried out by state-
owned utilities (main players in each country) which focused on bilateral 
agreements. The RPTCC, due to the inter-governmental approach, was not 
capable of making agreements that would have moved the project in a more 
regional approach or vision. 
8 10 
9 10 
10 11 The growth of regional power capacity granted through MOUs for 
exporting has motivated importing countries to start to rely on them as 
another source of electricity. 
11 12 The normalization of relying on imported electricity has triggered countries 
to start to consider the most options they could approach. Similar to the 
agreement between China and Thailand.  
3 13 With the state-owned companies as main responsible for each country and 
without experience of regional resources, there was a lack of regional vision 
and consequently the PDPs for each country have been developed 
independently. 
4 13 
13 14 Without a regional PDP or coordination between countries’ PDPs, creating 
more complex agreements involving third countries have not been created. 
14 15 In order to overcome those difficulties and to continue with the process, the 
regional institution will be strengthen to the creation of an independent 
RPCC. 
12 15 
3 16 Nevertheless, without previous experience and still relying on an inter-
governmental approach, initial negotiations are being proved to be more 9 16 
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15 16 difficult that should. The lack of agreement for selecting the place for the 
headquarters of the RPCC is a clear example of that. 
 
 
7.5. Evaluation of factors’ weight: 
Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
1 1 Indochina was divided 
into three groups after II 
World War 
The ideological differences were one 
the factors that continuously influenced 
the process from the beginning, making 
more complex the project (for example, 
the acquisition of the written agreement 
between governments for the pilot 
project). 
3 
1 3 Military and defense 
concerns were priority 
over technical issues 
More importantly, the military conflicts 
were affecting any possible 
collaboration at any level, as the attack 
to Mr. Morita during the Mekong 
Committee meeting showed 
5 
1 5 Previous cooperation 
institutions paralyzed 
The paralyzation of these bodies was an 
important component, but since those 
were not directly related to transport, 
the influence had not been direct 
1 
1 14 Transition towards 
market economies after 
Cold War 
The process towards opening to 
international market was one of the 
drivers for the socialist and communist 
countries to join the program, as well as 
an incentive for Thailand to cooperate 
with them 
3 
1 15 Reduction of political 
tensions in the region 
The perspective of pacification of the 
region helped the process to be moved, 
nevertheless, this pacification didn’t 
finish the conflicts between countries. 
1 
1 18 Commitment from 
EGAT and EDL with 
existing hydro power 
purchase agreement 
Without this existing scheme, all the 
process of building trust would have 
been much more complicated, both at 
technical and political level 
5 
1 19 Relative autonomy of 
EGAT and EDL 
Autonomy of action of EGAT and EDL 
allowed seeing the project from a more 
pragmatic perspective, as well as 
probably officials from EGAT,  
considered the cooperation with Lao 
PDR more favorably (not only for the 
5 
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direct gains but also for its contribution 
to the pacification of the region). It was 
also critical in the process of convincing 
governments of the merit of the project 
in both countries 
 
Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
2 1 Lack of previous 
studies on regional 
power trade 
The lack of existing studies had an 
influence in the pace of the project but 
didn’t become a major issue in 
mobilizing the willingness for regional 
power trade 
1 
2 3 State-owned companies 
were the main actors in 
each country 
State-owned companies became the 
main actors also for the regional power 
trade process 
3 
2 4 Countries concerned 
about the stability of 
their national supply 
Guarantees of national energy security, 
particularly in the supply, had been 
main concern and therefore totally 
determined the process 
5 
2 6 Most of state-owned 
utilities without 
previous agreements 
As with the lack of existing studies, the 
lack of previous agreements had 
influence but never became a major 
issue 
1 
2 15 Introduction of market 
reforms were unlikely 
in most of countries 
The lack of private distributors and/or 
independent system operators have 
been an important factor since those 
have not been able to play an important 
role 
3 
 
 
Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
3 1 MOUs have been 
signed between 
neighbouring countries 
Such agreements were an important 
factor during the entire process, for 
example in the preference towards the 
development of generation capacity 
rather than focusing on regional 
transmission 
3 
3 2 Countries didn’t want 
to depend on single 
source 
Importers willingness for granting 
access to different sources (particularly 
Thailand) became fundamental in the 
development of several MOUs 
5 
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3 3 Lao PDR’s main 
objective has been to 
increase its generation 
capacity 
As well as with importers, exporters 
countries (particularly Lao PDR) have 
been also moved the projects towards 
the development of generation capacity 
(as a mean to attract FDI) 
3 
3 5 Border disputes still 
remained 
The disputes have some influence, 
although, since the projects remain at 
technical level in a pragmatic way, this 
has been minimal 
1 
3 5 Thai and Myanmar 
utilities have been 
working together at 
different institutions 
The cooperation at technical has created 
some relations, but still not sufficient as 
for development regional perspectives 
of countries/state owned companies’ 
plans 
1 
3 14 EGAT is in charge of 
ensure national power 
supply 
The role of EGAT as the guarantor of 
the national supply has put it as the main 
actor from Thailand (which is also the 
most active country in the project) 
3 
 
Stage Code Factor Impact Weight 
4 1 Countries main concern 
was security of national 
supply 
Ensuring the security of supply is being 
an important factor for the agreement of 
the four stages process 
3 
4 2 Countries cooperation 
was influenced by 
governments’ relations 
momentum 
As mentioned before, the influence of 
these conflicts have been indirect and 
decreasing 
1 
4 3 Management of 
common resources was 
still not well developed 
Without the experience of developing 
mechanisms for management of 
common resources (as would be the 
Mekong river itself), the coordination 
between countries has not been as 
effective as should have 
3 
4 4 State-owned companies 
are main stakeholders 
in each country 
The involvement of the state-owned 
companies has been the major factor in 
this process affecting every negotiation 
5 
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8. Comparative analysis, identification of contextual variables 
This chapter identifies the appropriate contextual variables for building the comparative 
framework in the next chapter. Therefore, this chapter looks to fulfill the first of the sub-objectives 
of the research. For that, the first section summarizes the factors identified for each of the projects. 
The second section initially broadly classifies them into regional or sectorial, and next into more 
comprehensive categories. Finally relationship between main stakeholders are proposed as a 
method for the evaluation of the categories, and therefore to be the contextual variables of the 
comparative framework. 
 
8.1. Factors identified in the three case studies 
This section summarizes the factors identified in the previous chapters for each of the projects. 
This serves as background data for the chapter. The factors presented by project and by stage are 
as below: 
 
Stage Factor 
S
ta
g
e 
1
 
Indochina was divided into three groups after II World War 
Military and defense concerns were priority over technical issues 
Previous cooperation institutions paralyzed 
Trading between countries reduced to minimum 
Transport and trade involved several different departments and authorities 
No talks between technical bodies on regional transportation 
Civil servants didn’t appreciate how closer regional cooperation could benefit the 
GMS 
Road development in the countries didn’t include regional connectivity 
Transition towards market economies after Cold War 
Reduction of political tensions in the region 
S
ta
g
e 
2
 
History of conflicts 
Different national authorities in charge of transport, trade, and border crossing 
procedures 
National budgets constrained by the Asian Financial Crisis 
Absence of trust between countries 
Numerous non-physical trade barriers still remained 
Market transition in socialist and communist countries increased importance of 
international trade 
Transport operators complained about difficulties for crossing borders 
Countries looked forward deepening regional economic cooperation in ASEAN 
Major countries (Thailand) looked for new trading opportunities more intensively 
S t a g e 3
 
Ideologically rivalry between countries (divided in 3) 
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No technical bodies for regional transport/trade 
Minimal formal trading between countries 
No studies from Lao authorities about potential positive impact of increasing China – 
Thailand trade 
Roads to be utilized by private operators 
Asymmetry in the value of Thailand-China trade over Lao-Thailand and Lao-China 
Thai military base near expected crossing border bridge 
Border conflicts between Lao PDR and Thailand 
S
ta
g
e 
4
 
Governments lacked trust on each other 
Countries had very different national regulations 
Demand for corridors had been increasing rapidly 
Regulations involving different ministries and authorities 
Countries gave different relative importance to each connection 
Removal of non-physical barriers would include national strategic issues 
Table 27 - Factors identified, GMS Economic Corridors 
 
 
Stage Factor 
S
ta
g
e 
1
 
State-owned companies created to monopolize national sectors 
Countries tended to consider power sector as technical issue 
Debt crisis affected every Central American country 
IADB became main/only donor in the region 
Conflicts between countries due to aftermaths of Cold War 
State-owned companies built national grids until borders 
Impossibility to continue public funding of sector 
Seasonal surplus of capacity appeared in some countries 
State-owned companies built weak bilateral interconnections without need of political 
agreement 
State-owned companies had great autonomy of action 
State-owned companies created regional technical organization (CEAC) 
State-owned companies were initially interested only in regional infrastructure 
State-owned companies identified potential benefits from economies of scale 
Strengthening of bilateral interconnections was stopped by governments because of 
national security concerns 
Individual markets too small for being profitable 
International actors intervened to foster pacification 
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CEAC became active supporter of connectivity 
Full regional consensus became bases of cooperation 
S
ta
g
e 
2
 
Countries with different levels of reform 
Conflicts between countries still existing at that time 
Some countries could get more benefits than others 
State-owned companies had major influence in their respective national sectors 
Major reforms would be needed in some countries 
S
ta
g
e 
3
 
Tensions between countries could affect entire region 
State-owned companies had a history of cooperation 
Conflicts between countries still existing at that time 
State-owned companies were reluctant to lose control of their national sectors 
Countries didn’t have experience of effective functional cooperation 
CEAC was the main actor for the promotion of the regional project 
S
ta
g
e 
4
 State-owned companies were in charge of national systems 
Foreign relations influenced by ideological differences 
Privatization of generation was progressing in the region 
Countries' concerns about losing control over regional market 
Table 28 - Factors identified, SIEPAC 
 
Stage Factor 
S
ta
g
e 
1
 
Indochina was divided into three groups after II World War 
Military and defense concerns were priority over technical issues 
Previous cooperation institutions paralyzed 
Transition towards market economies after Cold War 
Reduction of political tensions in the region 
Commitment from EGAT and EDL, with existing hydro power purchase agreement 
Relative autonomy of EGAT and EDL 
S
ta
g
e 
2
 
Lack of previous studies on regional power trade 
State-owned companies were the main actors in each country 
Countries concerned about the stability of their national supply 
Most of state-owned utilities without previous agreements 
Introduction of market reforms were unlikely in most of countries 
S
ta
g
e 
3
 
MOUs have been signed between neighbouring countries 
Countries didn't want to depend on single source 
Lao PDR’s main objective has been to increase its generation capacity 
Border disputes still remained 
Thai and Myanmar utilities have been working together at different institutions 
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EGAT is in charge of ensure national power supply 
S
ta
g
e 
4
 Countries main concern was security of national supply 
Countries cooperation was influenced by governments’ relations momentum 
Management of common resources was still not well developed 
State-owned companies are main stakeholders in each country 
Table 29 - Factors identified, GMS Power Cooperation 
 
In total, 88 factors were identified for the three projects: 
 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Total 
GMS 
Economic 
Corridors 
10 9 8 6 - 33 
SIEPAC 18 6 5 4  33 
GMS Power 
Cooperation 
7 5 6 4 - 22 
Total 35 20 19 14  88 
Table 30 - Number of factors identified at every stage of each case studied 
 
8.2. Factor’s classification and categories 
Those factors were found to be either regional or sectorial (as expected).  
 Regional factors: are those related to those aspects that would affect to any regional 
cooperation program that would be proposed. In that, those are more related to the overall 
regional political situation. 
 
 Sectorial factors: are those particular for the sector under which the regional projects falls 
into. In that sense, there are no necessarily intrinsically to a particular sector (that is, there 
could be differences between regions), but the sector characteristics are dominant over the 
regional political situation. 
More interestingly, all the factors were found to be able to group into categories as follows 
8.2.1. Regional categories: 
8.2.1.1. Rivalry between countries:  
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Possible competition or enmity between countries. It can be grounded on many different issues, 
from ideological differences to personal antagonism between countries’ leaders. It also includes 
aspects like trust and confidence between countries. 
 
Case Stage Code Factor 
GMS EC 1 1 Indochina was divided into three groups after II World War 
GMS EC 1 15 Reduction of political tensions in the region 
GMS EC 2 1 History of conflicts 
GMS EC 2 6 Absence of trust between countries 
GMS EC 3 1 Ideologically rivalry between countries (divided in 3) 
GMS EC 3 15 Border conflicts between Lao PDR and Thailand 
GMS EC 3 13 Thai military base near expected crossing border bridge 
GMS EC 4 1 Governments lacked trust on each other 
GMS EC 4 14 Countries gave different relative importance to each connection 
GMS EC 2 24 
Countries looked forward deepening regional economic 
cooperation in ASEAN 
GMS P 1 1 Indochina was divided into three groups after II World War 
GMS P 1 15 Reduction of political tensions in the region 
GMS P 3 5 Border disputes still remained 
GMS P 4 2 
Countries cooperation was influenced by governments’ 
relations momentum 
GMS P 4 3 Management of common resources was still not well developed 
SIEPAC 1 5 Conflicts between countries due to aftermaths of Cold War 
SIEPAC 1 20 International actors intervened to foster pacification 
SIEPAC 2 2 Conflicts between countries still existing at that time 
SIEPAC 3 2 Conflicts between countries still existing at that time 
SIEPAC 3 5 
Countries didn’t have experience of effective functional 
cooperation 
SIEPAC 4 8 Foreign relations influenced by ideological differences 
Table 31 - Summary of factors: rivalry between countries 
 
8.2.1.2. Power imbalances:  
Differences in countries’ ability to exercise influence over other members and/or capture more 
benefits from projects. This derives in asymmetries in the relations. Those can come from military 
and/or economic differences, technological level, and geographical location among the member 
countries. 
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Case Stage Code Factor 
GMS EC 3 11 
Asymmetry in the value of Thailand-China trade over Lao-
Thailand and Lao-China 
SIEPAC 1 4 IADB became main/only donor in the region 
SIEPAC 2 6 Some countries could get more benefits than others 
Table 32 - Summary of factors: Power imbalances 
 
8.2.1.3. National institutional structure:  
Countries decision-making process for the internalization of regional level issues. It considers the 
pragmatism with those issues are considered. While in some cases, regional dimension is consider 
as a potential threat, in others, technical cooperation at regional level has some degree of autonomy. 
In that sense, it also includes the relative autonomy of state/public authorities, composed by 
bureaucrats, technocrats, and other public workers, respective to political power. 
 
Case Stage Code Factor 
GMS EC 1 3 
Military and defense concerns were priority over technical 
issues 
GMS EC 2 18 
Market transition in socialist and communist countries 
increased importance of international trade 
GMS P 1 3 
Military and defense concerns were priority over technical 
issues 
GMS P 2 15 
Introduction of market reforms were unlikely in most of 
countries 
SIEPAC 1 2 Countries tended to consider power sector as technical issue 
Table 33 - Summary of factors: National institutional structure 
 
8.2.1.4. Overall stability of the countries:  
Level of influence that relevant national actors, like civil society groups or private investors, can 
exercise on government decision making process. In that sense, it includes also factors affecting 
the stability of the governments as well as new strategic positions of the countries, in consideration 
with regional cooperation. 
Case Stage Code Factor 
GMS EC 1 14 Transition towards market economies after Cold War 
GMS EC 2 5 National budgets constrained by the Asian Financial Crisis 
GMS P 1 14 Transition towards market economies after Cold War 
SIEPAC 1 3 Debt crisis affected every Central American country 
Table 34 - Summary of factors: Overall stability of the countries 
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8.2.2. Sectorial categories: 
Particular characteristics of the sectors also play an important role in defining the context that 
influence the regional cooperation process.  
8.2.2.1. National security concerns:  
Strategic importance of the sector for the governments involved. 
 
Case Stage Code Factor 
GMS EC 2 29 Major countries (Thailand) looked for new trading opportunities 
more intensively 
GMS EC 4 18 Removal of non-physical barriers would include national 
strategic issues 
GMS P 2 4 Countries concerned about the stability of their national supply 
GMS P 3 2 Countries didn't want to depend on single source 
GMS P 4 1 Countries main concern was security of national supply 
SIEPAC 1 17 Strengthening of bilateral interconnections was stopped by 
governments because of national security concerns 
SIEPAC 2 13 Tensions between countries could affect entire region 
SIEPAC 4 20 Countries' concerns about losing control over regional market 
Table 35 - Summary of factors: National security concerns 
 
8.2.2.2. Institutional integration:  
Level of concentration of the decision-making over a sector in particular. These responsibilities 
can be shared across different departments, with different level of influence, or tend to be unified 
under an umbrella authority (or state-owned company) 
Case Stage Code Factor 
GMS EC 1 8 Transport and trade involved several different departments and 
authorities 
GMS EC 2 4 Different national authorities in charge of transport, trade, and 
border crossing procedures 
GMS EC 4 11 Regulations involving different ministries and authorities 
GMS P 1 19 Relative autonomy of EGAT and EDL 
GMS P 2 3 State-owned companies were the main actors in each country 
GMS P 3 14 EGAT is in charge of ensure national power supply 
GMS P 4 4 State-owned companies are main stakeholders in each country 
SIEPAC 1 8 State-owned companies built national grids until borders 
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SIEPAC 1 12 State-owned companies had great autonomy of action 
SIEPAC 2 10 State-owned companies had major influence in their respective 
national sectors 
SIEPAC 4 2 State-owned companies were in charge of national systems 
Table 36 - Summary of factors: Institutional integration 
 
8.2.2.3. Existing cooperation:  
Level of technical cooperation pre-existing to the project 
 
Case Stage Code Factor 
GMS EC 1 9 No talks between technical bodies on regional transportation 
GMS EC 1 5 Previous cooperation institutions paralyzed 
GMS EC 1 6 Trading between countries reduced to minimum 
GMS EC 2 7 Numerous non-physical trade barriers still remained 
GMS EC 3 2 No technical bodies for regional transport/trade 
GMS EC 3 4 Minimal formal trading between countries 
GMS EC 3 7 No studies from Lao authorities about potential positive impact 
of increasing China – Thailand trade 
GMS P 1 5 Previous cooperation institutions paralyzed 
GMS P 1 18 Commitment from EGAT and EDL, with existing hydro power 
purchase agreement 
GMS P 2 6 Most of state-owned utilities without previous agreements 
GMS P 3 1 MOUs have been signed between neighbouring countries 
GMS P 3 6 Thai and Myanmar utilities have been working together at 
different institutions 
SIEPAC 1 11 State-owned companies built weak bilateral interconnections 
without need of political agreement 
SIEPAC 1 13 State-owned companies created regional technical organization 
(CEAC) 
SIEPAC 1 26 Full regional consensus became bases of cooperation 
SIEPAC 3 1 State-owned companies had a history of cooperation 
SIEPAC 3 11 CEAC was the main actor for the promotion of the regional 
project 
Table 37 - Summary of factors: Existing cooperation 
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8.2.2.4. Shared value of regional economies of scale:  
Commonly understanding of the potential complementarities between countries 
Case Stage Code Factor 
GMS EC 1 10 Civil servants didn’t appreciate how closer regional cooperation 
could benefit the GMS 
GMS EC 1 12 Road development in the countries didn’t include regional 
connectivity 
GMS EC 4 2 Countries had very different national regulations 
GMS P 2 1 Lack of previous studies on regional power trade 
GMS P 3 3 Lao PDR’s main objective has been to increase its generation 
capacity 
SIEPAC 1 9 Impossibility to continue public funding of sector 
SIEPAC 1 10 Seasonal surplus of capacity appeared in some countries 
SIEPAC 1 15 State-owned companies were initially interested only in 
regional infrastructure 
SIEPAC 1 16 State-owned companies identified potential benefits from 
economies of scale 
SIEPAC 1 19 Individual markets too small for being profitable 
SIEPAC 1 22 CEAC became active supporter of connectivity 
SIEPAC 2 1 Countries with different levels of reform 
SIEPAC 2 11 Major reforms would be needed in some countries 
SIEPAC 1 15 State-owned companies were initially interested only in 
regional infrastructure 
Table 38 - Summary of factors: Shared value of regional economies of scale 
 
8.2.2.5. Publicness:  
Overall level of public ownership, or control executed by the central government or public 
authorities over the development of the particular sector. 
Case Stage Code Factor 
GMS EC 2 19 Transport operators complained about difficulties for crossing 
borders 
GMS EC 3 9 Roads to be utilized by private operators 
GMS EC 4 5 Demand for corridors had been increasing rapidly 
SIEPAC 1 1 State-owned companies created to monopolize national sectors 
SIEPAC 3 4 State-owned companies were reluctant to lose control of their 
national sectors 
SIEPAC 4 15 Privatization of generation was progressing in the region 
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Table 39 - Summary of factors: Publicness 
 
8.3. Identification of contextual variables 
The categories identified in the previous section were found to correspond to relationships between 
stakeholders. This equivalence is explained below: 
 
Category of factors Stakeholders’ relation Description 
Rivalry between 
countries 
Government ↔ 
Government 
Rivalries between countries affect the will 
of countries to cooperate with each other 
Power imbalances 
Government ↔ 
Government 
Strong asymmetries in the relations 
between countries can make governments 
(of less powerful countries) reluctant to 
cooperate, so to protect their independence 
from the major power 
National institutional 
structure 
Government ↔ 
Technical body 
Countries with governments centralizing 
decision-making at the highest level (like 
authoritarian regimes) have a strong 
control of technical bodies, giving them 
less autonomy of operation 
Overall stability of the 
countries 
Government ↔ 
National actors 
Countries with low stability will have 
strongly influence national actors can have 
strong influence on governments’ policy 
decisions. And vice versa, when national 
actors are very strong, their influence over 
government can play against the overall 
stability 
National security 
concerns 
Government ↔ 
Government 
Governments will be reluctant to cooperate 
in those areas that they consider of 
strategic importance 
Institutional integration 
Government ↔ 
Technical body 
In sectors where the responsibilities are 
accumulated under a single institution, that 
technical body tend to enjoy a larger 
autonomy from government 
Existing cooperation 
Technical body ↔ 
Technical body 
The existence of technical cooperation 
between technical bodies represent a better 
mutual understanding between them.  
Shared value of regional 
economies of scale 
Technical body ↔ 
Technical body 
Technical bodies with fluent relation will 
better understand the mutual benefits that 
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the regional cooperation can bring (the 
regional economies of scale) 
Publicness 
Government ↔ 
National actors 
In sectors with a larger private 
participation, the position of the 
government would be more 
impressionable by national actors  
Figure 36 - Relationships between stakeholders corresponding to categories of factors 
 
The differences in these relations therefore represent differences in the contexts of the projects. 
- Government ↔ Government (Gov. ↔ Gov.): It indicates the will for cooperation across 
the member countries. 
 
- Government ↔ Technical body (Gov. ↔ T.B.): It indicates the autonomy and capacity of 
influence of the technical body over government’s decision making. 
 
- Technical body ↔ Technical body (T.B. ↔ T.B.): Trust between technical bodies indicates 
their ability to establish effective cooperation. 
 
- Government ↔ National actors (Gov. ↔ N.A.): It indicates the ability of central 
government to implement its agenda. 
 
The type of relations established between these stakeholders affects directly or indirectly the 
decision-making of each central government, determining their final behavior regarding the 
regional cooperation. In that sense, by looking to similarities in these relations between different 
projects, it is possible to assess the contextual similarities. A schematic diagram of this is provided 
below: 
 
Figure 37 - - Overview of the contextual variables (drawn by the author) 
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9. Building the Comparative framework 
This chapter builds a Comparative Framework based on the outputs of the previous chapters. To 
do so, first the contextual variables relative importance is evaluated for each of the stages. Then, 
each of the cases are also analyzed 
 
9.1. Contextual variables weight during the development process 
The first section of the chapter evaluates the weight that each contextual variable has in each stage 
for every case study. This is done through the sum of the weight of the factors associated with each 
contextual variable (measured at chapter 5, 6 and 7). This is done in order to compare the relative 
weight38 of each variable during the development process of the projects.  
 
9.1.1. GMS Economic Corridors 
 
9.1.1.1. Stage 1 
Stage Code Factor Weight Category 
Contextual 
variable 
Total 
1 1 Indochina was divided into three groups 
after II World War 
3 
Rivalry between 
countries 
Gov. 
↔ 
Gov. 
4 
1 16 Reduction of political tensions in the 
region 
1 
Rivalry between 
countries 
1 14 Transition towards market economies 
after Cold War 
3 
Overall stability of 
the countries 
Gov. ↔ 
N.A. 
3 
1 3 Military and defense concerns were 
priority over technical issues 
5 
National institutional 
structure 
Gov. 
↔ 
T.B. 
8 
1 8 Transport and trade involved several 
different departments and authorities 
3 
Institutional 
integration 
1 9 No talks between technical bodies on 
regional transportation 
5 Existing cooperation 
T.B. 
↔ 
T.B. 
9 
1 5 Previous cooperation institutions 
paralyzed 
1 Existing cooperation 
1 6 Trading between countries reduced to 
minimum 
3 Existing cooperation 
Table 40 - GMS EC, evaluation of contextual variables Stage 1 
 
                                                 
 
38 The explanation for the weigh of each factor is provided in the chapers 5.7, 6.6, and 7.5 respectively for the cases 
of GMS Economic Corridors, SIEPAC, and GSms Power Sector Cooperation 
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9.1.1.2. Stage 2 
Stage Code Factor Weight Category 
Contextual 
variable 
Total 
2 1 History of conflicts 1 Rivalry between 
countries 
Gov. 
↔ 
Gov. 
14 
2 6 Absence of trust between countries 3 Rivalry between 
countries 
2 24 Countries looked forward deepening 
regional economic cooperation in 
ASEAN 
5 
Rivalry between 
countries 
2 29 Major countries (Thailand) looked for 
new trading opportunities more 
intensively 
5 
National security 
concerns 
2 5 National budgets constrained by the 
Asian Financial Crisis 
1 Overall stability of 
the countries 
Gov. 
↔ 
N.A. 
4 
2 19 Transport operators complained about 
difficulties for crossing borders 
3 
Publicness 
2 18 Market transition in socialist and 
communist countries increased 
importance of international trade 
3 
National institutional 
structure Gov. 
↔ 
T.B. 
8 
2 4 Different national authorities in charge 
of transport, trade, and border crossing 
procedures 
5 
Institutional 
integration 
2 7 Numerous non-physical trade barriers 
still remained 
3 
Existing cooperation 
T.B. ↔ 
T.B. 
3 
Table 41 - GMS EC, evaluation of contextual variables Stage 2 
 
9.1.1.3. Stage 3 
Stage Code Factor Weight Category Contextual 
variable 
Total 
3 1 Ideologically rivalry between countries 
(divided in 3) 
1 Rivalry between 
countries 
Gov.  
↔  
Gov. 
12 
3 15 Border conflicts between Lao PDR and 
Thailand 
5 Rivalry between 
countries 
3 13 Thai military base near expected 
crossing border bridge 
1 Rivalry between 
countries 
3 11 Asymmetry in the value of Thailand-
China trade over Lao-Thailand and Lao-
China 
5 Power imbalances 
3 9 Roads to be utilized by private operators 3 Publicness Gov. ↔ 
N.A. 
3 
3 2 No technical bodies for regional 
transport/trade 
3 Existing cooperation T.B.  
↔  
T.B. 
7 
3 4 Minimal formal trading between 
countries 
1 Existing cooperation 
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3 7 No studies from Lao authorities about 
potential positive impact of increasing 
China – Thailand trade 
3 Existing cooperation 
Table 42 - GMS EC, evaluation of contextual variables Stage 3 
 
9.1.1.4. Stage 4 
Stage Code Factor Weight Category Contextual 
variable 
Total 
4 1 Governments lacked trust on each other 3 Rivalry between 
countries 
Gov.  
↔  
Gov. 
9 
4 14 Countries gave different relative 
importance to each connection 
3 Rivalry between 
countries 
4 18 Removal of non-physical barriers would 
include national strategic issues 
3 National security 
concerns 
4 5 Demand for corridors had been 
increasing rapidly 
1 Publicness Gov. ↔ 
N.A. 
1 
4 11 Regulations involving different 
ministries and authorities 
5 Institutional 
integration 
Gov. ↔ 
T.B. 
5 
4 2 Countries had very different national 
regulations 
3 Shared value of 
regional economies of 
scale 
T.B. ↔ 
T.B. 
3 
Table 43 - GMS EC, evaluation of contextual variables Stage 4 
 
9.1.1.5. Summary 
GMS EC Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Gov. ↔ Gov. 4 14 12 9 
Gov. ↔ T.B. 8 8 0 5 
T.B. ↔ T.B. 9 3 7 3 
Gov. ↔ N.A. 3 4 3 1 
Table 44 - GMS EC, evaluation of contextual variables Summary 
 
9.1.2. SIEPAC 
9.1.2.1. Stage 1 
Stage Code Factor Weight Category Contextual 
variable 
Total 
1 4 IADB became main/only donor in 
the region 
1 Power imbalances Gov.  
↔  
Gov. 
6 
1 5 Conflicts between countries due to 
aftermaths of Cold War 
1 Rivalry between 
countries 
236 
 
1 17 Strengthening of bilateral 
interconnections was stopped by 
governments because of national 
security concerns 
3 National security 
concerns 
1 20 International actors intervened to 
foster pacification 
1 Rivalry between 
countries 
1 1 State-owned companies created to 
monopolize national sectors 
1 Publicness Gov.  
↔  
N.A. 
2 
1 3 Debt crisis affected every Central 
American country 
1 Overall stability of 
the countries 
1 2 Countries tended to consider 
power sector as technical issue 
3 National 
institutional 
structure 
Gov.  
↔  
T.B. 
11 
1 8 State-owned companies built 
national grids until borders 
3 Institutional 
integration 
1 12 State-owned companies had great 
autonomy of action 
5 Institutional 
integration 
1 9 Impossibility to continue public 
funding of sector 
1 Shared value of 
regional economies 
of scale 
T.B.  
↔  
T.B. 
19 
1 10 Seasonal surplus of capacity 
appeared in some countries 
1 Shared value of 
regional economies 
of scale 
1 11 State-owned companies built weak 
bilateral interconnections without 
need of political agreement 
1 Existing 
cooperation 
1 13 State-owned companies created 
regional technical organization 
(CEAC) 
1 Existing 
cooperation 
1 15 State-owned companies were 
initially interested only in regional 
infrastructure 
3 Shared value of 
regional economies 
of scale 
1 16 State-owned companies identified 
potential benefits from economies 
of scale 
5 Shared value of 
regional economies 
of scale 
1 19 Individual markets too small for 
being profitable 
3 Shared value of 
regional economies 
of scale 
1 22 CEAC became active supporter of 
connectivity 
3 Shared value of 
regional economies 
of scale 
1 26 Full regional consensus became 
bases of cooperation 
1 Existing 
cooperation 
Table 45 - SIEPAC, evaluation of contextual variables Stage 1 
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9.1.2.2. Stage 2 
Stage Code Factor Weight Category Contextual 
variable 
Total 
2 2 Conflicts between countries still 
existing at that time 
5 Rivalry between 
countries 
Gov.  
↔  
Gov. 
9 
2 6 Some countries could get more 
benefits than others 
1 Power imbalances 
2 13 Tensions between countries could 
affect entire region 
3 National security 
concerns 
2 10 State-owned companies had major 
influence in their respective national 
sectors 
5 Institutional 
integration 
Gov. ↔ 
T.B. 
5 
2 1 Countries with different levels of 
reform 
1 Shared value of 
regional economies 
of scale 
T.B.  
↔  
T.B. 
2 
2 11 Major reforms would be needed in 
some countries 
1 Shared value of 
regional economies 
of scale 
Table 46 - SIEPAC, evaluation of contextual variables Stage 2 
 
 
9.1.2.3. Stage 3 
Stage Code Factor Weight Category Contextual 
variable 
Total 
3 2 Conflicts between countries still 
existing at that time 
3 Rivalry between 
countries 
Gov.  
↔  
Gov. 
8 
3 5 Countries didn’t have experience of 
effective functional cooperation 
5 Rivalry between 
countries 
3 4 State-owned companies were 
reluctant to lose control of their 
national sectors 
1 Publicness Gov. ↔ 
N.A. 
1 
3 1 State-owned companies had a history 
of cooperation 
3 Existing 
cooperation 
T.B.  
↔  
T.B. 
8 
3 11 CEAC was the main actor for the 
promotion of the regional project 
5 Existing 
cooperation 
Table 47 - SIEPAC, evaluation of contextual variables Stage 3 
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9.1.2.4. Stage 4 
Stage Code Factor Weight Category Contextual 
variable 
Total 
4 8 Foreign relations influenced by 
ideological differences 
3 Rivalry between 
countries 
Gov.  
↔  
Gov. 
8 
4 20 Countries' concerns about losing control 
over regional market 
5 National security 
concerns 
4 15 Privatization of generation was 
progressing in the region 
1 Publicness Gov. ↔ 
N.A. 
1 
4 2 State-owned companies were in charge 
of national systems 
5 Institutional 
integration 
Gov. ↔ 
T.B. 
5 
Table 48 - SIEPAC, evaluation of contextual variables Stage 4 
 
9.1.2.5. Summary 
SIEPAC Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Gov. ↔ Gov. 6 9 8 8 
Gov. ↔ T.B. 11 5 0 5 
T.B. ↔ T.B. 19 2 8 0 
Gov. ↔ N.A. 2 0 1 1 
Table 49 - SIEPAC, evaluation of contextual variables Summary 
 
9.1.3. GMS Power Cooperation 
9.1.3.1. Stage 1 
Stage Code Factor Weight Category Contextual 
variable 
Total 
1 1 Indochina was divided into three 
groups after II World War 
3 Rivalry between 
countries 
Gov.  
↔  
Gov. 
4 
1 15 Reduction of political tensions in 
the region 
1 Rivalry between 
countries 
1 14 Transition towards market 
economies after Cold War 
3 Overall stability of 
the countries 
Gov. ↔ 
N.A. 
3 
1 3 Military and defense concerns were 
priority over technical issues 
5 National 
institutional 
structure 
Gov.  
↔  
T.B. 
10 
1 19 Relative autonomy of EGAT and 
EDL 
5 Institutional 
integration 
1 5 Previous cooperation institutions 
paralyzed 
1 Existing 
cooperation 
T.B.  
↔ 
6 
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1 18 Commitment from EGAT and EDL, 
with existing hydro power purchase 
agreement 
5 Existing 
cooperation 
T.B. 
Table 50 - GMS Power Cooperation, evaluation of contextual variables Stage 1 
 
9.1.3.2. Stage 2 
Stage Code Factor Weight Category Contextual 
variable 
Total 
2 4 Countries concerned about the 
stability of their national supply 
5 National security 
concerns 
Gov. ↔ 
Gov. 
5 
2 3 State-owned companies were the 
main actors in each country 
3 Institutional 
integration 
Gov.  
↔  
T.B. 
6 
2 15 Introduction of market reforms were 
unlikely in most of countries 
3 National 
institutional 
structure 
2 1 Lack of previous studies on regional 
power trade 
1 Shared value of 
regional economies 
of scale 
T.B.  
↔  
T.B. 
2 
2 6 Most of state-owned utilities 
without previous agreements 
1 Existing 
cooperation 
Table 51 - GMS Power Cooperation, evaluation of contextual variables Stage 2 
 
9.1.3.3. Stage 3 
Stage Code Factor Weight Category Contextual 
variable 
Total 
3 2 Countries didn't want to depend on 
single source 
5 National security 
concerns 
Gov.  
↔  
Gov. 
6 
3 5 Border disputes still remained 1 Rivalry between 
countries 
3 14 EGAT is in charge of ensure 
national power supply 
3 Institutional 
integration 
Gov. ↔ 
T.B. 
3 
3 1 MOUs have been signed between 
neighbouring countries 
3 Existing 
cooperation 
T.B.  
↔  
T.B. 
7 
3 3 Lao PDR’s main objective has been 
to increase its generation capacity 
3 Shared value of 
regional economies 
of scale 
3 6 Thai and Myanmar utilities have 
been working together at different 
institutions 
1 Existing 
cooperation 
Table 52 - GMS Power Cooperation, evaluation of contextual variables Stage 3 
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9.1.3.4. Stage 4 
Stage Code Factor Weight Category Contextual 
variable 
Total 
4 1 Countries main concern was 
security of national supply 
3 National security 
concerns 
Gov.  
↔  
Gov. 
7 
4 2 Countries cooperation was 
influenced by governments’ 
relations momentum 
1 Rivalry between 
countries 
4 3 Management of common resources 
was still not well developed 
3 Rivalry between 
countries 
4 4 State-owned companies are main 
stakeholders in each country 
5 Institutional 
integration 
Gov. ↔ 
T.B. 
5 
Table 53 - GMS Power Cooperation, evaluation of contextual variables Stage 4 
 
9.1.3.5. Summary 
GMS P Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Gov. ↔ Gov. 4 5 6 7 
Gov. ↔ T.B. 10 6 3 5 
T.B. ↔ T.B. 6 2 7 0 
Gov. ↔ N.A. 3 0 0 0 
Table 54 - GMS Power Cooperation, evaluation of contextual variables Summary 
 
9.1.4. Comparative analysis 
The comparative analysis of the previous results find similarities between the three cases. In all of 
them, for each stage it was found that some contextual variables are dominant over the others. In 
that sense, the main contextual variables for each stage are: 
 Stage 1: T.B. ↔ T.B.; Gov. ↔ T.B. 
 Stage 2: Gov. ↔ Gov.; Gov. ↔ T.B. 
 Stage 3: T.B. ↔ T.B.; Gov. ↔ Gov. 
 Stage 4: Gov. ↔ Gov.; Gov. ↔ T.B. 
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Figure 38 - Main contextual variables 
 
9.2. Contextual variables evaluation 
The contextual variables are evaluated for the three case studies based on the understanding 
derived from the analysis. 
Category 
Cont. 
var. 
Evaluation GMS-EC SIEPAC GMS-P 
Rivalry between 
countries 
Gov. 
↔ 
Gov. 
Will for cooperation: 
Common level of 
cooperation across the 
member countries 
Reluctant Reluctant Reluctant Power imbalances 
National security 
concerns 
National institutional 
structure 
Gov. 
↔ 
Weak 
T.B. 
Strong 
T.B. 
Strong 
T.B. 
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Institutional 
integration 
T.B. Strength of T.B.: 
Autonomy and 
capacity of influence  
Existing cooperation 
T.B. 
↔ 
T.B. 
Trust between T.B.: 
Ability of T.B. to 
establish effective 
cooperation 
Mistrust Trust Mistrust Shared value of 
regional economies 
of scale 
Overall stability of 
the countries Gov. 
↔ 
N.A. 
Strength of Gov.: 
Level of gov. ability 
to implement their 
agenda 
Strong Weak Strong 
Publicness 
 
9.3. The Comparative Framework 
Combining the outputs of the two previous sections, the Comparative Framework is built including 
the main contextual variables for each stage, and their possible values. As it will be explained in 
the last chapter, no other options are considered at this moment because of the limitation of the 
cases analyzed to serve as “pool of cases”, nevertheless, the arrows included express the need to 
consider different variations and degrees on the evaluation of the variables, particularly for the 
future development of the mentioned pool of cases. 
 
Figure 39 - The Comparative Framework, visualization  
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10. Utilization of the Comparative Framework 
This chapter serves to provide an understanding of the methodology for the application of the 
comparative framework.  
 
10.1. Practical case: Moving the GMS-Power cooperation to the stage 4 
The Stage 4 of the GMS Power Cooperation program is selected as the practical case. As 
mentioned in chapter 7, currently the project is facing difficulties to progress in its institutional 
construction. The lack of progress, and its contrast with the progress in the construction of 
generation power plants has been mentioned in different studies. ADB (2013) describes this 
situation as follows: 
 
“There has been remarkable progress in the GMS energy sector over the past 2 decades. 
Considerable success was also achieved in rolling out rural electrification in member 
countries. Rapid provision of large-scale, high-volume national grid systems; successful 
mobilization of indigenous resources; and the beginnings of cross-country trade also took 
place. These successes have been achieved mainly at the national level. Despite 
considerable political pronouncements that recognize the imperatives of regional 
cooperation, progress has not matched national achievements. The high-volume trans-
boundary connections that have been made to date within the GMS do not achieve a true 
interconnection of systems with synchronous operations, but are simply an extension of 
the national grids of the large- consuming countries into the territories of producers of 
(mainly) hydropower” 
ADB (2013), “Assessment of the GMS Energy Sector Development” 
 
In this sense, this chapter has two objectives. First one is to serve as an example of utilization and 
therefore serve as a guideline for future users. The second objective is to provide a small example 
of how the policy implications can be derived even from a limited number of cases. 
 
10.1.1. Overview of the utilization 
The utilization of the Comparative Framework is divided into 5 steps: 
- Step 1, Input of information into comparative framework: Incorporation of the existing 
cases according to the evaluation of the contextual variables and the stage, or stages, of 
interest. 
 
- Step 2, Identification of most relevant cases: Through the evaluation of the target project, 
the most relevant cases are identified based on contextual similarities. 
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- Step 3, Comparison of actions: Actions realized, if any, in target project are compared with 
those realized in the similar cases identified in the previous step. This would help to 
discover alternative approaches not yet attempted. 
 
- Step 4, Identification of actions: Based on the particular understanding of the target project, 
experts from Multilateral Development Bank are able to realize an evaluation of the 
feasibility and potential impact of the alternative approached identified in Step 3.  
 
- Step 5, Policy implications: Finally, experts from Multilateral Development Bank will 
adapt the actions to the target project. This process for transfer of lessons can be conducted 
in collaboration with the experts from the relevant source cases as well as with local and/or 
regional stakeholders. 
 
 
Figure 40 - Comparative Framework, overview of utilization 
 
10.1.1.1. Step 1: Input of information into the comparative framework 
The pool of cases would contain at this moment the two cases studies of GMS Economic Corridors 
(GMS-EC) and SIEPAC, the GMS Power Cooperation (GMS Pow.) is also introduced as “Target”. 
Since for this practical case, only the Stage 4 is of interest, only which is considered here.   
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10.1.1.2. Step 2: Identification of most relevant cases 
By looking into the Comparative Framework Stage 4 with the input of the available cases and the 
Target case, it is identified that the most relevant case for this practice is SIEPAC. 
 
 
 
10.1.1.3. Step 3, Comparison of actions 
The actions identified for the Stage 4 of SIEPAC are contrasted with those tried at the Target 
(GMS-Power).  
 
Action Tried 
Market + infrastructure approach was agreed X 
Framework Treaty was written to allow regional market X 
Regional operator and regulator were created X 
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Regional operator composed by representatives from state-owned companies X 
Regional regulator composed of politically appointed representatives X 
Investments focused on regional transmission X 
Regional transactions allowed with temporal measures X 
RMER designed for future regional market operation X 
Regional investors got interested in power generation opportunities ○ 
Interconnections with Mexico and Colombia were accepted △ 
II Protocol was signed to enforce RMER X 
II Protocol incorporated creation of political supervisory body △ 
Economic and managerial autonomy of regional regulator was agreed X 
 
 
10.1.1.4. Step 4, Identification/evaluation of actions 
The actions with a positive impact in SIEPAC (+) were identified (the evaluation is made base on 
the causality analysis by looking their influence in the process). The actions with a positive impact 
(in SIEPAC) are then evaluated for feasibility in GMS Power. At this moment is when the expertise 
of the MDB officials is required.  
 
Action Likely 
Market + infrastructure approach 
was agreed 
X 
Governments and technical bodies have already 
expressed a lack of interest in the development of a 
regional power market (at least at this moment). 
Even at national level, countries lack market 
structures 
Framework Treaty was written to 
allow regional market 
△ 
Although the actual IGA does not explicitly mention 
the regional power market, it does not deny it. In 
fact, the last stage of the GMS gradual plan includes 
such possibility. Therefore including it in a more 
formal agreement would be possible (although due 
to the lack of interest in the market approach, could 
be considered complicated) 
Regional operator and regulator 
were created 
△ 
A regional operator, or close institution, could be 
possible (in fact RPCC is supposed to fulfill such 
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role in the near future). A regional regulator seems 
more unlikely 
Regional operator composed by 
representatives from state-owned 
companies 
○ 
The constitution of the regional operator with 
personnel coming from state-owned companies 
should be possible 
Regional regulator composed by 
politically appointed 
representatives 
△ 
There are no negative indications that a regional 
regulator would be impossible, nevertheless, there 
are also no positive signals about its likeliness 
Investments focused on regional 
transmission 
△ 
Although it could be possible to increase the 
investments on regional transmission lines, it seems 
unlikely that would be strongly supported by state-
owned companies. A more active involvement of 
ADB or an approach looking for the strengthening 
of national grids (particularly important in Lao 
PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia) could be possible 
Regional transactions allowed 
with temporal measures 
○ 
The agreement for the Lao – Singapore transmission 
has proved the possibility of this (although it is 
needed to note the low capacity agreed). In any 
case, there seems to be no obstacle among countries 
for the creation of a prototype agreement 
RMER designed for future 
regional market operation 
△ 
The agreement on a common regulation seems to be 
further in time. Before it, there would be a need to 
harmonize systems and procedures among state-
owned companies 
Regional investors got interest in 
power generation opportunities 
○ That action has already been in place from the early 
beginning 
Interconnections with Mexico 
and Colombia were accepted ○ 
Neighboring countries, as Singapore, have shown 
some interest, and from member countries, no voice 
has been raised against this 
II Protocol was signed to enforce 
RMER 
X 
The enforcement of a regional regulation at this 
moment seems impossible 
II Protocol incorporated creation 
of political supervisory body 
△ 
Although possible, it doesn’t seem to be a demand 
for it 
Economic and managerial 
autonomy of regional regulator 
was agreed 
△ 
The establishment of a regional regulator seems 
complicated, even more to consider it with large 
autonomy 
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Action Tried Impact Likely 
Market + infrastructure approach was agreed X + X 
Framework Treaty was written to allow regional market X + △ 
Regional operator and regulator were created X + △ 
Regional operator composed by representatives from state-
owned companies 
X + ○ 
Regional regulator composed by politically appointed 
representatives 
X - △ 
Investments focused on regional transmission X + △ 
Regional transactions allowed with temporal measures X + ○ 
RMER designed for future regional market operation X + △ 
Regional investors got interest in power generation 
opportunities 
○ +  
Interconnections with Mexico and Colombia were accepted △ + ○ 
II Protocol was signed to enforce RMER X + X 
II Protocol incorporated creation of political supervisory body △ + △ 
Economic and managerial autonomy of regional regulator was 
agreed 
X + △ 
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10.1.1.5. Step 5, Proposal of policy implications / action plan to implement 
Based on the previous analyses, and in the deep understanding of the target case, policy proposals 
can be developed. 
 
Action Policy proposal 
Regional operator composed by 
representatives from state-owned 
companies 
Establish RPCC as a permanent institution with 
representatives from national TSOs 
Regional transactions allowed with 
temporal measures 
Develop a prototypal agreement for utilization of third 
country grid 
Interconnections with Mexico and 
Colombia were accepted 
Actively promote interconnections with ASEAN countries 
(Singapore) as well as look for connections with South 
Asia (Bangladesh, India) and rest of China 
Economic and managerial 
autonomy of regional regulator was 
agreed 
Secure the independence of RPCC to be able to mediate in 
disputes 
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11. Conclusion 
This research first objective is the identification of variables to explain contextual influence on the 
development of regional infrastructures. This has been done through the comparative analysis of 
three case studies which combine a large level of integration and differences in sectors (road and 
power) and region (South East Asia or Indochina Peninsula, and Central America). The level of 
integration was evaluated based on a development process proposed through the combination of 
related research. The five stages are (i) national stakeholders’ agreement, (ii) high level political 
agreement, (iii) physical construction, (iv) institutional construction, and (v) harmonization. The 
cases selected are GMS Economic Corridors, Power Sector Integration in Central America 
(SIEPAC), and GMS Power Cooperation Program.  
Input information has been obtained for each case from interview surveys, official reports, external 
research, and media sources.  For the three projects, each of the stages has been analyzed through 
causality analysis in order to identify the relevant factors and actions. For each factor identified 
has been found its relative impact or weight. Except for the stage (v), which has been found with 
insufficient evidence, numerous factors have been obtained across nine categories, including both 
sectorial and regional aspects. These categories had been found to correspond to relations between 
stakeholders, namely governments, technical bodies and national actors. Hence, the contextual 
variables identified are a relation between governments (Gov. ↔ Gov.), governments and technical 
bodies (Gov. ↔ T.B.), technical bodies among them (T.B. ↔ T.B.) and governments and national 
actors (Gov. ↔ N.A.). The difference on these contextual variables serves for explaining the 
differences in context. 
The second part of the research builds a Comparative Framework for regional infrastructures 
projects. This was initially done by identifying the dominant contextual variables for each stage. 
For that, the relative weight of each of them was calculated accordingly to the weight of their 
related factors. It was found that the dominant contextual variables were not the same throughout 
the process for any of the three cases. Nevertheless, the comparison between projects showed 
similar patterns for each stage. Based on that, the most dominant contextual variables were selected 
for each stage. For stage 1, (Gov. ↔ T.B.) and (T.B. ↔ T.B.); stage 2, (Gov. ↔ Gov.) and (Gov. 
↔ T.B.); stage 3, (Gov. ↔ Gov.) and (T.B. ↔ T.B.); and stage 4, (Gov. ↔ Gov.) and (Gov. ↔ 
T.B.). 
The third part provides a practical example for the utilization of the Comparative Framework for 
the stage (iv) of the GMS Power Cooperation program. The analysis has helped to identify the 
SIEPAC project as a relevant case study for that particular stage. Through the comparison and the 
understanding of the target case, four policy implications are derived: (a) establish RPCC as a 
permanent institution with representatives from national TSOs, (b) develop a prototypal agreement 
for utilization of third country grid, (c) actively promote interconnections with ASEAN countries 
(like Singapore) as well as look for connections with South Asia (Bangladesh, India) and rest of 
China, and (d) secure the independence of RPCC to be able to mediate in disputes. 
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11.1. Discussion and further work 
This research proposes a model that allows the identification of relevant existing regional 
infrastructures cases from which identify potential actions. Although using only three cases as a 
source of information, the Comparative Framework has been developed in order to be scalable, 
that is to be applicable to other regions and/or sectors. In fact, from its own design, the framework 
will increase its accuracy by the incorporation of more cases to the pool of cases.  
To test the possibility for its general application, the tentative results were discussed with officials 
from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). A positive feedback was received at that meeting. The 
note of the conversation can be found at [GMS-EC.III]. Novelty and relevance of the method were 
the two main aspects discussed, and  
- Relevance:  
a. The methodology proposed would be beneficial for them to extract lessons from 
most advanced programs (GMS) to their other programs (CAREC, SASEC) 
i. “This would be quite useful for us, for probably to look back and try to 
extract lessons from our past engagement with the member countries in the 
GMS” 
 
b. The contextual variables selected are relevant for the understanding of the processes 
i. “I think that your analysis is quite relevant, this framework of looking at 
government to government and technical body to technical body 
relationships” 
 
c. The division of the framework in different stages is useful 
i. “I think it would be useful, particularly these tentative results, you have the 
framework to analyze for different stages” 
 
- Novelty: 
 
a. Methodology proposed will help to implement new systems for the  
i. How the parties interact and so what would be the relevant cases to look at” 
 
b. Currently, there is no systematic approach for the transfer of lessons, even inside 
the institution: 
 
i. Actually, some staff move from one region into another and do basically the 
same stuff, so regional cooperation 
ii. But I would say that still this cross-learning is still not really happening at 
the level that is desirable 
 
The positive feedback from the experts, and real practitioners, about the relevance of the 
methodology and, especially, about the appropriateness of the components selected, provide an 
initial validation of the approach followed and of the results obtained. But for a more general 
utilization, the feasibility of its expansion beyond the limits of this research need to be also tested 
with practical cases. For that, we suggest the possibility of conducting similar case studies in other 
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regions (like other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia; then also Africa and Europe 
would provide valuable knowledge) as well as sectors (like aviation, telecommunications, and 
transboundary rivers). This will serve not only to identify the limits of the comparative framework, 
but also to (i) evaluate if the contextual variables are sufficient, or others would need to be included, 
as possible influence from extra-regional actors, or by regional organizations with own agenda; 
(ii) identify the limits of its possible utilization; (iii) increase the number of sources cases; and (iv) 
develop a more precise scale of values of the contextual variables, to allow a more accurate 
classification. The development of appropriate evaluation method would be an important element 
for this continuation. A possible suggestion would be to conduct this evaluation by multiple 
reviewers (two at minimum).  
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Appendixes: 
 
The following three appendixes include part of the source information utilized for the casual 
analysis of the three case studies. For each of them, meeting notes and/or transcriptions of the 
interviews conducted are included, similarly a summary of relevant news is provided for each 
project. 
 
This interviews followed a semi-structured format. The author collected the information discussed 
during the interview, and, based on that, wrote the interview notes. Therefore they should not be 
considered as direct transcriptions as a whole. In order to keep the privacy, some of them have 
been anonymized. Nevertheless, the relevant information has been kept in order to understand the 
typology of stakeholder interviewee.  
 
It is also needed to have in consideration that the views provided by the interviewees do not 
represent the official views of each their respective organization.  
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A. Appendix on GMS Economic Corridors 
A.I. Interview notes on GMS-Economic Corridors 
A.I.I. GMS-EC.I 
Interviewee Masami Ishida 
Affiliation IDE-JETRO, Director General, Development Studies Center 
Date  February 5th, 2016 
 
1 Centralized versus decentralized countries: 
2 There is a first difference between the countries: 
3  Viet Nam and Lao PDR are decentralized countries 
4  Thailand and Cambodia centralized 
5  Myanmar originally centralized although now is changing 
6 In fact this has had influence in the relations between Thailand and Lao PDR for example 
7 Although, at the beginning of the GMS they were not that different. 
8  
9 Key persons in the GMS: 
10 Two persons have been important: 
11  Mr. Morita who was the person that started the GMS program 
12  Mr. Ronald Butiong, who started working for the GMS as consultant and then 
joined the ADB as staff. Currently working on CAREC. He was referred as the 
“database of GMS” 
13  
14 Principles for GMS: 
15 At the beginning of the program, ADB visited all the countries.  
16  Avoid ministers of foreign affairs: in order to avoid discussions too focus on 
sovereignty, or that poor relations between countries. At the very beginning, the 
persons involved were the ministries of economy 
17  “2+1” principle: there is no need for the 6 countries to agree for a project  
18  National projects with subregional impact should also be considered 
19  No written agreement or protocol: to avoid discussion about details or “how things 
were written”. In fact, there is no need to sign written agreements and with record 
of proceedings would be sufficient. 
20  No secretariat: to avoid again conflicts because of excessive formalism. Neither 
ADB is secretariat, it only gives administrative support 
21  Ownership belongs to countries: in fact ADB’s approval is not needed for a project 
to be done. Countries propose project and then there is a call for donors. ADB can 
be donor, but it is not a requirement. For example Australia funded the First 
Friendship Bridge over the Mekong or Japan has also give a lot of cooperation to 
the region, not only though JICA but also through special funds allocated at the 
ADB (trust fund?) 
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22  
23 Preliminary works to the GMS: 
24 At the time before the GMS, the ADB had problems to lend money to Viet Nam and Lao 
PDR 
25  Viet Nam: Until 1986 it was linked to agreement with the Soviet Union. Then, 
due to low oil prices, Soviet Union couldn’t support anymore Viet Nam, so this 
started to look for other sources. There was a change in Viet Nam’s foreign policy 
to normalize relations with ASEAN and China. 
26  Cambodia: Unexpectedly for Mr. Morita, Cambodia’s Mr. Hun Sen well received 
the idea of regional cooperation. He considered that regional cooperation could 
help to reduce the conflicts with the neighbouring countries and therefore the cost 
of allocating military would be reduced. 
27 o It is important to note, that at that time the Vietnamese troops had left 
Cambodia. 
28 o This is an important reason why USA didn’t oppose the ADB helping to 
Viet Nam 
29 o ASEAN was also important at that time. At the end of the 80s, their 
economy was booming, so the next was to extend that to Indochina. 
Leaders from major countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand were 
looking for opportunities to invest (Thai PM: “from battlefield into market 
place” 
30  Myanmar: ADB couldn’t support Myanmar after the 1988’s affairs. All developed 
countries stopped assistance to Myanmar, and ADB had to follow that. 
31 o Against this background, Mr. Morita considered that, although ADB 
cannot assist Myanmar, it was important to have also Myanmar in the 
GMS programme (even though the strong opposition from the USA) 
32 o Other member countries didn’t oppose the incorporation of Myanmar 
33  Ministries of foreign affairs were not there -> all the members were 
positive 
34  Mr. Morita and ADB afraid Myanmar and Thailand cannot get 
each other, but nothing happened. 
35  
36 Agreement on the roads and corridors 
37  Roadmap after the 1st ministerial conference 
38 o After the 1st ministerial meeting a large number of projects were proposed. 
They were simply listed, after consultations, prioritization was done later 
based in principles agreed in the second meeting 
39 o There were many based on national interest, not regional benefit. 
40 o But that was not rational. During the second meeting some principles were 
agreed to prioritize projects. 
41  For example Phona Saly is not a regional project, and it has not 
been done. 
42  
43  North-South Economic Corridor: 
44 o Opposition from Lao PDR because of  
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45  Low national merit of a road without crossing to Vientiane  
46  Fears of possible military actions from Thailand using the Second 
Mekong bridge to be constructed 
47 o ADB asked Japan, not Thailand, to support the Second Mekong Bridge to 
Thailand 
48 o It took long time to convince Lao PDR. Mr. Morita directly tried to 
persuade Lao 
49  Even after retired he worked for the coordination 
50 o Chang Rai province influence: 
51  There were interest in the elimination of the opium cultivation 
52  But the province itself didn’t influence that much central 
government 
53  Organizations like United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNDOC) 
54  The king himself, actually his mother, directly supported free-drug 
area. 
55  Doi Chaang coffee 
56 o Link through Myanmar 
57  There were issues because of military group -> East Shan Army 
(Shan State Army) 
58  At beginning crossing through Myanmar was not possible 
because of that 
59  That link was actually built by “Asia World”, which is blacklisted 
company by the USA 
60  
61  East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC): 
62 o There were three road candidates: R12, R8 and R9 
63 o At the beginning of the 1990s, because of Thai politics (strong Senate), 
the decision was the R9.  
64  
65  Southern Economic Corridor (SEC): 
66 o At the beginning this was the one that created more interest because the 
economic benefits are larger. 
67 o It’s the one with less issues for the agreement on the route 
68  It connects three metropolitan areas: Ho Chi Minh, Phnom Penh 
and Bangkok 
69  It is a flat area 
70  
71  Economic corridors: 
72 o It was created by ADB 
73 o In 1998 all the countries liked the concept 
74 o It is important the belt-shape to represent that the effect can be broguth to 
other sectors 
75  To industries, trade and also people’s living standars by 
employment 
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76  
77 CBTA: 
78  Consultants proposed the agreement to Thailand, Lao PDR and Viet Nam 
79 o The name was basic framework (check in the book, p. 57) 
80 o Ministries of transport was in charge of the negotiation 
81  National Trade Facilitation Committees (NTFC) were created to 
coordinate with other ministries involved like finance, police & 
military, agriculture 
82 o CBTA was negotiated at the Subregional Transport Forum (STF) 
83  Ratification: 
84 o Annex 4 has been the more difficult to ratify 
85  Thailand and Myanmar agreed last year 
86  Initial Implementation of the CBTA program (IICBTA) 
87 o Lao Bao (Vietnam) – Dansavanh (Lao PDR)  
88  Triangle Areas: 
89 o They are schemes of cooperation between provincial governments 
90 o They can influence central governments 
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A.I.II. GMS-EC.II 
Interviewee Noritada Morita 
Affiliation Former ADB official 
Date  March 30th, 2016 
Place  Bangkok, Thailand 
 
This interview also corresponds to GMS-P.I 
  
 
 
1 Idea of technical level cooperation: 
2 The reason why in the GMS I refuse that is represented by the ministries of foreign affairs 
is because the nature of foreign affairs. They are not guided to put priority for the 
international cooperation. Collectively not.  
3 So when I started the sub-regional cooperation, GMS, I asked all the leaders “please do 
not put minister of foreign affairs as the coordination office, please remove them from the 
scheme”.  
4 It was very drastic. Any of the international affair or foreign affairs minister, any 
diplomatic aspects people just simply think without ta 
5 My view is different. If ministry of foreign affairs make the decision without looking at 
the benefit of the neighbor. The man like the president of Uruguay will never come out 
in that country. That is the point 
6 Now your be your benefit how its fits on my benefit, a bit of engineering is necessarily 
for what we call  Broad minding approach is needed. 
7 And foreign affairs people are not allowed initially to have such mind. They can exercise 
the flexibility only when they find that the things will not move. If they are flexible, they 
are at the end of the road. And then they look at what my neighbor needs, but that is too 
late. In that particular process of competition, you lose so many things and you can reach 
a point where there is not return. 
8 This was one of my philosophical principles, because this statement alone does not stand 
by itself. It works only in the foreign situation. 
9 When I started this region was in the middle of the Indochina war. My concern was when 
the Indochina sign the peace contract (peace accord or whatever), can they work together 
or not? 
10 My philosophy is that singing the paper for the peace is easy, but signing the peace of 
paper does not guarantee any peace at all. Next day you can bring out your gun and I can 
bring out my bread and we can start shooting each other. What I had to think was what 
assurance can we give among all these countries that are enemy today, tomorrow can they 
work together? Can they sleep together in the same bed? 
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11 No, because each insist on their own benefit of blaming each other about what happened 
in the war, not necessarily accepting others’ reasons and problems that other has to face 
because of me (it is happening between Japan and Korea).  
12 Now, in order to mitigate or neutralize such an behavior of the man that intend to insist 
that you are right and he is wrong we have to put the people into the peaceful stage of the 
mid. Means, in this particularly case, I have the following history that you may want to 
know: 
13  
14 Origins of the idea for the GMS: 
15 I held very uncomfortable in Laos. Laos is the other side of the Mekong River, just over 
there. I went there from Bangkok for an agreement. I went by plane, only one per day. 
And I stayed in the other side of the Mekong River, in the Laotian side.  
16 In the meeting, when the meeting finished when I came back to my hotel, I found that 
machine guns from the other side was hitting the next room of my hotel. Three artilleries 
went above over the hotel, fortunately. That artillery missed the hotel, but blasted behind 
the hotel. That was when I was the manager of this region. I was stretching my head, what 
area I have under my responsibility? How can I manage it? 
17 Then, that meeting I attended was of the Mekong River Commission. Instead of people 
talking about the agenda, both countries started criticizing the other size. Thai said oh yes, 
we shot Laotians because it was Laotians first who came to our size, so we just responded. 
Laotians said, no it is not true that we attacked, you attacked us first.  
18 The Thai delegation was there and all the international community members was there, 
and I was there representing the ADB. So, the entire meeting didn’t function blaming 
each other. And Western side was always siding to Thai side.  
19 Now, meeting was miserable and Western community was looking at the Laotians like 
they were the guilty of this incident. Nobody knows which side.  
20 When the meeting was over we went all to the airport and Laos, the hosting country and 
the chairman: “Nobody from Western side spoke to me because Thai delegation was 
there, they don’t want to be seen by Thai side that they were talking to Laos side”. 
21 Laotian side they have Laos and Viet Nam. Cambodia was unable to send their delegation 
because they were fighting with Pol Pot. So Laotians were in a way isolated.  
22 After the airport, this chairman from Laos’ side: Mr. Morita, you have seen, Laos is 
nobody is nobody in this world, everybody is siding to Western side, can you see how 
poor we are? 
23 We don’t have any sea, we have to rely on seaport from Thailand, who are not friendly at 
all. At that time they are exchanging the fire almost every day at the Mekong river.  
24 And Thai they were also under attention, because once they make a mistake, collectively 
they felt that soviet Russian together with its partners countries across the Mekong river. 
So I can also sympathize with the Thai side.  
25 The story of the Xeset hydropower dam 
26 But anyway, he said we are isolated, nobody is helping us, maybe it’s only ADB who can 
understand us.  
27 Now, we are international, Thailand is our shareholder, but your country is also our 
shareholder. For us, as long as you are our member country, whether than country A or 
country B is correct is not my issues. My issues is how to create the peace. So whatever I 
can do, please let me know.  
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28 He said, I like to have ADB financing for us to construct a hydro power project. I asked, 
what is the size? He said 1.5MW. Wow, so minor. 1.5 Mw I think if you have 1.5 MW is 
just good enough to give the lights for the Shangri-La hotel. They said after Laos 
revolution, 30-40 years, we are not heard by anybody.  
29 Even small hydropower, this one we need it. So that was the start point of GMS. 
30  I clearly remembered about that 40 years ago. He was almost crying I had to say yes or 
not. So I said sincerely, 1.5 Mw is too small. Your request is 1.5 MW is too small, it 
cannot produce economy.  
31 Unless you proof that it is financeable, it is very difficult for ADB to use the money that 
is donated by all the donors.  
32 To make the solution, answering to his question, what should we do then? Only way is 
you make this project at least 40-50 MW, then you might find some economy, Then he 
said: No Mr. Morita we don’t use such a big power station because we don’t have any 
industry to use the electricity so 1.5 is enough. So, how can we make this 40 50 MW when 
we don’t have no money?  
33 My question was very sympathetically frank, you sell the power to Thailand. His face was 
at least today we had a fight with Thailand, how can we sell. I know it, but if you want to 
make the project viable, you have to find the market. Whether this side of the river of the 
other it doesn’t matter, market is market. I was stupidly simple.  
34 Then I went back to Manila, my headquarters. I spoke to my boss, vice-president. He was 
laughing, he is an Indian. Do you know out board is reading English newspaper every 
day, they are not stupid, they know what is happening between two countries across the 
river. Every day they are shooting each other, how can you go to the board asking for the 
approval to expend the money when two countries are fighting. He was right, I was stupid, 
I knew it.  
35 But against that background, whether the country is smaller or big, they are our member 
countries, east or west doesn’t matter, they are member countries. So, we need to support.  
36 I said that according to my quick conversation with Thai government on the way back. 
They Thai government I don’t know but their electric authority: as long is power, whether 
it has yellow colour or red colour we buy it. Of course he know the problem involved. I 
feel pity of the other guys of the river, so small country.  
37 I talked with my boss that EGAT was sying, they can buy it. My boss said you don’t 
understand the situation, what I’m saying is that I need a written paper from Thai side that 
they will buy. You produce the official paper from Thai side that they will buy and then 
I can go to the board. But I cannot guarantee you that the board will say yes, because they 
are every day fighting. 
38 But Asians sometimes they can be illogical. Indians are very logical. What he said is true. 
When I was almost going out of his room, he said Mr. Morita come back. Are you sure 
that is what Thai electric authority said? Yes. Whatver you say I will try to get the written 
form from Thai government. I knew that I was going to be kick out of ADB if I failed. At 
least my vice president was watching me, because eit was my first year in the country 
department. Iwas in agriculture side. This was my first difficult case. Vice president said, 
good luck. 
39 I started talking to Laotians. We had almost 0 chances if you really convince Thai side. 
Thai side was seeing colour of electricity doesn’t matter, only price, how much do you 
need? How much do you like to charge? 
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40 After that we started doing all the calculations. I mobilized all my team and started the 
calculations. 
41 What Laotian side proposed I move back and for, 6 months I think to find the price that 
is attractive enough for Thailand to buy. The reason I was doing that, in a very hopeless 
situation was becayse before Laotian went into the eastern group. Late 1960s. Before 
Laotian revolution, western community have created SEATO (Southeas Asia Treaty 
Organization) just to settle down political tension from eastern side, they have given 
Laotians one hydropower project that is called Nan Theun 1. But that was before 
revolution, so it is really a different country. New Laos I was dealing with is a new Laos.  
42 The Laotian was saying that during our difficult times with Thailand we never cut off the 
power, we always sent the power. And Thai side they never get delayed in paying us. End 
of the month, in our New York account, the money was already there. That means 
between the two electric companies they have some trust. So, as long as this transmission 
line continue being active, I somehow feeling that we can re-activate. So many months 
back and for talking about the price.  
43 First thing I need was feasibility studies, and money for that. The first I need was a written 
form from Thai. That’s not easy. Our salary is always perform based. If you don’t perform 
your salary might go down. My Thai friend, gave a recommendation. Mr. Morita your 
name is always appearing in this newspaper. 
44 Mr. Morita no more you negotiate the price. It is beyond your capacity. I promise in a few 
months of time, our prime minister might be in Vientianne and your issue will be in his 
priority agenda. It is only prime minister who can decide the price. If you accept the price, 
whatever we agree I can do that, I can ask the prime minister to negotiate. I asked, do I 
have to follow the price two of you agree? Economical or not? If not economical I cannot 
agree. He said, shut up, that’s not important, important for us is to agree something for 
you, for ADB and for Asia. I said ok. Thank you, I will never try to intervene in the 
negotiation and I will try to persuade headquarters whatever the figure. 
45  
46 Moving forward after the Xeset hydropower 
47 Somehow things went ok. Xeset hydropower. Countries shooting each other, make a 
common hydropower dam. I felt at that time two things: 
48 (i) Unless we grab this opportunity, the Mekong countries will continue to fall 
apart 
49 (ii) Unless we do something similar to this, the countries which shooting until last 
night, can really become friendly tomorrow morning? Even if they sign a 
paper 
50 So I thought we have to do something 
51 That was the first motivation that I started thinking about the present form of GMS. 
52 I knew under the situation these two countries into one. And eventually all the countries 
of the Mekong that are divided into East and West is beyond to what I’m required to do. 
53 So I thought it was needed to create or provide a forum or platform where you can 
peacefully sit down and peacefully talk, and have a coffee together and smoke together 
54 This is how I was motivated. This is how to maintain the peace, once the peace comes to 
this region. 
55 That is all the purpose for ADB in Asia. 
56  
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57 If I do it in a very transparent way, simple being transparent would make the things fall 
done because I would have been a target of the both sides. I did it very quietly, and by 
that time I said China please come if the platform is ready. 
58 Thanks to the cooperation of my close friends I was able to do certain things. Friends 
from all the countries, although they are not officially friends, but through the ADB we 
are friends. This is what we called honest broker, goodwill broker. We are coordinator. 
Whether ADB can be trusted or not. 
59  
60 Why we included China that is out of issue. It was my invitation, not the request from 
China. The condition was that it should be Yunnan province. Yunnan province is large 
enough just to counterbalance all entire Mekong region population-wise. Moreover 67% 
of the water is through the Yunnan province. Large of Yunnan province used to be Tibet. 
Tibet is Mekong River. 
61  
62 We are trying to achieve the regional cooperation as a possible means to lead this region 
stability, political stability despite of East and West. 
63  
64 Now Thailand is the center of what is overseas investment today, prosperous. But during 
the Indochina war nobody paid any attention other than American army. You can see very 
prosperous Thailand. I think reason number (i) is Majesty and number (ii) regional 
stability. 
65 No more to China one, although people might not recall 
66 Thailand has proved that peace and leadership are important 
67 I was waiting among all the Indochina countries that Cambodia which is, still fighting to 
Pol Pot and Hun Sen. I was waiting until the peace come in Cambodia I present the entire 
project to the ADB as an official proposal to the board. 
68 Once the Cambodia peace was signed (that was 1991, October 23) Peace Accord was 
signed in Paris. Among the four parties – or four governments: Pol Pot group, Hun Sen, 
Song San, Prince Sijamuk 
69 Incidentally Prince Sijamuk sold itself to China. He was captured of the Pol Pot group 
and he was forced to agreed to stay in Beijing. 
70 Son San group was another group  
71 Hun Sen group. Mr. Hun Sen used to be under Pol Pot but he didn’t like Pol Pot. When 
he was said by Pol Pot to invade Viet Nam. He thought he was crazy, even Americans 
cannot defeat Viet Nam, how can I do that. So Hun Sen refused to use his army. Rather 
he crossed the border and make cese fire agreement with Viet Nam and he came back 
with the Viet Nam soldiers. What people didn’t like it, but he was at that time the strongest 
man. 
72 I had to deal with all these groups before I finalize GMS. I said everybody, all other 
countries have agreed, we are now waiting for Cambodia to get your settle peace, I am 
now here to ask you if you are interested in joining the GMS. That was my first visit to 
Cambodia after the peace accord in Paris. 
73 Among all the four representatives of the different parties. One thing that you may like to 
know is that the Paris Peace Accord which was agreed by all four parties and international 
community, for the first three years the country would be under the supervision of the 
OCDCD, representative of the United Nations. After that there will be national elections. 
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And chairman of that four group committee was prince Sinajuk and other three are 
members.  
74 For the first three years I have to see all the group. So anyway, the first time I met with 
them only one topic in the agenda: would you like to join the GMS? Other countries have 
already agreed, now we are waiting for you to come. Congratulations, you become now 
peace and we welcome you to join if you like.  
75 Everyone said yes, that is good idea. Even Pol Pot group said yes. The last man was Hun 
Sen, since then my relation with him was ok. He said oh, what you are saying are you 
proposing connecting the road and transmission line connected and communication 
aspects also interconnected and integrated? 
76 Yes, that is what we are proposed 
77 He said, ohh, this is very good. 
78 The reason he thought it was very good. He said this is good if I can be really friendly. If 
six countries worked together I don’t have to expend any budget on my defense, I can 
reduce the number of soldiers, I can move my soldiers from the border and I can reduce 
money from the budget, and that money I can spend on the poor people and on education 
of the young generation, they have suffered during the war time. So if peace comes, 
money is there for me to do this.  
79 Very impressive, young man, military man, no education but very clever. Other people 
were college graduate, they didn’t touch about that aspect. They are so tired about. But 
Hun Sen beyond that he mentioned this. 
80 Now Hun Sen is not popular among Western community. Maybe the reason is he is still 
close to Viet Nam what Americans and French dislike. 
81 This can be one of the reasons for value of the man. If peace comes I can save money and 
spend on the good of people. 
82 I thought this gentleman can become a good leader of the country. 
83 So at this moment GMS was ready 
84  
85 First conference in Manila: 
86 The first meeting in Manila, in 1992. It was not a big event at all. People didn’t understand 
what was naturally. To me it was a dream, countries shooting each other now coming to 
the Philippines which is outside the Indochina, in a way neutral.  
87 They didn’t talk each other in the meeting, they cannot speak English in a way. Only few 
people. So first day of the meeting was very stiff. 
88 The substance aspect after formality was discussed in the following manner. Because I 
didn’t have time to discuss in the bank. Some of the guidelines which I presented in the 
meeting I made conclusion only on the day I attend the meeting. Only in 5 minutes walk 
in the ADB building.  
89 (i) Greater Subregion Mekong, we have to give a name later on. If you pick up 
name first, there will be disagreement 
90  
91 (ii) Can we make this group without any charter? No agreement? Just by trust? I 
think this is first and last international group without a charter. People just 
don’t notice it, but it doesn’t have it. Because I know, it’s nicer to have but if 
you propose something among countries they are shooting each other until 
yesterday, nothing will be agreed. If country A said chapter 1 ok, country B 
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will say no. Going back to parliament, to cabinet and 1 year 2 years 3 years 
disappear. So I said we have to skip this very critical and unnecessary thing to 
avoid any conflict. So when the Indochina war was ended, I didn’t think I need 
to introduce new war that is battle. Because I knew they are all Buddhist 
countries and I think they are tired of fighting 30 years (they all have 
something in common, in this case religion / dimension, culture is very similar 
(Iberoamerica is culture through language, this is culture through religion). 
92 Another reason is once you start drafting charter you have to deal with foreign affairs. 
Department of treaty or treaty department, ministry of foreign affairs. They all have their 
own approach and their own language. They have to quote all the previous agreement, 
previous battles and so on. I don’t want to go back to all these previous things, which is 
useless.  
93 ADB colleagues thought, Morita is crazy. I accept. But there is no other way, and this is 
still wisest, I still believe. 
94  
95 The participants of each country were selected by each country. I only said please do not 
send minister of foreign affairs and the mission must be led by the office of prime minister 
because once the prime minister understand it, no argument latter on.  
96 And each meeting has to be presented, led by the team of office of prime minister. 
Because if you try to make a road in this way, the minister of construction says one thing, 
then the minister of environment says different, ministry of industry says different, 
ministry of agriculture…. . So each country cannot decide where the road has to go 
through. 
97  
98 ADB is not going to play a big role. You are the owners of the project. You decide 
everything. We are going to serve you as Secretariat.  
99 No headquarters. This is very fantastic. Because once one country decide where the 
headquarters, then they start fighting. Then no headquarters, ADB will give you support 
as a secretariat. 
100 Always ownership. Since then, word of ownership in the community started to grow. I 
have seen other donors’ project, the donor always try to have the ownership, this is our 
project, this is Japan. That’s wrong, that is their project. So don’t call it ADB project, it 
is Mekong project. 
101 Third reason is once you have a charter, always become a question of interpretation. And 
always when they have a problem of interpretation they look at my face, ADB what is 
your judgement, we follow your judgement.  
102 That means ADB becomes important. Ownership comes to ADB decision. But ADB is 
not owner, ADB is not going to decide, don’t look at us, you look at yourself. If we have 
a charter, always interpretation is key, wrong or right. Whether I like or not, as ADB I 
have to sit at the center. Incidentally I was so lucky, the head of our regional department.  
103 (iii) Morita san if you say charter is needed, we are very happy to draft. I said, no 
thanks Peter, no need it. Why? Ok, no problem, agree. (1:06:00). He said, yes, 
I understand, no charter. So legal department has no role to play 
104 (iv) Once court and legal department play a role, you have to go. 
105 (v) Very lucky, we are very close friend 
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106 (vi) The next rule I introduce was a very sensitive issue. I don’t want to have a 
vote. You may think it is very modern thing. But once you start voting you 
can have 51% versus 49%. And difference of 1 really decide everything. That 
is not our philosophy. Our philosophy should be that you really want to be 
democratic, not by country or number. But really democracy I believe is: if 
you really want to join us, you join, if you don’t like to join, you don’t join, if 
you want to come back, welcome. I said as long as two countries agree to do 
that, whether you have a third or fourth country I said, it doesn’t matter. 
Country A and B please start, we support you. If country C and D really like 
to join later, please welcome them. If you would like to drop in between, ok, 
we don’t count a vote. 
107 (vii) Another thing I didn’t say but in practice. In the meetings we don’t keep 
minutes, once you keep the minutes, negotiation start. I said, if you don’t mind, 
we make chairman statement. And chairman statement will incorporate all 
opinions. So you kindly leave it on our neutral position. And chairman 
statement is one, which they take as pipeline of the meeting. Because once you 
take the minutes, each delegation needs to take it back to their capital. And 
report to each cabinet. Then cabinet will reject, you will go back to the square 
one, nothing. So, all these things people agree, no complain. That’s how we 
started. 
108 (viii) In special guideline that I may was, this was incidental. I remember Asian 
highway which was push by United Nations group, no single inch was 
accomplished. Even now, what they call Asian highway is actually ADB 
project. But original Asian highway was never done, because they are 
applying international standard in their technology, this is you area. I said, if 
you are really to decide about the road network, which is very important. 
Everybody lets come together to one place and compare your map and my 
map and see at to the border what are the missing links. And connect these 
missing links, once the road is upgrade or not, if the missing link is due to 
absence of bridge, whether the bridge is wood or concrete or even bamboo, 
let’s accept it. Once you start designing, new road takes the time. And let’s no 
create new route. Initially let’s connect existing road by filling the missing 
links and ask your village people which road should connect. Whether is 
straight line or not, it doesn’t matter. If you want to make it straight line, you 
make latter on. When you make the tunnel, you make later on. If you want 
concrete bridge you make when you country become rich. We are just from 
the Indochina war. No money. So let’s respect whatever you had in your hands 
and connect. This is very important because if you are going to provide a new 
line, each country will say we like this link, this corridor. Just lets them decide 
which line, which 20 m across the border they want. That is enough.  
109 These are major parts of agreement. And we decided. Once these principle are ok we go 
into long term development plan meeting. The second meeting, we approved for the long 
term plan consisting of six sectors. 
111
0 
Some of which became useless, some of them very useful. I skip this now. Initially I 
didn’t include agriculture, very questionable third party. But I have two reasons:  
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111
1 
(i) Sub-regional cooperation basically should have the pillars consisting o the 
sector which require the other side also active. Unless two persons carry 
together, things don’t move at regional cooperation. If one person can carry 
all the things, that is no need for regional cooperation. Agriculture is good 
example.  
112 Your side of the border is forest, my side I want to cultivate it. I can do it by myself as 
long as I have water. 
113 (ii) All the countries are communist or socialist, that means ownership of the land 
is not private sector. All the western side, they are very curious about what is 
regional cooperation. How this communist countries say, what is their policy 
for. We have change we have to teach them that land reform is needed and etc. 
Once you start land reform it takes 10, 20 years. Some countries cannot do 
land reform. So once yiu go to the board, they will give you the money, 
approve it with the condition of land reform has to be done. But completely 
stop the progress. Unless you do the homework, we cannot do the second 
round. That is not the desire.  
114 (iii) Number 2, all the communist countries in the agriculture sector has the 
subsidy. And some countries still do like America or Japan. But developed 
countries they accept their own subsidies, but they don’t accept yours. A lot 
of problems of the board that I have to negotiate with all the countries to 
remove all the subsidies. Then things get stuck. So I decide not to include 
agriculture. 
115 (iv) This is not positive reason but self-defense reason. So that we don’t have to 
deal with land reform issue which is never be acceptable. I use to call to the 
board, Hong Kong, Singapore they are successful but all the land belong to 
the government. And until many years ago, the Netherlands the land use to 
belong to the king. So I have to use the reasons. Nothing wrong to them to 
have their own system. So let’s alone to them to have their own system until 
they established the economy. So it was later on that agriculture sector was 
added. Other than that, I’m not going to go to any sector. You may look at 
ADB literature. 
116  
117 Exceptional things: Civil aviation and tourism sector 
118 Civil aviation, is part of transport sector, and tourism sector went so well after two to 
three years counting after the completion of the master plan they have done all the 
homework, very quickly. But civil aviation group have made a very substantial 
contribution. Earlier, only capitals are connected. Connection between capital and 
secondary cities of the other side, and vice versa, or connections among the secondary or 
tertiary non existing, like Kunming. Nowadays every day you have all together 20 flights 
between Bangkok and so on. Less or more, more or less. This is the first product of GMS. 
There are so many, hundreds. And tourism. Naturally is motivated by private sector.  
119 The other sectors you may like to use the rest of the time after wash your hands and take 
some rest. We can go to question if I can answer, if I cannot honestly I say I don’t know 
how to answer. 
120 Once my thinking was valid, yes it was valid. Once it was not valid, I tell you it was not 
valid. Useful, useless it depends. 
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121  
122 View of countries at the incubation period 
123 GMS is becoming next year 25 years old and I was responsible from the officially 1992 
until my retirement in 1997. Unofficially this incubation starting 1983. 10 years of 
preparation. 
124 Two to three things that made my job easier: In a way, all the countries are so centrally 
planned, except for Thailand. That means, whatever the system they have, good or bad, 
they blindly follow. If the communist party says this is our guideline, they all follow. This 
tended to be strong point. 
125 And another aspect, second point. They have been in closed economy, closed technology, 
and they didn’t have any window to see through what is going on technology on the 
Western side. So whenever they met Thai group, which is only one from West. Thai is 
explaining this really fantastic and fresh, they all say: “this is so good”, “ok, we agree”. 
Thai leadership, with the knowledge the other five didn’t have it. 
126 In this case, other countries happened to be very slow. Thailand is not necessarily very 
fast, but ordinary. Whoever who have the knowledge 
127 So when you choose the leader, you don’t need to choose the leader. They naturally 
understand which country, who is going to be more updated knowledge. 
128 So between the countries these are two aspects from communist or socialist side. 
129 [Not for writing] From Thai side: Thailand was working against the Indochina. They were 
fighting against its neighbours. In a sense they were friends. When they were put together, 
they felt a bit guilty. So I think, they understand what they have done, so they didn’t 
bound the table. They tried to understand the neighbours, how they have suffered from 
this war. 
130 No country had a very sufficient infrastructure, other than Thailand. Thailand road 
standard is American. Again everybody was looking to Thai’s development on roads and 
ports. Admiring eyes. 
131 Thai provided in a way the modern standard. So, no difficult coordination is necessary. 
Technically all follow Thailand.  
132 Only thing you may want to know, some countries go for inches, kilometres, dimension. 
Technical dimension. 
133 I never tried to introduce that dimension unilaterally. That is something nations have to 
decide by themselves. Ownership to decide. If they like, it is ok, if they don’t like it is ok. 
134 This has worked very well, because this has not become a thing to fight. The reason to 
talk, can you tell me how you measure? 
135 So, technically the standard I think good but they have the American standard here, and 
American standard is not different to British standard from Asian point of view.  
136 These technical aspects. I have not been invited to United Nations concept of the Asian 
Highway except for two times. Where all this people. We are really looking towards. 
137  
138 GMS versus UN-ESCAP 
139 While ADB GMS was going on. UN-ESCAP proposal for Asian highway were discussed. 
They could compare different approach. 
140 Ours was very modest, if it is one lane…ok, you make bigger when you become rich. If 
you need tunnel, you make tunnel later, but you first connect. Connection is first. That 
is important 
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141 How fast it is, is secondary. But United Nations always modern technology and strict. 
Everything has to be done according to what they want. Connect Singapore to Beijing 
and Europe.  
142 But we are saying apply and use existing road, if you need to expand two meters…ok. 
But don’t tell us full length or that kind of thing 
143 That is relatively easy to adjust with Thai as leadership. If you go to Thailand, they have 
very nice highway. But if you go to the villages, they are also similar. That give them 
very comfortable feeling. 
144 In Malaysia, even in the village, it’s very nice. 
145 But anyway, in a way, to me, question of the technical standard was achieved in a way by 
the basically before the WWII through British. 
146 Even if you think that Thailand has not been under any colonial power, that doesn’t mean 
they have not absorb western standards. They are very well educated. Similar or above 
the neighbours who have been educated by the British. 
147 During 30 years of Indochina War, they have going to old style. 
148 So, I think this type of experience may apply to African or Latin American countries. 
149 But if you go beyond to what Thailand did, I think we failed. Maximum Thailand. 
Maximum that what they can digest, don’t go beyond. The best evidence is as I said, try 
to connect the two borders by extending 10 meters from each side. Very simple. 
Digestible. So things…started. 
150  
151 Initial stage: getting national stakeholders’ support  
152 The first meeting up to 2003, no heads of state meeting. Mostly deputy prime ministers 
or equivalent.  
153 The status of the prime minister depending on the country, but the fact, that prime minister 
sent their deputies or very senior cabinet member, there are truly authorized. 
154 Coming to the specific, maybe if you put zero, that is starting point, how to convince the 
country? Why you need the port? Why you need the road? And that is why you have to 
participate in GMS? This is the most difficult task for me to do, because it takes before 
you create a system.  
155 Why do they need to be part of the system? Which, for the communist countries 
something uncomfortable, they like to have their own system, but they don’t like to 
observe other system. So this area, I just give you example. If you look at the map, Laos 
is in the center. Fortunately or unfortunately.  
156 To me is fortunately. Because if first hydropower project, Xeset. If it was not in Laos, and 
if it was in some other countries, Laos could not understood that they can do it, despite of 
the international situation. 
157 You are right that Xeset hydro-project was a frontrunner, a good pilot. In fact, once Xeset 
hydropower started, I was able to start discussion, look, even Thai and Lao was shooting 
to each other, they are now doing joint project. So you are 100% right 
158 To have a good example, positively front-runner, a pilot. You can get any of the  
159 Secondly, all the countries had a suspicion over the neighbouring countries, they had a 
border issue. They had a trade issue. Throw of the labors, legal, illegal. I think more or 
less, you have to verify that issue. 
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160 If two to three countries agree, other countries fear to be left behind unless they join. So, 
which country you start talking is very important, and which country you select as the 
number two, you need a bit of analysis.  
161 Now, in case of Laos, because of hydropower was successful, the next is how I convince 
the other countries. That means, not the government, the political bureau above that. That 
means I had 100% bureaucrats including ministers. That took time.  
162 I thought it Laotians couldn’t join, this GMS would not be there because is center.  
163 Laotians always complaining two aspects: we are landlocked country, and therefore we 
are very poor, no power, no single country power. That was their complain.  
164 Behind the scenery, always Morita-san, how we can do it? Very small, No power, no 
political influence. I started to put myself into Laotian shoes.  
165 True, in case of the port, they have to rely on Thailand. So Thais, according to UN 
resolution, you are neighbouring to landlocked country, you have to keep at least one port 
open to them. Bangkok is the closes, and that is the only they can go. Road number 9. 
166 They always complain. We have to plan everything to Bangkok. Trucking company is 
Thai government that only allow Thai company. And they inspect everything. So they 
know very well where we are, and what we are carrying. Everything is under their military 
observation.  
167 That’s tragedy that they are land-locked as Nepal 
168 Answering to their questions, “oh, lucky, you are landlocked”. This is always my remark. 
Very lucky, I think during two years I continued to say. Look at Switzerland, they are 
lucky. So small country like you, no natural resources. But because they are at the center 
of Europe and by providing the road to the other countries to come across, right to the left 
and center. They are always Switzerland. If Switzerland cut one of the roads, all the other 
big European countries, beg, please, what is your condition? 
169 Then, you have  
170 No matters small, you get the power 
171 How we can cross our road, we don’t have power. You can say, sorry, we have to go 
maintenance works for two months. So we close this road. Then they will tell you,  what 
do you need? All the help will come. Then you say, yeas, we accept. That is the power 
172 If Portugal and Spain were locked in the center, they could have been stronger in Europe. 
They have many ports, many coast lines. Switzerland has no port.  
173 I tell you how you can exercise your power. Back and ford, back and ford. 
174 Finally, my counterpart in Laos was able to convince the politburo 
175 When they say, they will join. I really. Politically I think he was on tense situation. Are 
you coordinating with Thailand? Are you…? But he was very firm 
176 I really like to explain to our government, that although you may don’t know Mr. Kanpuy. 
Thanks to his efforts convincing the politburo. 
177 The point is before you come to the stage 1. Point 0, how to convince. 
178 In case of Viet Nam. Viet Nam was still under the international sanctions. They have 
lifted the bar. Only 1994. But nevertheless, I said. We will invite you. And they have so 
much pressure. Why Morita is keen to bring Viet Nam. We are still not welcoming them 
to the international community. 
179 My answer was always, apart from the political issue. Only one factor, Viet Nam is our 
member country. That was my concern, my answer. 
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180 In case of Viet Nam, we are a bit complicated. While they are under the sanctions. Now 
country helps, because no external aid was allowed. So, the benefit however was that at 
least they could appear that they are part of the international community through the 
GMS. That was the strong point from me to convince them. 
181 1990, when very difficult to go to the country. We started sending the missions to prepare 
for the projects. Because my concern was when the economic sanctions are lifted, if no 
project was not prepared, even if America would like to help, Viet Nam no project there. 
182 So preparation of the project early was extremely important message for Viet Nam. For 
them to join. 
183 And Cambodia, already Mr. Hun Sen position very clear. If we stands I don’t have to 
spend any government money for soldiers. I can spend for more social aspects. 
184 Now, in case of Thailand, no need to mention. They really like to become the center for 
the overseas investment. 
185 I didn’t need to discuss with them 
186 Although I had lot of preparatory with Thailand because they use our common language. 
Market language 
187 Myanmar, was really to me. I respect Myanmar, very strong mind. Because of the military 
group and Su Chi issue. Particularly military group. Su chi was not there before. I knew 
we could not give any money, but Myanmar was not the member of ASEAN. So unless 
we invite Myanmar, they would really left isolated. So this is opportunity that at least 
Western community, but GMS will welcome you. So you can be member group. And the 
water, Mekong comes from, 30% approx. comes from rainfall from Himalaya and similar 
from Myanmar, and the rest from Laotian mountains. So without Myanmar, this project 
doesn’t mean anything 
188 Myanmar was relatively easy.   
189 This process, was very important. And each country has each own project. So going 
bilateral was important to understand before sub-regional cooperation 
190  
191 Next stage: 
192 This is when we formulated the group. There was already the Xeset hydropower was 
under preparation. 
193 And luckily or unluckily, Thailand and Laos was still not in good term, almost fighting. 
Much more severe than India and Pakistan. Something like Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
194 I think today all are looking to Xeset project. 
195 Yes, basically although, economic corridors are modern. When they started looking at 
them, they were looking to where they can connect and where are the missing links.  
196 I think, that process of internal discussion, domestic discussion with the communes in the 
communist counties, communes were there. They present interest like Cambodia and 
Thailand they were fighting about border. UNESCO gave the world heritage status to the 
Temple of Preah Vihear (temple of God). That is located almost at the border. And they 
started shooting each other, to claim position. 
197 This was after GMS started. When Mr Thaksin issue came out. The government wanted 
to divert attention of people. Red and Yellow color collision. 
198 There are so many incidences 
199 Similar aspect, Myanmar and Thailand border issue 
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201 The point is, in fact, how to avoid these negotiations were to pass through was one of my 
headaches.  
202 You touch upon it 
203  
204 Route number 9 (EWEC): 
205 Ones is Route 9 (EWEC). Da Nang – Savannakhet. And Thai side is Mukdahan. That was 
to me the most difficult routing. It took almost three years, because against military groups 
are there.  
206 In Thai side, Mukdahan, near to the river, there was cantonment. Military base. Military 
camp.  
207 That was the legacy of the Indochina war. 
208 And if you have ever come from Da Nang to Laos and connect to the existing road. 
Savannakhet – Mukadahan was very beneficial, but the Laotian side didn’t agree. Because 
the Thai side you have military base, and before in Vientiane we get any report, Thai 
tanks are already coming into our country 
209 So, can you please change the route? Thai said no. This is almost completed. 
210 So, I thought better thing is to cool down and let the economic necessity speak. Either 
support or not. It took three years, but compromise came, that is still Savannakhet but 
suburb of Savannakhet. More expensive than original. 
211 That way we were able to avoid the situation 
212 Negotiation stuck for three years and we didn’t push 
213 And another aspect that complicated there was when you are crossing the bridge what is 
the international border. It should be the deepest point of the river, because that is real 
river. Another said, that 50/50. The center, measuring from the banks. 
214 They find that international bridge says it is in the center 
215 Most difficult part is, who is going to be responsible for the management and 
administration of the bridge? 
216 Three proposals were made: 
217 1) A company, sponsor, 50/50, equity participation by two governments. 
218 2) 50/50 and two departments of the bridge of both countries. Ministry of transports 
will form joint committee 
219 3) I forgot 
220 They selected the second option. Third time they agreed. 
221 Very amicable solution on that 
222 This is technical aspects which can happen any of the bridges 
223  
224 Route Number 3 (NSEC): 
225 The second point that you mentioned on that issues was the China route through Laos to 
Thailand. 
226 Now, that route is called Route number 3, and actual length was from Kunming to Chiang 
Mai, but route part of Chinese side already done, and good part of Thailand already done 
before they started the missing link. 
227 The missing link was from the china Laotian border (Boten) to this side of Mekong river.  
228 All together, 400 km approx.., maybe? 
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229 I retired already at that time, this project should have been done much earlier. But because 
of reluctance of Laos and because of Laotians’ mistake get delayed.  
230 The mistake that Laos made was, at that time, international community there talking about 
World Bank, IMF, BOT by the private sector.  
231 So, Laotians very happy to follow international community because the private sector 
build operate and after 20-30 years give it back. And they have done it without consulting 
us. 
232 I couldn’t complain, because that is what we told them. I am very happy as long as you 
decide by yourself. 
233 They have awarded the road to the Thai group. And that group when to financial crisis. 
234 And this private sector project didn’t move at all, because none of the banks came to the 
rescue. 
235 I was relaxing into the retirement, I was told to talk with them. 
236 I found that the real reason was not the question of the need of financing. No legal aspects, 
or financial aspects. It was really Laotians that were saying this road which we are 
offering our land and participating the financing, that we have to borrow from outside, 
really benefits only Thailand and China, not us. It only benefits Thailand and China  
237 That was the strong message that they told me. 
238 To my surprise, they are not very fair balance explanation.  
239 Laotians eventually would benefit from the increasing traffic 
240 I mobilized so much my limited knowledge that without having disclose the initial power 
that we told, that Laotians do or are going to miss one of the very important ones. You 
cannot calculate economically viability with and without this road. And also looking at 
the economic benefits, what you want to do is 
241 Without doing anything, people do illegal traffic 
242 Better have the road and controlling if you have the capacity 
243 Eventually they agreed, Laos was able to raise the money to buy back the right to construct 
the road to the private sector, who had that right. Although they were almost bankrupt, 
but they still had that certificate. 
244 This negotiation was in a way very difficult. Again the question is you cannot ensure the 
economic benefit to Laotians. 
245 By, in the form of ERR to the country as the whole. Ordinary rate of return was a bit short 
(9.5 or something less than 10%) 
246 I think at that time the economic growth of China, it was very clear that they have to rely 
247 Economic loss of China. It was very clear that they had to rely on this area: supply of food 
and supply of rubber and palm oil and so on 
248 Very fortunate, all the sudden, the Malaysia and Thai they came up to here to continue 
the number one of rubber production because of the increase of labour cost. 
249 So the rubber plantation starting moving to the Mekong area. And Laotians saw it 
250 Lava plantaion started moving to Mekong area 
251 And Laotians saw 
252 Number 2: increase of China per capita income. 
253 But most attractive was for the rubber. Because at that time massive investment by 
European, Japanese and Chinese automobile industry gave a shortage in the rubber. 
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254 But this came at the very last moment. Until then, they couldn’t understand by figure, and 
I couldn’t present concrete figure. 
255 Later on, massive shortage of food itself. That was very decisive, because China offered 
Thailand, Cambodia, Laos the almost free import of agricultural products. They have 
selected 80, 85 to 90 items which the import tax of 1.5%  
256 That convinced I think Laotians that is true that they can make the plantation around the 
highway, although I think that plantation is eventually done by Chinese. As long as money 
comes, money is money. 
257 The next point in that project was a bit little extra things for you 
258 The Mekong bridge at Lao approach 
259 Chiang Kong bridge 
260 Laotians wanted to ban to financing. Japan said no, for whatever the reason (that’s very 
bad). Then China offered to pay. Finally the entire pay was divided into three. China 
financed their own. Thai side Thai government. Central side, Laotians financed by 
borrowing from ADB. 
261  
262 Mediation on NSEC 
263 When I was asked to mediate, or to convince the Laotian government. 
264 This question about the Myanmar side I didn’t question. To me, I sincerely felt, Laotians 
are going to lose their position if that road is not built, only philosophy that I had 
265 And later on, I was told by one of the senior officials. Now Laos per capita income went 
up, it used to be income from hydro power, now its gold mine. 
266 Thank you, without GMS road we could not get a hit on gold mine. How to develop, how 
to transport out. It was our headache. But now, thanks to this project, the gold mine give 
us more money than hydropower. It is very nice 
267 This road will give another gold, which gold I don’t know. 
268 When I first visited Switzerland, unbeliavable. I went left 
269 The most easrtern part life was so miserable. I even don’t know if they have the heater ni 
winter. I couldn’t see the electricity lines 
270 I was given example to the deputy minister. Switzerland, where there is no main road 
there, the life is different 
271 You can be as Switzerland 
272 Don’t joke 
273 If you work with eastern part, life is still very low. 
274 Matterhorn 
275 Zermatt, is relatively the center. When I was young, I could see all the farmers, the houses 
were like the poor houses here. So I said, it must have taken Switzerland to today. Still 
some places are not so much different. 
276 You could be like Switzerland. It will take time. 
277  
278  
279 ADB’s neutrality role: 
280 Route N9, from Da Nang to Savannakhet. Japan was prepared to pay the cost and 
participate in the bridge and road. Laotians said, Morita san we cannot accept that. To me 
bridge is bridge, this is a bit sensitive (not for public knowledge) 
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281 If Japan do it. If Thailand and Japan shake hands, they twist our arm. Because Japan 
cannot say not to Thailand, but they can say no to us. Can you make sure that ADB is also 
part of the financing group, because we believe ADB is very fair to both sides. So you 
will come to meeting. ADB will sit there and ADB neutral position is very important for 
anything 
282 Neutrality. 
283 Neutral position, or fair position which is difficult to maintain. But if you have a honest 
broker they are all very happy. Finance only 70km, but Laotians are very happy. 
284 So, this is out of the negotiations. 
285 There could be so many things, but these are still in the memory 
286 How you generalize it, is out to you 
287  
288 Other donors’ support, Australia: 
289 Australia is one of the countries which is counted as the Asian member and for that reason 
in the board Australian constituency is looked together not with western countries. Joining 
the Asian countries 
290 And one of the greatest contributions was they helped a lot Cambodia. Because Cambodia 
was the country under continuous wrong finale of Indochina because of Pol Pot. 
Cambodia was still with internal fights. Cambodia is in that sense, late comer. 
291 Australia supported them 
292 Cambodia. ADB is preparing the review of ADB’s work, whch will be for publication at 
the end of this year. Peter McColly. He was tough member of the board. He used to be 
the chief of the group or rather. He is really nice assigned him for this interesting task 
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A.I.III. GMS-EC.III 
Interviewee ADB officials 
Date  June 16th, 2016 
 
As a request by the interviewees, the following disclaimer is included: 
“The views provided by the interviewees do not represent the views of ADB or the governments 
it represents” 
 
1 ADB support to GMS Economic Corridors 
2  
3 - Recently ADB approved a Technical assistance (TA) for transport and trade: 
4 o To enhance trade facilitation across the region 
5 o It is aimed at the implementation of Cross-border Trade Agreement (CBTA) 
6  CBTA is an umbrella agreement 
7  But when we look to each of the cross borders, they may have 
different procedures, for example: 
8  If they are single window cross-border or double window 
9 o Currently, ADB provides TA to support the implementation 
10 o Key cross-border points in the map of the GMS Economic Corridors 
11 o Very active role  
12 - Now in the process of reviewing the GMS Economic corridor 
13 o Because the past version has been prepared for a long time 
14 o Time change, situation change 
15 o Need to review the economic corridor 
16 o Now in the process and discussing with member countries what should be 
the new version (update and so on) 
17  
18 - Key events that led to the launching of the GMS: 
19 o In the early 90s 
20 o It was probably because of the Peace Accord for Cambodia, that was possible 
in 1991-92 
21  That was the trigger probably for ADB to facilitate this kind of 
scheme 
22  If you go back to GMS publications in the early days, we must be 
talking about “peace dividends” 
23  Until the early 90s, these countries were fighting, even territory 
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24  They were not talking to each other 
25  The GMS framework was to provide a forum for them to have 
meaningful dialogue about economic cooperation. That was the 
situation in the early 90s 
26 o In that sense, I think that your analysis is quite relevant, this framework of 
looking at government to government and technical body to technical body 
relationships 
27 - Initially, ADB activities in the transport sector were to create connectivity 
28 o So, it was basically road corridors, building bridges or the missing links of 
the road network 
29 o But then, 2006 or 7, the countries agreed that they should look at more 
comprehensive development along GMS transport corridors 
30  At that time, economic corridor concept was brought in 
31 o Early activities to create transport network but now there are many other 
activities 
32 - From ADB point of view, we are now involved in many other sectors: 
33 o Urban, agriculture, trade facilitation, energy power trade agreement 
34 o To expand the scope of cooperation through the corridors, which were 
initially for transport purposes 
35  
36 How did the economic corridors evolve? Independently or coordinated? 
37 - The three corridors evolved more or less independently 
38 - Because we have six members, there is always the intention of involving all the 
members 
39  
40   
41   
42  
43 CBTA: 
44 - When looking to transport corridors: 
45 o Road transport is very different from other types of transport or other types 
of infrastructure 
46  Public sector normally provides infrastructure and the actual use is 
left to the users 
47  In the case of power/energy sector 
48  Generation to final consumption you are controlling 
everything, somebody is controlling the flow 
49 o The road corridor was only to provide infrastructure, but there was a need to 
facilitate the usage of the provided infrastructures 
50  That was the genesis of the pre-CBTA in the late 90s 
294 
 
51  It took so long for countries to ratify all the protocols and annexes 
52  Only in 2015, all the annexes and protocols were ratified 
53   
54   
55   
56   
57   
58 - In that process, in all these things, the ADB does not own any project 
59 o Projects are owned by the member countries 
60 o And are endorsed by member countries 
61 o ADB role is basically to provide technical inputs or to provide the 
mechanisms to facilitate agreement among the member countries 
62 - For CBTA, what we basically did was to provide the both: 
63 o Technical inputs 
64 o And the forum for the countries to discuss and agree on measure to address 
issues 
65 - But the rest was pretty much left to the member countries, 
66 o And that is why this delay happened 
67  
68 For CBTA negotiations, initially at ECF then to NTFCs, discussion ADB with each 
of the countries individually? 
69  
70 - Economic corridors evolve individually 
71 o ADB tried to solidify 
72 o And role of facilitator and technical assistance 
73 - When we look to the implementation, 
74 o Different cross-border points 
75 o Those are the main issue 
76 o You cannot make umbrella that includes all the aspects of all the border 
points 
77  CBTA only umbrella to facilitate the trade/transport flow within the 
region 
78  But for the implementation, you need to go to the details for the cross-
border point for the two countries 
79  For example, if we look at the border point between Myanmar and 
Thailand 
80  That might not be relevant to other countries 
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81  Then, it might not be necessary to discuss at such GMS big 
meeting, but just with the two countries at ministry level or 
even agency level in order to implement 
82 o To summary: 
83  CBTA as umbrella 
84  Then need of support for the materialization 
85  
86 - Because full ratification of CBTA took so long 
87 o Countries signed bilateral agreements and they started to implement 
88 o Not fully under the umbrella of CBTA, because CBTA was not ratified by 
all member countries 
89 o There are many bilateral agreements in the region 
90  Even now countries concern that they don’t have full picture, for 
example: 
91  Laos, their provinces agreed with the neighbouring provinces 
in Viet Nam and Thailand, and they are just operating on 
bilateral bases transport facilitation 
92  Under the TA, we are trying to collect all the information of 
these existing bilateral agreements 
93  We call them (these bilateral agreements), Initial 
Implementation of the CBTA 
94  Ideally, they should be brought under the CBTA, but 
95 o Whether that is the best approach for the two countries 
concern, again we need to consult with those two 
countries 
96 o Because the genesis of these bilateral agreements was 
not because CBTA delayed, but because the 
concerned party they thought that similar level of trade 
facilitation was possible through bilateral agreement 
and not only through CBTA 
97 o It is case by case 
98 o So CBTA fully implementation will be quite 
challenging in my personal view 
99  Messy situation 
100 - Another dimension is Mekong under GMS, except for China, are members of 
ASEAN 
101 o And at the ASEAN level, they have similar agreements 
102 o So, how we operate GMS level agreements and how the member countries 
want to align GMS agreements with ASEAN agreements, this is another 
issue that we need to look at. 
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103 o This is probably on your slide, you seem to not have look at this aspect, but 
this is an important issue 
104 o Particularly relevant to trade or customs, those softer elements 
105  Because they are not location specific 
106 o It doesn’t make sense to the countries to introduce two set or regulations to 
meet with two set of requirements coming from GMS and ASEAN 
107 o Infrastructure in a way is location specific 
108  Effectively, the Philippines or Indonesia are concerned on how 
Indochina countries interconnect themselves 
109  
1110 International and subnational level influence on the process: 
1111  
112 - On that issue, we have another team who are better position to respond to that 
question 
113 - I will introduce to those people who are looking to alignment of ASEAN and GMS 
agreements, or other wider regional or global agreements to do with customs or trade, 
and those soft elements 
114 - One important aspect is the quantity, 
115 o If you are looking at transport: 
116  What is the traffic volume crossing these borders? 
117 o And if you are talking about trade: 
118  What the value of the trade among these countries? 
119 o For example, Laos has lot of border crossing points, and in that sense is 
very important in the GMS, but if you to the traffic volume or the trade 
volume crossing these border points, they are not really significant for 
the neighbours 
120  I don’t know for Cambodia, but for Thailand, Viet Nam or China, 
the trade with Laos may not be significant 
121 - And then in each of the neighbouring countries, what priority they place in their, 
with Laos, that would be much more influenced by the significance of their relation 
with Laos to their economy 
122 o So it is very asymmetrical: 
123  For Laos, these agreements are very important 
124  But for the neighbouring countries, they may not be so 
125  And then, as you rightly pointed out, our role in there is basically 
to balance the asymmetries. That is what we are done, so probably 
for the case of Laos or Cambodia, and to some extend to 
Myanmar, we are playing that role. 
126  But for Thailand or China or even maybe Viet Nam, I am not that 
sure 
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127  
128 Relevance of the study to development banks: 
129  
130 - In principle GMS as a program as facilitator, coordinator and to identify some 
projects or infrastructure investment that will support the development in the country 
131 - GMS program also helps us to identify with the country what would be the priority 
projects that can help the development of the country 
132 o If we can identify these opportunities, then ADB we can help the finance 
of the projects 
133 - This is how I see the use of the GMs program: 
134 o Not only facilitator or coordinator 
135 o But also to identify together with the member countries the likely priority, 
opportunity to help the development of the country to fulfill the role of 
developing bank 
136  
137 - That is very honest view to individual staff to develop some projects for the ADB to 
finance 
138 o After all, ADB is structured as a bank to provide financial resources 
139 - ADB has a unique mandate coming from our charter that this regional cooperation 
is one of the activities we should pursue without any regard to potential financing or 
any projects 
140 o So it could be a standard activity 
141 o But on the ground, all these facilitation, particularly in the initial phase 
of GMS, was benefiting us to identify projects which we financed 
142 o If you look at the list of projects that we finance, they all have GMS.  
143  GMS corridors  
144  and even now we finance urban infrastructure projects which have 
GMS titles (GMS corridor town development) or GMS 
agriculture. 
145 - That’s one view held by many ADB staff 
146 - Coming back to your question of the utility of the framework you are trying to 
develop 
147 o Yeah, I think it would be useful, particularly these tentative results, you 
have the framework to analyze for different stages 
148  How the parties interact and so what would be the relevant cases 
to look at 
149  This would be quite useful for us, for probably to look back and 
try to extract lessons from our past engagement with the member 
countries in the GMS 
150  So we have other regional cooperation schemes, like CAREC in 
Central Asia and also South Asia, we have similar schemes. 
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151  Actually, GMS is the most advanced in many aspects 
152  We are so advance that member countries that capable to stand on 
their own, like Thailand or Viet Nam or China. They depend less 
on ADB for resolving issues bilateral issues. And also in terms of 
project financing. Again, they have financing resources.  
153  Thailand can finance most of the infrastructure on their 
own 
154  China the same. China is providing assistance to 
neighbouring countries 
155  So that is where we are, whereas in other regions, particularly in 
Central Asia we may have a more significant role. 
156  South Asia, that is a bit different because India is so so 
powerful. One very strong party and other not so strong 
parties. 
157 o But there again, the role of ADB to rebalance the 
asymmetry would be useful and would be 
appreciated by those relatively weak countries like 
Bhutan or Nepal 
158 o So for those two initiatives 
159  Analysis of GMS and the lessons drawn from your research 
would be useful from my view 
160  
161 Transfer of knowledge inside the organization: 
162  
163 - I think there are both formal and informal setups 
164 - Actually, some staff move from one region into another and do basically the same 
stuff, so regional cooperation 
165 - But I would say that still this cross-learning is still not really happening at the level 
that is desirable 
166 - So in that sense, somebody from the outside looks at what we are doing and 
recommend some measures to facilitate internal cross learning and extract some 
lessons. That would be useful 
167 - I think if you directly talk with staff that is dealing with RCI (Regional Cooperation 
and Integration) they can give you direct feedback. 
168 o Many of them have been dealing with this for a long time 
169 o We could introduce with those units, teams 
170  
171 Other international donors 
172 - Actually this TA, KH mentioned is funded by Australia 
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173 - My suggestion is probably you look to how these organizations operation and how 
they are owned, and how they get financing from shareholders or donors and how 
they work with bilateral donors (or individual countries) 
174 - We don’t really have any specific framework in terms of our relations with our 
shareholders 
175 - We don’t have specific framework for the GMS 
176 - Look to the overall set up 
177 - ADB is owned by the member countries, including the GMS countries 
178 o They are our shareholders 
179 o World Bank is owned by many more countries 
180 - ADB, WB say something is basically the collective views of the countries 
181 o We are not independent of the member countries 
182 - That applied to most of the bilaterals 
183 o JICA, Australia 
184 - But we don’t really any specific framework 
185 - Basically, the way we operate under the GMS framework is something endorsed by 
ADB’s member countries 
186 o On the surface, there might be differing approaches between ADB or 
JICA 
187  But JICA is owned by the Japanese government and Japanese 
government also owns ADB partially 
188  We have a common shareholder 
189  So we can’t be so different 
190 o But if you look at the phenomena 
191  JICA also has to identify project 
192  We have to identify projects 
193  WB has to identify projects 
194  JICA has to look for projects 
195  Australia government also should be funding some projects in 
financing some projects 
196  It is quite complex 
197 o But we don’t have a specific framework under the GMS  
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A.2. News on GMS Economic Corridors 
Date Highlight Source Link 
05/04/2016 ADB President Affirms support 
for Lao PDR development, 
Regional Cooperation 
The 
Financial 
http://www.finchannel.com/ind
ex.php/business/56289-adb-
president-affirms-support-for-
lao-pdr-development-regional-
cooperation  
25/12/2015 ADB’s Brief on Connecting 
South Asia with Southeast Asia 
IndraStra http://www.indrastra.com/2015/
12/BE-ADB-brief-on-
Connecting-South-Asia-with-
SE-Asia-0573.html  
27/11/2015 Thailand to Veitnam, one 
delivery’s journey 
Nikkei http://video.asia.nikkei.com/de
tail/videos/business-
clip/video/4664894928001/tha
iland-to-vietnam-one-delivery-
s-
journey?autoStart=true&page=
2  
11/09/2015 GMS cooperation’s strategic 
role to ASEAN highlighted 
Vietnam 
Breaking 
News 
http://www.vietnambreakingne
ws.com/tag/gms-ministerial-
conference/  
02/09/2015 Construction of the Second Thai 
– Myanmar Friendship Bridge 
Thai Gov. 
Public 
Relations 
Depart. 
http://thailand.prd.go.th/ewt_ne
ws.php?nid=2110&filename=in
dex  
23/07/2015 Vietnam-Thailand Joint Trade 
Committee gathers for second 
meeting 
Vietnam 
Breaking 
News 
http://www.vietnambreakingne
ws.com/2015/07/vietnam-
thailand-joint-trade-committee-
gathers-for-second-meeting/  
02/07/2015 Vietnam strongly asserts 
commitment in Mekong-Japan 
cooperation 
Vietnam 
Breaking 
News 
http://www.vietnambreakingne
ws.com/2015/07/vietnam-
strongly-asserts-commitment-
in-mekong-japan-cooperation/  
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11/06/2015 GMS Economic Corridors 
Forum looks to enhance cross-
border trade 
Vietnam 
Breaking 
News 
http://www.vietnambreakingne
ws.com/tag/gms-cross-border-
transport/  
20/05/2015 VN attends EWEC in Thailand Vietnam 
Breaking 
News 
http://www.vietnambreakingne
ws.com/2015/05/vn-attends-
ewec-in-thailand/  
20/05/2015 Third East-West Economic 
Corridor seeks solutions for 
development 
Vietnam 
Breaking 
News 
http://www.vietnambreakingne
ws.com/2015/05/third-east-
west-economic-corridor-seeks-
solutions-for-development/  
09/05/2015 Myanmar, Laos open first 
friendship bridge 
Xinhuanet http://news.xinhuanet.com/engli
sh/2015-
05/09/c_134224520.htm  
13/04/2015 Deputy PM inspects Moc Bai 
border gate 
Vietnam 
Breaking 
News 
http://www.vietnambreakingne
ws.com/2015/04/deputy-pm-
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B. Appendix on SIEPAC 
B.I. Interview notes on SIEPAC 
B.I.I. SIEPAC I 
Interviewees Jose Enrique Martinez, Luis Bujan, Jose Carlos Farfan 
Affiliation EPR, General Manager, CFO, Operations Manager 
Date  30 October 2012 
Place  San Jose, Costa Rica 
Interview in Spanish, translation into English by the author 
 
“The views provided by the interviewees do not represent the views of EPR or the governments 
it represents” 
 
Line Text 
1 Background of the process: 
2 o From 1976 there were meetings between the countries 
3 o During the 80s bilateral interconnections 
4 o The ERICA study showed that there were several benefits from the integration. 
5 o In 1987, Spain for the ¨V Centenario¨ celebrations wanted to develop projects in 
Latin America. The electric integration was the most feasible in Central America. 
6 o Teofilo de la Torre proposed the creation of CEAC as an institution for the 
cooperation and integration through the communication between the different 
parties. 
7 o Before CEAC there were several coordination groups. CEAC was the mechanism 
for institutionalizing that. 
8 o CEAC wrote the Framework Treaty. 
9 o After the studies of Endesa, in 1987, financing was started to be sought. Then IADB 
got involved. 
10 o IADB asked for new technical and economic studies. 500 kV was too high, 230 kV 
was found to be more suitable for the region. 
11 o IADB financed the studies and gave technical cooperation. It was noticed that the 
infrastructure alone was not guarantee of success. An electricity market and deep 
integration were needed. For doing that, the governments were needed for signing a 
binding agreement. 
12 o At that time every country was controlled by one state-owned company. The 
approach between them started the process. 
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13 o At the technical level it was assumed that after expanding the national systems until 
the borders, those should interconnect and integrate. The border was only political, 
no physical. The hardest part has been to break that political barrier. 
14  
15 The sign of the Framework Treaty: 
16  
17 o The IADB was very important for making this possible 
18 o The agreement was prepared and agreed by the state-owned companies in CEAC. 
Then, the governments signed it. 
19 o Initially the Framework Treaty was very large, but then it was reduced to the 
minimum agreed points. 
20 o The reforms of the national sectors were another factor that stimulated the 
integration. 
21 o The Framework Treaty gave stability to the project because for retiring each country 
must wait 10 years. 
22  
23 Differences between countries 
24  
25 o Costa Rica: 
26  The power is divided; the government doesn’t control parliament or justice. 
In other countries is different.  
27  Reach consensus takes long time 
28  The public sector is very big. Many people work for public companies as 
ICE. 
29  Work unions have large influence. 
30  ICE is doing a good job, contracting many people, paying good salaries, 
keeping low tariffs without subsidies and in a good financial situation. Many 
people don’t want any change. 
31  There are several cases of political corruption. People don’t trust in politics. 
This is more general in the whole region. 
32 o Guatemala: 
33  70% of the generation in private 
34  There are large generation capacity that could be exported 
35  Several contracts of PPAs with high costs. Pressures for extending them. It 
seems that now the government is trying to change that situation with new 
tendering process that should reduce the final price. 
36  Electricity is still expensive in Guatemala 
37 o Honduras 
38  Very bad situation of the state-owned company. 
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39  High costs because of PPAs with thermal generation. 
40  Government doesn’t allow passing that cost to final tariff. ENEE must 
assume that debt; therefore it cannot improve the national system. 
41  
42 Interconnections with Mexico and Colombia 
43  
44 o The interconnection between Mexico and Guatemala is only bilateral.  
45 o Now Mexico would like to export to El Salvador and Honduras but regulation is still 
needed to be developed to allow that. 
46 o The region would be benefited from an interconnection Mexico-MER 
47 o For solving such problems the IADB is involving in the interconnection Colombia – 
Panama. 
48 o Also for Colombian generators the interconnection is only meaningful if it is with 
the region. 
49  
50 Success actions in SIEPAC 
51  
52 o Involvement of the state-owned companies 
53 o Consensus environment 
54 o Sovereignty guarantees 
55 o The idea of a gradual process respecting the national sovereignty (6+1) was well 
accepted. 
56 o Make a mandatory agreement 
57 o Difficult for retiring. 10 years and US$100 million 
58 o Active involvement of the IADB. IADB is the main financer of the region. 
59 Make the process by consensus. Integration cannot be imposed 
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B.I.II. SIEPAC II 
Interviewee Edgardo Calderón 
Affiliation Executive Secretary of the MER Governing Board (CDMER) 
Date  October 30th, 2012 
Place  San Jose (Costa Rica) 
Interview in Spanish, translation into English by the author 
 
Line Text 
1 The SIEPAC process: 
2  
3 SIEPAC is part of a process of electric integration. There have been different stages of 
this process: 
4  
5 o 1st – Stage of the national integration:  
6  The national systems were composed by isolated small systems mainly 
private. 
7  It was more optimal and reliable to interconnect those systems. 
8  That was made by vertically integrated state-owned companies 
9  Finally the state-owned companies became monopolies 
10  Thermal generation was used only as back-up systems. 
11  
12 o 2nd – Stage of the bilateral interconnections: 
13  It was only for mutual support between neighbouring countries.  
14  There was no cession of independence; each national system is expanded 
independently.  
15  “You don’t have an interconnected system, only linked systems.” 
16  After interconnecting many countries the idea of sending /receiving 
electricity to / from countries without shared border came to the discussion. 
17  Several coordination organisms were created. In the Southern countries the 
most famous was the GRIE, Regional Group of electric interconnection. 
18  The main agreed idea was “split-saving” were seller and buyer were 
benefited from the exchange. 
19  During this time large hydro power plants were built and the countries started 
to sell lot of electricity from these power plants. Therefore the benefits from 
greater interconnection appear naturally. 
20  Technical studies were made for finding the best way to create 
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interconnections. In 1965, with ECLAC, the ERICA study was created. 
(Regional Study for the Interconnection of Central America). There were 
many different ideas about how to do it. El Salvador and Guatemala 
purchased a model to Tractobel 
21  Nevertheless the idea was not regional. Only strengthen the bilateral 
interconnections and that would increase the regional possibilities. 
22  
23 o 3rd – Stage of the regional interconnection: 
24  Endesa brought a new idea: create a unique interconnection between all the 
countries. 
25  Endesa came with the solution, a single line of 500MW that would connect 
all the capitals. 
26  But that project was out of the reality. The national systems were, and are, 
weak. They can resist that kind of interconnection in a single point; there 
were possibility to total blackouts in case of failure. 
27  The financing was also very expensive. Despite Endesa said they would have 
paid everything, nobody relied on that. 
28  Finally the project was no accepted because pre-made solutions were not 
acceptable and the state-owned companies wanted strengthening of the 
national systems 
29  The important were agreements between the state-owned companies, right 
below the governments. “The governments didn’t bring any good idea”. 
30  
31 o 4th – Stage of the feasibility studies, 1997: 
32  Technical studies by PTI (Canada) and economic by University of Comillas 
(Spain). 
33  Those showed that the “minimum cost of repentance”. That idea was very 
well accepted. The minimum was to build the line. 
34  After accepting that, feasibility studies were made considering 6 possible 
scenarios. 
35  With full integration the benefits were very large 
36  It was needed to create an electricity market for getting the benefits. 
37  It was also the “time” for the electricity markets. The other possibility would 
have continued through CEAC, but that was good only for vertically 
integrated systems and many countries started to create national electricity 
markets. 
38  After that there are no exchanges between countries but between agents. 
Therefore a market of agents. 
39  When the idea is defined, it is brought to the Presidents’ Summits at SICA. 
From there the idea of the Framework Treaty appears. 
311 
 
40  The lack of trust and the legal insecurity would have driven to only small 
exchanges. 
41  It was a technical-political negotiation. Only Presidents and state-owned 
company involved, the ministers of energy were not included because of the 
low knowledge of the issues of the electric sector. 
42  All the ideas were first agreed at the technical level and then the top managers 
of the state-owned companies “sold” the ideas to the presidents of the 
countries. 
43  
44 o 5th – Stage of the regional integration: 
45  Infrastructure doesn’t belong to one country; it has 9 owners in all its 
extension. 
46  Extra-regional members face the same risks: US$40 million with sovereignty 
guarantees or internal equity. Sharing the risks = no feel they come to “steal” 
47  RMER because the Framework Treaty is not complete. 
48  Countries create their national electric law and then don’t want to change, 
despite it might be bad law. RMER was a unique opportunity to change all. 
49  Governments felt they have given too much power to the regional 
institutions, that’s why they created the Governing Board (CDMER). It has 
voice but actually no much decision power. It also can help to introduce 
political aspects to the development, not only technical, and reduce 
bureaucracy.  
50  So many changing actors, about 40 different governments. Many pretend to 
use the MER for other purposes. But they can’t because there are 6 to 
convince. Also is difficult to take too much advantages or reduce the 
commitment; that doesn’t work because “your neighbour can be kind because 
has other interests with you, but others will not allow you”. 
51  Central American are different countries but with similarities. That must be 
more challenging in regions and Africa where differences are also cultural 
52  
53 o 6th Stage of finalization of the first goal: 
54  January 2013 
55  Two steps: increase the exchanges and develop regional plants 
56  Need to create mechanism of inter-institutional coordination 
57  The goal is to use one single electric sector law. There are several interphases 
for that 
58  From 2002 there are trading between the 7 countries, but the Framework 
Treaty is not only for exchanges, it has bigger targets. If not, it would have 
much simpler.  
59  Process will end with the full integration because national resources for 
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national dispatch will finish (El Salvador has no more). 
60  Integration was not made since the beginning because politically was 
impossible. It was impossible to make such big reforms in each country 
61  “Steps cannot be done in one single” 
62  
63  
64 The Executive Unit: 
65  
66 o The Executive Unit is conformed to very high level persons, both technicians and 
top managers.  
67 o There is the risk to get lost during the decision-making process. For that is important 
to have a “bedside consultant”. In SIEPAC three “gurus” were contracted, three 
global consultants. 
68 o The consultant has no big power. In other regions consultants lead the process and 
impose the philosophy of the project. That scheme creates big problems. 
69 o It is important to no allow the banks to be inside the decisions. 
70 o Every step was approved by the Executive Unit. 
71 o It is important to have a structure ad-hoc in order to avoid “political pollution”. The 
technical solutions must be first. Several mechanisms ad-hoc have been and are 
created for solving particular problems, in many occasions for big problems. 
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B.I.III. SIEPAC III 
Interviewee Salvador López 
Affiliation EOR director 
Date  November 1st, 2012 
Place  San Jose (Costa Rica) 
Interview in Spanish, translation into English by the author 
 
1 Origin of the idea of regional integration: 
2  
3 o It appears after the bilateral interconnections 
4 o Several benefits were identified, it was in a scheme of “cooperation”, exchange of 
electricity in critical times 
5 o The national systems have little capacity, so if we can create stronger interconnections 
we could increase the “cooperation”. 
6 o By the end of the 80s the bilateral interconnections were ready and the possibility to 
get Spanish collaboration funds from the V Centenario Funds appeared. 
7 o The system was perfected technically -> line of 230kV 
8 o It was not possible to made by 1992 (the desired date) and in 1996 a treaty is negotiated 
for constructing the line. 
9  
10 Origin of the agreement: 
11 o It was the time of the electricity markets trend. 
12 o Guatemala, El Salvador and Panama created their own national electricity markets 
13 o In 1996 sign of the Framework Treaty with the laws of reform => Create an electricity 
market 
14 o There was a problem for including those countries with electricity market (Guatemala, 
El Salvador and Panama) and those vertically integrated (Honduras and Costa Rica). 
15 o The “creative idea” was to create a 7th market apart of the nationals. The regional 
organisms will push to the integration; those are not created in other regions. 
16 o There was also a political decision motivated by the Peace Agreements. There was a 
favorable environment for the integration. 
17 o The process includes a high level of negotiation 
18 o Then the idea was not only to build the line or make exchanges. For that a regional 
administration is created: CRIE, EOR, EPR 
19  
20 The regional regulation: 
21 o There was need a regulation for ruling the exchanges between agents 
22 o In 2005 the RMER => it is very complex, designed for allowing a full integration of 
the region. 
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23 o There were meetings every 15 days during 2 until finalized it. That is because it face 
also all the details, and the conflicts are in the details. There were several arguments 
because in many cases there is a strong feeling of losing of sovereignty or power. 
24 o The definition of which was the regional transmission system and which not was very 
complicated. Being interconnected the regional line and the national systems both are 
affected. The national system and the regional system affect mutually. Electricity 
moves following the Ohm’s law, it simply goes where there is lower resistance. 
25 o It is crucial to keep the 300MW of capacity in the regional transmission. The IADB 
was very worried about that point. It is still under discussion how to ensure it 
26  
27 The harmonization interphases: 
28 o Some countries are faster than others on this. 
29 o There are several interferences from national actors. In Guatemala, the private 
generators are inside the decision-making process. 
30 o CRIE has recently strengthened with own personnel. But the problem is what the role 
of a regulator is. That seems to be not clear for many. 
31  
32 Challenges for the future: 
33 o Implementation of the market: 
34  Up to now there are only exchanges in the connection nodes but not internal, 
because it is seen as a loss of sovereignty. 
35  It is needed a strong commitment with the regional transactions ensuring their 
technical viability. For that national reinforcement of the national systems is 
needed, the problem is who pays that. 
36  Guarantee legally the long term contracts through the conclusion of the 
regulatory harmonization processes. 
37 o Develop regional power plants: 
38  With the RMER operating we can enter into a new phase with commercial 
measurement and regional planning. 
39  For that is needed to have access to also internal nodes, that gives transparency 
for the payments and will increase the transactions. 
40  Countries will start to depend on others. 
41  Without the regional market, the largest power plant possible at each country 
was about 200MW. More could be dangerous for the system. But, with the 
regional market there is a maximum demand of 6600 MW, then 10% is 660 
MW, that means that it is possible to construct a 500 MW power plant, but only 
if it is in the regional market. 
42 o Distinguish between energy security and sovereignty.  
43  Every country wants their national resources for their national supply, but no 
ones can design, efficiently, the systems for a 0% possibility of rationing. In 
particular, Costa Rica insists that all their national supply must be in Costa Rica 
and then export only surpluses. 
44  According to the RMER all the electricity must be dispatched. First national 
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dispatch and then extra must be dispatched in the regional market. But the 
countries are not doing that, they only report a part of that as “guarantee”. 
However, if all the electricity would be dispatched there would always be a 
surplus of 200 MW, enough for covering any contingency through the spot 
market. And when Mexico and Colombia will make agreements with the MER, 
there will be much more “extra” electricity. 
45  If we do the security of supply between all, that costs much less. 
46  It is needed to break the old philosophy of the national regulators. 
47  Another question is how much firm energy the countries will to ensure for the 
regional market (to sell or buy). It is considered that 10% from each country is 
possible, considering that at a regional level is a lot. 
48  
49 o Overcome the national reluctances: 
50  The long term vision is that 6 + 1 = 1, which means that the 6 national markets 
with the 7th regional will not be 7 markets but only 1. 
51  El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras have little potential. The incorporation 
of the extra-regional, Mexico and Colombia can boost the process again. 
52  Finally is a political choice to decide how much we interdepend. 
53  If Honduras depends on Colombia, but Nicaragua decides to nationalize and 
take control over the regional transmission line in its territory and block the 
transmissions to the north, then Honduras may face difficult challenges. 
54  It is very important the harmony between the political leaders. Nicaragua has 
border disputes with Costa Rica, Honduras and Colombia. 
55  Central America is not a stable region. Politics will not allow a full 
interdependency. But a 10% can be assumed by all. 
56  Nevertheless, despite the political problems, the project continues because the 
markets are relatively independent from this kind of problems. 
57  
58 Origin of the cooperation in the electric sector: 
59  All started with the creation of the CEAC in 1986 
60  Every company was in charge their whole national sectors. INDE, CEL, ENEEL, INE, 
ICE and IRE. They were “gods” 
61  It was easy because the president of each company used to have more relevance than 
any minister. 
62  Since they were directed elected by the presidents of each country, they had a strong 
representation. 
63  The national reforms changed drastically. Nevertheless, the state-owned companies 
are still very large. Only in Panama they don’t control the generation, despite the 
government owns the 49% of the power plants 
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B.I.IV. SIEPAC.IV 
Interviewee ETESA officials, CEAC official at the time of the interview 
Date  November 2nd, 2012 
Place  Panama City (Panama) 
Interview in Spanish, translation into English by the author 
 
1 Introduction of SIEPAC: 
2  
3  SIEPAC started before the national reforms but is also a trigger for the 
creation of national markets. 
4  It was possible because every state-owned company used to have decision 
capacity. 
5  The final goal is to maximize the energy resources in the region through 
regional power plants. But for that is needed to overcome the reluctances from 
energy security and sovereignty. 
6  
7 Regional regulation and harmonization process: 
8  
9  With the perspective of the full enforcement of the RMER, projects for 
different regional power plants are arisen. For example, there are rumors 
about one possible thermal plant of 800 MW in Honduras. 
10  It is very important to make a good harmonization process of regulation and 
equipment. 
11  It is crucial to allow the long-term contracts, so far only the surpluses are 
being traded through the regional market. 
12  It is very important to make the national markets information available to all. 
And it must be public and updated. Panama used to do it, but, since it was the 
only one, it stopped.  
13  Each country must open and share its internal information. This is one of the 
challenges, politics must understand that point. For that is the reason of 
CDMER (Governing Board), try to involve more the politics in the process. 
That’s also why SICA has an energy department. 
14  
15 Role of extra-regional members: 
16  
17  They are important because facilitate financing, but also because of their 
technical experience. For example ISA has experience with interconnections 
in Brazil and Peru. 
18  CFE is a tremendously big company, Mexico is a system of 70000MW 
19  The interconnection between Guatemala and Mexico started after SIEPAC 
but it has been completed much before. There will be a need for new 
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negotiations for making an agreement Mexico-MER when the 7th market will 
start full operations. 
20  The Mesoamerican Project has been very important for the political support. 
It has allowed conversations between the governments and put it in the 
political agenda. These projects must be started with public support, despite 
it will finish with private initiative. 
21  
22 Problems with Costa Rica 
23  
24  Agreements are easier because most of us operate under market scheme. 
25  Costa Rica is vertically integrated, that is a political decision 
26  It is needed to privatize ICE 
27  So far, it has divided in business units. 
28  It accepts private participation in generation with BOT contracts for 20 years. 
29  It’s necessary that a new energy law observes that actual situation  
30  In Panama there was no such problem, actually many people don’t know that 
generation and distribution were privatized. 
31  
32 Main success actions 
33  
34  The possibility to have backup power and cheaper if the efficiency is achieved 
35  The feasibility studies showed that and make everyone to pay more attention 
to the process 
36  The Framework Treaty is crucial because if one retires from SIEPAC the 
project fails. It has given a very strong political support 
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B.I.V. SIEPAC.V 
Interviewee Eric Jaramillo 
Affiliation Panama state-owned lawyer at the time of Framework Treaty negotiations  
Date  November 2nd, 2012 
Place  Panama City (Panama) 
Interview in Spanish, translation into English by the author 
 
1 Background of the SIEPAC project 
2  
3  In 1986 Endesa and the Spanish government proposed the project with the idea 
of commissioning on 1992. 
4  They created a company in Spain named SIEPAC corporation with the states 
are shareholders (finally the shareholders are the state-own companies). 
5  The idea was since the creation of the CEAC. 
6  
7 Reasons for the success 
8  
9  The most important element has been the sign of the Framework Treaty, 
because: 
10 o Ensure the commitments: 
11  For the creation of the regional market 
12  For appointing a representative in the EPR 
13  Each country will give concession to the EPR 
14  Regional institutions will be created: EOR for commercial 
administration and CRIE for supervision 
15 o Gradualism: 
16  The integration will continue increasing 
17  International interconnections will have no national taxes 
18 o Adoption of a regional regulation (RMER) 
19  II Protocol gives financial viability to CRIE and also increase its independence 
and authority 
20  Presidential summits 
21  State-owned companies involvement 
22 o Everything was made by the state-owned companies. Governments 
didn’t intervene 
23 o For the ratification of the Framework Treaty we explained and defended 
the project in the national parliaments in El Salvador, Costa Rica… 
24  Several people was very important: 
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25 o Don 39  Teofilo de la Torre, at that time Executive Secretary of the 
Executive Unit 
26 o Pablo Cop, President of ICE at that time 
27 o They had several meetings with the President of Costa Rica 
28 o In Guatemala, we also had that kind of personal meetings 
29  “Social contract” 
30 o The ownership of the EPR is agreed to be shared equally. No company 
can control more than a 15% of the total shares. 
31 o That % has been decreasing due to the incorporation of the extra-regional 
members 
32 o Endesa was not included since the beginning because some members 
(like Costa Rica or El Salvador) opposed to it. There were nationalist 
feelings; they considered Endesa wanted to take the control. Panama had 
no problems with the incorporation but finally the regional consensus 
prevailed. 
33  Incorporation of extra-regional members 
34 o The Spanish government and Endesa continued showing interest in 
participating more actively 
35 o The company was started in 1998 as under the Panama law.  
36 o From 1999 to 2002 (incorporation of Endesa), the company operated very 
bad with meeting every 4 months with each company paying its own 
expenses and the studies financed by IADB and realized by the Executive 
Unit (Teofilo de la Torre) 
37 o Thanks to the final incorporation of Endesa the project could start. 
Endesa unblock the financing of US$170 million from IADB (Spain gave 
that money to IADB for this project). 
38 o For making possible that agreement, EPR offices were located in Costa 
Rica. Because of that, most of the workers are Costa Rica nationals 
39 o Also the general manager was from Endesa for the first period (5 years). 
That was Francisco Núñez Ortega. 
40 o Conflicts have been reduced thanks to the participation of extra-regional 
members. 
41 o After Francisco Núñez Ortega, Jose Enrique Martinez was appointed 
general manager (also from Endesa). His conciliatory character trying to 
promote consensus is very important. 
42 o CFE and ISA joined EPR as investors; they have been very active, with 
high interest in making the project successful. Their collaboration in the 
management is also positive. 
 
  
                                                 
 
39 “Don” is an equivalent to Mr, when used in this context means high respect to that person 
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B.I.VI. SIEPAC.VI 
Interviewee Grupo Terra’s expert (previously INDE official) 
Date  November 5th, 2012 
Place  Guatemala City (Guatemala) 
Interview in Spanish, translation into English by the author 
 
1 Background of the SIEPAC project 
2  
3  During the 80s the national system of Guatemala was a “disaster”. There was 
corruption and no generation expansion -> finally rationing of electricity 
4  After the problems with the electric supply some large power plants were built 
(Hidrochula, Chixoy) 
5  In 1986 the interconnection with El Salvador 
6  In 1990 studies with Mexico for importing electricity 
7  During the 90s new electricity crisis -> private generators entered Guatemala 
and several emergency contract were signed 
8  Then meeting with the IADB. There were three options: 
9 o Isolated systems 
10 o Coordinated systems 
11 o Integrated systems 
12  
13 Strong points 
14  
15  There were several meetings before the sign of the Framework Treaty, which 
is basic pillar of the project 
16  RMER is a Central American regulation, what means no country can “cut” the 
line. That gives a strong power, at least in theory; but, so far, all the agreements 
have been supported and respected. 
17  
18 Main Issues 
19  
20  Problems with Costa Rica 
21 o There are problems of reciprocity: ICE can make contracts with 
distribution companies or invest in Guatemala, while the private 
generators in Guatemala cannot make it freely (only through ICE). 
22 o ICE has divided into independent business units, but that’s not enough. 
23 o Nevertheless, ICE (Teófilo de la Torre in particular) is one of the first 
promoters 
24 o The real problem is that private generators of Guatemala saw ICE as a 
strong competitor. Similar problem doesn’t happen with ENEE in 
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Honduras40 because the company has 40% of losses 
25  
26  Problems with CRIE 
27 o There are problems for approving the needs for repayment to EPR, 
through the Annual Transmission Costs for the operation and 
maintenance. Law allows only 3%, EPR studies said they need 4%, while 
CRIE has only approved 1.9%. Despite it doesn’t need to make a big 
business, EPR should be financially independent from the countries 
28 o Guatemala and El Salvador have sign a long term contract, but there are 
no guarantees for supply, so it can start. There is need for a resolution of 
CRIE about that issue. 
29 o CDMER has no control over CRIE, but the governments should be able 
to control CRIE 
30  
31  The benefits in the short term are being more attractive (those for reducing 
electricity tariff immediately), but the main benefit is in the construction of 
regional power plants. For a good plant of LNG, 500 MW is the minimum 
size. 
32  The main issue is to not become fully dependent of imported energy. Mexico 
has capacity for providing all the electricity of Guatemala and making the 
Guatemala companies go to bankruptcy. There must be concerns that extra-
regional members should not be more than a %. 
33  
34 Role of the IADB 
35  
36  The ascendency of IADB is very huge. 
37  IADB gives the financing for any project in the Central American countries 
38  The support of the IADB is always kept in the mind of the governments. 
39  
 
  
                                                 
 
40 Honduras has in fact a single buyer model as Costa Rica  
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B.I.VII. SIEPAC.VII 
Interviewee Yancy Garita Brenes 
Affiliation CRIE market analyst 
Date  November 5th, 2012 
Place  Guatemala City (Guatemala) 
Interview in Spanish, translation into English by the author 
 
1 Activities of CRIE 
2  
3  Meetings CRIE-SICA for the promotion of national laws that facilitate the 
commercial development of the regional market 
4  Intermediate stage, the harmonization for the measurement systems for being 
to apply RMER conditions. It is necessary to be able to use all the nodes (also 
internal) 
5  Ensure the transmission capacity of the regional grid 
6  Using the methodology detailed in the RMER, CRIE establish operational 
management, transmission charges (considering nodes) and complementary 
charge. 
7  There are difficulties for convincing about the payments because RMER is not 
operative and line is not finished (one part in Costa Rica). 
8  CRIE is the maximum authority of the MER. EOR realizes technical studies 
and proposes actions, then CRIE analyzes them and approves or not. CDMER 
cannot take decisions over the MER directly. 
9  
10 Structure of CRIE 
11  
12  The maximum authority in CRIE is the Board of Directors, constituted by 1 
representative (or commissioner) from each country.  
13  Usually this commissioner is from the national regulatory bodies. That makes 
that there are many national political pressures, because they want to go slower 
in the regulatory integration. Since the agreements are made by consensus, the 
decisions are slow. 
14  For example, Costa Rica must open the national market and improve the 
measurement equipment. In Costa Rica there is only one agent and the principle 
of gradualism of the Framework Treaty means give time to Costa Rica for 
changing. 
15  Recent strengthening of the CRIE: 
16 o Apart of the Board of Directors, 3 managerial units have been created 
(legal, market and technical). 
17 o Each counts with 1 specialist and 1 analyst. 6 new employees in total. 1 is 
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from each country. There was not specific criterion for the election of 
position for each nationality; a “lottery” scheme was applied. There is a 
commitment with keeping diverse nationality representation at CRIE. 
18  CRIE has offices at every country 
19  Decisions are always by consensus. At least, that’s the main goal 
20  
21 Issues at CRIE 
22  
23  The main problems come for the slowness in the enforcement of the RMER: 
24 o II Protocol and RMER give sanctioning power to the CRIE. Without 
enforcement of RMER, CRIE cannot force because it cannot punish any 
action. 
25 o CRIE should regulate interconnection between Guatemala and Mexico, in 
order to smooth operation at MER. But, without RMER, nothing can be 
made. 
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B.I.VIII. SIEPAC.VIII 
Interviewee Karla Hernandez 
Affiliation EPR manager in Honduras 
Date  November 6th, 2012 
Place  Tegucigalpa (Honduras) 
Interview in Spanish, translation into English by the author 
 
1 Background of SIEPAC 
2  
3  At the initial stages the framework was very different because there used to 
be no markets. 
4  The main motivation was the mutual cooperation between different systems. 
5  El Cajon dam in Honduras was so large that it was from other countries was 
sent to there and then Honduras charged 20% of the electricity generated. 
6  Studies of ECLAC attempted to integrate the whole region as one single 
system. Then different studies for making a more feasible project. 
7  Then, the goal changed to promote foreign investment because the region as 
a whole is more attractive 
8  The idea was to make possible the construction of regional power plants. In 
Honduras there are talks for developing El Faro with 750MW, in Costa Rica 
for Boruca. 
9  The 6 + 1 = 1 still is not real, at this moment they are still 7 different 
markets. 
10  
11 Main issues 
12  
13  Nowadays there are several fears because of differences in political 
ideologies. 
14  Honduras (actually every country) is investing only for national generation. 
15  The region is politically instable. When the coup d’état in Honduras, 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua closed the borders isolating 
Honduras. 
16  Finally they open because several products they need come from Honduras’ 
ports. There is a mutual dependency between the countries. 
17  Problem is the inference of political decisions in commercial issues. 
18  In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, has put taxes against the agreements 
19  There are bad past experiences in national security issues.  
20  Therefore, the question is how much can I depend on energy? 
21  For solving disputes CRIE works well, but we don’t feel comfortable that 
there is no regional institution over CRIE. Costa Rica has not accepted 
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Parlacen (Central American Parliament) and Panama will soon quit. The 
Central American Court works better, but it is still not enough. 
22  
23 Role of international actors 
24  
25  IADB 
26 o It gives strong guarantees to the project 
27 o The involvement of the IADB gave a “certificate of certainty” 
28 o IADB ensures transparency and quality 
29  Endesa 
30 o It is very important because it was the first to boost the project and 
contributes with money and financing  
31  Mexico and Colombia 
32 o CFE and ISA are seen with more reluctances because they are much 
stronger than the Central American companies 
33  There is a common fear to loss the control of the region 
34 o For appointing the executive director of REDCA41 three candidates 
were proposed. One from Honduras, one from Spain and another from 
Colombia. The Honduran candidate was the favorite but he decided to 
withdraw. Finally, no one was chosen and REDCA is still inside the 
EPR structure. There were concerns to choose the most neutral, and 
there is confidence on EPR work. 
35  The general consensus in how much open the region is: 
36 o EPR: fully open to extra-regional members 
37 o EOR: only for Central Americans but there is no quotas per country 
38 o CRIE: close, only to countries and with quotas 
39  
40 Challenges for the future 
41  
42  Operation of CDMER for the promotion of the regional market benefits 
43  CDMER is composed mainly by ministers of energy, but in Honduras there 
is not Ministry of energy. Therefore is again the state-owned company who 
represents. 
44  How to develop the regional generation? Similar scheme as for EPR cannot 
be used. For the line, there are parts in every country, but the power plant 
will be in one country. And the country which will cut the trees and move 
people will claim to use its national resources for the supply of foreign 
countries. The solution will be private or PPP. 
45  Mesoamerican Project will not be successful because every aspect included 
in “national security” is put out of the agenda 
46  
                                                 
 
41 REDCA is a new project developed by EPR for creating a regional optical fiber using the route of the SIEPAC line 
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47 Differences between Honduras and Costa Rica 
48  
49  Honduras is delayed in the division in business units, but it is more open to 
private generation. Everybody can sell to Honduras with contracts with high 
securities 
50  The main problem with Costa Rica is that very protectionist. If ICE tries to 
protect its internal market, then others try to do the same. 
51  ICE has been cooperating always; despite some don’t want to see that point. 
During the period of the ratification, ICE commit with the payments despite 
it was not accepted by the country. 
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B.I.XIX. SIEPAC.XIX 
Interviewee Juan Carlos Posadas 
Affiliation Institute of the Americas, Country Director, Project on Regional Electric 
Interconnection and Trade in Central America. 
Date  November 6th, 2012 
Place  Tegucigalpa (Honduras) 
Interview in Spanish, translation into English by the author 
 
1 Reasons for the integration 
2  
3  Technical studies showed the operational benefits. 
4  For the case of southern countries. Costa Rica has its generation capacity on 
the north. So the exports from Panama to Nicaragua gave higher stability to 
the Costa Rica system. Studies said that Costa Rica should pay to Panama for 
those exports. Obviously Costa Rica didn’t agree, but that was the seed of 
everything. 
5  Through the optimization of the regional resources, the society gets a benefit. 
6  
7 Main issues 
8  
9  At present times, no one country really accepts to depend on the others. Only 
El Salvador and Panama accepts relatively. 
10  Problems to Hidro Xacbal for ensuring the transmission rights. That should 
have already been solved by the governments 
11  Governments must give clear signals that they support the integration. At this 
stage the political support must be much bigger than it actually is. 
12  Guatemala has put barriers to export. They want to use the renewable energy 
for the national dispatch and export only thermal. 
13  It is very easy to make the project fail just with taxes issues (that happen in 
Argentina-Chile) 
14  Who is going to lead the integration process? That should be CRIE, but it is 
not acting like that. For that reason the CDMER has been created, but it can 
dangerous if the governments pretend to interfere in the future development. 
15  The problem is that presidents of the country are not well informed of the 
situation and the needed actions. Actually ministers of energy are not 
involved with the process. From the Institute of the Americas we want to 
promote more meetings between different institutions, add new ideas to the 
debates. 
16  Guatemala and Panama want to take advantage from the extra-regional 
members. But if Mexico and Colombia want to interconnect is for exporting 
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energy to MER, not only to Guatemala and Panama. 
17  CRIE must be strengthened much more. Commissioners full time, more 
technical capacity and more financial resources. Every country wants to get 
the most benefits possible, that’s the natural behavior, for that a strong 
regulator is needed in order to ensure the fairness and the future development. 
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B.I.XX. SIEPAC.XX 
Interviewee Teófilo de la Torre 
Affiliation President of ICE at the time of the interview 
Date  November 8th, 2012 
Place  San Jose (Costa Rica) 
Interview in Spanish, translation into English by the author 
 
1 General ideas 
2  
3  The creation of a regional market is a very very difficult task. That’s why 
almost no market exists in the world. Particularly including 6 countries. 
There are some for 2 or 3. 
4  They European Union has no European electricity market. 
5  It is very complicate the tasks of communicating and forcing agreements. 
6  We have less ability to obey communitarian rules. However, I’ve seen 
several efforts are being down in the world in this direction. I hope our will 
be the most successful in the world. Africa, Europe, Scandinavian countries, 
within United States. All they have problems. 
7  We have worked at this effort for many decades. First we speak the same 
language, second we are small, and third, we have other communitarian 
relations. Industrialization of the region promoted efforts in trade, certain 
amount of ability of governmental officials to negotiate and to accept rules 
that are on top of national regulation. 
8  
9 Background of SIEPAC 
10  
11  We have strong technical capacities, which were very simple to coordinate 
between the 6 countries because when we started this effort, the electric 
sector was very simple, on vertical integrated company, state-owned in each 
country. All you have to do is coordinate six electric managers. At that time 
each country was trying to build an electric system in the whole country. Try 
to reach to the borders, main cities. 
12  By late 70s, each country had an interconnected electric system and reached 
to the borders. 
13  We found that an opportunity, larger electric systems, you have many 
opportunities of better quality of service. Any electric company sees the 
benefits of interconnection. You did inside your country and you should do 
with other countries or federals states.  
14  So the six electric companies did that from a technical point of view. We 
started to meet until understand how to do it. 
15  we have the same voltage and frequency 
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16  all with systems arrive to the border or close to the border with high voltage 
17  So we agreed in a bilateral manner to interconnect between neighbouring 
countries. We did it over 10 or 20 years 
18 o Nicaragua-Honduras 
19 o Costa Rica-Panama 
20 o Guatemala-El Salvador 
21 o Nicaragua-Costa Rica 
22  We made in a bilateral way and we agreed how to sell / purchase power 
between two countries, or better said, between two companies. That allowed 
us to sell / purchase surplus power from some countries to another. We found 
we were in a position to move to a more integrated situation. If two are 
interconnected, why not two, three,…, six. We did it in a gradual process.  
23  Technically, no market wise, larger electric systems have more strength. And 
it’s the best way for having better cost. That was made by the national 
companies and it didn’t require in all the situation governmental treaties. 
Governments only participate in two occasions: Nicaragua – Honduras and 
Guatemala – El Salvador. Other was only a contract between two electric 
companies. 
24  We arrived to a point we had difficult situation in late 80s, economic situation 
in the region. One of the problems was being able to support the growth of 
power demand. Because the economic situation was difficult in the world 
and in Central America. Governments started to shrink, because of liberalist 
political situation in the world. 
25  The electric companies, government owned, started to have a lot of 
difficulties in order to finance future generation projects. Because 
governments will not permit them to finance, because it is debt, or the electric 
rates were controlled politically. Companies started to deteriorate at the end 
of 80s. In general the whole region started to have blackouts, payment 
problems, no continue the expansion of new projects. And the demand 
continued to grow. The solution started to be, take a look at the electric 
competitive markets. Chile and England have done that, there were some 
experiences. Suggestions appear that part of the solution was to have electric 
markets, at least until the wholesale market. 
26  The first step was that the vertical integrated power company purchase power 
from privates, PPAs (independent power producers). 10 or 20 years of power 
at a fix rate. Those companies put their money. 
27  That solved the first problem: to have supply. Early 90s, all have. Costa Rica 
did not have that problem, because of the investment of ICE did not shrink 
as in other countries, but still have limitations. And it opened that possibility 
for renewable energy up to a 30 % of the capacity of the country. Each 
country was transitioning vertically monopoly markets to wholesale 
competition in generation. 
28  We continued to discuss among electric companies to create a larger electric 
system. We started to see in parallel that these electric companies were 
disintegrating, dividing in different companies. 4 companies move from 
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purchasing power to a wholesale electricity market, unbundling generation, 
transmission and distribution, and large consumers appear: Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama. In Honduras and Costa Rica, politically it 
was not successful. And the old model is today present. Now the task is more 
complicated. Larger electricity market + wholesale market among 6 
countries. Studies in mid 90s, the product of that effort was the Tratado 
Marco. Reading it is not a substitute of 6 wholesale markets, it is superposed 
on top of national ones. In simple, the Tratado Marco we respect what you 
do in your country (it’s on your loss), but if you are going to sell / purchasing 
cross border there are new rules. When it is international trade we use 
different rules, and those rules are clear in Tratado Marco: international trade 
we apply new regional rules, detailed in Tratado Marco and RMER. Since 
you have new rules, you need to have someone who takes a look, CRIE, and 
a operator who says how much you have pay / charge, the operator. Operator 
of the system and the market. That was the idea. 
29  
30 Signing the Framework Treaty (Tratado Marco) and the way after 
31  
32  It was quite simple to agree on that. In less than one year 6 governments and 
6 electric companies agreed on that. In the following two years, the congress 
of each country argeed the Tratado. And this Tratado is binding, if any of 
these countries want to retire, it has to give in advance of 10 years. It deterred 
to leave the compromise. 
33  Since then, created CRIE, EOR, special purpose for the construction of the 
transmission EPR, and prepare the operating codes, contracted several 
international consulting companies and experts in electric markets. 
Transmission line is almost finished, except a part in Costa Rica, and it is 
also interconnected with the national lines. EOR and CRIE in operation since 
the last 10 years, and the transmission line will be finish in 2013. 
34  We finish the simple part. We thought it was the most complicated, but now 
is more difficult.  
35  For the construction, it was not so difficult, and EPR made a good job 
obtaining the financing and new investors 
36  In the creation of the market rules, that was more complicated. Several years 
of discussion of each article of the 400 pages of the RMER. Technical 
people, lawyers, economist, politics.  
37  Make the agreement is complicated. But it was made and approved in 
December 2005. Nevertheless, we could not put in force because 
transmission line was not ready. Now it’s ready, so we can put it. RMER will 
be enforced at the beginning of 2013 
38  Who is going to buy and purchase? Up to now is only surplus. If you have 
short term surplus, you take a look who want to buy it and negotiate the price 
or go to the spot market. For 10 years that has been working. People at EOR 
have great experience operating among 6 different countries. Opportunity 
trade, that was small.  
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39  Then you have to pass to something more complicated. Power blocks of 
electricity that you are willing to trade for a longer times (5 - 10 years), 50, 
100 – 200 MW. There are other problems, easy to write but difficult to accept 
in the reality. They are written in RMER. For example: 
40 o If I have a generating plant in Costa Rica and someone in Guatemala 
offer to buy 100 MW for the next 10 years. That means that the 
electricity system in Guatemala for the next 10 years, and if something 
goes wrong in between, you have a problem. You have to move to the 
spot market, and the spot market might not have enough electricity; so, 
long term contracts have to pass different tests of reliability and change 
a little the culture of the people, who are used to have the generating 
facilities inside the country and not outside. A country can be very 
willing to export, but a country depending on imports is a more difficult 
culture. And technical people get nervous; they cannot control the 
electricity you have to import. 
41  
42 Challenges for building regional power plants 
43  
44  That is one of the issues in the near future. We have to see people building 
plants which will sell to other countries, no countries, other agents located in 
other countries (large consumers…). 
45  Be sure that what is written in Tratado Marco is enough. So far, the trading 
is small. 
46  Regional plants 
47  What happen if someone says, I don’t want to buy? I don’t want to sell to 
you because I need in my country or someone is willing to pay more? 
48  Those relations are controlled by contracts, and they have rules. The problem 
if it is between governments. But between companies and with contracts, the 
probability of no paying is lower. 
49  The playground is ready. Several barriers and limitations. 
50  Nobody believed this was going to be simple. The capacities of the groups 
at the technical entities are growing. EOR has good capacity, CRIE is on the 
way. Consejo Director, Board of Directors, constituted by representers of the 
countries, it is a political body that oversees the whole market. Advise that 
something is failing. They are the policemen. They can go back to the 
governments and say that there is a problem. 
51  That’s general. 
52  
53 Differences between CRIE and CDMER 
54  
55  CRIE is the electric regional regulator: it’s not for relation between 
governments 
56  CDMER is political representative. 
57  CRIE is appointed by politics but it is technical. Measures to ensure the 
market is working and if there is needed a future expansion. The maximum 
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authority in the market. 
58  CDMER is a group of representing the 6 governments taking a look that 
everything is going ok. A kind of supervisor of CRIE, but it cannot give 
orders, but suggestions. 
59  Sometimes there are different opinions between countries. If they cannot be 
solved in the technical level, CDMER try to do it. If it is not successful that 
goes to the governments. And the governments have their relations at SICA, 
ministers of foreign affairs or Presidents. High level coordination groups. 
Political playground for taking considerations of major problems. 
60  CDMER is a group of representatives of the countries, report to governments 
what is happening. It is not an international entity. It is a technical audit. It 
gives the guarantee to the governments that this regional entity is not going 
in a wrong direction. 
61  If CRIE cannot solve a dispute, then there is a major problem. Probably parts 
will go to court. Before going to court, there are several mechanisms for 
solving disputes, arbitration, coordination, conversations. CRIE is the last 
point of administrative issues. But CDMER is no superior to CRIE. SICA 
could be superior. It is not clear if it could be a court of appealing, at this 
time it’s not. But some lawyers that is the case. 
62  
63 Merits of RMER over past situations (bilateral agreements, RTMER) 
64  
65  In 2002, all the bilateral agreements were canceled and replaced by RTMER. 
A very simple regulation because the transactions capacity was very limited. 
A Pilot code for 1 or 2 years, but finally during a longer time. RMER and 
line. It has been enforcing for 10 years. It is a very weak regulation, cannot 
operate with several transmission lines connecting countries. It is very 
important to start using the RMER and stop using the RTMER. A lot of new 
problems 
66  The order of level in the dispatch is: 1st Firm contracts, 2nd national dispatch 
and finally regional dispatch 
67  In the future is expected that it will 1st firm contracts and then regional 
dispatch. 
68  There is a respect for the national dispatch, and then each national operator 
tells what is available and at what price. EOR decide whether to accept of 
not 
69  If one country doesn’t want to sell, it can simply to put a very high price. So 
nobody buys.  
70  That would be against the regional market but it is one the no technical 
decisions. Technically is better to do the regional dispatch and the countries 
will adjust to that, but that was no accept by the six countries. By nobody, 
neither the companies. 
71  We are not at the time that we can with to the regional entity. That’s why it 
is a 7th market, because it respect the  
72  In future they will merge in one 6 + 1 = 1 
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73  Politically is still not acceptable, it is the future, but before we must be sure 
that we have something that is suitable. 
74  But if regional dispatch is after national dispatch price will be higher? 
That’s why the firm contracts are so important 
75  Also the countries must accept that the firm contract has priority to the 
national dispatch. Countries tend to say that buying electricity has priority to 
selling. Countries have the authority to say yes or no. 
76  Reasonable regulator will say yes, if it is a plant that is being built for exports. 
Other will create an economic loss to their country. 
77  Degree of the dependence from other countries is part of the national policy. 
We don’t worry about depending 100% on oil for transport, but in electricity 
we should not depend more than a 10%, it is in the national policy. Most of 
the countries would not want to depend more than the national reserve of the 
system (10 – 15%). If some of the neighbours make a problem, technical or 
political. As long as not being more than 10%, regulators will say yes (in 
purchasing countries). 
78  
79 Who should lead the process of promoting the development of MER? 
80  
81  That is a good question. I may have no answer. But I would say the most 
interested party for promoting the use of the market should CDMER. All 
parts have responsibility. 
82  EOR indicative power planning for transmission and generation. Those plans 
are shown to any group which is interested in investing. Giving orientation 
of thermal, hydro…. Instruments made by EOR very useful for attracting 
investment 
83  CRIE is for interesting parties understanding the legal reliability and the rules 
they will play. 
84  CDMER is a second stage insurance that the 6 governments are committed 
with the market. There is a political will below it. 
85  In the end, the six governments are the most interested in attracting the 
private investors. And each of them wants to install in their country. That’s 
natural. Make here and export to whole Central America.  
86  The most simple is each government will say: I’m the best come here. 
87  The main moving block since the beginning has been to attract investors. 
88  Government has not enough money for investing to the electric sector. 
89  Private sector was invited. They did with PPAs. 
90  But that was too expensive for governments, because of no competition. And 
they passed to competitive markets 
91  But competitive markets are not so attractive for private investors as PPAs. 
In market there is a risk, you are not so sure you will make money. 
92  This regional market is the opportunity to bring more foreign investment and 
allow building larger plants that will not be able to be built without the 
regional market. Large plants give lower plants. If you build one 500 MW 
the final price is lower than if you build 5 of 100MW 
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93  But if it is very large you need investors. You will find easily investors for 
several investors 500 MW plants than for 5 of 100MW. More funding 
opportunities for developing the sector. 
94  That is the main objective. There are others as increasing reliability, lower 
cost, but also that you have also large players in generation than if you don’t 
have the regional market. 
95  
96 Interest of Costa Rica in SIEPAC 
97  
98  We have large capacity, with renewables in a large proportion due to large 
reservoirs. 
99  6000 MW, we need to have 1000MW of capacity for having security of 
supply. We don’t have so much export capacity except during rainy season.  
100  We also import thermal when that is cheaper in the dry season.  
101  Now we are at a point that the plants we want to build are very large. Those 
are projects that need investors, partners to ICE.  
102  Mainly, since is renewable, we have lot of plants, wind, geothermal, mini 
hydro. With multiple owners, most of them local companies. You don’t have 
those large international firms. 
103  There is no fear to extra-regional members because presence of CFE, Endesa 
and ISA are limited, but they can have subsidiaries. But ISA has no 
generation, only transmission and market operator. Endesa has lot of 
generation capacity. And CFE is like ICE, governmental, no intention to 
invest in generation in other countries. 
104  I have seen that large private generators they are retiring from Central 
America. Tampa (from Florida) they sold their investments in Guatemala. It 
seems there is a trend of large energy companies to leave space in small 
countries and concentrate in larger markets. 
105 o For example, in the oil business. Shell sold all their gas, Texaco. Why 
are you selling? Is a bad business? No we are concentrating in the large 
markets. Central America is not attractive. Large companies are losing 
interest in small countries. 
106 o New actors appear: Grupo Terra (Honduras) with Hidroxacbal. They 
are growing as a large conglomerate. 
107  
108 Claims from Guatemala 
109  
1110  There is no limit of how much to purchase. Guatemala says they cannot sell. 
ICE can purchase power from Guatemala companies, what they want to see 
is that they can sell not only to ICE but to the other distribution companies 
or large consumers (Intel). That’s why they complain, we have an open 
market 
1111  We are still vertical integrated but with the division in business units we 
commit with the Tratado Marco. Logic is that we will arrive to the same 
situation as other countries. 
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112  It might give us an advantage, temporally. 
113  We are very socialistic country. It is very difficult to privatize or unbundling 
or increase the amount of private generation. Changes in the law for the last 
20 years 
114  In congress there are now 6 projects for changing the electric law. There are 
people reactions 
115  No large changes soon, but the trend is in that direction. 
116  The entering the SIEPAC put us one step closer to having wholesale market. 
If not locally, we will have it regionally. 
117  The same with Honduras. They have very bad financial situation. But they 
have more other more complicated problems than the electric sector. 
118  
119 Role of the extra-regional members 
120  
121  Endesa was founder of the project. They have the idea of having a strong 
transmission line crossing Central America. And they were going to finance 
it with Spanish cooperation funds. But it was too much. Talking with other 
banks we arrived to IADB. Making a group in order to finance the project. 
122  At the beginning, Central American countries felt that this is a project that 
only Central American should be the owners of the transmission line. And 
that was not attractive for Endesa, because they wanted to be leaders of the 
project. But at that time Endesa was a public company.  
123  1995 – 2001 – Endesa was not included in the EPR concept.  
124  “We are more comfortable doing alone”, “we want to do it by ourselves” 
125  In 2001 we restarted everything and we arrived that Endesa should be an 
equal partner. Access to Spanish funds, Endesa wanted to have a significant 
part of the project in the management. Management responsibility for 
Endesa. 
126  The changed was motivated because we were having several difficulties for 
raising the financing. IADB conditions were not acceptable for the ministers 
of finance. 
127  The project almost disappeared. There was a full renegotiation. And then 
Endesa and Spain entered. The new package included Endesa, Spain and 
IADB. 
128  IADB had offered expensive money (ordinary capital) for all the countries. 
And there are several countries in the region, that according to IMF they 
cannot receive normal money, only concessional money (40 years). They 
found a piece of that money in the soft loan section of IADB and the 
government of Spain. Spain appears as a part of the solution. Honduras and 
Nicaragua could sign the financing. That brought the solution 
129  CFE and ISA entered later. They requested invitation. Each one of them have 
interest of being part of the SIEPAC development expecting that they will be 
able to interconnect their systems with SIEPAC and they wanted to have 
knowledge and influence. Mexico – Guatemala finished before SIEPAC. 
Interest of both, (public owned), political risks for participates. Good 
338 
 
neighbours policy. The proportion of equity of each partner, started to 
decrease. The Central American countries have been reduced. Colombia and 
Mexico have also given strong political support 
130  During those years there was a program proposed by Mexico, called Plan 
Puebla-Panama, now Proyecto Mesoamerica (including Colombia), which 
adopted SIEPAC as one of the insignia projects, through that we also have 
with strong political support from Mexico, and eventually CFE entered 
through that road. 
131  External political support is very important for national government support 
132  The main support that we have been receiving external has been IADB. They 
have been the leaders of the full effort from the beginning not only with 
money, but with technical advice and support. 
133  At one time, many years ago, the Spanish president, he made a meeting with 
Central American Presidents and told them: 
134 o “You are stupid people that you don’t go ahead with large for big 
projects that are import for you, we have the money ready and you don’t 
act” 
135 o That made an important reaction 
136 o The President of IADB has told the Presidents of Central America, why 
are you doing? why are you so slow? It is a petty that you are not taking 
advantage of this project 
137  Strong international movement that pushed governmental decisions in that 
direction. That’s part of the success. Strong political support, not only locally 
but also from outside. 
138  
139 National level issues 
140  
141  Straightly enough all the politicians agree with the SIEPAC project, maybe 
not all the parts. But in general, the concept of participating in a larger market 
is accepted by all, from the right, the center or the left. 
142  The problem is when you say: let private sector to export, and they say no. 
When you say ICE is the exporter, they say yes.  
143  You should not use your natural resources, which are scarce, for exporting 
raw material. These scarce resources that should be for value added products, 
with higher profitability. 
144  Don’t make exports using hydro sites, with environmental limitations. 
145  In general they have approved the Treaty, the II protocol. 3 years of 
negotiation because of local rules of how to go to the regional market. We 
have to be sure that ICE is the only actor. 
146  You will not find politicians opposing SIEPAC. But if you are going to build 
the large hydro projects for exports. No, you should use that for local 
development, and use them for making new products and then sell those 
products. 
147 o Yes, that’s what we are doing. If you build the large project 
(Reventazon), it takes three years to use it. Ok, so let’s export during 
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the time you have surplus. And someone will buy it. 
148 o The national resources will be used for the national development. 
149  Politicians basically agree on SIEPAC, but they disagree on how to move at 
the national level. ICE has been trying to coordinate to pursue other 
politicians 
150  Now the problem is the harmonization in the regional and national level. 
151  ICE has lot of technical knowledge; we are also the operator for Costa Rica 
in Central America. Discussing with the regulator 
152  
153 Harmonization 
154  
155  Harmonization has been a slow process 
156  CRIE made a proposal to each country, what CRIE considered a valid way 
to making the harmonization. Maintain the regional regulation and tide the 
local regulation to the regional. Plugging both together. CRIE did that by 
contracting consulting companies. Panama did by them. 
157  Then each national regulator has used this information for taking more time 
of study and decided how to do it. How they will take resolution in order to 
have the RMER in operation in January, under preliminary phase. 
158  Right now CRIE is not participating. But local regulators. It is their job. 
159  
160 Strengthening of CRIE 
161  
162  They still need to change their “hat” from national to regional. 
163  It’s growing. Until very recently they didn’t have own budget, they were 
living with donations from IADB. Now they are more than 20, they used to 
be only 3. 
164  Develop CRIE is more complicate than EOR because governments are 
reluctant to give power to it. 
165  
166 Role of CDMER 
167  
168  The idea is that CDMER reduce reluctances from governments. 
169  Treaty 1998, CDMER in 2010. And the decision to create CDMER came 
from 10 years of experience; we found that something was missing. Only 
EOR and CRIE will be something isolated from the countries. And that was 
not going to be good for the market. CDMER is the place for involving the 
governments. 
170  CDMER is by delegated from ministers of energy. 
171  Most of the countries have ministers of energy, but others do not have.  
172  Panama until very recently, and then the responsibility was for the company.  
173  In Honduras there is no minister of energy.  
174  In El Salvador there is no minister of energy, it is an internal group inside 
the minister of Economy. 
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175  Then, the national companies, that are government-owned, have a larger role. 
176  
177 Main issues 
178  
179  The problem with this project is that it has been so slow, that if you have it 
in a high profile for many years, everybody will know that it goes too slow. 
You only communicate the accomplishment of milestones.  
180  I prefer low profile because in any way you have nothing to say. 
181  The most important is to have been faster. 
182  This project has a longer life than internet. 
183  I sometimes check what is going in internet about SIEPAC. With time is 
getting better. 
184  The reform of the electricity law in Costa Rica is very unpopular. Times 
change. Combo was in 2000, and II protocol was ten years later. 
Governments always consider the reform of the law is necessary. 
185 o When II protocol went to the parliament, government found the 
opportunity to make slightly changes. For example: 
186  Private generators could sell energy in the regional market 
187  Since it was with a popular project, there will be no oppositions. 
188 o It took three years to the government to understand that was not going 
to happen 
189 o It is a very sensitive issue. Government tried to put something but it 
was no success 
190 o The general position is that we have a successful model for generating 
and selling. And what is successful should not be changed. Government 
thinks it should change because everything its changing, and there is 
also stakeholders which would like to participate: investors, foreign 
companies. 
191 o So, that’s the case, the present situation is supportable, it is sustainable, 
as long as ICE has the ability to finance development of generation. The 
discussion is whether it will have that ability in the next years, when 
the investment will be higher. Allow ICE to make partnerships or allow 
higher private participation. Both changes are needed in order to 
maintain the 
192 o This is small market; it doesn’t need highly competitive market because 
it is difficult to make it in a small market. 
193 o The difference between ICE and ENEE. Is that ENEE is not building 
any generation, it is buying power. Only owns the old plants. 
194  That is a model fine for private. PPAs are very beneficial for 
them. Make money in a simple way. 
195  In Costa Rica they have to be small and renewable. Lot of 
limitations. 60% ICE, 30% private 10% others. Private 
stakeholders, businessmen complain in front of their 
governments. 
196 o Also ideological reasons in each country. Those who are promoting 
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foreign investment and more trade, those bodies within any government 
are requesting that everything should be changed. Government small 
and only regulator. 
197 o If we don’t change they could have more of the pie. 
198  
199 Possible lessons from SIEPAC 
201  
202  The first Tratado was very large and we went to directors and they started to 
have many objections. After several meetings we found we will never agree 
203 o Why don’t we do differently? Just put in this board what we agree about 
and then build a treaty that write what we agree. 
204 o We throw again the two hundred pages. 
205 o Started to say general ideas.  
206 o We agree in 8 or 9 points. Now drafted the protocol for these 8 or 9 
points. 
207 o We did that, next meeting we found that with minor changes we have 
the drafted agreement. 
208 o We only put there what we believe that the 6 countries was going to 
accept. If we would have continued discussing the full Tratado we will 
have never finished. 
209 o “Agree on principles first” 
210  The amount of control that each country is willing to give to the regional 
bodies. Because you are losing part of the sovereignty. 10 % goes to the 
regional body, do you agree with that? If you say 50%, some will not agree. 
211  Very general discussion is important. People who know about the business 
also, lawyers, politicians, people out of the electric sector that are able to take 
decisions. Once we had that we started to go ahead 
212  Agree on a general set of rules, and then tie together the responsible parties 
to comply with it. 
213  It is not sufficient we agree on this rules, but you have to sign something that 
is mandatory, irreversible and then you start to build based on that principles. 
214 o Many years later no country has never say they don’t agree on the 
principles of Tratado, we have discussed about RMER but not about 
Tratado. 
215 o Everybody says Tratado is the Bible, we cannot change the Bible, so 
we make a good Bible. Because it would have been badly done 
somebody would have said, I don’t with that Bible. 
216  The other is that things should go quickly. One of our mistakes is that we 
have been slow, tremendously slow. The success comes from doing things 
faster. Because it took 15 years, 4 governments in each country, 6 countries, 
24 governments. Each time the government you have new stakeholders. New 
minister, new president of the company, new president of the government… 
217 o And what people usually do, it is to take a good look of what the former 
president did and it is basically wrong so throw it and do it again. So 
the effort we have to do as coordinators it was to teach each new official 
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and make him to participate in the process. And that is a terrible job, 
because you have to convince 24 governments along 15 years, and the 
president, the ministers, the staff and the responsible of the electric 
sector all of them change.  
218 o And some of them have different ideas and they want to change. But 
you cannot change, it was decided like this. 
219 o I don’t care what other did. 
220 o Then you have to convince them they are not right. It is very slow. 
221 o One of the recommendations, you should tried in the shortest period, if 
possible in one government, and make it irreversible. It is a very 
difficult process, but that is the main finding. Also be sure that you have 
very good supporters from outside. Governments are very permeable of 
what developing banks official, say. We found that IADB was very 
important. President of Costa Rica may not listen to me but he will 
listen to the President of IADB or the President of Mexico and that push 
the project to go in the right direction. 
222  Most of the Treaties that are sign by Presidents in Central America are 
irreversible that, a long term commitment. And here you have lot of 
investments that they want to invest if in 60 days the market can disappear. 
So you need to have a long term, the 10 years.  
223 o There are many other examples of treaties sign by the governments in 
Central America like that. 
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B.I.XXI. SIEPAC.XXI 
Interviewee Rodolfo Rieznik 
Affiliation Representative of Spain cooperation funds (V Centenario) at the time of initial 
negotiations 
Date  December 27th, 2012 
Place  Madrid (Spain) 
Interview in Spanish, translation into English by the author 
 
1 Barriers for the cooperation in the power sector 
2  
3  There are not many experiences in creating this kind of markets. There are 
many policies pretending to do it, but, for political reasons mainly, they don’t 
consolidate. 
4  It is a problem of national sovereignty. 
5  There are also many economic interests. Past contracts with high price that 
they don’t want to lose. 
6  SIEPAC took 25 years. And after so long period, reality and feasibility studies 
are very different. 
7  In SIEPAC, combination of infrastructure and the interest of the multilateral 
organizations of promoting electricity markets was very important. 
8  
9 Origin of the project 
10  
11  The region was talking about the integration time ago because of the benefits 
it can provide 
12  During the 80s the debt crisis in Latin America. International financing is 
closed for them. 
13  They didn’t have enough money for buying the fuel for thermal plants 
14  They were not able to expand the generation capacity 
15  Endesa offered to pay technical studies for supporting the regional 
integration. 
16  At that time Endesa was a state-owned company and vast experience in 
transmission projects. 
17  
18 Why and how did Endesa get involved in SIEPAC? 
19  
20  In 1987 Spain was preparing for celebrating in 1992 the 500 years from the 
arrival of Colon to America. That meant an increase in the political relations 
with Latin America. Spain offered to give money to the IADB for projects in 
Latin America. That created also a relation between Spain and the IADB. 
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21  Endesa was interested to start a internationalization process. Ignacio 
Larranzabal, the director of the international department of Endesa, has 
worked previously in ECLAC, where he heard about the interest of the 
Central American countries about creating regional interconnection. He 
reported to Mr. Tora Galvan, his boss and an expert in transmission projects. 
Tora Galvan showed great interest in the project and offered the support of 
Endesa to Central America. 
22  
23 IADB and the agreement for the Framework Treaty 
24  
25  The IADB revised the studies of Endesa but it considered the investment and 
the voltage proposed too high. There was also no proposal for opening the 
national markets. The project was not meaningful if the region didn’t 
compromise to open the markets. 
26  New studies were made, around 70. The IADB conditioned everything to the 
sign an international treaty that would set the minimum commitments. That 
made everything slower, because those treaties should be ratified by the 
national parliaments. 
27  What used to be a technical problem became political. 
28  IADB conditioned the financing to a clear and firm commitment of the 
countries. In 1992 it decided to include it in its portfolio. In 1997, in a summit 
in Barcelona, it accepts to finance. But until 2011 or 2002, the financing was 
not ensured. 
29  
30 How was the consensus about the project achieved? 
31  
32  At the beginning the interests of IADB and the state-owned companies were 
different 
33 o IADB wanted the reform of the national markets, not the construction 
of the infrastructure. First the countries should reform their national 
systems, and then if there were a clear interest with electricity 
exchanges, the project could be studied. 
34 o Endesa defended the need of the infrastructure for making possible those 
exchanges of electricity. The development of the infrastructure was 
going to promote the exchanges in a better way. 
35  “you need the roads for making possible the trading” 
36  it was not a “white elephant” project 
37 o I considered that both aspects should be done at the same time. Because 
difficulties would have existed in any case. Also you cannot have 
guarantee that markets would solve the problems in the electric sector 
in Central America 
38 o The region (Teofilo de la Torre) only wanted the interconnection.  
39 o The compromise solution was to do both aspects 
40  
41  
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42 Incorporation of Endesa to EPR 
43  
44  Actually Endesa has been always in the project since it could convince the 
IADB to include the project in its portfolio. 
45  Endesa proposed the creation of a company for the construction of the project, 
but the problem was that a private company couldn’t have sovereignty 
guarantees. The other problem was to define the ownership of the line. At 
first, the idea was that every country would have the ownership of the line in 
its territory.  
46  I proposed a single company with equal ownership of every country. Then, 
no one could dominate the project. 
47  The IADB accepted the incorporation of Endesa because its clients (the 
countries of the region) continued having majority.  
48  Endesa contributed to the peace between the shareholders, because being 
extra-regional is considered to be independent. 
49  One of the key aspects of the EPR is that is not dispersed in the whole region. 
It has offices, but the headquarters are in place.  
50  Other is that EPR is very executing; it gives explications only to its 
shareholders, not to the governments. The countries have also respected that. 
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B.2. News on SIEPAC 
 
Date Highlight Source Link 
21/01/2016 Progress in regional power 
market 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Avance
_en_mercado_regional_de_en
erga  
22/12/2015 Costa Rica achieved 99% 
renewable energy this year 
Tree hugger http://www.treehugger.com/re
newable-energy/costa-rica-
achieved-99-renewable-
energy-year.html  
14/07/2015 July 14, 1969: Honduras and El 
Salvador clash in the four-day 
“Football War” 
BR http://home.bt.com/news/worl
d-news/july-14-1969-
honduras-and-el-salvador-
clash-in-the-four-day-
football-war-
11363991995167  
22/06/2015 The electricity that Central 
America needs 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/La_ele
ctricidad_que_necesita_Centr
oamrica  
09/04/2015 Costa Rica: State-owned utility 
obliged to export surpluses 
  
10/10/2014 Conclusion celebration and re-
strengthening compromise with 
Central American Electric 
interconnection, SIEPAC 
IADB http://www.iadb.org/es/notici
as/comunicados-de-
prensa/2014-12-10/siepac-
celebra-
conclusion,11018.html  
10/10/2014 Central  America takes a 
significant step: SIEPAC is 
completed 
E&N http://www.estrategiaynegoci
os.net/inicio/756554-
330/centroam%C3%A9rica-
da-paso-trascendente-se-
complet%C3%B3-siepac  
10/09/2014 Mexico willing to export 
electricity to Central America 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Mxico
_quiere_exportar_electricidad
_a_Centroamrica  
13/08/2014 Regional power system working 
at half 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Sistem
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a_regional_de_energa_funcio
na_a_medias  
24/04/2014 Intra-regional power trading Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/El_co
mercio_intrarregional_de_ene
rga  
01/04/2014 Lack of regulation prevents 
power delivery (3) 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Falta_d
e_reglamento_impide_entreg
a_de_energa_3  
18/03/2014 Power interconnection opens 
market in Honduras 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Interco
nexin_elctrica_abre_mercado
_en_Honduras  
22/11/2013 Restriction in the regional power 
market 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Restric
ciones_en_el_comercio_regio
nal_de_energa  
20/11/2013 Guatemala has exportable 
power surpluses 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Guate
mala_tiene_excedentes_de_el
ectricidad_exportables  
31/10/2013 Uncertainty in power market in 
Costa Rica 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Incerti
dumbre_en_mercado_elctrico
_de_Costa_Rica  
06/08/2013 Integrating the Latin American  
Electricity Grid 
World Watch 
Institute 
http://blogs.worldwatch.org/r
evolt/integrating-the-latin-
american-electricity-grid-2/  
27/06/2013 IADB hosts ministerial meeting 
for boosting the Mesoamerican 
electric grid 
Prensa Libre http://www.prensalibre.com/e
conomia/BID-ministerial-
impulsar-electrica-
Mesoamerica_0_945505683.h
tml  
13/06/2013 IADB considers SIEPAC 
successful 
Prensa Libre http://www.prensalibre.com/e
conomia/BID-califica-
exitoso-
Siepac_0_944905502.html 
05/06/2013 Official starting of Mercado 
Electrico Regional 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Arranq
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ue_oficial_del_Mercado_Elct
rico_Regional  
31/03/2013 Celsia doesn’t discard to invest 
in interconnection with Panama 
El 
Colombiano.
com 
http://www.elcolombiano.co
m/BancoConocimiento/C/cels
ia_no_descarta_invertir_en_i
nterconexion_con_panama/ce
lsia_no_descarta_invertir_en_
interconexion_con_panama.as
p 
26/03/2013 Mesoamerican Project, progress El 
Arsenal.net 
http://www.elarsenal.net/2013
/03/26/proyecto-de-
mesoamerica-avances/ 
14/03/2013 Panama-Colombia electric 
interconnection project 
discarded 
El 
espectador.c
om 
http://www.elespectador.com/
noticias/economia/articulo-
410353-descartan-proyecto-
de-interconexion-electrica-
colombia-panama 
05/03/2013 Shale and Beyond: The Next 
Phase of Latin American Energy 
Integration 
World 
Politics 
Review 
http://www.worldpoliticsrevie
w.com/articles/12761/shale-
and-beyond-the-next-phase-
of-latin-american-energy-
integration 
01/03/2013 EOR: Present stage of regulation 
and operation of the regional 
market 
CRIE http://www.crie.org.gt/images
/stories/PUBLICACIONES%
20VARIAS/Boletin_EOR_Es
tado_actual_regulacion_y_op
eracion_MER.pdf 
28/02/2013 Lack of regulation prevents 
power delivery (2) 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Falta_d
e_reglamento_impide_entreg
a_de_energa_2  
12/02/2013 Costs of System of regional 
electric interconnection 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Costos
_del_Sistema_de_Interconexi
n_Elctrica_regional  
08/12/2012 Boundary disputes in Latin 
America: An islet for a sea 
The 
Economist 
http://www.economist.com/ne
ws/americas/21567986-
colombia-smarts-loss-
territorial-waters-islet-sea 
20/11/2012 Suspended interconnection 
between Panama and Colombia 
Estrategia y 
Negocios 
http://www.estrategiaynegoci
os.net/2012/10/12/suspendida
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-interconexion-entre-panama-
y-colombia/ 
20/11/2012 Energy and sustainable 
development in Central America 
El Periodico http://www.elperiodico.com.g
t/es/20121120/economia/2208
73/ 
20/11/2012 Electricity from the North El Periodico http://www.elperiodico.com.g
t/es/20121120/economia/2208
75/ 
07/11/2012 Panama and Colombia analyze 
project for electric 
interconnection 
La Prensa http://www.laprensa.com.ni/201
2/11/07/activos/122999 
 
09/09/2012 Energy sales from Hidro Xacbal 
not before January, 2013 
El mundo http://elmundo.com.sv/venta-
de-energia-de-hidro-xacbal-
hasta-enero-2013 
28/08/2012 Transmission through SIEPAC 
is ready 
Prensa Libre http://www.prensalibre.com/e
conomia/Transmision-traves-
Siepac-
lista_0_763723635.html 
13/08/2012 Central America’s Electric 
Sector: The Path to 
Interconnection and a Regional 
Market - IOA 
Ensec http://www.ensec.org/index.p
hp?option=com_content&vie
w=article&id=375:central-
americas-electric-sector-the-
path-to-interconnection-and-
a-regional-
market&catid=128:issue-
content&Itemid=402 
12/08/2012 SIEPAC charges criticized Prensa Libre http://www.prensalibre.com/e
conomia/Critican-cobros-
Siepac_0_763123689.html 
06/08/2012 Opening of power market in 
Costa Rica 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/La_ape
rtura_del_mercado_elctrico_d
e_Costa_Rica  
09/06/2012 Central America prepares for 
improving electric generation 
El digital http://el19digital.com/index.p
hp?option=com_content&vie
w=article&id=39885:centroa
merica-se-prepara-para-
mejorar-su-generacion-
electrica&catid=23:nacionale
s&Itemid=12 
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26/05/2012 Electric interconnection with 
Mexico becomes priority: 
Guatemala 
El 
Economista 
http://eleconomista.com.mx/i
ndustrias/2012/05/27/intercon
exion-electrica-mexico-se-
vuelve-prioritaria-guatemala 
22/05/2012 Central America increase 
generation capacity 
El Salvador http://www.elsalvador.com/m
wedh/nota/nota_completa.asp
?idCat=47673&idArt=692244
0 
20/05/2012 Mexico will be able to sell 
electricity to Central America 
Energias 4e http://www.energias4e.com/n
oticia.php?id=1053 
23/04/2012 Honduras in disadvantage in 
electric interconnection 
La Prensa http://www.laprensa.hn/Secci
ones-
Principales/Economia/Econo
mia/Honduras-con-
desventaja-en-interconexion-
electrica 
22/04/2012 Central America: Challenge to 
the physical integration 
La Estrella http://laestrella.com.pa/online
/impreso/2012/04/22/centroa
merica-desafio-a-la-
integracion-fisica.asp 
20/04/2012 Country increases selling of 
energy to neighbours 
Prensa Libre http://www.prensalibre.com/e
conomia/Pais-incrementa-
venta-energia-
vecinos_0_685731421.html 
20/04/2012 Energy bag will be created in 
Central America and Panama 
La Tribuna http://www.latribuna.hn/2012
/04/20/crearan-
una-%E2%80%9Cbolsa-
energetica%E2%80%9Dde-
centroamerica-y-panama/ 
18/04/2012 Electric sub-station inaugurated 
in Honduras as part of SIEPAC 
La Tribuna http://www.latribuna.hn/2012
/04/18/inauguraran-una-
subestacion-en-honduras-
como-parte-del-siepac/ 
18/04/2012 Cost of SIEPAC will be transfer 
to final users 
Prensa Libre http://www.prensalibre.com/e
conomia/Costo-Siepac-
trasladado-
usuarios_0_684531549.html 
11/04/2012 Light adjustment will affect 
mainly people 
La Tribuna http://www.latribuna.hn/2012
/04/11/ajuste-
a-%E2%80%9Cluz%E2%80
%9D-afectara-mayormente-
al-pueblo/ 
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25/03/2012 Plan for El Diquis continues in 
ICE 
Nacion http://www.nacion.com/2012-
03-25/ElPais/Plan-para--
represa-El-Diquis-avanza-a-
paso-firme-en--el-ICE.aspx 
15/02/2012 CABEI agrees US$65 million 
loan with German bank 
People Daily http://spanish.peopledaily.co
m.cn/31618/7729263.html 
14/02/2012 ICE and SIEPAC signed loans 
for extension of Cachi and 
regional electric interconnection 
La Nacion http://www.nacion.com/econo
mia/ICE-Siepac-ampliacion-
Cachi-
interconexion_0_1250475155
.html  
14/02/2012 System for the Electric 
Interconnection of Central 
America is ready in 92% 
La voz del 
Sandinismo 
http://www.lavozdelsandinis
mo.com/nicaragua/2012-02-
14/sistema-de-interconexion-
electrica-de-america-central-
esta-construido-en-un-92-por-
ciento/ 
14/02/2012 CABEI finances final works for 
the regional electric 
interconnection 
El Financiero http://www.elfinancierocr.co
m/ef_archivo/2012/febrero/19
/economia3072867.html 
13/02/2012 Germany finances energy 
projects 
El Nuevo 
Diario 
http://www.elnuevodiario.co
m.ni/nacionales/241596-
alemania-financia-proyectos-
de-energeticos 
04/02/2012 Actions for promoting regional 
projects in generation in Central 
America are analyzed 
ECLAC http://www.eclac.cl/cgi-
bin/getProd.asp?xml=/mexico
/noticias/noticias/6/46256/P4
6256.xml&xsl=/mexico/tpl/p
1f.xsl&base=/tpl/top-
bottom.xsl 
16/01/2012 Lack of regulation prevents 
power delivery 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Falta_d
e_reglamento_impide_compr
a_de_energa  
16/01/2012 Mercado Electrico Regional in 
2011 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Mercad
o_Elctrico_Regional_en_201
1  
14/01/2012 Absence of information El Financiero  http://www.elfinancierocr.co
m/ef_archivo/2012/enero/22/
opinion3014136.html 
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13/01/2012 Latin America 2012: Energy 
Outlook 
Latin 
Business 
Chronicle 
http://www.latinbusinesschro
nicle.com/app/article.aspx?id
=5392 
12/01/2012 Electricity market advances in 
Central America 
Estrategia y 
Negocios 
http://www.estrategiaynegoci
os.net/2012/01/09/avanza-el-
mercado-electrico-en-
centroamerica/ 
12/01/2012 Cutuco to participate in Central 
American supply calls 
BNAmericas http://www.bnamericas.com/s
tory.jsp?sector=10&noticia=5
75731&idioma=I&source= 
11/01/2012 EOR: Hidro Xacbal must wait 
for regulation 
La Prensa 
Grafica 
http://m.laprensagrafica.com/
2012/01/11/eor-hidro-xacbal-
debe-esperar-reglamento/ 
04/01/2012 De la Madrid, a legacy of crises 
in the late 20th century  
Vivelo Hoy http://www.vivelohoy.com/no
ticias/8081854/de-la-madrid-
un-legado-de-crisis-a-finales-
del-siglo-xx  
04/01/2012 Nicaragua asks Venzuela for 
US$108 million for subsidizes 
energy 
Prensa.com http://www.prensa.com/uhora
/economia/nicaragua-pide-
venezuela-108-millones-de-
dolares-para-subsidiar-
energia/53273 
24/11/2011 Boosting the interconnection 
with Honduras 
S21 http://www.s21.com.gt/pulso/
2011/11/24/impulsan-
interconexion-honduras 
26/08/2010 Grupo Terra looks to expand to 
all Central America 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Grupo_
Terra_busca_expandirse_a_to
da_Centroamerica  
24/08/2010 Inauguration of hydroelectric 
Hydroxacbal 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Inaugu
ran_proyecto_hidroelectrico_
Hidroxacbal  
15/08/2011 Costa Rica: One single power 
exporter 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Costa_
Rica_Un_nico_exportador_de
_electricidad  
12/08/2011 Central America ready for the 
shared electric grid SIEPAC 
Revista 
Summa 
http://www.revistasumma.co
m/economia/15441-
centroamerica-alista-red-
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electrica-compartida-
siepac.html 
10/08/2011 II Protocol is approved Tico Vision http://www.ticovision.com/cg
i-
bin/index.cgi?action=viewne
ws&id=6790 
29/07/2010 El Salvador hosts electric 
market summit 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/El_Sal
vador_sede_de_convencion_s
obre_mercado_electrico  
13/07/2011 Change in the electric model of 
Costa Rica 
CR Hoy http://www.crhoy.com/cambi
o-de-modelo-electrico-en-
costa-rica/ 
12/07/2011 The barriers for the regional 
electric interconnection 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/Los_ob
stculos_a_la_Interconexin_en
ergtica_regional 
04/07/2011 Interview: Teofilo de la Torre: 
Our Project protects the role of 
ICE 
CR Hoy http://www.crhoy.com/entrevi
sta-teofilo-de-la-
torre-%E2%80%9Cnuestro-
proyecto-lo-que-hace-es-
proteger-el-rol-del-
ice%E2%80%9D/ 
23/03/2011 The process for the Central 
American electric integration 
El Heraldo http://archivo.elheraldo.hn/Ed
iciones/2011/03/24/Noticias/
El-proceso-de-la-integracion-
electrica-centroamericana 
11/03/2011 Effectiveness of SIEPAC will 
speed fragmentation of ENEE 
El Heraldo http://archivo.elheraldo.hn/Ed
iciones/2011/03/25/Noticias/
Vigencia-de-SIEPAC-
agilizara-fragmentacion-de-
la-ENEE 
23/09/2010 Expert denounces plan for 
finishing ICE 
ANEP http://www.anep.or.cr/article/
experto-denuncia-plan-para-
liquidar-al-ice/ 
26/07/2010 MINAET endorses Framework 
Treaty 
CR Hoy http://www.crhoy.com/minaet
-avala-tramite-de-tratado-
marco-del-mercado-electrico/ 
02/06/2010 Countries of SICA bet for the 
implementation of renewable 
energies 
CR Hoy http://www.crhoy.com/paises-
del-sica-apuestan-a-la-
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implementacion-de-energias-
renovables/ 
26/04/2010 Central American nations must 
have common policy to promote 
electric development 
CR Hoy http://www.crhoy.com/nacion
es-centroamericanas-deben-
tener-politica-comun-que-
fomente-desarrollo-electrico/ 
26/02/2010 Guatemala starts to import 
energy from Mexico 
Summa http://www.revistasumma.co
m/economia/1990-guatemala-
comienza-a-importar-energia-
desde-mexico.html 
24/10/2009 Mexico-Guatemala electric 
interconnection inaugurated 
Summa http://www.revistasumma.co
m/economia/166-
inauguraran-interconexion-
electrica-entre-mexico-y-
guatemala.html 
28/07/2009 XI Tuxtla Summit begins CR Hoy http://www.crhoy.com/inicia-
xi-cumbre-de-tuxtla/ 
29/02/2009 CFE will provide energy to 
Central America 
El Porvenir http://www.elporvenir.com.m
x/notas.asp?nota_id=287721 
19/02/2009 CFE adquires 11,1% 
participation in SIEPAC 
BNAmericas http://www.bnamericas.com/n
ews/energiaelectrica/CFE_ad
quiere_participacion_de_11,1
*_en_Siepac 
21/12/2008 El Diquis replaces the big 
project of Boruca 
Nacion http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/
2008/diciembre/21/pais18162
96.html 
16/12/2008 $16.7 million from CAF for 
regional power integration 
Central 
America 
Data 
http://www.centralamericadat
a.com/es/article/home/167_mi
llones_para_integracion_elect
rica_de_Centroamerica  
29/10/2008 Central America needs more 
electricity more its development 
La Voz del 
Sandinismo 
http://www.lavozdelsandinis
mo.com/economia/2008-10-
29/centroamerica-necesita-
mas-energia-electrica-para-
su-desarrollo/ 
09/04/2007 Seeing to revive the Puebla-
Panama Plan 
BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spani
sh/latin_america/newsid_654
0000/6540033.stm 
02/08/2006 Endesa: SIEPAC works starts, 
the electricity line that will 
El 
Economista 
http://www.eleconomista.es/e
mpresas-
finanzas/noticias/61794/08/06
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connect the Central American 
countries 
/Endesa-Comienzan-las-
obras-del-proyecto-Siepac-la-
linea-electrica-que-conectara-
a-los-paises-
centroamericanos.html 
11/07/2006 Construction of the Central 
American transmission line 
SIEPAC starts in Panama 
IADB http://www.iadb.org/es/notici
as/comunicados-de-
prensa/2006-07-11/comienza-
en-panama-construccion-de-
linea-de-transmision-
electrica-centroamericana-
siepac,3182.html 
18/02/2005 ISA joins EPR as new 
shareholder of SIEPAC 
BN Americas http://www.bnamericas.com/n
ews/energiaelectrica/ISA_se_
une_a_EPR_como_nuevo_so
cio_en_proyecto_Siepac 
05/03/2004 Central America boosts in 
Madrid its Free Trade 
Agreement with the European 
Union 
America 
Economica 
http://www.americaeconomic
a.com/numeros4/255/reportaj
es/mike255.htm 
01/07/2002 Construction of SIEPAC will be 
tendered on September 2 of 
2003 
BN Americas http://www.bnamericas.com/n
ews/energiaelectrica/Construc
cion_de_Siepac_se_licitara_e
l_2S03 
09/11/2001 Endesa to take 14.3% SIEPAC 
stake 
BN Americas http://www.bnamericas.com/e
n/news/electricpower/Endesa
_to_Take_14,3*_Siepac_Stak
e  
07/11/2001 SIEPAC, IADB and 
governments approved loan for 
US$250 million 
BN Americas http://www.bnamericas.com/n
ews/energiaelectrica/Siepac,_
BID_y_Gobs,_Acuerdan_Pre
stamo_por_US*250mn 
21/10/2000 ISA: Shares for all El Tiempo http://www.eltiempo.com/arc
hivo/documento/MAM-
1224181 
15/04/2000 Report from Costa Rica on mass 
protests against privatization of 
state-owned utilities 
WSWS.org http://www.wsws.org/en/artic
les/2000/04/cr-a15.html 
15/09/1998 Endesa, energy in expansion El Tiempo http://www.eltiempo.com/arc
hivo/documento/MAM-
819269  
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30/06/1990 500 years, 500 programs El Pais http://elpais.com/diario/1985/
06/30/espana/488930402_850
215.html 
29/05/1990 The High Patronage will 
approve today in Seville the 
Cooperation Plan V Centenario 
El Pais http://elpais.com/diario/1990/
05/29/espana/643932016_850
215.html 
23/01/1990 One plan for the V centenary El Pais http://elpais.com/diario/1990/01
/23/espana/633049201_850215.
html 
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C. Appendix on GMS-Power 
C.I. Interview notes on GMS-Power 
C.I.I. GMS-P.I 
Interviewee Noritada Morita 
Affiliation Former ADB official 
Date  March 30th, 2016 
Place  Bangkok, Thailand 
 
This interview also corresponds to GMS-EC.II 
 
1 Idea of technical level cooperation: 
2 The reason why in the GMS I refuse that is represented by the ministries of foreign affairs 
is because the nature of foreign affairs. They are not guided to put priority for the 
international cooperation. Collectively not.  
3 So when I started the sub-regional cooperation, GMS, I asked all the leaders “please do 
not put minister of foreign affairs as the coordination office, please remove them from 
the scheme”.  
4 It was very drastic. Any of the international affair or foreign affairs minister, any 
diplomatic aspects people just simply think without ta 
5 My view is different. If ministry of foreign affairs make the decision without looking at 
the benefit of the neighbor. The man like the president of Uruguay will never come out 
in that country. That is the point 
6 Now your be your benefit how its fits on my benefit, a bit of engineering is necessarily 
for what we call  Broad minding approach is needed. 
7 And foreign affairs people are not allowed initially to have such mind. They can exercise 
the flexibility only when they find that the things will not move. If they are flexible, they 
are at the end of the road. And then they look at what my neighbor needs, but that is too 
late. In that particular process of competition, you lose so many things and you can reach 
a point where there is not return. 
8 This was one of my philosophical principles, because this statement alone does not stand 
by itself. It works only in the foreign situation. 
9 When I started this region was in the middle of the Indochina war. My concern was when 
the Indochina sign the peace contract (peace accord or whatever), can they work together 
or not? 
10 My philosophy is that singing the paper for the peace is easy, but signing the peace of 
paper does not guarantee any peace at all. Next day you can bring out your gun and I can 
bring out my bread and we can start shooting each other. What I had to think was what 
assurance can we give among all these countries that are enemy today, tomorrow can 
they work together? Can they sleep together in the same bed? 
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11 No, because each insist on their own benefit of blaming each other about what happened 
in the war, not necessarily accepting others’ reasons and problems that other has to face 
because of me (it is happening between Japan and Korea).  
12 Now, in order to mitigate or neutralize such an behavior of the man that intend to insist 
that you are right and he is wrong we have to put the people into the peaceful stage of 
the mid. Means, in this particularly case, I have the following history that you may want 
to know: 
13  
14 Origins of the idea for the GMS: 
15 I held very uncomfortable in Laos. Laos is the other side of the Mekong River, just over 
there. I went there from Bangkok for an agreement. I went by plane, only one per day. 
And I stayed in the other side of the Mekong River, in the Laotian side.  
16 In the meeting, when the meeting finished when I came back to my hotel, I found that 
machine guns from the other side was hitting the next room of my hotel. Three artilleries 
went above over the hotel, fortunately. That artillery missed the hotel, but blasted behind 
the hotel. That was when I was the manager of this region. I was stretching my head, 
what area I have under my responsibility? How can I manage it? 
17 Then, that meeting I attended was of the Mekong River Commission. Instead of people 
talking about the agenda, both countries started criticizing the other size. Thai said oh 
yes, we shot Laotians because it was Laotians first who came to our size, so we just 
responded. Laotians said, no it is not true that we attacked, you attacked us first.  
18 The Thai delegation was there and all the international community members was there, 
and I was there representing the ADB. So, the entire meeting didn’t function blaming 
each other. And Western side was always siding to Thai side.  
19 Now, meeting was miserable and Western community was looking at the Laotians like 
they were the guilty of this incident. Nobody knows which side.  
20 When the meeting was over we went all to the airport and Laos, the hosting country and 
the chairman: “Nobody from Western side spoke to me because Thai delegation was 
there, they don’t want to be seen by Thai side that they were talking to Laos side”. 
21 Laotian side they have Laos and Viet Nam. Cambodia was unable to send their delegation 
because they were fighting with Pol Pot. So Laotians were in a way isolated.  
22 After the airport, this chairman from Laos’ side: Mr. Morita, you have seen, Laos is 
nobody is nobody in this world, everybody is siding to Western side, can you see how 
poor we are? 
23 We don’t have any sea, we have to rely on seaport from Thailand, who are not friendly 
at all. At that time they are exchanging the fire almost every day at the Mekong river.  
24 And Thai they were also under attention, because once they make a mistake, collectively 
they felt that soviet Russian together with its partners countries across the Mekong river. 
So I can also sympathize with the Thai side.  
25 The story of the Xeset hydropower dam 
26 But anyway, he said we are isolated, nobody is helping us, maybe it’s only ADB who 
can understand us.  
27 Now, we are international, Thailand is our shareholder, but your country is also our 
shareholder. For us, as long as you are our member country, whether than country A or 
country B is correct is not my issues. My issues is how to create the peace. So whatever 
I can do, please let me know.  
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28 He said, I like to have ADB financing for us to construct a hydro power project. I asked, 
what is the size? He said 1.5MW. Wow, so minor. 1.5 Mw I think if you have 1.5 MW 
is just good enough to give the lights for the Shangri-La hotel. They said after Laos 
revolution, 30-40 years, we are not heard by anybody.  
29 Even small hydropower, this one we need it. So that was the start point of GMS. 
30  I clearly remembered about that 40 years ago. He was almost crying I had to say yes or 
not. So I said sincerely, 1.5 Mw is too small. Your request is 1.5 MW is too small, it 
cannot produce economy.  
31 Unless you proof that it is financeable, it is very difficult for ADB to use the money that 
is donated by all the donors.  
32 To make the solution, answering to his question, what should we do then? Only way is 
you make this project at least 40-50 MW, then you might find some economy, Then he 
said: No Mr. Morita we don’t use such a big power station because we don’t have any 
industry to use the electricity so 1.5 is enough. So, how can we make this 40 50 MW 
when we don’t have no money?  
33 My question was very sympathetically frank, you sell the power to Thailand. His face 
was at least today we had a fight with Thailand, how can we sell. I know it, but if you 
want to make the project viable, you have to find the market. Whether this side of the 
river of the other it doesn’t matter, market is market. I was stupidly simple.  
34 Then I went back to Manila, my headquarters. I spoke to my boss, vice-president. He 
was laughing, he is an Indian. Do you know out board is reading English newspaper 
every day, they are not stupid, they know what is happening between two countries 
across the river. Every day they are shooting each other, how can you go to the board 
asking for the approval to expend the money when two countries are fighting. He was 
right, I was stupid, I knew it.  
35 But against that background, whether the country is smaller or big, they are our member 
countries, east or west doesn’t matter, they are member countries. So, we need to support.  
36 I said that according to my quick conversation with Thai government on the way back. 
They Thai government I don’t know but their electric authority: as long is power, whether 
it has yellow colour or red colour we buy it. Of course he know the problem involved. I 
feel pity of the other guys of the river, so small country.  
37 I talked with my boss that EGAT was sying, they can buy it. My boss said you don’t 
understand the situation, what I’m saying is that I need a written paper from Thai side 
that they will buy. You produce the official paper from Thai side that they will buy and 
then I can go to the board. But I cannot guarantee you that the board will say yes, because 
they are every day fighting. 
38 But Asians sometimes they can be illogical. Indians are very logical. What he said is 
true. When I was almost going out of his room, he said Mr. Morita come back. Are you 
sure that is what Thai electric authority said? Yes. Whatver you say I will try to get the 
written form from Thai government. I knew that I was going to be kick out of ADB if I 
failed. At least my vice president was watching me, because eit was my first year in the 
country department. Iwas in agriculture side. This was my first difficult case. Vice 
president said, good luck. 
39 I started talking to Laotians. We had almost 0 chances if you really convince Thai side. 
Thai side was seeing colour of electricity doesn’t matter, only price, how much do you 
need? How much do you like to charge? 
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40 After that we started doing all the calculations. I mobilized all my team and started the 
calculations. 
41 What Laotian side proposed I move back and for, 6 months I think to find the price that 
is attractive enough for Thailand to buy. The reason I was doing that, in a very hopeless 
situation was becayse before Laotian went into the eastern group. Late 1960s. Before 
Laotian revolution, western community have created SEATO (Southeas Asia Treaty 
Organization) just to settle down political tension from eastern side, they have given 
Laotians one hydropower project that is called Nan Theun 1. But that was before 
revolution, so it is really a different country. New Laos I was dealing with is a new Laos.  
42 The Laotian was saying that during our difficult times with Thailand we never cut off 
the power, we always sent the power. And Thai side they never get delayed in paying us. 
End of the month, in our New York account, the money was already there. That means 
between the two electric companies they have some trust. So, as long as this transmission 
line continue being active, I somehow feeling that we can re-activate. So many months 
back and for talking about the price.  
43 First thing I need was feasibility studies, and money for that. The first I need was a 
written form from Thai. That’s not easy. Our salary is always perform based. If you don’t 
perform your salary might go down. My Thai friend, gave a recommendation. Mr. Morita 
your name is always appearing in this newspaper. 
44 Mr. Morita no more you negotiate the price. It is beyond your capacity. I promise in a 
few months of time, our prime minister might be in Vientianne and your issue will be in 
his priority agenda. It is only prime minister who can decide the price. If you accept the 
price, whatever we agree I can do that, I can ask the prime minister to negotiate. I asked, 
do I have to follow the price two of you agree? Economical or not? If not economical I 
cannot agree. He said, shut up, that’s not important, important for us is to agree 
something for you, for ADB and for Asia. I said ok. Thank you, I will never try to 
intervene in the negotiation and I will try to persuade headquarters whatever the figure. 
45  
46 Moving forward after the Xeset hydropower 
47 Somehow things went ok. Xeset hydropower. Countries shooting each other, make a 
common hydropower dam. I felt at that time two things: 
48 (iii) Unless we grab this opportunity, the Mekong countries will continue to fall 
apart 
49 (iv) Unless we do something similar to this, the countries which shooting until 
last night, can really become friendly tomorrow morning? Even if they sign 
a paper 
50 So I thought we have to do something 
51 That was the first motivation that I started thinking about the present form of GMS. 
52 I knew under the situation these two countries into one. And eventually all the countries 
of the Mekong that are divided into East and West is beyond to what I’m required to do. 
53 So I thought it was needed to create or provide a forum or platform where you can 
peacefully sit down and peacefully talk, and have a coffee together and smoke together 
54 This is how I was motivated. This is how to maintain the peace, once the peace comes to 
this region. 
55 That is all the purpose for ADB in Asia. 
56  
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57 If I do it in a very transparent way, simple being transparent would make the things fall 
done because I would have been a target of the both sides. I did it very quietly, and by 
that time I said China please come if the platform is ready. 
58 Thanks to the cooperation of my close friends I was able to do certain things. Friends 
from all the countries, although they are not officially friends, but through the ADB we 
are friends. This is what we called honest broker, goodwill broker. We are coordinator. 
Whether ADB can be trusted or not. 
59  
60 Why we included China that is out of issue. It was my invitation, not the request from 
China. The condition was that it should be Yunnan province. Yunnan province is large 
enough just to counterbalance all entire Mekong region population-wise. Moreover 67% 
of the water is through the Yunnan province. Large of Yunnan province used to be Tibet. 
Tibet is Mekong River. 
61  
62 We are trying to achieve the regional cooperation as a possible means to lead this region 
stability, political stability despite of East and West. 
63  
64 Now Thailand is the center of what is overseas investment today, prosperous. But during 
the Indochina war nobody paid any attention other than American army. You can see 
very prosperous Thailand. I think reason number (i) is Majesty and number (ii) regional 
stability. 
65 No more to China one, although people might not recall 
66 Thailand has proved that peace and leadership are important 
67 I was waiting among all the Indochina countries that Cambodia which is, still fighting to 
Pol Pot and Hun Sen. I was waiting until the peace come in Cambodia I present the entire 
project to the ADB as an official proposal to the board. 
68 Once the Cambodia peace was signed (that was 1991, October 23) Peace Accord was 
signed in Paris. Among the four parties – or four governments: Pol Pot group, Hun Sen, 
Song San, Prince Sijamuk 
69 Incidentally Prince Sijamuk sold itself to China. He was captured of the Pol Pot group 
and he was forced to agreed to stay in Beijing. 
70 Son San group was another group  
71 Hun Sen group. Mr. Hun Sen used to be under Pol Pot but he didn’t like Pol Pot. When 
he was said by Pol Pot to invade Viet Nam. He thought he was crazy, even Americans 
cannot defeat Viet Nam, how can I do that. So Hun Sen refused to use his army. Rather 
he crossed the border and make cese fire agreement with Viet Nam and he came back 
with the Viet Nam soldiers. What people didn’t like it, but he was at that time the 
strongest man. 
72 I had to deal with all these groups before I finalize GMS. I said everybody, all other 
countries have agreed, we are now waiting for Cambodia to get your settle peace, I am 
now here to ask you if you are interested in joining the GMS. That was my first visit to 
Cambodia after the peace accord in Paris. 
73 Among all the four representatives of the different parties. One thing that you may like 
to know is that the Paris Peace Accord which was agreed by all four parties and 
international community, for the first three years the country would be under the 
supervision of the OCDCD, representative of the United Nations. After that there will be 
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national elections. And chairman of that four group committee was prince Sinajuk and 
other three are members.  
74 For the first three years I have to see all the group. So anyway, the first time I met with 
them only one topic in the agenda: would you like to join the GMS? Other countries have 
already agreed, now we are waiting for you to come. Congratulations, you become now 
peace and we welcome you to join if you like.  
75 Everyone said yes, that is good idea. Even Pol Pot group said yes. The last man was Hun 
Sen, since then my relation with him was ok. He said oh, what you are saying are you 
proposing connecting the road and transmission line connected and communication 
aspects also interconnected and integrated? 
76 Yes, that is what we are proposed 
77 He said, ohh, this is very good. 
78 The reason he thought it was very good. He said this is good if I can be really friendly. 
If six countries worked together I don’t have to expend any budget on my defense, I can 
reduce the number of soldiers, I can move my soldiers from the border and I can reduce 
money from the budget, and that money I can spend on the poor people and on education 
of the young generation, they have suffered during the war time. So if peace comes, 
money is there for me to do this.  
79 Very impressive, young man, military man, no education but very clever. Other people 
were college graduate, they didn’t touch about that aspect. They are so tired about. But 
Hun Sen beyond that he mentioned this. 
80 Now Hun Sen is not popular among Western community. Maybe the reason is he is still 
close to Viet Nam what Americans and French dislike. 
81 This can be one of the reasons for value of the man. If peace comes I can save money 
and spend on the good of people. 
82 I thought this gentleman can become a good leader of the country. 
83 So at this moment GMS was ready 
84  
85 First conference in Manila: 
86 The first meeting in Manila, in 1992. It was not a big event at all. People didn’t 
understand what was naturally. To me it was a dream, countries shooting each other now 
coming to the Philippines which is outside the Indochina, in a way neutral.  
87 They didn’t talk each other in the meeting, they cannot speak English in a way. Only few 
people. So first day of the meeting was very stiff. 
88 The substance aspect after formality was discussed in the following manner. Because I 
didn’t have time to discuss in the bank. Some of the guidelines which I presented in the 
meeting I made conclusion only on the day I attend the meeting. Only in 5 minutes walk 
in the ADB building.  
89 (ix) Greater Subregion Mekong, we have to give a name later on. If you pick up 
name first, there will be disagreement 
90  
91 (x) Can we make this group without any charter? No agreement? Just by trust? I 
think this is first and last international group without a charter. People just 
don’t notice it, but it doesn’t have it. Because I know, it’s nicer to have but 
if you propose something among countries they are shooting each other 
until yesterday, nothing will be agreed. If country A said chapter 1 ok, 
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country B will say no. Going back to parliament, to cabinet and 1 year 2 
years 3 years disappear. So I said we have to skip this very critical and 
unnecessary thing to avoid any conflict. So when the Indochina war was 
ended, I didn’t think I need to introduce new war that is battle. Because I 
knew they are all Buddhist countries and I think they are tired of fighting 30 
years (they all have something in common, in this case religion / dimension, 
culture is very similar (Iberoamerica is culture through language, this is 
culture through religion). 
92 Another reason is once you start drafting charter you have to deal with foreign affairs. 
Department of treaty or treaty department, ministry of foreign affairs. They all have their 
own approach and their own language. They have to quote all the previous agreement, 
previous battles and so on. I don’t want to go back to all these previous things, which is 
useless.  
93 ADB colleagues thought, Morita is crazy. I accept. But there is no other way, and this is 
still wisest, I still believe. 
94  
95 The participants of each country were selected by each country. I only said please do not 
send minister of foreign affairs and the mission must be led by the office of prime 
minister because once the prime minister understand it, no argument latter on.  
96 And each meeting has to be presented, led by the team of office of prime minister. 
Because if you try to make a road in this way, the minister of construction says one thing, 
then the minister of environment says different, ministry of industry says different, 
ministry of agriculture…. . So each country cannot decide where the road has to go 
through. 
97  
98 ADB is not going to play a big role. You are the owners of the project. You decide 
everything. We are going to serve you as Secretariat.  
99 No headquarters. This is very fantastic. Because once one country decide where the 
headquarters, then they start fighting. Then no headquarters, ADB will give you support 
as a secretariat. 
100 Always ownership. Since then, word of ownership in the community started to grow. I 
have seen other donors’ project, the donor always try to have the ownership, this is our 
project, this is Japan. That’s wrong, that is their project. So don’t call it ADB project, it 
is Mekong project. 
101 Third reason is once you have a charter, always become a question of interpretation. And 
always when they have a problem of interpretation they look at my face, ADB what is 
your judgement, we follow your judgement.  
102 That means ADB becomes important. Ownership comes to ADB decision. But ADB is 
not owner, ADB is not going to decide, don’t look at us, you look at yourself. If we have 
a charter, always interpretation is key, wrong or right. Whether I like or not, as ADB I 
have to sit at the center. Incidentally I was so lucky, the head of our regional department.  
103 (xi) Morita san if you say charter is needed, we are very happy to draft. I said, 
no thanks Peter, no need it. Why? Ok, no problem, agree. (1:06:00). He 
said, yes, I understand, no charter. So legal department has no role to play 
104 (xii) Once court and legal department play a role, you have to go. 
105 (xiii) Very lucky, we are very close friend 
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106 (xiv) The next rule I introduce was a very sensitive issue. I don’t want to have a 
vote. You may think it is very modern thing. But once you start voting you 
can have 51% versus 49%. And difference of 1 really decide everything. 
That is not our philosophy. Our philosophy should be that you really want 
to be democratic, not by country or number. But really democracy I believe 
is: if you really want to join us, you join, if you don’t like to join, you don’t 
join, if you want to come back, welcome. I said as long as two countries 
agree to do that, whether you have a third or fourth country I said, it doesn’t 
matter. Country A and B please start, we support you. If country C and D 
really like to join later, please welcome them. If you would like to drop in 
between, ok, we don’t count a vote. 
107 (xv) Another thing I didn’t say but in practice. In the meetings we don’t keep 
minutes, once you keep the minutes, negotiation start. I said, if you don’t 
mind, we make chairman statement. And chairman statement will 
incorporate all opinions. So you kindly leave it on our neutral position. And 
chairman statement is one, which they take as pipeline of the meeting. 
Because once you take the minutes, each delegation needs to take it back to 
their capital. And report to each cabinet. Then cabinet will reject, you will 
go back to the square one, nothing. So, all these things people agree, no 
complain. That’s how we started. 
108 (xvi) In special guideline that I may was, this was incidental. I remember Asian 
highway which was push by United Nations group, no single inch was 
accomplished. Even now, what they call Asian highway is actually ADB 
project. But original Asian highway was never done, because they are 
applying international standard in their technology, this is you area. I said, if 
you are really to decide about the road network, which is very important. 
Everybody lets come together to one place and compare your map and my 
map and see at to the border what are the missing links. And connect these 
missing links, once the road is upgrade or not, if the missing link is due to 
absence of bridge, whether the bridge is wood or concrete or even bamboo, 
let’s accept it. Once you start designing, new road takes the time. And let’s 
no create new route. Initially let’s connect existing road by filling the 
missing links and ask your village people which road should connect. 
Whether is straight line or not, it doesn’t matter. If you want to make it 
straight line, you make latter on. When you make the tunnel, you make later 
on. If you want concrete bridge you make when you country become rich. 
We are just from the Indochina war (4:34:28). No money. So let’s respect 
whatever you had in your hands and connect. This is very important because 
if you are going to provide a new line, each country will say we like this 
link, this corridor. Just lets them decide which line, which 20 m across the 
border they want. That is enough.  
109 These are major parts of agreement. And we decided. Once these principle are ok we go 
into long term development plan meeting. The second meeting, we approved for the long 
term plan consisting of six sectors. 
1110 Some of which became useless, some of them very useful. I skip this now. Initially I 
didn’t include agriculture, very questionable third party. But I have two reasons:  
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1111 (v) Sub-regional cooperation basically should have the pillars consisting o the 
sector which require the other side also active. Unless two persons carry 
together, things don’t move at regional cooperation. If one person can carry 
all the things, that is no need for regional cooperation. Agriculture is good 
example.  
112 Your side of the border is forest, my side I want to cultivate it. I can do it by myself as 
long as I have water. 
113 (vi) All the countries are communist or socialist, that means ownership of the 
land is not private sector. All the western side, they are very curious about 
what is regional cooperation. How this communist countries say, what is 
their policy for. We have change we have to teach them that land reform is 
needed and etc. Once you start land reform it takes 10, 20 years. Some 
countries cannot do land reform. So once yiu go to the board, they will give 
you the money, approve it with the condition of land reform has to be done. 
But completely stop the progress. Unless you do the homework, we cannot 
do the second round. That is not the desire.  
114 (vii) Number 2, all the communist countries in the agriculture sector has the 
subsidy. And some countries still do like America or Japan. But developed 
countries they accept their own subsidies, but they don’t accept yours. A lot 
of problems of the board that I have to negotiate with all the countries to 
remove all the subsidies. Then things get stuck. So I decide not to include 
agriculture. 
115 (viii) This is not positive reason but self-defense reason. So that we don’t have to 
deal with land reform issue which is never be acceptable. I use to call to the 
board, Hong Kong, Singapore they are successful but all the land belong to 
the government. And until many years ago, the Netherlands the land use to 
belong to the king. So I have to use the reasons. Nothing wrong to them to 
have their own system. So let’s alone to them to have their own system until 
they established the economy. So it was later on that agriculture sector was 
added. Other than that, I’m not going to go to any sector. You may look at 
ADB literature. 
116  
117 Exceptional things: Civil aviation and tourism sector 
118 Civil aviation, is part of transport sector, and tourism sector went so well after two to 
three years counting after the completion of the master plan they have done all the 
homework, very quickly. But civil aviation group have made a very substantial 
contribution. Earlier, only capitals are connected. Connection between capital and 
secondary cities of the other side, and vice versa, or connections among the secondary 
or tertiary non existing, like Kunming. Nowadays every day you have all together 20 
flights between Bangkok and so on. Less or more, more or less. This is the first product 
of GMS. There are so many, hundreds. And tourism. Naturally is motivated by private 
sector.  
119 The other sectors you may like to use the rest of the time after wash your hands and take 
some rest. We can go to question if I can answer, if I cannot honestly I say I don’t know 
how to answer. 
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120 Once my thinking was valid, yes it was valid. Once it was not valid, I tell you it was not 
valid. Useful, useless it depends. 
121  
122 View of countries at the incubation period 
123 GMS is becoming next year 25 years old and I was responsible from the officially 1992 
until my retirement in 1997. Unofficially this incubation starting 1983. 10 years of 
preparation. 
124 Two to three things that made my job easier: In a way, all the countries are so centrally 
planned, except for Thailand. That means, whatever the system they have, good or bad, 
they blindly follow. If the communist party says this is our guideline, they all follow. 
This tended to be strong point. 
125 And another aspect, second point. They have been in closed economy, closed technology, 
and they didn’t have any window to see through what is going on technology on the 
Western side. So whenever they met Thai group, which is only one from West. Thai is 
explaining this really fantastic and fresh, they all say: “this is so good”, “ok, we agree”. 
Thai leadership, with the knowledge the other five didn’t have it. 
126 In this case, other countries happened to be very slow. Thailand is not necessarily very 
fast, but ordinary. Whoever who have the knowledge 
127 So when you choose the leader, you don’t need to choose the leader. They naturally 
understand which country, who is going to be more updated knowledge. 
128 So between the countries these are two aspects from communist or socialist side. 
129 [Not for writing] From Thai side: Thailand was working against the Indochina. They 
were fighting against its neighbours. In a sense they were friends. When they were put 
together, they felt a bit guilty. So I think, they understand what they have done, so they 
didn’t bound the table. They tried to understand the neighbours, how they have suffered 
from this war. 
130 No country had a very sufficient infrastructure, other than Thailand. Thailand road 
standard is American. Again everybody was looking to Thai’s development on roads and 
ports. Admiring eyes. 
131 Thai provided in a way the modern standard. So, no difficult coordination is necessary. 
Technically all follow Thailand.  
132 Only thing you may want to know, some countries go for inches, kilometres, dimension. 
Technical dimension. 
133 I never tried to introduce that dimension unilaterally. That is something nations have to 
decide by themselves. Ownership to decide. If they like, it is ok, if they don’t like it is 
ok. 
134 This has worked very well, because this has not become a thing to fight. The reason to 
talk, can you tell me how you measure? 
135 So, technically the standard I think good but they have the American standard here, and 
American standard is not different to British standard from Asian point of view.  
136 These technical aspects. I have not been invited to United Nations concept of the Asian 
Highway except for two times. Where all this people. We are really looking towards. 
137  
138 GMS versus UN-ESCAP 
139 While ADB GMS was going on. UN-ESCAP proposal for Asian highway were 
discussed. They could compare different approach. 
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140 Ours was very modest, if it is one lane…ok, you make bigger when you become rich. If 
you need tunnel, you make tunnel later, but you first connect. Connection is first. That 
is important 
141 How fast it is, is secondary. But United Nations always modern technology and strict. 
Everything has to be done according to what they want. Connect Singapore to Beijing 
and Europe.  
142 But we are saying apply and use existing road, if you need to expand two meters…ok. 
But don’t tell us full length or that kind of thing 
143 That is relatively easy to adjust with Thai as leadership. If you go to Thailand, they have 
very nice highway. But if you go to the villages, they are also similar. That give them 
very comfortable feeling. 
144 In Malaysia, even in the village, it’s very nice. 
145 But anyway, in a way, to me, question of the technical standard was achieved in a way 
by the basically before the WWII through British. 
146 Even if you think that Thailand has not been under any colonial power, that doesn’t mean 
they have not absorb western standards. They are very well educated. Similar or above 
the neighbours who have been educated by the British. 
147 During 30 years of Indochina War, they have going to old style. 
148 So, I think this type of experience may apply to African or Latin American countries. 
149 But if you go beyond to what Thailand did, I think we failed. Maximum Thailand. 
Maximum that what they can digest, don’t go beyond. The best evidence is as I said, try 
to connect the two borders by extending 10 meters from each side. Very simple. 
Digestible. So things…started. 
150  
151 Initial stage: getting national stakeholders’ support  
152 The first meeting up to 2003, no heads of state meeting. Mostly deputy prime ministers 
or equivalent.  
153 The status of the prime minister depending on the country, but the fact, that prime 
minister sent their deputies or very senior cabinet member, there are truly authorized. 
154 Coming to the specific, maybe if you put zero, that is starting point, how to convince the 
country? Why you need the port? Why you need the road? And that is why you have to 
participate in GMS? This is the most difficult task for me to do, because it takes before 
you create a system.  
155 Why do they need to be part of the system? Which, for the communist countries 
something uncomfortable, they like to have their own system, but they don’t like to 
observe other system. So this area, I just give you example. If you look at the map, Laos 
is in the center. Fortunately or unfortunately.  
156 To me is fortunately. Because if first hydropower project, Xeset. If it was not in Laos, 
and if it was in some other countries, Laos could not understood that they can do it, 
despite of the international situation. 
157 You are right that Xeset hydro-project was a frontrunner, a good pilot. In fact, once Xeset 
hydropower started, I was able to start discussion, look, even Thai and Lao was shooting 
to each other, they are now doing joint project. So you are 100% right 
158 To have a good example, positively front-runner, a pilot. You can get any of the  
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159 Secondly, all the countries had a suspicion over the neighbouring countries, they had a 
border issue. They had a trade issue. Throw of the labors, legal, illegal. I think more or 
less, you have to verify that issue. 
160 If two to three countries agree, other countries fear to be left behind unless they join. So, 
which country you start talking is very important, and which country you select as the 
number two, you need a bit of analysis.  
161 Now, in case of Laos, because of hydropower was successful, the next is how I convince 
the other countries. That means, not the government, the political bureau above that. That 
means I had 100% bureaucrats including ministers. That took time.  
162 I thought it Laotians couldn’t join, this GMS would not be there because is center.  
163 Laotians always complaining two aspects: we are landlocked country, and therefore we 
are very poor, no power, no single country power. That was their complain.  
164 Behind the scenery, always Morita-san, how we can do it? Very small, No power, no 
political influence. I started to put myself into Laotian shoes.  
165 True, in case of the port, they have to rely on Thailand. So Thais, according to UN 
resolution, you are neighbouring to landlocked country, you have to keep at least one 
port open to them. Bangkok is the closes, and that is the only they can go. Road number 
9. 
166 They always complain. We have to plan everything to Bangkok. Trucking company is 
Thai government that only allow Thai company. And they inspect everything. So they 
know very well where we are, and what we are carrying. Everything is under their 
military observation.  
167 That’s tragedy that they are land-locked as Nepal 
168 Answering to their questions, “oh, lucky, you are landlocked”. This is always my remark. 
Very lucky, I think during two years I continued to say. Look at Switzerland, they are 
lucky. So small country like you, no natural resources. But because they are at the center 
of Europe and by providing the road to the other countries to come across, right to the 
left and center. They are always Switzerland. If Switzerland cut one of the roads, all the 
other big European countries, beg, please, what is your condition? 
169 Then, you have  
170 No matters small, you get the power 
171 How we can cross our road, we don’t have power. You can say, sorry, we have to go 
maintenance works for two months. So we close this road. Then they will tell you,  what 
do you need? All the help will come. Then you say, yeas, we accept. That is the power 
172 If Portugal and Spain were locked in the center, they could have been stronger in Europe. 
They have many ports, many coast lines. Switzerland has no port.  
173 I tell you how you can exercise your power. Back and ford, back and ford. 
174 Finally, my counterpart in Laos was able to convince the politburo 
175 When they say, they will join. I really. Politically I think he was on tense situation. Are 
you coordinating with Thailand? Are you…? But he was very firm 
176 I really like to explain to our government, that although you may don’t know Mr. 
Kanpuy. Thanks to his efforts convincing the politburo. 
177 The point is before you come to the stage 1. Point 0, how to convince. 
178 In case of Viet Nam. Viet Nam was still under the international sanctions. They have 
lifted the bar. Only 1994. But nevertheless, I said. We will invite you. And they have so 
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much pressure. Why Morita is keen to bring Viet Nam. We are still not welcoming them 
to the international community. 
179 My answer was always, apart from the political issue. Only one factor, Viet Nam is our 
member country. That was my concern, my answer. 
180 In case of Viet Nam, we are a bit complicated. While they are under the sanctions. Now 
country helps, because no external aid was allowed. So, the benefit however was that at 
least they could appear that they are part of the international community through the 
GMS. That was the strong point from me to convince them. 
181 1990, when very difficult to go to the country. We started sending the missions to prepare 
for the projects. Because my concern was when the economic sanctions are lifted, if no 
project was not prepared, even if America would like to help, Viet Nam no project there. 
182 So preparation of the project early was extremely important message for Viet Nam. For 
them to join. 
183 And Cambodia, already Mr. Hun Sen position very clear. If we stands I don’t have to 
spend any government money for soldiers. I can spend for more social aspects. 
184 Now, in case of Thailand, no need to mention. They really like to become the center for 
the overseas investment. 
185 I didn’t need to discuss with them 
186 Although I had lot of preparatory with Thailand because they use our common language. 
Market language 
187 Myanmar, was really to me. I respect Myanmar, very strong mind. Because of the 
military group and Su Chi issue. Particularly military group. Su chi was not there before. 
I knew we could not give any money, but Myanmar was not the member of ASEAN. So 
unless we invite Myanmar, they would really left isolated. So this is opportunity that at 
least Western community, but GMS will welcome you. So you can be member group. 
And the water, Mekong comes from, 30% approx. comes from rainfall from Himalaya 
and similar from Myanmar, and the rest from Laotian mountains. So without Myanmar, 
this project doesn’t mean anything 
188 Myanmar was relatively easy.   
189 This process, was very important. And each country has each own project. So going 
bilateral was important to understand before sub-regional cooperation 
190  
191 Next stage: 
192 This is when we formulated the group. There was already the Xeset hydropower was 
under preparation. 
193 And luckily or unluckily, Thailand and Laos was still not in good term, almost fighting. 
Much more severe than India and Pakistan. Something like Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
194 I think today all are looking to Xeset project. 
195 Yes, basically although, economic corridors are modern. When they started looking at 
them, they were looking to where they can connect and where are the missing links.  
196 I think, that process of internal discussion, domestic discussion with the communes in 
the communist counties, communes were there. They present interest like Cambodia and 
Thailand they were fighting about border. UNESCO gave the world heritage status to the 
Temple of Preah Vihear (temple of God). That is located almost at the border. And they 
started shooting each other, to claim position. 
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197 This was after GMS started. When Mr Thaksin issue came out. The government wanted 
to divert attention of people. Red and Yellow color collision. 
198 There are so many incidences 
199 Similar aspect, Myanmar and Thailand border issue 
201 The point is, in fact, how to avoid these negotiations were to pass through was one of my 
headaches.  
202 You touch upon it 
203  
204 Route number 9 (EWEC): 
205 Ones is Route 9 (EWEC). Da Nang – Savannakhet. And Thai side is Mukdahan. That 
was to me the most difficult routing. It took almost three years, because against military 
groups are there.  
206 In Thai side, Mukdahan, near to the river, there was cantonment. Military base. Military 
camp.  
207 That was the legacy of the Indochina war. 
208 And if you have ever come from Da Nang to Laos and connect to the existing road. 
Savannakhet – Mukadahan was very beneficial, but the Laotian side didn’t agree. 
Because the Thai side you have military base, and before in Vientiane we get any report, 
Thai tanks are already coming into our country 
209 So, can you please change the route? Thai said no. This is almost completed. 
210 So, I thought better thing is to cool down and let the economic necessity speak. Either 
support or not. It took three years, but compromise came, that is still Savannakhet but 
suburb of Savannakhet. More expensive than original. 
211 That way we were able to avoid the situation 
212 Negotiation stuck for three years and we didn’t push 
213 And another aspect that complicated there was when you are crossing the bridge what is 
the international border. It should be the deepest point of the river, because that is real 
river. Another said, that 50/50. The center, measuring from the banks. 
214 They find that international bridge says it is in the center 
215 Most difficult part is, who is going to be responsible for the management and 
administration of the bridge? 
216 Three proposals were made: 
217 4) A company, sponsor, 50/50, equity participation by two governments. 
218 5) 50/50 and two departments of the bridge of both countries. Ministry of 
transports will form joint committee 
219 6) I forgot 
220 They selected the second option. Third time they agreed. 
221 Very amicable solution on that 
222 This is technical aspects which can happen any of the bridges 
223  
224 Route Number 3 (NSEC): 
225 The second point that you mentioned on that issues was the China route through Laos to 
Thailand. 
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226 Now, that route is called Route number 3, and actual length was from Kunming to Chiang 
Mai, but route part of Chinese side already done, and good part of Thailand already done 
before they started the missing link. 
227 The missing link was from the china Laotian border (Boten) to this side of Mekong river.  
228 All together, 400 km approx.., maybe? 
229 I retired already at that time, this project should have been done much earlier. But 
because of reluctance of Laos and because of Laotians’ mistake get delayed.  
230 The mistake that Laos made was, at that time, international community there talking 
about World Bank, IMF, BOT by the private sector.  
231 So, Laotians very happy to follow international community because the private sector 
build operate and after 20-30 years give it back. And they have done it without consulting 
us. 
232 I couldn’t complain, because that is what we told them. I am very happy as long as you 
decide by yourself. 
233 They have awarded the road to the Thai group. And that group when to financial crisis. 
234 And this private sector project didn’t move at all, because none of the banks came to the 
rescue. 
235 I was relaxing into the retirement, I was told to talk with them. 
236 I found that the real reason was not the question of the need of financing. No legal 
aspects, or financial aspects. It was really Laotians that were saying this road which we 
are offering our land and participating the financing, that we have to borrow from 
outside, really benefits only Thailand and China, not us. It only benefits Thailand and 
China  
237 That was the strong message that they told me. 
238 To my surprise, they are not very fair balance explanation.  
239 Laotians eventually would benefit from the increasing traffic 
240 I mobilized so much my limited knowledge that without having disclose the initial power 
that we told, that Laotians do or are going to miss one of the very important ones. You 
cannot calculate economically viability with and without this road. And also looking at 
the economic benefits, what you want to do is 
241 Without doing anything, people do illegal traffic 
242 Better have the road and controlling if you have the capacity 
243 Eventually they agreed, Laos was able to raise the money to buy back the right to 
construct the road to the private sector, who had that right. Although they were almost 
bankrupt, but they still had that certificate. 
244 This negotiation was in a way very difficult. Again the question is you cannot ensure the 
economic benefit to Laotians. 
245 By, in the form of ERR to the country as the whole. Ordinary rate of return was a bit 
short (9.5 or something less than 10%) 
246 I think at that time the economic growth of China, it was very clear that they have to rely 
247 Economic loss of China. It was very clear that they had to rely on this area: supply of 
food and supply of rubber and palm oil and so on 
248 Very fortunate, all the sudden, the Malaysia and Thai they came up to here to continue 
the number one of rubber production because of the increase of labour cost. 
249 So the rubber plantation starting moving to the Mekong area. And Laotians saw it 
250 Lava plantaion started moving to Mekong area 
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251 And Laotians saw 
252 Number 2: increase of China per capita income. 
253 But most attractive was for the rubber. Because at that time massive investment by 
European, Japanese and Chinese automobile industry gave a shortage in the rubber. 
254 But this came at the very last moment. Until then, they couldn’t understand by figure, 
and I couldn’t present concrete figure. 
255 Later on, massive shortage of food itself. That was very decisive, because China offered 
Thailand, Cambodia, Laos the almost free import of agricultural products. They have 
selected 80, 85 to 90 items which the import tax of 1.5%  
256 That convinced I think Laotians that is true that they can make the plantation around the 
highway, although I think that plantation is eventually done by Chinese. As long as 
money comes, money is money. 
257 The next point in that project was a bit little extra things for you 
258 The Mekong bridge at Lao approach 
259 Chiang Kong bridge 
260 Laotians wanted to ban to financing. Japan said no, for whatever the reason (that’s very 
bad). Then China offered to pay. Finally the entire pay was divided into three. China 
financed their own. Thai side Thai government. Central side, Laotians financed by 
borrowing from ADB. 
261  
262 Mediation on NSEC 
263 When I was asked to mediate, or to convince the Laotian government. 
264 This question about the Myanmar side I didn’t question. To me, I sincerely felt, Laotians 
are going to lose their position if that road is not built, only philosophy that I had 
265 And later on, I was told by one of the senior officials. Now Laos per capita income went 
up, it used to be income from hydro power, now its gold mine. 
266 Thank you, without GMS road we could not get a hit on gold mine. How to develop, how 
to transport out. It was our headache. But now, thanks to this project, the gold mine give 
us more money than hydropower. It is very nice 
267 This road will give another gold, which gold I don’t know. 
268 When I first visited Switzerland, unbeliavable. I went left 
269 The most easrtern part life was so miserable. I even don’t know if they have the heater 
ni winter. I couldn’t see the electricity lines 
270 I was given example to the deputy minister. Switzerland, where there is no main road 
there, the life is different 
271 You can be as Switzerland 
272 Don’t joke 
273 If you work with eastern part, life is still very low. 
274 Matterhorn 
275 Zermatt, is relatively the center. When I was young, I could see all the farmers, the houses 
were like the poor houses here. So I said, it must have taken Switzerland to today. Still 
some places are not so much different. 
276 You could be like Switzerland. It will take time. 
277  
278  
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279 ADB’s neutrality role: 
280 Route N9, from Da Nang to Savannakhet. Japan was prepared to pay the cost and 
participate in the bridge and road. Laotians said, Morita san we cannot accept that. To 
me bridge is bridge, this is a bit sensitive (not for public knowledge) 
281 If Japan do it. If Thailand and Japan shake hands, they twist our arm. Because Japan 
cannot say not to Thailand, but they can say no to us. Can you make sure that ADB is 
also part of the financing group, because we believe ADB is very fair to both sides. So 
you will come to meeting. ADB will sit there and ADB neutral position is very important 
for anything 
282 Neutrality. 
283 Neutral position, or fair position which is difficult to maintain. But if you have a honest 
broker they are all very happy. Finance only 70km, but Laotians are very happy. 
284 So, this is out of the negotiations. 
285 There could be so many things, but these are still in the memory 
286 How you generalize it, is out to you 
287  
288 Other donors’ support, Australia: 
289 Australia is one of the countries which is counted as the Asian member and for that 
reason in the board Australian constituency is looked together not with western countries. 
Joining the Asian countries 
290 And one of the greatest contributions was they helped a lot Cambodia. Because 
Cambodia was the country under continuous wrong finale of Indochina because of Pol 
Pot. Cambodia was still with internal fights. Cambodia is in that sense, late comer. 
291 Australia supported them 
292 Cambodia. ADB is preparing the review of ADB’s work, whch will be for publication at 
the end of this year. Peter McColly. He was tough member of the board. He used to be 
the chief of the group or rather. He is really nice assigned him for this interesting task 
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C.I.II. GMS-P.II 
Interviewee Energy expert 
Date  May 31st, 2016 
Place  Tokyo (Japan) 
 
Summary of interview: 
Line Text 
1 GMS Power trade overview 
2 - GMS is a concept rather than an actual project 
3 - It is design / a vision ADB provide to countries showing its possibility to fund 
in case they want 
4 - There is no actual movement 
5 HAPUA: 
6 - It has no power to control or coordinate the projects, but rather serves for 
sharing information 
7 - EGAT, EDL and other national utilities are in charge of bilateral contracts 
8 - There is not clear intention to create the regional market 
9 - So far it is connection between power generation and demand 
10 China: 
11 - It is not clear if it wants to export or import 
12 Viet Nam: 
13 - Currently it is importing from China 
14 - It is looking for energy independence.  
15 - In particular would like to set limits to import from China to no more than 5 or 
10% 
16 - Currently they are short in their generation, particularly in the North 
17 - In the South they have surplus capacity and utilize it to export to Cambodia. 
This is a win-win situation for both countries 
18 - Lao PDR and Viet Nam have complicated political relationship. So they are 
reluctant to depend on each other. 
19 Myanmar: 
20 -  
21 Thailand: 
22 - Willing to increase imports 
23 - Now too much dependent on gas-fired: 
24 o It used to produce all the natural gas but now need to import LNG 
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25 o The dependency on imports of LNG is a major threat 
26 o Looking to develop coal in neighbouring countries: 
27  It used to be highly pollutant coal power plant at the center of the 
country 
28  Strong public criticism against coal 
29  Currently very difficult to develop new coal power plants in the 
country 
30 o Hydro from Lao is clean and cheap 
31 - Also looking to limit imports: 
32 o Target on limit single source (country) 10 – 15% 
33 Cambodia: 
34 - Potential for hydro development from the Mekong river, will to export that 
electricity 
35 - Main problem is the lack of financial resources.  
36 - Cambodia needs foreign investment 
37 HAPUA: 
38 - It is the regional organization looking for power trade the most in the region 
39 - One of the recommendations is to HAPUA to be central organizer of the project 
40 - It doesn’t have permanent office 
41 - The current secretariat is from Indonesia, but there are no employees 
42 - There are many committees 
43 o Each one has its special members 
44 Relations with international donors: 
45 - ADB was who initiated and now proceeding to the investment 
46 - Currently ADB and WB are not working much in financing projects because 
companies like EGAT can self-finance their projects 
47 - Other countries need funding from international donors 
48 o Some problems are: 
49  Long procedure for ADB 
50  Conditioning. For example World Bank funding Viet Nam under 
the conditions of market reforms in energy market 
51 Main barriers: 
52 - Institutions:  
53 o There is no institution for coordination / control the work. 
54 o There is no organization similar to ENTSO-E in Europe 
55 - Political issues: 
56 o Sometimes is said that ASEAN is like EU, but political situation is very 
different. 
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57 o EU started from experience of II World War 
58  There was a strong political motivation 
59 o But in ASEAN there is not that strong political motivation 
60  In their heart they don’t trust 
61  It is mostly purely economical 
62 National utilities: 
63 - Relations: 
64 o Very fluent relations because the trade is beneficial for every company 
in terms on money 
65 o They manage the contracts  
66 - They have some level of autonomy 
67 o EGAT 
68 o EDL is very similar to the government 
69 o Cambodia like EDL 
70 o In Viet Nam is different because they are under process of being 
unbundled and liberalized 
71 o Malaysia is like Thailand 
72 o In Singapore purely private 
73 Laos-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore: 
74 - It is not new line, it is just connecting the missing links, so investment is not so 
large 
75 - Contracted capacity of 100 MW (not so big project) 
76 - It is supposed to serve as a pilot for the region 
77 - Thailand and Malaysia are transit countries, they receive a fee for transmission 
78 Yunnan-Thailand: 
79 - Remains not implemented (maybe) 
80 Mekong River Committee: 
81 - It serves to discuss how the river should be development 
82 - It includes Lao PDR, Viet Nam, Cambodia and Thailand (but not China) 
83 - New development of hydropower dams in the main stream of the Mekong is 
becoming very difficult (if not impossible) because of its affection to 
downstream countries 
84 - But China, not being member is free for doing its development 
85 o “China does not want to be controlled by anyone” 
86 Lack of political will: 
87 - Lack of strong political intention for regional market 
88 - On the other hand, bilateral is gradually proceeding 
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89 - It might be more important to support those business agreements rather than the 
political agreement 
90 - They invite much more investment: for that maybe need to relax taxes, change 
regulations 
91 - There is willingness at companies level 
92 - As long as trading is inside ASEAN there is not much opposition from 
politicians 
93 - 15% seems to be a limit (similar to reserve) 
94  Regional optimization results: 
95 - The core is hydro development in Laos 
96 - Development on the main stream might not be possible due to affections to 
Lower Mekong countries 
97 Regional talks (about headquarters of RPCC) 
98 - Not sure about current status 
99 - But Lower Mekong want to keep control inside the region 
100 - But China provides lot of money to Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia 
101 Other issues 
102 - Possibility of connection between Indonesia and Singapore 
103 - The project for the ASEAN gas pipeline has been already abandoned because it 
is too much investment 
104 - The new approach is to increase the interconnections through LNG 
105 - For regional market development, the grid is still weak in Myanmar and 
Cambodia 
106 o Need to build their grid and then connect 
107 - Construction of power transmission line between Malaysia (Sarawak) and 
Indonesia (West Kalimantan) 
108 - Under current situation, continuity of development of IPP seems the best 
solution 
109 o Until the development of conditions for a regional market  
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C.I.III. GMS-P.III 
Interviewee EGAT officials 
Date  June 14th, 2016 
Place  Bangkok (Thailand) 
 
The views provided by the interviewees do not represent the views of EGAT or shall not considered 
as official view of the government of Thailand 
 
Issues discussed, Notes: 
1 (i) Electricity cooperation of Thailand with neighbouring countries: 
2  Several MOUs signed with neighbouring countries 
3 - Lao PDR: 
4  MOU for 7,000 MW 
5  Existing framework for development 
6  Currently 5,000 MW, therefore there is still gap of 2,000MW 
7 - Myanmar: 
8  New MOU signed last year 
9  Still not framework 
10  Cooperation includes other aspects as generation and 
transmission as well as human resources development (HRD) 
11 - China: 
12  MOU and framework for 3,000 MW 
13  Still on development 
14  Power would be transmitted through Lao PDR 
15  There is need for agreement between exporting (China) 
and Lao PDR about how to pay for the use of Lao 
infrastructure 
16 - Malaysia: 
17  There is no MOU at governments level 
18  But grid to grid link of 300MW 
19  Current agreement (export from Lao) includes 100 MW 
20 - Cambodia: 
21  There is MOU but not framework 
22  Thailand looking to 25-30% of power import in the PDP 
23 - Limit to max of 15% from a single country 
24  
25 (ii) Stages of regional power trade 
26 
 
27  Still at bilateral agreements phase 
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28  Still not a multilateral trade 
29  China and Thailand would be 2nd stage because it goes through Lao PDR 
30 o Need for China and Lao PDR to make an arrangement 
31  If you know the exact amount of power that you want/need, you do a bilateral 
contract.  
32  But sometimes your demand is fluctuating, that’s why you need market 
33 o For the 3rd stage, there would be need of a regional market 
34  
35 (iii)ADB involvement 
36 
 
37  Financial support 
38 o Identification of bankable projects 
39  Technical studies 
40 o Relevance of the most recent, RETA 6440 
41  Update of the regional master plan 
42  
43 (iv) Regional coordination 
44 
 
45  Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee (RPTCC) 
46 - Coordination committee 
47 - Two working groups on Grid Code and Regulatory issues 
48  Regional Power Coordination Center (RPCC) 
49 - To promote synchronized / unified regional electricity market 
50 - Expected to become like the ENTSO-E in Europe 
51 - Current discussions for the location of the RPCC 
52  China and Thailand bidding 
53  No agreement was possible, ADB is setting the criteria for re-
bidding process  
54  Currently, all the countries’ PDP are done independently 
55 - Plan to set a group to see to the PDP of each country and to integrate 
them 
56 - For the ASEAN Power Grid 
57 - Under HAPUA cooperation 
58  
59 (v) Summary of the initiatives 
60 
 
61  Three major initiatives: 
62 - Country to country discussions/negotiations: 
63  To set MOUs and based on individual countries objectives 
(PDPs) 
64 - ADB supported studies/initiatives: 
65  To identify relevant bankable projects to develop the MOUs 
66 - HAPUA/APG discussions: 
67  To overcome technical  
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68  
69 (vi) EGAT and Thai government coordination 
70 
 
71  Upper committee with government, EPPO 
72  Ministry of energy, office of prime ministry to coordinate international activity 
and to set the framework for the MOUs 
73 - Authority, government body and related government agencies 
74 -  
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C.II. News on GMS-Power 
 
Date Highlight Source Link 
06/05/2016 The truth behind the blackouts Myanmar 
Times 
http://www.mmtimes.com/inde
x.php/business/20167-the-truth-
behind-the-blackouts.html  
31/03/2016 Vietnam revises its Power 
Development Plan: much 
greener 
CleanED http://news.cleaned-
usth.com/post/2016/03/31/Viet
nam-revises-its-Power-
Development-Plan-much-
greener  
10/02/2016 Managing the Mekong River for 
All 
Khmer 
Times 
http://www.khmertimeskh.com/
news/21222/managing-the-
mekong-river-for-all/  
03/02/2016 Laos to export electricity to 
Myanmar, more for Vietnam 
The Nation http://www.nationmultimedia.c
om/business/Laos-to-export-
electricity-to-Myanmar-more-
for-Vie-30278432.html  
10/12/2015 Govt to mull power offer from 
Laos 
The Nation http://www.nationmultimedia.c
om/business/Govt-to-mull-
power-offer-from-Laos-
30274616.html  
02/10/2015 Laos and the Nam Theun 2 
project fails its human rights 
obligations 
FIVAS http://fivas.org/frontsak/laos-
and-the-nam-theun-2-project-
fails-its-human-rights-
obligations/  
25/09/2014 Lao-Singapore transmission line 
can save billions 
The Nation http://www.nationmultimedia.c
om/business/Lao-Singapore-
transmission-line-can-save-
billions-30244094.html  
16/06/2015 Myanmar, Thailand to enhance 
cooperation in energy, electric 
power 
Xinhuanet http://news.xinhuanet.com/engli
sh/2015-
06/16/c_134330004.htm  
28/05/2015 Time to SCRUTINISE ‘win-
win’ mega-dams 
The Nation http://www.nationmultimedia.c
om/opinion/Time-to-
SCRUTINISE-win-win-mega-
dams-30261094.html  
02/03/2015 Power plants to play a bigger 
role in Banpu’s future 
Bangkok 
Post 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/a
rchive/power-plants-to-play-a-
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bigger-role-in-banpu-
future/486508  
30/03/2014 PTTEP’s gas project begins to 
show growth 
Myanmar 
Times 
http://www.mmtimes.com/inde
x.php/business/10011-pttep-s-
gas-project-begins-to-show-
growth.html  
23/03/2014 (*)Tapping a neighbour’s 
energy 
Bangkok 
Post 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/p
rint/401245/  
02/03/2014 PTTEP to invest $3.3 b in oil 
and gas projects 
Myanmar 
Times 
http://www.mmtimes.com/inde
x.php/business/9719-pttep-to-
invest-3-3b-in-new-myanmar-
gas-and-oil-projects.html  
12/12/2013 Thailand signs up for Asean grid Bangkok 
Post 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/a
rchive/thailand-signs-up-for-
asean-grid/384385  
18/11/2013 Powering the future Bangkok 
Post 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/a
rchive/powering-the-
future/380446  
27/05/2013 Thai-based solar developer 
completes 84 MW PV plant in 
Lopburi 
Pv-
magazine 
http://www.pv-
magazine.com/news/details/beit
rag/thai-based-solar-developer-
completes-84-mw-pv-plant-in-
lopburi_100011487/#axzz4AtH
5qH41  
05/11/2012 ADB, Norway to Help Update 
Myanmar Electricity Law 
ADB News 
Release 
http://www.adb.org/news/adb-
norway-help-update-myanmar-
electricity-law  
17/10/2012 Indonesia – Malaysia Power 
Transmission Line Plans Kick-
Off 
Engerati http://www.engerati.com/article
/indonesia-malaysia-power-
transmission-line-plans-kick  
30/03/2008 China, Laos pledge further co-
op, sign agreements 
Xinhuanet http://news.xinhuanet.com/engli
sh/2008-
03/30/content_7884583.htm  
05/10/2005 China, Japan tug-of-war over 
Indochina 
AsiaTimes http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
Japan/GJ05Dh03.html  
 
